


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Economic Development, Inequality, and War

Humanitarian Emergencies in Developing
Countries

E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen



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
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Preface

The link between development and peace is an emerging focus of scholarship on developing countries. Recognizing this, scholars recently inaugurated the *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development and Conflict, Security and Development*. This book provides further evidence on how economic factors affect war and state violence and specifies development policies to reduce the risk of death and displacement from humanitarian emergencies.

The global economy has large inequalities, with the richest one-fifth of the world's population acquiring four-fifths of income and wealth and the poorest one-fifth a share of about 2 per cent. This bottom fifth is undernourished and has a purchasing power of no more than \$2 daily. Within low-income economies, the median income shares of the richest one-fifth are 48 per cent and the median for the poorest one-fifth is 6 per cent. Do inequality and relative deprivation contribute to grievances that fuel war? Researchers at the World Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit say no. We say yes and explain why.


This book also analyses relationships between political variables and war. We claim that there is a direct link between political authoritarianism and war, even if democratization itself is a disruptive process and the likelihood of conflict only decreases relatively late in the process.

We did the research for this book at the UN University's World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Helsinki, Finland; Kansas State University, Manhattan; and the University of Helsinki. Colleagues at these institutions made helpful comments and criticisms. We are grateful to all who helped but we are solely responsible for any weaknesses.

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E. W. N. & J. A.

Countries experiencing humanitarian emergencies in the 1990s



ZZ Emergency Countries

- | | | |
|-----------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| 1. AFGHANISTAN | 12. CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) | 23. KASHMIR (INDIA, PAKISTAN) |
| 2. ALGERIA | 13. CONGO (KINSHASA) | 24. KOSOVO (SERBIA) |
| 3. ANGOLA | 14. CROATIA | 25. LIBERIA |
| 4. ARMENIA | 15. EL SALVADOR | 26. MOZAMBIQUE |
| 5. AZERBAIJAN | 16. GEORGIA | 27. RWANDA |
| 6. BOSNIA | 17. GUATEMALA | 28. SIERRA LEONE |
| 7. BURUNDI | 18. GUINEA-BISSAU | 29. SOMALIA |
| 8. CAMBODIA | 19. ERITREA | 30. SOUTH AFRICA |
| 9. CHAD | 20. ETHIOPIA | 31. SRI LANKA |
| 10. CHECHNYA (RUSSIA) | 21. INDONESIA (INDONESIA & EAST TIMOR) | 32. SUDAN |
| 11. COLOMBIA | 22. IRAQ | 33. TAJIKISTAN |
| | | 34. TURKEY |
| | | 35. UGANDA |



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1

A Humanitarian Emergency: War, Genocide, and Displacement

Recently the media have focused on the threat of insurgents in failed states with weapons of mass destruction to the rich of the United States, Canada, and Europe. Scholars predict an inevitable clash between the West and Islam. Amid these perils to the West, we should not forget that war, state violence, and rebel resistance threaten the livelihoods and voices of millions of poor in Africa and Asia. About 20 per cent of Africans live in countries seriously disrupted by war or state violence. The cost of conflict includes refugee flows, increased military spending, damage to transport and communication, reduction in trade and investment, and diversion of resources from development. The World Bank (2000a, pp. 57–9) estimates that a civil war in an African country lowers GDP per capita by 2.2 percentage points annually. Scholars must focus on reducing this danger to the survival income and human rights of the world's poorest.

Economic stagnation, political decay, and deadly political violence interact in several ways: economic and political factors contribute to war, while war has an adverse effect on economic growth and political development. This book analyses how economic decline, income inequality, a weakening state, pervasive rent seeking by ruling élites, an extensive threat to survival income, and competition for control of mineral exports contribute to humanitarian emergencies. These emergencies comprise a human-made crisis in which large numbers of people die and suffer from war, state violence, and refugee displacement, and are usually accompanied by widespread disease and hunger (Väyrynen 2000a). During the twentieth century, some 170 million people were killed by the state (democides) (Rummel 1994), compared to about 30 million people in armed conflict. Rummel lists the Soviet Union, Communist China, Nazi Germany, and 15 other instances in the twentieth century in which

governments intentionally killed at least one million people. As will be pointed out in Chapter 2, only a small proportion of these hundreds of millions of deaths from humanitarian emergencies are from insurgent action or fighting between belligerents.

A substantial literature views ethnic groups as products of 'primordial sentiments', based on 'permanent and separate histories, separate social institutions, customs and practices, and separate leaders', in which politics is practised almost exclusively along ethnic lines (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). World Bank researchers find that a major factor contributing to war is ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. However, we find that ethnic identity is created and reconstituted in struggles to share benefits from economic growth and self-government. Frequently ethnic antagonism emerges during conflict rather than being the cause of conflict.

1.1 Objectives of the study

The study has three major objectives. *First*, we examine factors associated with humanitarian emergencies, the types of relationships, and the mechanisms of interaction between the variables. What are the sources of humanitarian emergencies? Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) showed that stagnation and decline in real (inflation-adjusted) GDP,¹ slow growth in average food production, high income inequality, a high ratio of military expenditure to national income, and a tradition of violent conflict are sources of emergencies. Also inflation and low levels of International Monetary Fund (IMF) funding are associated with emergencies, although causality may run from emergencies to high inflation and low Fund assistance, rather than, or as well as, the other way round (*ibid.*).

However, the focus of this book is much less on econometrics than on a discussion of how factors embedded in the political economy of developing countries contribute to humanitarian emergencies. 'Political economy' includes not only economic analysis but also an examination of the interests of political leaders and policymakers who make economic decisions and members of the population who are affected by these decisions. This politico-economic analysis, based on a research project begun in 1996 by the UN University/World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Helsinki, and Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford (QEH), generalizes on the case studies of 17 war-affected less-developed countries (LDCs), and explains the reasons for econometric findings from annual data from 124 LDCs from 1980 to 1995 (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999). The case studies include Nigeria

and Pakistan from the late 1960s and early 1970s and Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Haiti, El Salvador, Colombia, Bosnia, and the South Caucasus from 1980 to 2000.

Second, we use our findings concerning the origins of war to provide insight into a question addressed by contributors to an edited work by Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (2000): How important are economic agendas in wars? The analysis of this book indicates that economic agendas and variables are important contributors to war and state violence (and their continuance). Berdal and Malone's work pose a second question: Does greed or grievance drive contemporary civil wars? The editors' introductory chapter (*ibid.*, p. 4) states that 'The fact is that much of the violence which bodies such as the UN have been concerned in the post-Cold War era has been driven not by a Clausewitzian logic of forwarding a set of political aims, but rather by powerful economic motives and agendas.' The editors' discussion emphasizes that continuing war does not represent the collapse of one system as much as the emergence of a new one that 'benefits certain groups – government officials, traders, combatants, and international actors who stand to gain from dealing with local actors – while impoverishing other sections of the community' (*ibid.*).

For the World Bank's Paul Collier, a contributor to the Berdal–Malone volume, the answer to the second question is greed, not grievances from income, wealth, and power discrepancies. Our evidence, however, indicates that *both* greed and grievance contribute to contemporary deadly political violence. Collier's answer may ensue from a lack of a reliable dataset on income distribution. Our access to an improved dataset provides a basis for a relationship between inequality-based grievances and war. Thus, similar to the editors, Berdal and Malone, we find that both greed and grievance play major roles in wars, and neither is the overriding factor contributing to war.

Third, on the basis of our analysis, we identify policies for preventing humanitarian emergencies, which would be much less costly than the present strategy of the world community of spending millions of dollars annually to provide mediation, relief, and rehabilitation after the conflict occurs.

1.2 War and genocide

Reginald Green (1994) identifies the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (Rev. 6: 2–8) or humanitarian emergencies as war, disease, hunger, and

displacement. The early stages of famine and other forms of humanitarian emergencies are not easily distinguishable from endemic poverty (Green 1986, pp. 288–310); war and emergency may merely entail a deepening of conflict and exploitation existing during ‘peacetime’ (Keen 1994). Thus, the determinants of poverty and underdevelopment (discussed comprehensively in Nafziger 1997) overlap substantially with the causes of humanitarian emergencies. Still, we do not repeat the vast literature on economic development, but instead focus on a different literature, which will, however, also enhance our understanding of underdevelopment.

Is genocide a universal human phenomenon? Or is mass murder an aberration like the Holocaust? Raimo Väyrynen (1996) and Steven Katz (1996, pp. 19–38) observe that the Holocaust is unique, killing 6 million people, two-third of European Jewry. But Gérard Prunier (1995, pp. 264–5) contends that for a three month period from April to July 1994 the 800,000 estimated deaths (11 per cent of the population) from genocide in Rwanda represented perhaps the highest non-natural casualty rate in history.² At the peak of the Sudanese famine, a crisis largely human-made as argued below, during nine weeks in June–August 1988, 7 per cent of the population of the camp in Meiram, southern Kordofan, died each week (Keen 1994, p. 76). Even in 1995, Sudan had 450,000 refugees and 1.7 million internally displaced people, while in the same year Afghanistan and Rwanda each had more than one million refugees (Väyrynen 2000a, p. 70). Philippe le Billon and Karen Bakker (2000, pp. 53–4) estimate that as many as 1.8 million people in Cambodia died from torture or murder and associated hunger and disease between 1975 and early 1979 under the Khmer Rouge. Its class and racist genocide was targeted at the educated and urban, the administration, the army, merchants, Vietnamese administrators, Chinese traders, and rural Muslim Cham (*ibid.*, pp. 73–81).

We identify 35 countries (or provinces) with humanitarian emergencies from 1990 to 2000. We draw the line so that an emergency occurs in countries with 2,000 or more people dying and refugees crossing international boundaries as a result of war, internal conflict, or state violence during at least one year, 1990–2000. The countries (or sub-national political entities) with emergencies consist of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chechnya (Russia), Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Croatia, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Indonesia (Indonesia and East Timor), Iraq, Kashmir

(India, Pakistan), Kosovo (Serbia), Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uganda (see map).³ Extending the list to 1980–2000 adds Lebanon and Myanmar (Burma).

The collapse of superpower rivalry around 1991 did not reduce Third World state violence and conflict. According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' *World Disasters Report 1994*, mortality from all non-natural disasters increased from 1968 to the early 1990s. The United States Mission to the United Nations (1996, pp. 3–4) estimates an increase in mortality and population displacement⁴ from humanitarian emergencies from 1983 to 1994, despite the end of the cold war. To be sure, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1995, pp. 244–55) warns: 'Serious statistical problems ... arise in large, complex, and rapidly changing emergencies ... A life and death struggle for food and influence is hardly ever compatible with accurate enumeration.' Still, the increase in mortality and displacement from human-made disasters grew faster than the growth in population through the mid-1990s, although evidence indicates a decline in humanitarian emergencies from the early 1990s to the late 1990s (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999, p. 275; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, pp. 12–13 and figure 1; Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla 2001, p. 7).

In our research, we analyse the strength and direction of the relationship between humanitarian emergencies and a set of economic, political, and social variables. We also examine the probability of humanitarian emergencies as a function of these variables. Our statement that a 10 per cent increase in gross domestic product (GDP) growth reduces the probability of a humanitarian emergency by 4.1 per cent (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999, p. 286) is tied to a particular dataset (Yale University's Correlates of War database for civil wars,⁵ time period 1980–94), concept of humanitarian emergency (war deaths per population times refugees per population), and econometric technique (probit analysis).⁶ Our analysis concentrates on correlates of humanitarian emergencies, while supporting the correlations by tests of leads and lags to detect causal linkages. Still, as Holsti (2000, pp. 239, 250, 264) points out, 'If ... there are certain conditions and/or processes that increase the likelihood of a humanitarian emergency, there is no certainty that such an emergency will in fact ensue. ... Why, for example, was there widespread bloodshed in 1965 Indonesia, or in Burma since 1962, but not in Malaysia or Singapore at the same time?'

1.3 The major issues of this study

This section focuses on the major issues of the study, after which we discuss the sources, methods, and data for the study in the remainder of, and the appendix to, this chapter.

Chapter 2 examines why poor countries, facing stagnation or slow economic growth, are more vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies. We also discuss the related issues of employment and inflation, and their relationships to emergencies.

Chapter 3 analyses the role of ethnicity in war and state violence. We treat ethnic identity as less a primordial phenomenon than an awareness formed in the process of social competition and political mobilization. Political élites use ethnicity as the political formula to divert attention from inequalities within their own communities.

Chapter 4 investigates how large and increasing inequalities contribute to grievances that increase vulnerability to emergencies. Relative deprivation, people's perception of social injustice based on a discrepancy between goods and conditions they expect and those they can get, can be mobilized into political violence, especially during a period of high expectations.

Slow growth and poor economic management often contribute to external deficits and debt crises, which require the countries' economies to adjust through exchange-rate changes, monetary and fiscal policies, economic liberalization or reform, or structural reforms in agriculture, industry, public enterprise, finance, energy, education or other sectors. Chapter 5 discusses how the reactions of élites and masses to adjustment, stagnation, and inequality affect the probability of political conflict and humanitarian disasters. Élités may be threatened by adverse economic changes and the reaction of non-élites to these changes. The strategies of political élites to maintain power and affluence, amid economic crises and shifts, may exacerbate conflict and the potential for humanitarian emergencies.

Chapter 6 finds that, other things held constant, authoritarianism is causally related to humanitarian emergencies. Nevertheless the process of democratization can often trigger undesirable side effects, such as the aggravation of communal tensions. Many democratically elected regimes in Africa, contriving to hold elections to satisfy international norms of 'presentability', ignore political liberties, the rule of law, and separation of power. Still democracy is difficult to sustain where there is not accompanying economic development.

The chapter also considers how a high ratio of military spending to GDP, by supporting authoritarian structures, increasing the probability of irregular executive transfers, and diverting resources from civilian economic growth, worsens the risk of a humanitarian emergency. In the 1990s, several highly militarized African countries experienced negative growth and political decay that increased vulnerability to conflict and state violence.

Chapter 7 indicates that food shortages and hunger increase humanitarian emergencies. Emergencies, in turn, increase hunger, creating a vicious circle. In this chapter, we criticize Amartya Sen's entitlement theory of famine, showing that famine is often the outcome of the state's direct violence against or withholding food and other supplies from politically disobedient groups, as in Sudan in the 1980s.

Chapter 8 points out how the struggle for control over minerals and other natural resources can be important sources of conflict. In Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo, rulers and warlords used exclusive contracts with foreign firms for diamond mining for orderly sources of revenue in lieu of a government agency to collect taxes. State failure and conflict may result not so much from the inadequacy of state institutions but from the benefit of deadly political violence to numerous influential people.

Chapter 9 focuses on long-term policies to prevent emergencies linked to our analysis of root causes. Domestic responses include accelerating economic growth, improving income distribution, stabilizing income and prices, and designing appropriate economic and political institutions. External responses involve changes in the international economic order that encompasses economic relations and institutions linking people from different nations. A political economy approach includes analysis and interests of domestic and international political decision makers and members of the population (domestic or foreign).

Subsequent sections of Chapter 9 argue that in a weak or failed state, some rulers, warlords, and traders profit more from war and violence than in peacetime. War may be rational and may provide cover for crimes that benefit the perpetuator economically, so that the objectives of the war are not winning but economic benefits. Finally, a short conclusion summarizes the findings of the book concerning the three major objectives in section 1.1: factors associated with humanitarian emergencies, policies for preventing emergencies, and the importance of economic agendas, such as greed, in war.

1.4 The first econometric analysis of humanitarian emergencies

Can econometric analysis clarify the sources of humanitarian emergencies? How do we measure such complex phenomena? Are there data available? We raised these questions in our research, to our knowledge the first econometric analysis of the sources of humanitarian emergencies.

Yes, econometric analysis can clarify. Yes, we can measure humanitarian emergencies and find data. Econometric analysis, together with our reliance on case studies and political economy analysis, is important in filling major gaps of knowledge concerning factors contributing to emergencies.

This and the next section sketch our approach for the general reader, while the Appendix to this chapter provides sources, methods, and econometric results. The Appendix includes the quantitative analysis, such as indicators, data set, and regressions. We applied different types of econometric methods to unveil the association between humanitarian emergencies and their hypothesized sources. Readers can, however, skip the Appendix, and still understand the main ideas and arguments of the remainder of the book, which focuses on political economy and case studies.

Our database for the econometric component includes annual data on a pool of 124 countries from 1980 to 1995. To ensure broad representation, we included all low- and middle-income countries (that is, LDCs) with more than one million people,⁷ as indicated by the World Bank, *World Development Report 1996*,⁸ except upper-middle income oil-exporting countries Libya, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain (with a relative abundance of resources but a lack of conflict data); European Union member Greece; and Eritrea, independent in 1993 and lacking data before then. All Eritrean war deaths and refugee data were classified as a part of Ethiopia's civil war. In Appendix Table A1.2, we present the geographic breakdown of countries in the dataset. Forty-two, or about one-third of the countries, are from Sub-Saharan Africa while one-fifth are from Latin America and Asia, respectively. The remaining countries are from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.

1.5 Measuring humanitarian emergencies

We used four components to measure our concept of humanitarian emergencies. War deaths, a proxy for deaths resulting from direct

violence, measures the intensity of armed conflict in the country. However, because of the limitations of our dataset, our proxy for war deaths excludes the large number of civilian deaths that result from genocides. Yet most genocides take place during wars, so that our dataset, by identifying wars, identifies most occurrences of genocides but understates civilian deaths during the period. Moreover, we can analyse genocides in discussing factors contributing to humanitarian emergencies, even though quantitative data on recent genocides are too weak for formal econometric analysis.

The number of refugees indicates the extent of displacement across national boundaries. The daily calorie supply per capita is used as a proxy for malnutrition, and infant mortality rate is used as a proxy for disease. We elaborate on these measures in the Appendix.⁹

Are the four components – deaths, refugees, malnutrition, and disease – a part of a single phenomenon, humanitarian emergencies? The simple correlations between these components (Appendix Table A1.1) show that the four dimensions of humanitarian emergencies, as represented by our measures, are indeed intercorrelated, but except for correlations of deaths with refugees ($r = 0.57$) and refugees with calorie growth ($r = -0.27$), the associations are not very strong.

We also conducted correlation analyses with different lag structures on the four dimensions of humanitarian emergencies and found that wars may be more conducive to refugee flows and sluggish calorie supply growth than vice versa. Refugee flows seem to be conducive to slow calorie supply growth rather than vice versa. However, largely due to the invariability of the indicators, particularly those of deaths and refugee flows, the differences between the lag and lead correlation coefficients are not great.

When studying such complex phenomena as humanitarian emergencies, the validity of indicators is critical while the operationalization of the dependent variable presents difficulties. We therefore rejected constructing a dichotomous dependent variable, patterned after Väyrynen (1996), recording 1 if a humanitarian emergency existed sometime during the period and 0 if it did not. First, this procedure would have involved establishing an arbitrary threshold for humanitarian emergencies: how can we determine the moment when deaths and disability have reached an emergency in one country while in another one they had not? Second, in numerous instances, such as Uganda and Mozambique, countries moved in and out of humanitarian emergencies, and sometimes as in Burundi, Somalia, and Liberia, back again, during 1980 to 1995.

We therefore constructed continuous indicators for our dependent variables, thus not losing information on annual variations or facing problems of setting thresholds, as with dichotomous indicators. Because of the complexity of humanitarian emergencies, we tested our hypotheses on three different measures of the dependent variable. Our first, most simple measure,¹⁰ which included both deaths *and* refugees, is constructed on the premise that war deaths and refugees per population are closely related. To illustrate, according to our measure, the countries that experienced both war deaths *and* refugees during a given year from 1980–94 largely overlapped with Väyrynen (2000a).

Figure 1.1 shows an increase for our second measure,¹¹ which is positive when there are either deaths *or* refugees from 1980 to 1994.¹² After 1988, the increases seem to be from the rising number of refugees in the world (Figure 1.2), in contrast to the number of war deaths (Figure 1.3), which, according to our dataset, decline. Moreover, the decline in deaths would be more gradual and the increase in emergencies steeper, if we had measures for democides and politicides, which are often part of humanitarian emergencies but are not included in our war death figures. Complicating the picture is a third measure,¹³ which relies on the Väyrynen definition of four components of emergencies – deaths, refugees, malnutrition, and disease. This four-faceted measure




Figure 1.1: Deaths and refugee flows, 1980–94 (annual means of values)




Figure 1.2: War deaths per population, 1980–94 (annual means of values)




Figure 1.3: Refugees per population, 1980–94 (annual means of values)

has declined since 1990, largely because of the general improvement in infant survival and calorie supply.

However, most of the study relies on the first two indicators that include deaths and/or refugees rather than the third measure that uses four components. The latter is not used much, because of the relatively low correlation of war deaths with malnutrition and disease, and because the introduction of the indicator that included malnutrition and disease does not alter the results of the econometric analysis in any meaningful way. Thus, for the purposes of constructing our first two measures, we regarded the conditions for a humanitarian emergency as (1) large numbers of people dying from war *or* being victims of population displacement;¹⁴ *or* (2) large numbers of people dying from war *and* being victims of population displacement.¹⁵

Appendix to Chapter 1: sources, indicators, and statistics

A1.1. Sources of the components of humanitarian emergencies

A1.1.1 War. We selected the number of war-related deaths per population as the proxy for war. Two sources were identified: the Correlates of War (COW) database for civil wars (Singer and Small 1994 and update) and the Stockholm Peace Research Institute's database on war-related deaths in major armed conflicts (SIPRI Yearbook 1989–96 [successive years], *World Armaments and Disarmament*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. United States: Oxford University Press). The information yielded by the two sources was compared with each other.

The COW database includes major civil wars, where (a) military action was involved, (b) the national government at the time was actively involved, (c) effective resistance (as measured by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) occurred on both sides, and (d) at least 1,000 war deaths resulted during the civil war. Also a minimum population of 500,000 and either diplomatic recognition by at least two major powers or membership in the League of Nations or United Nations were required. A total number of 150 such wars occurred from 1816 to 1988 (The Correlates of War Project, 1994), whereas 38 such wars were recorded during the period under observation, 1980–95. Furthermore, the Ogaden (1976–83) and the Tigrean (1978–1991) wars were extracted from the Correlates of War Dataset on *international* wars and classified under Ethiopia as civil wars. Besides Ethiopia, six other countries experienced two civil wars between 1980–95.

The problem with the COW dataset is that casualties are reported from the entire war, not per annum. To obtain annual figures for the pooled dataset, the deaths were divided by the number of years that the conflict endured. Consequently the number of deaths is invariant from year to year, unless one war was replaced by another with a different death rate. This is unfortunate, but of course the pool's cross-sectional variation remains.

The civil war in El Salvador will serve as an example of how the figures were arrived at: the war lasted for 14 years, from 1979 until 1992. According to the COW data, 25,000 lives were lost in fighting. The number of 25,000 war-related deaths is divided by 14 years, which gives 1,786 deaths during each year, 1980 to 1992. The year 1979 falls out of the period under investigation. The number of deaths is then divided by the annual population estimate, and the resulting score is finally multiplied by 100 to eliminate a high concentration of figures close to zero. For example in 1980 the country's population was 4.52 million, yielding the score 3.95, and in 1992 5.04 million, yielding the score 3.31, for war-related deaths per population (DEATHPOP).

SIPRI provides estimates of war-related deaths for 36 countries in the present sample. However, information is missing for a total of eight years, 1980–87. In addition, the coding procedure seems to be more conservative than that of the Correlates of War Project. Even during the period 1988–95 SIPRI fails, in many cases, to report any estimate of the death toll even if a major conflict was underway during a given year. Besides the numerous cases of 'not available' data, SIPRI does not report the conflicts of Armenia (1992–), Burundi (neither the 1988 nor the early 1990s' war), Georgia (1991), Romania (1989), and Russia (1991) – which fulfil the criteria applied by the COW project. For the SIPRI data, deaths per population were multiplied by 10,000 in order to avoid a concentration of observations very close to zero.

The basic problem of the COW dataset is less dramatic: it does not contain data for the year 1995, which leaves out the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Russia (Chechnya). Because of its superior coverage, the COW figures were adopted as a basis for indicator construction. It should be noted, however, that, as compared to SIPRI statistics, COW does not record the conflicts in Algeria 1993–, Bangladesh 1989–95, Cambodia (only) 1992, Chad (only) 1989–92, Georgia 1993–94, Guatemala 1988–95, Indonesia 1988–95, Iran 1988–93, Mauritania 1988–89, South Africa 1988 and 1990–93, Turkey (only) 1989–90, Uganda 1989 and 1991, and Yemen 1994.

A1.1.2 Displacement. As discussed in detail by Helinä Melkas (1996), the statistics for internally displaced populations are particularly unreliable. Therefore, the number of refugees by origin adjusted for the source country's population (REFUPOP) was chosen as a proxy for displacement. (The score was multiplied by 100 in order to avoid concentration of observations close to zero.) Source: World Refugee Survey (1980–96, successive years) World Refugee Statistics. The United States Committee for Refugees (USCR). Washington DC: Immigration and Refugee Services of America.

In collecting the information, refugees from the former Soviet bloc to the Western countries before the 1980s were excluded from the dataset since neither their sources nor living conditions are related to humanitarian emergencies in the 1980s and 1990s. Cuban refugees to the United States were excluded for the same reason. Several annual figures had to be estimated on the basis of previous or adjacent years because of lacking data. Normally this was unproblematic, as the *status quo* was the typical condition. The *Survey's* reporting of any significant repatriations was helpful in changing circumstances. In some other cases estimation was more difficult, for example, when the number of refugees was reported from a group of countries such as from 'Indochina'. The statistics for individual countries (in this case Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) would be calculated from the adjacent years' data, giving each country the average proportional share of the total number of refugees from Indochina one year before and after. Another example of the difficulties involved is the change from reporting the number of refugees by country of origin in 1980 to reporting by country of asylum in 1981. In one case the figures simply provided no basis for judging, and the number of refugees from Zambia in 1981 was estimated at 2,000.

A1.1.3 Hunger. The measure selected to indicate hunger is the annual calorie supply per capita (Food and Agriculture Organization 1995). Although 'starvation' is rarely the 'cause' of famine deaths, food shortages may provoke people into actions which increase their exposure to other risks, such as death from disease (Seaman 1993, p. 27). A low calorie supply is an indicator of poverty rather than humanitarian emergency. One should look at changes in calorie supply rather than levels. Looking at the trend of calorie supply from 1980 to 1995 one observes an encouraging, albeit weak, upward trend in the countries under study. Any downward deviation of this general trend could be indicative of a humanitarian emergency. The indicator of hunger

(CALAVE) is expressed as a deviation of calorie supply from the annual average change in the whole sample:

$$\text{CALAVE} = \text{CALINDEX} - \text{AVERAGE}(\text{CALINDEX}),$$

where AVERAGE (CALINDEX) = average annual change in the index of calorie supply in the whole sample; CALINDEX = LAG (CALINDEX) + (((CALSUPP - LAG (CALSUPP)) / LAG (CALSUPP))* 100), or index of change in the calorie supply for N_1, \dots, N_k ; 1980 = 100. Source: FAOSTAT TS 1995 Database. Rome: Copyright by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Programme. Software by the United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.

Negative values indicate that a country is below the general trend towards increased calorie supply, which is hypothesized to be an indicator of a potential complex humanitarian emergency. The data on calorie supply were extrapolated for all countries for 1993–95.

A1.1.4 Disease. Since infants are highly susceptible to disease, we used the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births as a proxy for disease. Disease claims human lives during emergencies due to lack of food and sanitation. Seaman (1993, p. 27) points out that the immediate cause of death is generally from infection, electrolyte imbalance or a range of other biological events. As with calorie supply, infant mortality in itself is also an indicator of poverty. For instance, poor countries cannot afford health services that would prevent diseases. There is a need to resort once again to a measure indicating a deviation from the general trend. Encouragingly, during the period 1980–95, we observe a clear reduction in infant mortality in the countries under study. The indicator is constructed as follows:

$$\text{INFAVE} = \text{INFINDEX} - \text{AVERAGE}(\text{INFINDEX}),$$

where AVERAGE (INFINDEX) = average annual change in the index of infant mortality; INFINDEX = LAG (INFINDEX) + (((INFMORT - LAG (INFMORT)) / LAG (INFMORT))* 100), or index of change in the infant mortality rate for N_1, \dots, N_k ; 1980 = 100. Source: World Tables Database 1993 Update. Socio-Economic Access and Retrieval System, vers. 2.5, April 1992. Washington DC: The World Bank.

The data on infant mortality were extrapolated for 1993–95 for all countries and for 1980–81 for Lithuania, Belize and Slovenia.

A1.2. Sources of explanatory variables

CPIDIFF – Consumer Price Index, annual change. Source: Social Indicators of Development (SID) 1995 Database. Socio-Economic Access and Retrieval System (calculated). Washington DC: World Bank.

DEATRAD – ‘death tradition’: number of deaths from political violence, 1963–77. Source: Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice (1983) *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 3rd edn, Vol. 2: *Political Protest and Government Change*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

GDPGRO – Gross domestic product (average annual growth, per cent), 1980–92. Source: World Tables Database 1993 Update. Socio-Economic Access and Retrieval System, vers. 2.5, April 1992. Washington DC: World Bank.

GINI – Gini Index as defined by Deininger and Squire (1996), requiring that observations be based on household surveys, on comprehensive coverage of the population, and on comprehensive coverage of income sources. Source: Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire. (1996) A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality. *The World Bank Economic Review* 10(3): 565–91.

GNPCAP – Gross national product per capita, 1980–93 (US\$, Atlas method). Source: Social Indicators of Development (SID) 1995 Database. Socio-Economic Access and Retrieval System. Washington DC: World Bank.

FOODGRO – Annual growth of food production per capita. Source: World Tables Database 1993 Update. Socio-Economic Access and Retrieval System, vers. 2.5, April 1992 (calculated). Washington DC: World Bank.

IMFGNP – Use of IMF credit as a percentage of GNP: The use of IMF resources except those resulting from drawings in the reserve tranche. Source: World Bank 1996d Database. Socio-Economic Access and Retrieval System, vers. 3.0, May 1993 (calculated). Washington DC: World Bank.

MILCENT – ‘Military centrality’: Annual military expenditures as a percentage of GNP. Source: *SIPRI Yearbook* (1986–95, successive years) *World Armaments and Disarmament*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). New York: Oxford University Press.

ODAPOP80 – Official Development Assistance per capita index (1980 = 100). Source: World Development Report (successive years; calculated from ‘Official Development Assistance: receipts’). Washington DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

ODAPOGRO – Official Development Assistance per capita growth. Source: World Development Report (calculated from ODAPOP80). Washington DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

POLRI – Summary Index of ‘Political Rights Grievances’, that is, demands for greater political rights other than autonomy, sum of codings on five ordinal scales:

- POL1 Diffuse political grievances
- POL2 Seek greater political rights
- POL3 Seek greater central participation
- POL4 Seek equal civil rights
- POL5 Seek change in officials/policies
- POL6 Other political grievances

Source: Ted Robert Gurr (1993) *Minorities at Risk. A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

TOT80 – Terms of Trade Index (1980 = 100, US\$-based). Source: World Tables Database 1993 Update. Socio-Economic Access and Retrieval System, vers. 2.5, April 1992 (converted from 1987 = 100). Washington DC: World Bank.

TOTCHANG – Terms of trade index, annual change. Source: World Tables Database 1993 Update. Socio-Economic Access and Retrieval System, vers. 2.5, April 1992 (calculated from TOT80). Washington DC: World Bank.

A1.3. Indicators of the dependent variable

We constructed continuous indicators for our dependent variables, thus not losing information on annual variations or facing problems of setting thresholds, as with dichotomous indicators. Because of the complexity of humanitarian emergencies, we tested our hypotheses on three different measures of the dependent variable. Our first, most simple measure, is based on the information that war deaths and refugees per population are closely related:

$$(1) \quad \text{DEATHREF} = (\text{DEATHPOP} + 1) * (\text{REFUPOP} + 1),$$

where DEATHPOP, REFUPOP = war-related deaths and refugees per population, respectively (except if both DEATHPOP and REFUPOP = 0, then DEATHREF = 0 instead of 1).

The variable combines two important components of complex humanitarian emergencies, but for a positive score both components do not have to be present (the reason for adding two constants in the equation). The variable thus gets positive values not only when there are both deaths and refugees, but also when there are deaths but no refugees or refugees but no deaths. The inclusiveness of this variable increases the number of non-zero observations, which increases the variability of the dependent variable. However, a second equation assures that a humanitarian emergency comprises both components, that is

$$(2) \quad \text{HUMEMERG} = \text{DEATHPOP} * \text{REFUPOP}.$$

We constructed a composite indicator that also includes malnutrition and disease as parts of complex humanitarian emergencies:

$$(3) \quad \text{COHE} = (1 + \text{DEATHPOP}) * (1 + \text{REFUPOP}) * ((100 - \text{CALAVE}) / 10) * ((100 + \text{INFAVE}) / 10),^{16}$$

where CALAVE = deviation from trend (average annual increase) in calorie supply and INFAVE = deviation from trend (average annual decrease) in the infant mortality rate.¹⁷

The negative sign before CALAVE ensues because cases with below average calorie supply growth are more likely to be a part of a complex humanitarian emergency, whereas the positive sign before INFAVE indicates that below average infant mortality *reductions* are expected to increase the probability of a complex emergency. Of the three indicators, COHE is the most inclusive and HUMEMERG the most exclusive, since it only includes cases with both deaths and refugees. One point of interest is comparing the results of models using different operationalizations of humanitarian emergencies. While rejecting the ‘country-list approach’, we later created dichotomous variables for probit regression analyses, which enabled us to estimate the changes in the probability of humanitarian emergencies.

A1.4. Econometric and statistical tables: descriptive statistics and results of regression analyses

Table A1.1: Simple correlations between major components of humanitarian emergencies

		<i>LDEATHPO</i>	<i>LREFUPOP</i>	<i>LCALAVE</i>	<i>LINFAVE</i>
Pearson Correlation	<i>LDEATHPO</i>	1.000	0.572***	-.171***	0.084***
	<i>LREFUPOP</i>	0.572***	1.000	-.274***	0.145***
	<i>LCALAVE</i>	-.171***	-.274***	1.000	-.060**
	<i>LINFAVE</i>	0.084***	0.145***	-.060**	1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)	<i>LDEATHPO</i>	.	0.000	0.000	0.001
	<i>LREFUPOP</i>	0.000	.	0.000	0.000
	<i>LCALAVE</i>	0.000	0.000	.	0.018
	<i>LINFAVE</i>	0.001	0.000	0.018	.
N	<i>LDEATHPO</i>	1861	1861	1457	1681
	<i>LREFUPOP</i>	1861	1984	1560	1800
	<i>LCALAVE</i>	1457	1560	1560	1530
	<i>LINFAVE</i>	1681	1800	1530	1800

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Note: *LDEATHPO* = natural logarithm of deaths per population; *LREFUPOP* = natural logarithm of refugees per population; *LCALAVE* = natural logarithm of deviation from the trend of calorie supply; *LINFAVE* = natural logarithm of deviation from the trend of infant mortality; Sig = statistical significance of the correlation coefficients (2-tailed test); N = number of observations (pairwise exclusion of missing data). The data are for 124 developing countries, 1980 to 1995; thus, our correlations are for 1,984 cross-sections less missing values.

Table A1.2: Distribution of countries by region

<i>Region</i>	<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>Number of countries</i>	<i>% of total</i>	<i>Number of cases in regression analysis</i>	<i>% of total in regression analysis</i>
Sub-Saharan Africa	672	42	33.9	215	32.6
Latin America and the Caribbean	400	25	20.2	212	32.2
Eastern Europe	336	21	16.9	25	3.8
Middle East and North Africa	192	12	9.7	75	11.4
Asia	384	24	19.4	132	20.0
Total	1984	124	100.0	659	100

Note: The ‘number of cases in regression analysis’ is based on applying the ordinary least squares model for *LDEATREF*, presented in Table A1.5, on the respective regions, with listwise deletion of missing data.

Table A1.3: Simple correlations with statistical significance and number of observations

	LDEATREF	LHUMEMER	LCOHE	LCPIDIFF	LDEATRAD	LFOODGRO	LGDPGRO	LGINI	LGNPCAP	LIMFGNP	LMLCENT	LODA80	LODACHAN	LTOT80	LTOTCHAN
<i>Pearson correlation</i>															
LDEATREF	1.000	0.871**	0.972*	0.126**	0.260**	-0.075*	-1.06**	0.077**	-3.11**	0.000	0.319**	0.006	0.039	0.025	-0.13
LHUMEMER	0.871**	1.000	0.910**	0.100**	0.103**	-0.085**	-0.094**	0.029	-2.38**	0.053*	0.313**	0.038	0.048	-0.03	-0.04
LCOHE	0.972**	0.910**	1.000	0.113**	0.184**	-0.089**	-0.213**	0.011	-3.40**	0.062*	0.301**	0.022	0.034	0.012	-0.19
LCPIDIFF	0.126**	0.100**	0.113**	1.000	0.088**	-0.12	0.122**	0.105**	0.075*	0.006	0.012	0.035	-0.04	-0.02	0.001
LDEATRAD	0.260**	0.103**	0.184**	0.088**	1.000	0.046	0.122**	-0.49	-1.89**	-1.26**	0.237**	0.061*	0.016	-0.093**	-0.34
LFOODGRO	-0.075*	-0.085**	-0.089**	0.046	1.000	1.000	0.280**	-0.40	0.031	-0.046	-0.30	0.043	-0.09	0.003	-0.21
LGDPGRO	-1.06**	-0.094**	-1.19**	-0.12	0.280**	1.000	1.000	0.144**	-0.98**	0.060*	0.002	0.072*	-0.06	0.056	0.036
LGINI	0.029	0.077**	0.011	0.105**	-0.49	0.280**	1.000	1.000	0.028	0.129**	-0.22	-0.06	-0.44	0.008	0.018
LGNPCAP	-3.11**	-2.38**	-3.40**	0.075*	-1.89**	0.031	-0.98**	0.028	1.000	-4.52**	-0.42	0.011	0.049	-1.37**	-0.32
LIMFGNP	0.000	0.053*	0.062*	0.006	-1.26**	-0.46	0.060*	0.129**	-4.52**	1.000	-1.19**	-10.4**	-0.45	-0.01	0.036
LMLCENT	0.319**	0.313**	0.301**	0.012	0.237**	-0.30	0.002	-0.22	-0.42	1.000	1.000	-1.12**	0.012	0.042	0.008
LODAPO80	0.006	0.038	0.022	0.035	0.061*	0.043	0.072*	-0.66	0.011	-1.04**	1.000	0.200**	0.000	-1.14**	-0.13
LODAPOGR	0.039	0.048	0.034	-0.04	0.016	-0.09	-0.60	-0.44	0.049	-0.45	0.200**	1.000	1.000	-0.21	-0.22
LTOT80	0.025	-0.03	0.012	-0.02	-0.93**	0.003	0.056	0.008	-1.37**	-0.01	0.042	-1.14**	-0.21	1.000	0.435**
LTOTCHAN	-0.13	-0.04	-0.19	0.001	-0.34	-0.21	0.036	0.018	-0.32	0.036	0.008	-0.13	-0.22	0.435**	1.000
<i>Sig. (2-tailed)</i>															
LDEATREF		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.998	0.000	0.834	0.189	0.434	0.706
LHUMEMER	0.000		0.000	0.001	0.000	0.005	0.001	0.320	0.000	0.047	0.000	0.190	0.109	0.921	0.902
LCOHE	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.745	0.000	0.030	0.000	0.457	0.262	0.718	0.578
LCPIDIFF	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.007	0.721	0.000	0.004	0.019	0.857	0.700	0.283	0.900	0.945	0.973
LDEATRAD	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.007		0.138	0.000	0.112	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.037	0.585	0.004	0.317
LFOODGRO	0.014	0.005	0.004	0.721	0.138		0.000	0.293	0.357	0.163	0.353	0.193	0.793	0.938	0.535
LGDPGRO	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.001	0.042	0.954	0.024	0.068	0.091	0.305
LGINI	0.320	0.000	0.000	0.112	0.293	0.000	0.000		0.370	0.000	0.505	0.062	0.232	0.827	0.652
LGNPCAP	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.019	0.357	0.001	0.001	0.370		0.000	0.147	0.717	0.130	0.000	0.357
LIMFGNP	0.998	0.047	0.030	0.857	0.000	0.163	0.042	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.001	0.161	0.976	0.300
LMLCENT	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.700	0.000	0.353	0.954	0.505	0.147	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.690	0.209	0.818
LODAPO80	0.834	0.190	0.457	0.283	0.037	0.193	0.024	0.062	0.717	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.716
LODAPOGR	0.189	0.109	0.262	0.900	0.585	0.793	0.068	0.232	0.130	0.161	0.690	0.000	0.000	0.557	0.525
LTOT80	0.434	0.921	0.718	0.945	0.004	0.938	0.091	0.827	0.000	0.976	0.209	0.001	0.557	0.000	0.000
LTOTCHAN	0.706	0.902	0.578	0.973	0.317	0.535	0.305	0.652	0.357	0.300	0.818	0.716	0.525	0.000	0.000

Table A1.3: Simple correlations with statistical significance and number of observations *continued*

	LDEATREF	LHUMEMER	LCOHE	LCPIDIFF	LDEATRAD	LFOODGRO	LGDPPGRO	LGINI	LGNPCAP	LIMFGNP	LMILCENT	LODA80	LODACHAN	LTOT80	LTOTCHAN
N	1860	1860	1428	1068	1500	1078	1249	1146	1382	1381	1339	1203	1129	960	880
LHUMEMER	1860	1860	1428	1068	1500	1078	1249	1146	1382	1381	1339	1203	1129	960	880
LCOHE	1428	1428	1428	1056	1373	1067	1046	911	1204	1202	1218	1100	1112	880	880
LCPIDIFF	1068	1068	1056	1068	1023	886	934	751	984	984	983	937	947	820	820
LDEATRAD	1500	1500	1373	1023	1600	1034	1104	1054	1337	1248	1303	1173	1102	948	869
LFOODGRO	1078	1078	1067	886	1034	1078	933	682	907	907	936	923	931	858	858
LGDPPGRO	1249	1249	1046	934	1104	933	1277	891	1183	1159	1060	982	921	902	828
LGINI	1146	1146	911	751	1054	682	891	1222	1041	969	947	799	753	684	627
LGNPCAP	1382	1382	1204	984	1337	907	1183	1041	1489	1381	1183	1032	971	906	831
LIMFGNP	1381	1381	1202	984	1248	907	1159	969	1381	1381	1181	1032	971	906	831
LMILCENT	1339	1339	1218	983	1303	936	1060	947	1183	1181	1340	1093	1026	897	822
LODAPO80	1203	1203	1100	937	1173	923	982	799	1032	1032	1093	1203	1112	873	801
LODAPOGR	1129	1129	1112	947	1102	931	921	753	971	971	1026	1112	1129	809	809
LTOT80	960	960	880	820	948	858	902	684	906	906	897	873	809	960	880
LTOTCHAN	880	880	880	820	869	858	828	627	831	831	822	801	809	880	880

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table A1.4: Explanatory variables: descriptive statistics

	N statistic	Minimum statistic	Maximum statistic	Mean statistic	Std. statistic	Skewness statistic	Std. error	Kurtosis statistic	Std. error
CPIDIFF	1068	-13.06	11749.62	93.2209	649.7213	12.797	0.075	187.489	0.150
FOODGRO	1078	-38.44	58.50	-0.2201	8.6021	0.346	0.075	5.038	0.149
GDPGRO	1277	-52.30	26.10	1.5889	7.1555	-1.728	0.068	7.025	0.137
GINI	1222	19.49	65.54	41.2155	10.5291	0.227	0.070	-0.788	0.140
GNPCAP	1489	70	8220	1225.72	1200.27	1.970	0.063	5.382	0.127
IMFGNP	1381	0.00	64.70	3.5574	6.3784	4.932	0.066	34.393	0.132
MILCENT	1340	0.20	34.20	3.7371	3.9053	3.429	0.067	15.909	0.134
ODA80	1203	-218.21	4129.35	185.8051	333.5066	7.225	0.071	62.527	0.141
ODAGRO	1129	-556.25	31757.66	46.8684	959.4926	32.124	0.073	1060.483	0.145
TOT80	960	28.88	374.57	90.6177	25.2101	3.972	0.079	33.612	0.158
TOTCHANG	880	-50.28	116.77	-1.4636	13.4574	1.366	0.082	14.021	0.165
DEATRAD	1600	0.00	1995163	48251.4	255856	6.464	0.061	42.239	0.122
Valid N (listwise)	509								

Note: CPIDIFF = consumer price index, annual change; FOODGRO = food production growth; GDPGRO = real GDP growth; GINI = gini index; GNPCAP = GNP per capita; IMFGNP = use of IMF credit/GNP; MILCENT = military expenditures/GNP; ODA80 = official development assistance per population index, 1980 = 100; ODAGRO = official development assistance per population, annual change; TOT80 = terms of trade index, 1980 = 100; TOTCHANG = terms of trade, annual change; DEATRAD = deaths from domestic violence 1963–77.

Table A1.5: Humanitarian emergencies: OLS regression models

<i>Explanatory variables</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
	<i>LDEATREF</i>	<i>LHUMEMER</i>	<i>LCOHE</i>
Constant	7.31*** (2.67)	4.27**(1.85)	15.07***(2.51)
LGDPGRO[-1]	-1.83***(0.55)	-1.16***(0.38)	-2.54***(0.52)
LGINI[-1]	0.29**(0.12)	0.18**(0.08)	0.36***(0.11)
LGNPCAP[-1]	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.07***(0.02)	-0.19***(0.03)
LIMFGNP[-1]	-0.10***(0.03)	-0.05***(0.02)	-0.06**(0.03)
LCPIDIFF[-1]	0.26*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.05)
LMILCENT[-1]	0.18*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)
LDEATRAD	0.04*** (0.01)	A	0.02* (0.01)
R square	0.18	0.16	0.19
N	663	663	663
DW	0.34	0.31	0.38

Note: The figures are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses), respectively. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from domestic violence 1963–77; except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [-1]. Coefficient significant *** = at the 1 per cent level (2-tailed test), ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level; a = not significant; DW = Durbin–Watson test statistic for serial correlation.

Table A1.6: Humanitarian emergencies

Generalized least squares (Prais–Winsten) regression models			
<i>Explanatory variables</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
	<i>LDEATHREF</i>	<i>LHUMEMER</i>	<i>LCOHE</i>
Constant	-2.69*** (0.81)	1.18(0.73)	2.82***(0.58)
LGDPGRO[-1]	B	-0.29**(0.14)	A
LFOODGRO [-1]	-0.19*(0.12)	A	B
LGINI[-1]	0.97***(0.16)	0.14*(0.08)	0.56***(0.14)
LGNPCAP[-1]	-0.14***(0.04)	-0.07***(0.02)	-0.21***(0.03)
LIMFGNP[-1]	A	A	A
LCPIDIFF[-1]	0.16***(0.04)	A	0.19***(0.04)
LMILCENT[-1]	0.19***(0.04)	0.10***(0.02)	0.19***(0.03)
LDEATRAD	0.05***(0.01)	0.02***(0.007)	0.03***(0.01)
Rho	0.86***(0.02)	0.88***(0.02)	0.83***(0.02)
N	600	753	732
DW	1.93	1.64	1.98

Note: The figures are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses), respectively. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LFOODGRO = ln growth of food production per capita; LGINI = ln gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from domestic violence 1963–77; except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [-1]. Rho = coefficient of autocorrelation. Coefficient significant *** = at the 1 per cent level (2-tailed test), ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level; a = not significant; and b = not included in the equation. DW = Durbin–Watson test statistic for serial correlation.

Table A1.7: Humanitarian emergencies: fixed (LSDV) and random effects (GLS) models

Explanatory variables	LDEATREF		LHUMEMER		LCOHE	
	Fixed	Random	Fixed	Random	Fixed	Random
Constant	3.52*** (0.85)	3.68** (1.46)	0.69** (0.32)	0.11 (0.27)	11.10*** (1.56)	8.61*** (1.19)
LGDPGRO[-1]	A	-0.45* (0.27)	A	a	-0.72*** (0.26)	-0.53** (0.25)
LGINI[-1]	-0.90*** (0.23)	-0.44** (0.19)	A	a	-0.50** (0.23)	A
LGNPCAP[-1]	A	a	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.04)
LCPIDIFF[-1]	A	a	A	0.07** (0.03)	a	A
LMILCENT[-1]	0.23*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.03)
LDEATRAD	A	0.05** (0.02)	A	a	a	A
No. of units	69	62	91	77	61	83
R square	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.10	0.10	0.18
N	885	775	1102	933	752	996

Note: The figures are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses), respectively. LGDPGRO = In real GDP growth; LGINI = In gini index; LGNPCAP = In GNP per capita; LCPIDIFF = In consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = In military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = In deaths from domestic violence 1963-77; except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [-1]. Coefficient significant *** = at the 1 per cent level (2-tailed test), ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level; a = not significant; R square is for 'within effects' in the fixed effects model and for overall effects in the random effects model; no of units = number of cross-sectional units taken into account by the analysis.

Table A1.8: Probabilities of humanitarian emergencies: probit models

<i>Explanatory variables</i>	(1)	(2)
	<i>LDEATREF</i>	<i>LHUMEMER</i>
LGDPGRO[-1]	-0.82* (0.45)	-0.41** (0.20)
LGINI[-1]	0.25*** (0.10)	0.12** (0.05)
LGNPCAP[-1]	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.03** (0.01)
LIMFGNP[-1]	-0.07*** (0.03)	-0.014 (0.011)
LCPIDIFF[-1]	0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)
LMILCENT[-1]	0.05* (0.028)	0.02* (0.01)
LDEATRAD	0.04*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.003)
obs. P	0.33	0.08
pred. P	0.30	0.05
Log Likelihood	-309.79	-136.60
Chi square	95.40	35.42
N	562	562

Note: The figures are changes in probabilities and standard errors (in parentheses), respectively. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from domestic violence 1963–77; except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [-1]. The underlying coefficient is significant *** = at the 1 per cent level (2-tailed test), ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level; obs. P = observed probability, pred. P = predicted probability at the mean of the dependent variable. The statistical significance of the model is tested against the value of Chi square with seven degrees of freedom.

Table A1.9: Humanitarian emergencies: tobit models

<i>Explanatory variables</i>	(1) <i>LDEATREF</i>	(2) <i>LHUMEMER</i>
Constant	16.14** (7.68)	51.09*** (15.50)
LGDPGRO[-1]	-4.37*** (1.58)	-13.61*** (3.34)
LGINI[-1]	0.99*** (0.36)	3.48*** (1.03)
LGNPCAP[-1]	-0.48*** (0.11)	-1.01*** (0.30)
LIMFGNP[-1]	-0.27*** (0.10)	-0.59*** (0.23)
LCPIDIFF[-1]	0.40*** (0.14)	a
LMILCENT[-1]	0.43*** (0.10)	1.16*** (0.25)
LDEATRAD	0.16*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.07)
Se	1.50 (0.08)	2.27 (0.26)
Log Likelihood	-586.81	-232.51
Pseudo R square	0.10	0.15
N	664	753
Censored/uncensored	454/210	696/57

Note: The figures are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses), respectively. LGDPGRO = ln real GDP growth; LGINI = ln gini index; LGNPCAP = ln GNP per capita; LIMFGNP = ln use of IMF credit/GNP; LCPIDIFF = ln consumer price index, annual change; LMILCENT = ln military expenditures/GNP; LDEATRAD = ln deaths from domestic violence 1963–77; except for LDEATRAD, all explanatory variables are lagged one year [-1]. Coefficient significant *** = at the 1 per cent level (2-tailed test), ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level; a = not significant; se = estimated standard error of the regression; pseudo R square = least squares goodness-of-fit equivalent of maximum likelihood estimation; censored / uncensored = the number of left censored observations at LDEATREF and LHUMEMER <=0/number of uncensored observations.

Table A1.10: GDP growth (LGDPGRO)

1. Ordinary least squares models			
<i>LAG</i>	<i>LDEATREF</i>	<i>LHUMEMER</i>	<i>LCOHE</i>
[-4]	-1.446*** (0.513)	-1.138*** (0.345)	-2.112*** (0.481)
[-3]	-1.699*** (0.521)	-1.214*** (0.358)	-2.304*** (0.490)
[-2]	-1.809*** (0.516)	-1.178*** (0.355)	-2.534*** (0.490)
[-1]	-1.833*** (0.547)	-1.142*** (0.380)	-2.544*** (0.517)
	-2.023*** (0.576)	-1.103*** (0.407)	-2.720*** (0.545)
[+1]	-1.679*** (0.581)	-0.818** (0.412)	-2.219*** (0.556)
[+2]	-1.721*** (0.580)	-0.484 (0.407)	-1.929*** (0.615)
[+3]	-1.800*** (0.648)	-0.088 (0.459)	-1.832*** (0.693)
[+4]	-1.844*** (0.703)	-0.078 (0.504)	-1.862** (0.776)

Note: The figures are parameter estimates and standard errors; coefficient significant *** = at the 1 per cent; ** = five per cent, * = 10 per cent level of significance (2-tailed test); all other variables are held constant in the models. Strongest associations are indicated in bold.

Table A1.11: GDP growth (LGDPGRO)

2. Generalized least squares (Prais–Winsten) models	
LAG	LHUMEMER
[-2]	-1.197*** (0.320)
[-1]	-0.287** (0.142)
	-0.266* (0.157)
[+1]	-0.050 (0.168)
[+2]	-0.115 (0.182)

Table A1.12: Food production growth (LFOODGRO)

LAG	LDEATREF
[-2]	-0.105 (0.116)
[-1]	-0.193* (0.116)
	-0.048 (0.130)
[+1]	0.089 (0.124)
[+2]	0.039 (0.125)

Table A1.13: IMF credit/GNP (LIMFGNP)

LAG	LDEATREF	LHUMEMER	LCOHE
[-2]	-0.074** (0.032)	-0.046** (0.022)	-0.041 (0.030)
[-1]	-0.097*** (0.032)	-0.061*** (0.022)	-0.063** (0.030)
	-0.124*** (0.032)	-0.082*** (0.022)	-0.088*** (0.030)
[+1]	-0.127*** (0.032)	-0.079*** (0.022)	-0.101*** (0.031)
[+2]	-0.128*** (0.032)	-0.073*** (0.022)	-0.106*** (0.033)

Note: The figures for Tables A1.11–13 are parameter estimates and standard errors; coefficient significant *** = at the 1 per cent; ** = 5 per cent, * = 10 per cent level of significance (2-tailed test); all other variables are held constant in the models. Strongest associations are indicated in bold.

Table A1.14: Military centrality (LMILCENT)

LAG	LDEATREF	LHUMEMER	LCHE
[-2]	0.159*** (0.033)	0.136*** (0.024)	0.119*** (0.032)
[-1]	0.182*** (0.033)	0.160*** (0.023)	0.153*** (0.031)
	0.191*** (0.033)	0.164*** (0.023)	0.164*** (0.031)
[+1]	0.176*** (0.033)	0.145*** (0.023)	0.150*** (0.031)
[+2]	0.157*** (0.033)	0.124*** (0.023)	0.140*** (0.033)

Note: The figures are parameter estimates and standard errors; coefficient significant *** = at the 1 per cent; ** = five per cent, * = 10 per cent level of significance (2-tailed test); all other variables are held constant in the models.

Table A1.15: Inflation (LCPIDIFF)

<i>LAG</i>	<i>LDEATREF</i>	<i>LHUMEMER</i>	<i>LCHE</i>
[-2]	0.216*** (0.057)	0.156*** (0.040)	0.231*** (0.054)
[-1]	0.257*** (0.055)	0.200*** (0.038)	0.267*** (0.052)
	0.287*** (0.050)	0.229*** (0.034)	0.292*** (0.047)
[+1]	0.306*** (0.050)	0.261*** (0.034)	0.299*** (0.048)
[+2]	0.304*** (0.051)	0.266*** (0.035)	0.307*** (0.050)

Note: The figures are parameter estimates and standard errors; coefficient significant *** = at the 1 per cent; ** = five per cent, * = 10 per cent level of significance (2-tailed test); all other variables are held constant in the models. Strongest associations are indicated in bold.

2

Poverty, Stagnation, Unemployment, and Inflation

Despite political conflicts in Quebec, Northern Ireland, and the Basque provinces, contemporary humanitarian emergencies are rarely found among high-income countries, unless you include the roughly 20,000 people killed yearly, mostly by guns, in the United States' cities. Emergencies generally occur in low- and middle-income (that is, developing) countries, suggesting a threshold above which emergencies do not occur¹ (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 1996, pp. 13–30; Holsti 1991, pp. 274–78; Jung, Schlichte, and Siegelberg 1996, pp. 50–4). A disproportional number of these states are weak or failing (Holsti 2000, pp. 243–50), a trait that interacts as cause and effect of their relative poverty.

A weakening or decaying state is one experiencing a decline in the basic functions of the state, such as possessing authority and legitimacy, making laws, preserving order, and providing basic social services. A complete breakdown in these functions indicates a failing or collapsing state (Holsti 2000, pp. 246–50; Zartman 1995, pp. 1–7).

A factor common to 12 of the 15 countries that Rummel (1994) indicates have had more than one million democides (murders by the state) in the twentieth century is stagnation and protracted declines in average incomes in the period before democide. These 12 stagnant countries include early twentieth-century feudal Russia, the Soviet Union during the 1917 revolution and War Communism, the Chinese imperial dynasty and republican government just before Chiang Kai-shek's regime, China's Kuomintang regime before Chinese Communist rule, post-World War I pre-World War II Germany, pre-1975 Cambodia, pre-1945 Vietnam, the declining Turkish Ottoman state before World War I, World War II Poland and Yugoslavia, and North Korea. Three cases, Pakistan since independence (Nafziger 1994

pp. 143–65), Japan from 1936 to 1945 (Nafziger 1995), and pre-revolutionary late nineteenth-century Mexico, in which some one million Indian families lost their land, are exceptions, with positive per capita growth but high income inequality.

2.1 Relative deprivation

Emergencies are more likely to occur in countries experiencing stagnation and decline in real GDP. Stagnation and decline exacerbate the feeling of relative deprivation, people's perception of social injustice based on a discrepancy between goods and conditions they expect and those they can get or keep. This deprivation often results from vertical (class) or horizontal (regional or communal) inequality (Stewart 2000, p. 16), where the actors' income or conditions are related to those of others within society. Relative deprivation spurs social discontent, which provides motivation for collective violence (Gurr 1970). Among the various components of emergencies, war and violence have major catalytic roles, adding to social disruption and political instability, undermining economic activity, spreading hunger and disease, and fuelling refugee flows.

Relative deprivation is essentially a diachronic concept: people feel deprived of something they had, but subsequently lost, or when others have gained relative to them. Consequently, a short-term income reduction is more important than protracted income decline or stagnation in analysing war and conflict dimensions of humanitarian emergencies. Indeed one who grows accustomed to being destitute may not feel frustrated at all. Deterioration of living conditions over a prolonged period thus entails absolute rather than relative deprivation. Although low or declining average incomes can become a source of relative deprivation in comparison to neighbouring countries or to incomes from an earlier period, aggression is unlikely to result from such an abstract and remote source. Tangible and salient factors such as a marked deterioration of living conditions, especially during a period of high expectations, are more likely to produce socio-political discontent that may be mobilized into political violence (cf. Davies 1962, pp. 5–19). Thus, the psychological feeling of relative deprivation often corresponds to some economic or material deprivation.

Pastor and Boyce (2000, p. 365) contend that emergencies are more likely to occur amid slow or negative growth, or when sudden stagnation takes place in the face of rising expectations. El Salvador's rapid growth in the late 1970s spurred expectations that exacerbated

discontent after real GNP fell sharply from 1979 to 1982, giving impetus to incursions by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas, militia death squad reaction, and civil conflict during the 1980s. To resolve the conflict (and reduce relative deprivation), El Salvador needed to restore growth, create a policy consensus, and promote policies to reduce inequality (along with disarming combatants, and integrating the FMLN politically), a tall order but one partially fulfilled with the 1992 Peace Accords and its aftermath (*ibid.*, pp. 367–92).

Only a portion of violence results from insurgent action. In fact, Kalevi Holsti (2000, pp. 250–67) demonstrates that the policies of governing élites are at the root of most humanitarian emergencies,² a fact not recognized in most research on war (cf. Collier 2000a and Collier and Hoeffler 1998a). Stagnation and decline in incomes exacerbate the feeling of relative deprivation. Slow or negative growth puts ruling coalitions on the horns of a dilemma. Ruling élites can expand rent-seeking opportunities for existing political élites, contributing to further economic stagnation that can threaten the legitimacy of the regime and future stability. Or they can reduce the number of allies and clients they support, undermining the legitimacy of the regime, risking opposition by those no longer sharing in the benefits of rule, and increasing the probability of regime turnover. Either strategy to manage power, amid economic crises, can exacerbate the potential for repression and insurgency and, ultimately, humanitarian emergencies.

To forestall threats to the regime, political élites frequently use repression to suppress discontent or capture a greater share of the majority's shrinking surplus. These repressive policies may entail acts of direct violence against, or withholding food and other supplies from, politically disobedient groups, as in Sudan in the 1980s (Keen 1994; Keen 2000b, pp. 292–4; and chapters 4 and 7 in this volume). Moreover, repression and economic discrimination may generate relative deprivation and trigger socio-political mobilization on the part of the groups affected, leading to further violence, worsening the humanitarian crisis.³

Since economic deceleration or collapse can disrupt ruling coalitions and exacerbate mass discontent, we should not be surprised that since 1980 the globe, particularly Africa, has been more vulnerable to political violence and humanitarian emergencies. This increase in *intrastate* political conflict and humanitarian emergencies in Africa in the early 1990s is linked to its negative growth record in the 1970s and 1980s and virtual stagnation in the early

1990s. Indeed in Africa, which had the highest death rate from wars,⁴ GDP per capita was lower in the 1990s than it was at the end of the 1960s (World Bank 2000, p. 1).⁵

In the sub-Sahara, falling average incomes and growing political consciousness added pressures on national leaders, whose response was usually not only anti-egalitarian but also anti-growth; depressing returns to small farmers, appropriating peasant surplus for parastatal industry, building parastatal enterprises beyond management capacity, and using these inefficient firms to give benefits to clients. Regime survival in a politically fragile system required expanding patronage to marshal élite support, at the expense of economic growth. Élites extract immediate rents and transfers rather than providing incentives for economic growth. In addition, spurring peasant production through market prices and exchange rates would have interfered with state leaders' ability to build political support, especially in cities (Nafziger 1988).

Claude Ake (1996, pp. 1, 18) reinforces this view when he states that for Africa, 'the problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place. ... [W]ith independence African leaders were in no position to pursue development; they were too engrossed in the struggle for survival.'

Africa's economic crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s originated from its inability to adjust to the 1973–74 oil shock, exacerbated by a credit cycle, in which states over-borrowed at negative real interest rates in the mid- to late 1970s, but faced high positive rates during debt servicing or loan renewal in the 1980s. African leaders' statist economic policies during the 1970s and early 1980s (OAU 1980) emphasized detailed state planning, expansion of government-owned enterprises, heavy-industry development, and government intervention in exchange rates and agricultural pricing. These policies contributed to economic regression and growing poverty (especially in rural areas) and inequality. The political élites used the state to pursue economic policies that supported their interests at the expense of Africa's poor and working classes (Nafziger 1993).

This stagnation and decline contributed to political decay in the 1980s and early 1990s in such countries as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zaire, and Liberia. Ethnic and regional competition for the bounties of the state gave way to a predatory state. Predatory rule involves a personalistic regime ruling through coercion, material inducement, and personality politics, tending to degrade the institutional foundations of the economy and state (Lewis 1996, p. 80; Holsti 1996, pp. 104–05). A

strong leader stands at the top of the state and ‘supports a network of cronies in civilian and military bureaucracies. Beneficiaries of the political system are decided by coercion and clientelism’ (Väyrynen 2000b, p. 437). Élités extract immediate rents and transfers rather than providing incentives for economic growth. In some predatory states, the ruling élite and their clients ‘use their positions and access to resources to plunder the national economy through graft, corruption, and extortion, and to participate in private business activities’, (Holsti 2000, p. 251.) Ake (1996, p. 42) contends that ‘Instead of being a public force, the state in Africa tends to be privatized, that is, appropriated to the service of private interests by the dominant faction of the élite.’ People use funds at the disposal of the state for systematic corruption, from petty survival venality at the lower echelons of government to kleptocracy at the top.

Humanitarian crises are more likely to occur in societies where the state is weak and venal, and thus subject to extensive rent-seeking, ‘an omnipresent policy to obtain private benefit from public action and resources’, (Väyrynen 2000b, p. 440.) Cause and effect between state failure and rent seeking are not always clear. State failure need not necessarily result from the incapacity of public institutions. Instead, while ‘state failure can harm a great number of people, it can also benefit others’ (ibid., p. 442), especially governing élites and their allies. These élites may not benefit from avoiding political decay through nurturing free entry and the rule of law and reducing corruption and exploitation. Instead political leaders may gain more from extensive unproductive, profit-seeking activities in a political system they control than from long-term efforts to build a well-functioning state in which economic progress and democratic institutions flourish (ibid., pp. 441–3; Keen 1998; Keen 2000b).⁶ These activities tend to be pervasive in countries that have abundant mineral exports (for example, diamonds and petroleum), such as Sierra Leone, Angola, Congo, and Liberia, while predatory economic behaviour is less viable in economies with few mineral exports such as Ghana, Tanzania, and Togo, which had too limited resources for extensive rent seeking (Väyrynen 2000b, pp. 440–8).

The majority of countries with humanitarian emergencies have experienced several years (or even decades) of negative or stagnant growth, where growth refers to real growth in GNP or GDP per capita. Virtually all emergencies in Africa in the 1990s (section 1.2’s list of African countries, except for Chad and Uganda) were preceded by slow or negative economic growth.

2.2 Patrimonialism, rent-seeking, and failed states

Clientelism or patrimonialism, the dominant pattern in Africa and many other LDCs, is a personalized relationship between patrons and clients, commanding unequal wealth, status, or influence, based on conditional loyalties and involving mutual benefits. For Max Weber (1978, pp. 1028–9), ‘The patrimonial office lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the “private” and the “official” sphere. For the political administration is treated as a purely personal affair of the ruler, and political power is considered part of his personal property which can be exploited by means of contributions and fees.’

In Nigeria’s second republic, 1979–83, Richard Joseph (1987, p. 8) labelled this phenomenon prebendalism, referring to ‘patterns of political behaviour which rest on the justifying principle that such offices should be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of officeholders as well as their reference or support group’. Prebendalism connotes an intense struggle among communities for control of the state. Corruption is endemic to political life at all levels in Nigeria and many other African countries (*ibid.*).

Clientelism overlaps with, but reaches beyond, ethnicity. The ethnic identity of the client may be amalgamated with, widened, or subordinated to the identity of the patron, who exchanges patronage, economic security, and protection for the client’s personal loyalty and obedience. For Richard Sandbrook and Jay Oelbaum (1997, pp. 604–5), patrimonialism is associated with the power of government used to reward the rent-seeking behaviour of political insiders, the ruler’s acquiescence in the misappropriation of state funds and the non-payment of taxes by political cronies, the distribution of state jobs by political patrons to followers (with corresponding incompetence, indiscipline, and unpredictability in government positions), and the non-existence of the rule of law. Clientelism often operates within a political party, as in the case of the *Parti Democratique de la Côte d’Ivoire* (PDCI), or the Northern People’s Congress, 1960–66, an instrument of Northern Nigeria’s traditional aristocracy (Lemarchand 1972, pp. 68–90).

In the previous section, we linked weak states with predatory rule and accompanying rent-seeking by political élites. Political power backed by military coercion is a key resource for access to economically gainful activities. State weakening deteriorates into collapse when the state is ‘unable to control its territory, perform basic protective and regulatory tasks, or to provide a centre for identification and

participation by the citizens'. State failure, with an inability of state authorities to maintain public order, provides armed military and criminal groups the opportunity to seize power. The paucity of public resources to alleviate suffering exacerbates the humanitarian crisis (Väyrynen 2000b, p. 451).

2.3 Absolute deprivation

Absolute deprivation can also contribute to a humanitarian emergency. Protracted economic stagnation is likely to increase the probability of non-conflict components of a humanitarian emergency, that is, population displacement, hunger, and disease. As the literature on the economic struggle for bare survival under extreme distress shows (section 8.2 on Rwanda), economic Darwinism or a Malthusian trap tends to become dominant when food, resource, and employment scarcity becomes chronic. Under such circumstances, dog-eat-dog behaviour tends to prevail over the behaviour dictated by the legal rules and social conventions regulating access to resources, and over the moral and judicial condemnation of theft, robbery, and expropriation. Protracted stagnation is also likely to weaken community sentiments of solidarity *vis-à-vis* weaker groups and hence redistribution in their favour. Protracted stagnation may also spur élites to expropriate the assets and resources of weaker social communities violently, particularly if political, ethnic, or class tensions already exist (as in the case, discussed in Chapters 7 and 9, of Sudan in the 1980s).

The relationship between stagnation, economic Darwinism, and the breakdown of social cohesion needs to be qualified on several counts. Obviously, countries with higher initial incomes per capita can withstand longer periods of stagnation without experiencing major social tensions and may introduce economic reforms to address the sources of the stagnation. However, as Tanzania suggests, economic stagnation within a context of 'shared poverty' may not be inherently destabilizing at the local level. Predatory economic behaviour has a lower pay-off in mineral-export-poor economies, such as Ghana, Tanzania, and Togo that have a longer gestation time for production. In addition, of major relevance is the effect of stagnation on the provision of basic needs and infrastructure, and the impact of these factors on social and political integration. Finally, repression and political control may, at least temporarily, avoid the violent manifestations that could otherwise emerge if economic destitution continues unabated.

2.4 Changes in international terms of trade

The causes and accompaniments of economic stagnation or decline vary enormously. Two factors that appear to be most frequently related to the explosion of humanitarian emergencies are worsening international conditions and the failure of agricultural development.

In low-income countries, a major factor contributing to the explosion of humanitarian emergencies is worsening international conditions. In developing countries, sudden external shocks and long-term deterioration in the international economic position can contribute to stagnation or precipitous slumps. Valpy FitzGerald (2002) argues that low-income countries (LICs) or least developed countries (LLDCs) are vulnerable economies, because of 'poor levels of economic and social infrastructure, and [the fact that] their public institutions have few resources to resolve internal conflicts'. Thus exogenous shocks that can be absorbed in middle-income economies and developed countries (DCs) may in LICs engender large changes in the inter-regional or inter-group distribution of income, threaten survival income of a large portion of the population, and reduce the state's capacity to provide public goods. Abrupt shocks may include large shifts in terms of trade, falling development assistance, and interest-rate shocks (factors frequently observed in the early 1980s and 1990s), while protracted deterioration may include a long-run decline in commodity terms of trade, increasing debt-service burdens, rising foreign protection, or the gradual exclusion from international capital markets and flows of foreign direct investment.

Terms of trade shocks can be severe. For example, during its slow and negative per capita growth, sub-Saharan Africa experienced declining commodity terms of trade (price index of exports divided by the price index of imports) – a fall of 52 per cent from 1970 to 1992 (or 38 per cent from 1980 to 1992). Sub-Saharan Africa's income terms of trade or export purchasing power, the commodity terms of trade times export volume, declined 46 per cent from 1970 to 1992 (or 29 per cent from 1980 to 1992) (see Figure 2.1).⁷ This fall in the sub-Sahara's commodity terms of trade over a period of one to two decades is consistent with the Prebisch–Singer thesis that the terms of trade of countries (mainly Africa and other LDCs) producing primary goods (food, raw materials, minerals, and organic oils and fats) decrease in the long run. The bulk of the extensive evaluation of this thesis for the century before the 1970s, which Nafziger (1997, pp. 502–5) summarizes, indicates that when we adjust for biases, primary producers' terms of trade still deteriorate, although by a smaller magnitude than Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer thought. The




Figure 2.1: Sub-Saharan African commodity and income terms of trade, 1972-92 (1970 = 100)

Source: Nafziger 1993, p. 68.

substantial fall in export purchasing power and material levels of living made the region more vulnerable to political crises (Nafziger 1993, pp. 67-71).

Declines in terms of trade and aggregate income exacerbated Nigeria's political vulnerability. Nigeria's fall in GNP per capita (in constant prices), 72 per cent, 1980 to 1990, and from 1990 to 1994, an additional 15 per cent (76 per cent accumulative) (World Bank 1996a, p. 34), almost without peacetime precedent in the rapidity of its collapse, was largely from a breakdown in the terms of trade. After 1973, petroleum has comprised more than 90 per cent of Nigeria's export revenues. Nigeria's terms of trade in the late 1980s were one-third to one-sixth the 1981 oil-driven peak. From a peak in 1980, Nigeria's export purchasing power (or income terms of trade) fell 72 per cent in 1982 and 60 per cent in 1983 (Figure 2.2), placing a large burden on the newly re-elected government of President Shehu Shagari, which was overthrown by the military (Nafziger 1993, pp. 67-9).

Nigeria's negative net transfer of resources, 12.5 per cent of exports, 1984-86, from a continuing depressed terms of trade, closely approxi-

mated the war-reparations transfer burden borne by Germany, 1925–32 that contributed to the depression, unemployment, and resentment that fuelled the rise of Nazism. In Nigeria in 1985, during the depression at the peak of this resource transfer, the Mohammed Buhari military government was overthrown by Major-General Ibrahim Babangida (Nafziger 1993, pp. 27–8, 67–9, 129–34). Although changes in the terms of trade, net resource transfer, and other economic variables do not by themselves determine irregular power transfers or civil wars, these economic changes bear watching as signals for pressures on regimes, especially those such as military regimes that have lost legitimacy with their populations.

Also, between 1986–87 and in the early 1990s, Zambia’s conflict with the IMF over eliminating maize meal subsidies, which contributed to urban riots and political instability, occurred after a decade of collapsing copper prices (1975–85) and several years when the annual debt service was almost one-half as much as export receipts, as in the mid-to late 1980s (Auvinen 1990). While the distributive effects can vary, and some of the countries affected have been able to adjust, the depressive effect of these trends on weak economies, especially those difficult to restructure, are largely unavoidable.




Figure 2.2: Nigeria’s commodity and income terms of trade, 1970–90 (1980 = 100)
 Source: Nafziger 1993, p. 69.

2.5 Economic regress and emergencies

Since economic deceleration or collapse can disrupt ruling coalitions and exacerbate mass discontent, we should not be surprised that since 1980 the globe, particularly Africa, has been more vulnerable to political violence and humanitarian emergencies. From 1960–73 to 1973–96 (and especially after 1980), growth decelerated in both LDCs and DCs (Nafziger 1997, pp. 13–7, based on World Bank data). Africa especially experienced a great descent in real GDP per capita after 1973. In sub-Saharan Africa, growth fell from 2.0 per cent yearly, 1966 to 1973, to –0.7 per cent yearly from both 1974 to 1984 and 1985 to 90, and –0.9 per cent from 1991 to 1994 (World Bank 1996a, p. 77; World Bank 1996b, p. 18).

FitzGerald (2002) found that the income terms of trade (or export purchasing power) of LLDCs, largely primary exporters, was low and volatile in the last two decades of the twentieth century and declining in the 1980s, at least in countries involved in conflict (see Table 2.1). Price fluctuations increased income uncertainty and reduced investment. This increased LLDCs' vulnerability to conflict.

The majority of countries with humanitarian emergencies have experienced several years (or even decades) of negative or stagnant growth, where growth refers to real growth in gross national product (GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Virtually all countries experiencing emergencies in 1992 to 1995 (listed in section 1.2 for 1990–2000), were preceded by slow or negative economic growth. Indeed twelve of the sixteen Afro-Asian countries listed, had negative growth in the preceding period. Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sierra Leone (from sub-Saharan Africa), Lebanon, Algeria (from the Middle East), Afghanistan,

Table 2.1: Trends in the purchasing power of vulnerable economies' exports

<i>Annual change in the income terms of trade (%)</i>	<i>1980–90</i>	<i>1990–93</i>
All LLDCs	0.1	4.8
Conflict LLDCs	–1.3	1.5
Non-conflict LLDCs	8.9	0.7
Sig. Diff. Means?	No	No
Sig. Diff. Variance?	No	Yes
All LDCs	1.8	8.0

Source: FitzGerald 2002, p. 68.

and Iraq (from Asia) had negative growths in real GNP per capita in the years 1980 to 1991, while Burundi, South Africa (the sub-Saharan), Sri Lanka, and Turkey (Asia) had positive growths (World Bank 1993b, pp. 238–9).

Widespread negative growth among populations where a majority is close to levels of subsistence increases the vulnerability to humanitarian disasters. Consider low- and middle-income (developing) countries. From 1980 to 1991, 25 of 35 (71 per cent of) sub-Saharan African countries and 40 of 58 (69 per cent of) Afro-Asian countries experienced negative growth, according to the World Bank's *World Development Report* (1993b, pp. 238–9). In contrast, from 1960 to 1980, only 8 of 29 (28 per cent of) sub-Saharan countries and 9 of 53 (17 per cent of) Afro-Asian countries (which includes three, Israel, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which have since graduated to high-income-country status) had negative economic growth, according to the earlier World Bank annual (1982, pp. 110–11). In addition, the positive growth of Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1960s and 1970s also reversed to a negative rate in the 1980s, according to the same World Bank sources. The following discussion suggests that the increase in intrastate humanitarian emergencies in the early 1990s is linked to the disastrous growth record of the developing world (except East, Southeast, and South Asia) in the 1970s and 1980s; moreover, sub-Saharan Africa's economy was virtually stagnant throughout the 1990s.

As indicated before, there may be a fine line between an emergency and endemic poverty. Indeed Christian Morrisson (2000, pp. 207–27) shows that, where there is already serious poverty, humanitarian emergencies can occur during stabilization programmes that include high price increases for food bought by poor households and the absence of a safety net in the adjustment programme. Moreover, harsh repression of political discontent following an adjustment programme can trigger a limited humanitarian emergency, which however can be avoided by improving the sequence of timing (for example, avoiding abrupt changes reducing the living standards of the poor) of adjustment and by compensatory transfers to poor households (*ibid.*). Chapter 9 discusses how adjustment and stabilization programmes need to provide compensatory transfers or other safety nets for the weaker segments of the population.

2.6 The effect of growth on emergencies

Frances Stewart, Frank Humphreys, and Nick Lea (1997, pp. 11–41) show that humanitarian emergencies contribute to falls in GNP per

capita.⁸ The GLS Prais–Winsten model in Auvinen and Nafziger (1999, pp. 280, 289 and Appendix Table A1.6) indicates that some of the impact of economic growth on humanitarian emergencies is carried over from past interactions between war, refugees, and economic growth.

When we estimated two-stage least squares models, with humanitarian emergencies and economic growth as the endogenous variables, to correct for the possible simultaneous equations bias caused by the two-way causality, the coefficient of GDP growth increased threefold for all three variables for measuring emergencies. There seems to be a two-way causal relationship between GDP growth and humanitarian emergencies but the relationship is stronger from GDP growth to emergencies than vice versa. This finding is supported when we apply different lag structures on the OLS and GLS models (Appendix Tables A1.10–A1.11). A poor economic performance, as indicated by sluggish real GDP growth, seems to be an important variable in explaining the rise of humanitarian emergencies, but emergencies also feedback to reduce growth. Section 2.7 discusses countries that show a high correlation between slow growth and humanitarian emergencies.

2.7 Developing countries with economic decline and emergencies

In Africa, Angola and Mozambique, which fought wars of independence until 1975 and for years after that against forces supported by the United States and South Africa,⁹ both suffered massive economic disruption during much of the last two decades. Sudan and Ethiopia, fighting civil wars in the 1980s, also suffered from economic collapse during the 1980s. Somalia's negative per-capita growth during the period of General Siad Barre's authoritarian regime from 1969 to 1991 turned to more rapid economic decline during the fighting between factions during 1991–92, and was not reversed during the United Nations humanitarian intervention of 1992–94. The economies of Liberia and Sierra Leone, which experienced economic decline during the 1980s, virtually collapsed during their conflicts during the 1990s. Liberia's GNP fell an estimated 77 per cent from 1989 to 1993, while Sierra Leone's GNP declined by about one-half between the start of the civil war in 1991 and 1995 (Reno 1996b, p. 1).¹⁰

In Asia, Afghanistan's growth, which was slow before the Soviet coup of 1978, was highly negative during the subsequent wars with guerrilla forces. While data are scarce, economists believe that Myanmar's inter-

nal conflicts prevented positive economic growth during the 1980s and early 1990s.

On the other hand, the civil war by the government of Sri Lanka with militant Tamil separatists from 1983 until the present devastated only a small portion of the country. As a result, Sri Lanka's moderate growth in gross domestic product per capita and high levels of social indicators (literacy and life expectancy) among Asian countries in the 1970s remained during these years, although because of wartime capital destruction, the growth of *net* domestic product per capita would have been slower. In a similar fashion, Turkey's conflict with its minority Kurds had little effect in slowing down overall growth.

During the Iran–Iraq war, 1980–88, Iraq's GDP per capita (in constant 1980 prices) fell by 58 per cent. The United Nations' comprehensive embargo on Iraq beginning in August 1990, followed by the United States-led bombing and war with the US and United Nations of January–February 1991, contributed to a further 64 per cent decline in GDP per head (cumulative impact since 1980 was an 85 per cent fall) by 1991. From 1991 to 1994, average GDP declined an additional 33 per cent, for an accumulative fall of 90 per cent! (Alnasrawi 1996.)

In Latin America, Nicaragua had a negative growth in GNP per capita of 4.4 per cent yearly, 1980 to 1991 (World Bank 1993b, p. 238), which included a decade-long war with the United States and its Contra supporters. Guatemala has suffered economic decline from its decades-long civil war and conflict with rebels, while Peru experienced an economic setback from attacks beginning in the late 1970s from the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path), based in the poverty-stricken Andean region, who were skilled in rural guerrilla warfare.

In Central and Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, from 1980 to 1990, real GDP per capita declined and annual inflation averaged more than 35 per cent. Since the breakup of Yugoslavia and the war of the early 1990s, Bosnia-Herzegovina's economy has been massively disrupted, leading to its further collapse (Woodward 1995a), while Croatia, although it resumed growth in 1994, had a real GDP in 1996 36 per cent below its 1989 level (Bartholdy 1996, pp. 282, 291).

The breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in a reduction of inter-republic trade by 46 per cent in 1992.¹¹ Kasper Bartholdy (1996, pp. 282, 291) indicates that all of the former Soviet republics experienced an income collapse in the early 1990s, even if we assume that as much as one-fifth of income, from the black market or informal sector, is unreported. Among these were several republics facing humanitarian crises in the 1990s: Russia (with a secessionist conflict in

Chechnya), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan (Bartholdy 1996, pp. 282, 291).

Only a few of our countries of focus had positive growth. Rwanda's economic growth was positive until the mid-1980s, when it turned negative due to an agricultural crisis (Uvin 2000, pp. 166–70). Burundi grew moderately during the 1980s, not suffering from negative growth until its crisis from 1993 on. Urban and rural violence in Colombia, which includes clashes between the army and guerrillas that displaced hundreds of thousands of Colombians in the 1990s, has not prevented the country from a moderate rate of economic growth in recent years.

Economic growth was slow or negative among countries at war in the 1980s and 1990s, indicative of a two-way causal relationship between economic decline and emergencies.

2.8 Inflation

Our regression analyses indicate that inflation, as measured by the annual percentage change in the consumer price index, is associated with humanitarian emergencies (Appendix Tables A1.5 and A1.6). We did not expect this, since real economic growth adjusts for inflation, and the distributional aspects of inflation would be captured in income inequality. The relative invariability of data on income distribution (from infrequent surveys, so that 33 of 76 countries for which we have data had no more than one change in their Gini coefficient between 1980 and 1995) means that we can rarely measure shifts in income concentration. Inflation, measured here on a year-by-year basis, may capture the destabilizing effect of income distributional shifts¹² on political violence and emergencies, an effect that cannot be captured due to Gini's invariability in our data set. Inflation redistributes income, at least in the early stages, from low-income workers and those on fixed incomes to high-income classes.

Testing lags indicates that humanitarian emergencies may give rise to inflation rather than, or as well as, the other way around: the associations are strongest two years after the emergency (Appendix Table A1.15). While examples of emergencies being cause rather than effect are numerous, we list only a few. After a decade-long civil war, with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, technicians, and aid in 1989–91 (Rubin 2000, pp. 32–43), Afghanistan fell victim to hyperinflation. Iraq experienced galloping inflation during the 1980s as a result of war with Iran and in the 1990s after the war with the US and UN (Alnawrawi 2000, pp. 91–105).

Inflation is indicative of an unresolved conflict over income claims that the government has not been able to accommodate. Relative deprivation theory suggests that the more rapid the inflation, the more discontented the population, and the greater the likelihood of political conflict. Inflation reduces purchasing power and breeds uncertainty within different social groups, both rich and poor. Acute inflation can erode (and hyperinflation confiscate) the wealth of those rich and middle-class people who have failed to invest in foreign exchange, real estate, and other speculative assets whose short-term capital gains protect against rapid price increases. Among wage earners and pensioners, governments may seek to maintain legitimacy and power by indexing wages and prices to compensate their major constituencies – the military, government employees, and organized labour in the politically mobilized urban areas, penalizing those who are left outside the system. This frequently includes poor people in the informal sector, who are rarely crucial for the government's support.

To avoid social unrest, the government may compensate informal-sector poor by some means such as subsidies for food and fuel. In the absence of any indexation, the 'inflation tax' contributes to a growing sense of social and economic injustice among those who are not compensated. This is the basic mechanism through which inflation may serve as a source of discontent and incite conflict behaviour, particularly in the cities.

The thesis of inflation's politically destabilizing effects is backed by other empirical evidence. According to Roberto Franzosi, political strikes can be expected to vary directly with high levels of inflation, although the relationship may be correlational rather than causal (Franzosi 1989, pp. 348–53). In Latin America, 1976–82, inflation was associated with 'austerity protest' (Walton and Seddon 1994, p. 44). Furthermore, in sub-Saharan Africa, inflation was found to be particularly destabilizing, whereas purchasing-power growth decreased the number of disturbances (Morrisson *et al.* 1994, pp. 10–11). In general, social unrest from inflation and other forms of macroeconomic instability sometimes invites repressive responses from authoritarian regimes, which tend to fuel violence and spur humanitarian crises.

2.9 Unemployment

In Africa, low agricultural productivity and stagnant farm employment, part of Africa's food and agricultural crisis discussed in Chapter 5, spur rural–urban migration, increasing pressures on the urban labour and

housing markets, and expanding the potential for political discontent and a humanitarian emergency. Sub-Saharan Africa's labour force growth was 2.5 per cent annually between 1980–92 and 2.7 per cent yearly between 1992–2000. Assume agricultural employment remains constant, so that growth is in industry and services. Since these non-agricultural sectors employ one-third of Africa's labour force, these sectors would have to increase their total employment more than 8 per cent annually to absorb the 2.7 per cent labour force growth (as $0.33 \frac{1}{3} \times 0.081 = 0.027$). Virtually no African country's nonagricultural employment grows this fast, especially when you consider that increasing capital intensity means that output in non-agriculture must grow faster than its employment (Nafziger 1997, pp. 249–52).

Slow urban and nonagricultural output growth and low productivity on farms contribute to what most economists think are high rates of urban unemployment and underemployment in Africa. Still, the relationship between employment and output is less certain in Africa and other LDCs than in the West because businesses in LDCs often respond slowly to increased demand for output, labour supply in urban areas responds rapidly to new employment opportunities through migration from rural areas, LDCs have fewer monetary and fiscal policies to affect aggregate demand and employment, and (with capital-intensive production) employment growth is usually slower than output growth (Nafziger 1997, p. 257). Moreover, few African countries have figures on unemployment, and those that do have substantial margins of error. As the International Labour Office (1995, pp. 15–21) indicates, in Africa and other LDCs, statistics from household surveys, while generally more reliable than data from unemployment registries or insurance systems, are deficient because of inadequate infrastructure, errors in sampling method, and the inexperience and lack of training of interviewers and supervisors.

While statistics on employment are scant, the information available indicates that the unemployed in Africa and other LDCs are most often young, urban, educated males (Endale 1995, pp. 30–7; Nafziger 1997, pp. 245–53), who are potential sources of social unrest and political discontent. Moreover, there is some evidence on the effect of competition for employment, labour unrest, and their exploitation by political élites on inter-state and inter-ethnic violence that escalates to humanitarian disaster. Abbas Alnasrawi (1992, pp. 339–40) sees high and rising unemployment, together with an oil price collapse, unprecedented inflation rates, and recurrent shortages, as fuelling Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. And in Nigeria, communal employment conflict,

intensified by policies instigated in response to a large body of unemployed, was a major factor contributing to the interrelated political crises of the 1964–65 election violence, the January and July 1966 coups, and the 1967–70 civil war. Urban people out of work, particularly school leavers and dropouts, proved to be social dynamite in the hands of Nigeria's regional upper classes.

In Nigeria, by the mid-1960s, vacancies in the civil service were scarce because the indigenization in the civil service during the previous decade or so, was virtually complete (except in the Northern Region). Educated Southerners were especially frustrated as less qualified Northerners were advanced over them to give regional balance to the federal civil service. While Southern governing élites expanded the number of posts and intensified policies of regional discrimination in employment in reaction to the decline in openings, there was a limit to the growth of jobs that the political élites could provide to placate disgruntled graduates.

In May 1966, Northern Nigerian university students, who stood to lose virtually guaranteed high-level positions in the regional government, and Northern civil servants, held protest demonstrations against a fresh military decree that replaced the regional federation with a unitary administration and unified civil service. These protests gave impetus to the unrest of such marginal urban groups in the North as the unemployed, daily paid labourers, and petty traders and contractors, threatened by Igbo competition. These groups, who established a symbiotic relationship with the pre-coup Northern ruling élite, the Native Authorities and Northern politicians, spearheaded the 29–30 May riots in the North in which hundreds of Igbos were killed and much of their property was destroyed. Later, at the September 1966 constitutional discussions between federal and regional military leaders, those supporting the old ruling class of the Northern Region were jolted by the Northern (and federal) military leaders' about-face from confederation to federation. In an environment of distrust and animosity, this volte-face provided the immediate sparks for several days of popular violence and disorders directed against Igbos and other Easterners in the North beginning on 'Black Thursday', 29 September, and climaxing 1 October, when army troops stationed in Kano, Northern Nigeria mutinied against officers restricting them from killing Easterners. The disorders appeared too far-reaching and well ordered to have been spontaneous, and can be interpreted as a desperate last-ditch strike by the insecure former ruling Northern élite at the most vulnerable groups available.

Political thugs, including those used by the old Northern élite in September–October 1966, were recruited largely from the ranks of the unemployed. And the large number of displaced and destitute persons in the East, who were driven by pogroms in the North to their ethnic homelands, constituted a combustible and easily manipulated group for the pursuit of military mobilization, secession, and territorial extension.

Throughout most of the period since independence, Sri Lanka's urban unemployment rate has been high (Olsen 1989, p. 27). In the late 1970s, unemployment among persons with some secondary schooling was more than 20 per cent (Squire 1981, p. 70). The high unemployment, together with Tamil overrepresentation in the universities and civil service during the first decade after independence, sparked anti-Tamil riots and put pressure on Ceylonese political leaders to adopt pro-Sinhalese language and employment policies in the 1950s. And, as pointed out earlier, Tamil demands for a separate state were closely linked to declining opportunities in employment, especially in the central and provincial civil services.

The link between low agricultural productivity and urban unemployment and underemployment is likely to be substantial. However, since LDC unemployment data, where they exist, have large margins of error and are difficult to compare crossnationally, and *underemployment* figures are virtually meaningless (Nafziger 1997, pp. 247–8), we lack global generalizations concerning the relationship between underemployment and humanitarian emergencies. Most likely, policies to increase growth and improve labour-market effectiveness (*ibid.*, pp. 245–69) will reduce the threat of unemployment as a tinderbox to war and emergencies.

2.10 Conclusion

Econometric and case-study evidence indicates that, holding other variables constant, slow real GDP growth helps explain humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian emergencies also contribute to reduced (often negative) growth, although, according to our econometric tests, the direction of causation is weaker than from growth to emergencies. Still, contemporary humanitarian disaster in developing countries is rarely episodic, but is usually the culmination of longer-term politico-economic decay over a period of a decade or more. Negative growth interacts with political predation in a downward spiral, a spiral seen in African countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Zaire (Congo). For most African and many Asian and

Latin states, the vision at independence of steady political and economic development toward convergence with Western nations (see Patel 1964, pp. 129–30) has been a delusion.

Table 2.2 contains a matrix of poor and slow-growing countries. Of the 31 economically most vulnerable countries, 16 have experienced a

Table 2.2: Economically most vulnerable countries (GNP per capita, 1998, less than US\$3,100, with negative per capita growth, 1990–98)

<i>GNP per capita, less than US\$ 800</i>	<i>GNP per capita, US\$ 800 to less than US\$ 3,500</i>
Afghanistan*	Albania
Angola	Algeria
Armenia	Belarus
Azerbaijan	Bulgaria
Bosnia & Herzegovina*	Croatia
Burundi	Estonia
Cameroon	Georgia
Central African Republic	Iraq*
Comoros	Kazakstan
Congo-Brazzaville	Korea, Dem. Rep.*
Congo-Kinshasa	Latvia
Eritrea*	Lithuania
Guinea-Bissau	Macedonia*
Haiti	Paraguay
Kenya	Peru
Kyrgyzstan	Russia
Liberia*	Romania
Madagascar	Swaziland
Moldova*	Turkmenistan*
Mongolia	Ukraine
Myanmar*	Uzbekistan*
Niger	Yugoslavia*
Rwanda	
Sierra Leone	
Somalia*	
Tajikistan*	
Togo	
Turkmenistan*	
Yemen, Rep. of	
Zambia	
Zimbabwe	

* Growth estimated by the authors.

Note: Burkina Faso and Sudan would be included in the left column and Paraguay in the right column if GNP per capita was for 1995 and per capita growth was computed for 1985–1995. World Bank, 1997b, pp. 214–15, 248.

Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2000, pp. 202–05.

humanitarian emergency from 1980 to 2000 (based on section 1.2). The 15 countries that have not experienced an emergency are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Moldova, Mongolia, Niger, Togo, Turkmenistan, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. From this list, only four countries, viz. Cameroon, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia and Turkmenistan, have been spared serious political conflict during the period.

Of the next most vulnerable group of 22 countries, eight have experienced a humanitarian emergency: Algeria, Croatia, Georgia, Iraq, Democratic Republic of Korea, Russia, and the former Yugoslavia, while Macedonia experienced a major conflict in 2001.

Given the strong association between the level of economic development and humanitarian emergencies, it is from this list of the economically most vulnerable that we can expect to find the countries plunging into humanitarian emergencies in the early decades of the twenty-first century. Hence, the list in Table 2.2 can serve as an early warning device for countries vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies and a guide for international agencies focusing on preventing emergencies. Let us hope that this will not turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

3

Ethnicity, Political Economy, and Conflict

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998, p. 567) find that ‘the probability of civil war and its duration are a function of the gains from ... and the costs of rebellion, made up of the opportunity costs of conflict and the cost of coordination, [based on] four proxies, namely per capita income, the natural resource endowment, population size, and the extent of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation.’ They rely on a variable of cultural distinctness, ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), first used by P. Mauro (1995, p. 692) to explain the rate of growth. ELF is based on *Atlas Narodov Mira* (Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the USSR 1964), ‘whose goal was to provide an extremely accurate depiction of the ethnolinguistic composition of world population’ (Mauro pp. 692, 711). For Collier and Hoeffler, all variables in the equations are significant in explaining war duration, and all variables except ELF are significant in explaining the probability of war occurring (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, pp. 568–9).

In our econometric analysis, we tried variables from Ted Gurr’s Minorities at Risk database (1993) that is based on a more contemporary designation of ethnic minority group than the Soviet source of 1964. While the impact of the research design cannot be altogether excluded, the correlations between the Minorities at Risk variables and our dependent variables were found to be weak and more consistent with the following interpretation, which starts by examining the colonial legacy, government policies, and regional and ethnic competition for the benefits of modernization.

Colonial rule exacerbated differences of ethnicity, region, and class in Africa and Asia. Indeed colonial governments did not need deliberately to divide to rule. Foreign rule itself is sufficient to cause division and conflict. Since hostility cannot be directed to the powerful foreign

oppressor, it is transferred to an indigenous scapegoat (Burton 1966, p. 124).

Communal conflicts and discrepancies originating during colonialism were often reinforced by post-independence policies that exacerbated regional and ethnic inequalities in income, employment, educational opportunities, and social services. Class and ethnic identities cross-pressure African and Asian workers and peasants. Most élites received their support from ethnic and regional bases, allied with other communal élites to control the state, and used this power to distribute benefits to their communities. The communal competition for these benefits transfers potential hostility from class differences to the élites and masses of others.

Ethnic identity is less a primordial phenomenon than an awareness formed in the process of modern social competition and political mobilization. Ethnicity, when implicated in humanitarian emergencies, is created, manifested, combined, and reconstituted in struggles to share benefits from modernization and self-government but is not a source of these struggles (Nafziger *et al.*, 2000). This view, similar to that of Jennifer Widener (1999, p. 406), is 'Ethnic identities are socially constructed, highly malleable, and situationally defined.' For example, the concept of the Yoruba people in Nigeria expanded under British reorganization since the beginning of the twentieth century, when Yoruba referred only to the people of Oyo. Élites use identification with ethnic and regional communities, and even accentuate them, to transfer potential hostility from inequalities and power disparities within their communities to the élites and subjects of other communities. Gérard Prunier (1995, pp. 140–1) explains that if ethnic communities or

tribes did not exist, they would have to be invented. In a world where illiteracy is still the rule, where most of the population has horizons which are limited to their parochial world, where ideologies are bizarre foreign gadgets reserved for intellectuals, solidarity is best understood in terms of close community. In turn, these positive (or negative) group feelings are manipulated by the élite in their struggles for controlling scarce and even shrinking financial, cultural and political resources. Rwanda offers a perfect example of this process.

Jocelyn Alexander, Jo Ann McGregor, and Terrence Ranger (2000, pp. 305–06) argue: 'The salience of ethnic antagonism in some recent

wars cannot be explained as the inevitable resurgence of ancient tensions – rather, they are the product of a reworking of historical memories in particular political contexts. ... [E]thnicity is widely understood to be unnatural, to be historically “invented,” “constructed” or “imagined” and used “instrumentally” by politicians.’ Frequently ethnic antagonism emerges during conflict rather than being the cause of conflict. Or as Richard Sandbrook states (2002), during a political crisis people identify with their primary community (ethnic group, religion or clan) ‘to regain a sense of security and power’.

Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (1970, pp. 1112–30) challenge the premise that new roles created with economic development and social change undercut ‘tribalism’ and communalism. Instead, modernization reinforces communal conflict and creates conditions that lead to new communal groups and ethnic identities. They credit Nigeria’s rapid economic growth for ‘sowing the seeds’ of the nation’s ethnic conflict in the late 1960s.

Melson and Wolpe (1970, pp. 1115–18) also contend that differential rates of development between ethnic groups and attempts to narrow the differences exacerbate conflict. At independence in 1960, Southern Nigeria had more experience in parliamentary government, higher literacy, and higher economic development than Northern Nigeria. Northerners resented the disproportionate representation of Southerners in skilled positions in the army and civil service, and the immigration of Southern entrepreneurs and technicians to the North. Policies of regional discrimination and protection in the North to reduce sub-national differences, and responses to the policies in the South, contributed to the bitter enmity that broke up the Nigerian Federation during the late 1960s.

The salience of multiple levels of identities – extended family, sub-group, clan, ethnic or linguistic community, nation-state, or world region – varies, depending on the nature of social interaction and conflict. Thus, for example, in Zaire in the 1950s and early 1960s, Mongo self-awareness grew with the competition for education, government jobs, and political office, but declined after President Mobutu Sese Seko seized power in 1965, regrouped provinces, and eliminated electoral politics (Anderson, von der Mehden, and Young 1974, pp. 28–78). On the other hand, Igbo identity in Nigeria, enhanced by the competition for benefits from the nationalist movement and decolonization from the 1940s through the early 1960s, increased in the mid- and late 1960s with the competition for government jobs, the election crises and coups, the politicization of the army, the violence against Igbos in

the North, the return of Igbos to their ethnic homeland, the inter-regional contention for oil revenues, and the Biafran secession and civil war, 1967–70. After the Biafran defeat, Igbo identity declined. In East Pakistan (Bangladesh after 1971), Muslim identity asserted itself with the nationalism and the partition of the Indian sub-continent between a Hindu-dominated India and Muslim Pakistan. However, as the East's resentment festered from a lack of sharing in the economic fruits of independence and modernization, Bengali nationalism grew. Later, with conflicts with West Bengal and India over water (discussed below) and border regions, Bangladesh emphasized its Islamic identity rather than its Bengali nationality.

In the 1980s in South Africa, ethnic consciousness and cleavages were deliberately aroused as part of government divide and rule implemented through the security apparatus. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party used cultural symbolism to strengthen his and his party's political power. During the most violent phase of the conflict from 1991 to 1993, ethnic identities became further strengthened and reified, and their relevance as sources of political mobilization increased (Auvinen and Kivimäki 1998, p. 42; Taylor and Shaw 1992). In a similar way, Milosevic redeemed Serb nationalism by evoking the painful memory of the Kosovo Polje battle of 1389. In Somalia, President Siad Barre succeeded in holding power for 13 years after his failed military campaign in the Ogaden in 1977–78 by manipulating clan identities and thus dividing the opposition into several different movements. However, this strategy led to his ousting in 1991. By having fuelled clan antagonisms, Barre made the instrumental use of clan affinities much easier for his opponents, who could build on his work (Auvinen and Kivimäki 2000, pp. 187–230).

In a departure from Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 567), in which ethno-linguistic fractionalization explained civil war and its duration, Collier (2000b, pp. 12–13) contends that:

Ethnic grievance is actively manufactured by the rebel organization as a necessary way of motivating its forces. As a result, where conflicts occur in ethnically diverse societies, they will look and sound as though they were caused by ethnic hatreds. ... Conflict is not caused by divisions, rather it actively needs to create them. When such conflicts are viewed during or after the event, the observer sees ethnic hatred. The parties to the conflict have used the discourse of group hatred in order to build fighting organizations. It is natural for observers to interpret such conflicts as being caused by ethnic

hatred. Instead, the conflicts have caused the inter-group hatred and may even, as in Somalia, have created the groups.

This position is similar to ours. This chapter discusses regional, ethnic, and clan conflicts in Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Somalia. Except for Nigeria, these conflicts took place under conditions of slow growth or, in the case of Rwanda since the mid-1980s, negative growth. The evidence suggests that politico-economic factors, such as historical legacies, government policies, and regional and ethnic competition, are instrumental in contributing to humanitarian disasters. Ethnicity is less a primordial phenomenon than a sentiment formed and strengthened in response to government policies and during social competition and political mobilization. Ethnic identity changes amid conflict, continually being re-formed and reshaped in response to politico-economic change.

3.1 Nigeria and Pakistan

This section shows how political economy provides a better explanation for the origins of humanitarian emergencies than ethnicity, despite a superficial correspondence between ethnicity and political violence. We focus on two secessionist civil wars accompanied by state violence: Nigeria (1967–70), in which the Eastern Region unsuccessfully attempted to gain independence as the Republic of Biafra, and Pakistan (March–December 1971), in which East Pakistan succeeded in its bid for independence as the Republic of Bangladesh. In the Nigerian–Biafran war, perhaps four million people died from hunger and other war-related causes and several million people were displaced. In the war between West and East Pakistan, millions of people were killed and millions of others dislocated. Most of the war victims were East Bengalis, including many who fled to India near the end of the war.

We emphasize the longer-run conditions underlying secessionist conflict rather than on questions of how either war was precipitated or ultimately resolved.¹ We examine the causes of these wars in the following categories: the colonial legacy, the post-colonial international economic system, elite economic interests, class structure and conflict, ethnic and regional economic relationships, and economic policy.

Colonial and global factors have more of an *indirect* effect on war. The polity and economy, their rules and institutions, and the shape of class relationships and elite structure at political independence are very much a product of the policies and relations of the colonial era. In the

post-colonial global system, the DCs (the West and Japan) with their means of coercion (military, economic, and political power) and superior resources (aid, investment, and trade with the former colonies) relate to LDCs so there may be common interests between the élites of the DC and the LDC even when there is a conflict of interest between the DC and LDC in general. The DC develops a bridgehead in the LDC enabling the DC to maintain political and economic hegemony in the LDC and to support those in the LDC willing to cooperate, that is, those whose interest is generally consistent with the DC. The commonality of interest between élites in the DC and LDC corresponds to a disharmony of interest between the élites and masses in the LDC (Galtung 1971, pp. 83–4), which becomes the basis for political discontent and the risk of deadly political violence. Internal economic factors – regional economic rivalries, conflicts among élite groups, class conflict, and domestic economic policy – that are partially shaped by international variables – influence the probability of war and humanitarian emergencies. This approach, while not rejecting the influence of ethnicity, emphasizes the affect of the political economy – competition for employment and business activity, the accentuation of ethnicity by ruling élites to transfer hostilities from class inequalities, and the rise of ethnic identity in response to a lack of participation in the benefits of nationalism or modernization.

3.1.1 The colonial legacy

In the century or so before World War I, Britain occupied the central position in the international economy as the major banker, trader, investor, and industrialist. Colonies, such as India (which before 1947 included present-day Pakistan and Bangladesh) and Nigeria, became integrated in to the system as economic dependents specializing in primary products instrumental to the industrial developing of the leading industrial countries. Integration of peripheral countries within the world system affected their boundaries and political structures, which helped contribute to political instability after political independence. By providing the overriding economic and political opportunity structure within which individual and collective competition was to operate, colonial rule conditioned the growth of nationalism, communalism, and regionalism.

3.1.2 The differential impact of colonialism

The impact of British rule differed substantially from regional to region within Nigeria and India. The coastal areas of Southern Nigeria and East Bengal, where British intrusion was of longer and more intense

duration, had more experience in parliamentary government, a greater political consciousness, higher literacy, and more developed industrial capitalist institutions, than inland regions.

Bengal, most of which became East Pakistan in 1947, had become an important administrative and trading centre after the British East Indian Company gained a foothold there in the late seventeenth century. Bengal was given legislative institutions in 1861, and Punjab, the largest West Pakistani province, in 1897. In Nigeria, British administration was not formally established until 1900, but coastal groups, particularly in the Niger Delta region, had already experienced economic contact with the West for more than two centuries.² Africans were represented in the Legislative Council in Southern Nigeria after 1923, but in the North not until 1946.

British suzerainty was exercised in Northern Nigeria and in parts of West Pakistan under 'indirect rule', an arrangement mutually advantageous to the colonial power and to the native princes and emirs. Britain economized on officers and utilized indigenous systems of tax collection and maintenance of order, while the traditional rulers, under British hegemony, obtained security through the elimination of important sources of both external and internal opposition. The maintenance of these indigenous chiefs hampered the development of nationalism and a strong native bourgeoisie, and strengthened the concentration of land and power among overlords and zamindars. Princely states, which joined Pakistan, maintained a semi-independent status long after independence.

3.1.3 Communal and regional conflict

The British, by use of the classic techniques of divide and rule, helped create or exacerbate differences of class, caste, region, and ethnicity among the people they ruled. In part, this was accomplished by bringing diverse ethnic communities, with separate historical identities, under a common administrative and economic system, and also by perceiving alien societies in racial categories.

In Nigeria, especially before World War II, the British supported the development of separate institutions and identities for different ethnic and religious communities, and a system of 'native administration' to foster communal loyalty. In the early 1920s, Governor Hugh Clifford clearly emphasized that the idea of a Nigerian nation was both inconceivable and dangerous. Even the nationalist leaders before 1934 tended to think of nationalism in terms of regional or ethnic community (Coleman 1958, pp. 192–210).

In India, where conflict and competition between Hindu and Muslim led ultimately to partition and the creation of Pakistan, the British encouraged the development of separate legal, political, and social institutions for different religious, caste, and ethnic communities, especially when these demonstrated loyalty to the colonial rulers. The army was recruited among (usually dependable) ethnic groups regarded as 'martial races', which included the Pathans and Punjabi Muslims from (then) northwestern India, but excluded Bengalis. The consequence of this policy after independence was a Pakistani military with a very disproportionate representation of Westerners, who felt a disdain for their Bengali countrymen.

By providing protection to loyal communities, such as the Muslims in India, and regional élites, such as the Northern traditional aristocracy in Nigeria, the colonial power impeded assimilation and integration. The British support of Northern resistance to a Nigerian self-government dominated by Southerners led to agreements in 1953–54 and 1958 to leave the North intact with a majority of representatives in the Federal legislature. In both India and Nigeria, the creation of new administrative units led to the evolution of new communal identities, and the strengthening and politicization of old ones. Migration under colonial aegis brought groups into closer contact under competitive conditions. Thus, Punjabis reacted adversely to Bengali officials of the colonial government, as did Northern Nigerians to the influx of Igbo workers.

3.1.4 Nationalism

Nationalist movements are generally spearheaded by those whose personal and collective destinies are tied to the removal of alien rule and economic domination. Communalism or ethnic nationalism grows stronger as other groups perceive their own lack of participation in the benefits of modernization and self-government and join the struggle. In Nigeria, the heightening of Yoruba nationalism in the West beginning around 1948 was partly in response to the disproportionate weight of Igbos in the leadership in Nigerian national movement. Hausa–Fulani nationalism was aroused later in response to the threat of Southern economic and political supremacy. In Pakistan, the overriding salience of Hindu–Muslim conflict overshadowed and even precluded the development of other ethnic cleavages until after independence. The dominant cultural group in Pakistan – the Urdu-speaking immigrants from North India – displayed little respect for the language or culture of the majority Bengalis until compelled by political pressure to do so after nearly half a decade of independence.

3.1.5 Patterns and processes of decolonization

Former ruling powers may affect the polities and economies of their colonial possessions long after departure, by the manner in which they leave. Partition and federalism were two devices by which the British retained their influence in former colonies.

Partition left Pakistan, created from the economic backwashes of India, without a major industrial or urban economic centre. Traditional commercial patterns between the jute-growing areas of East Bengal and the major jute-processing centre of Calcutta were broken. Trade with India dropped from more than 65 per cent of Pakistan's total foreign trade in 1948–49 to about 3 per cent in 1951, not rising above 6 per cent for any year in the 1950s (MacEwan 1971, pp. 42–52). A large portion of the class, which had been associated with commerce and, the embryonic beginnings of manufacturing was lost by their exodus to India. The vacuum was filled by a new class of Muslim industrial capitalists, whose power and influence grew during succeeding years.

Federalism, both in Pakistan and Nigeria, was designed to prevent national domination by a popular majority, but in practice facilitated regionalization of political support, and ultimately the domination by an élite from ethnic communities, which represented a minority of the population. The fragility of the federal structure given to both countries is demonstrated by the changes made in subsequent years.³ The political organization which served as the prime vehicle for the nationalist movements in the 1940s, the Muslim League in Pakistan, and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), increasingly lost ground to more regionally-oriented political parties with the rising subnational consciousness of the 1950s. The League, which had secured the independence of Pakistan, lost heavily in the 1954 provincial elections in the East to the newly formed Awami League. From 1951 to 1960, each of the three major Nigerian political parties, which played leading roles in unifying and mobilizing the regional socio-economic élite, achieved security and hegemony in one region only. The contradictions which arose when the security of one regional élite interfered with that of another were important factors contributing to the coups and civil war in Nigeria (Olorunsola 1972, pp. 23–26; and Nafziger 1973, pp. 508–16).

Another legacy of British rule enhanced by the methods of decolonization adopted in Nigeria was an efficient and professional military establishment, generally isolated from and antagonistic toward popular political movements. British commanding officers were retained well

after independence, thereby increasing the military's political isolation. In both countries the military was drawn into political intervention shortly after the departure of the British commanding officer.

In Pakistan, the military intervened in 1958 to forestall a threatened loss of power by the West to the East in the upcoming elections, and in 1969 to restore order after riots occurred in both wings of Pakistan. The 1958 establishment of martial law thus consolidated the domination of the predominantly West Pakistani industrial and commercial capitalists, civil servants, army officers, and technocrats (Wright 1973, pp. 13–15).⁴

In Nigeria, the efforts of the mutineers in the *coup d'état* of January 1966 and the succeeding Ironsi government can be interpreted, in part, as an attempt to ensure the security of the Southern and, more specifically, the Igbo élite, by the removal of the firm hold of Northern emirs and administrators on the federal government. The countercoup of the following July, directed against Igbo domination of the military government, was led by representatives of the smaller ethnic minorities, especially from the lower North.

Though the evidence presented thus far does not support the theory that states as diverse as Pakistan and Nigeria were doomed from their inception, it does reveal that British colonial rule has had an extensive and varied impact on ethnic and regional identities and interests, class structure, political parties, and the successive government structure in independent Pakistan and Nigeria.⁵

3.1.6 International economic linkages after independence

Colonial policy which discouraged industrial growth, integrated the peripheral economies into the world economy, and helped create and support a native élite oriented toward cooperating with the colonial power, facilitated Pakistan's and Nigeria's economic dependency after political independence. Although Pakistan extricated itself from the British colonial nexus to a greater extent than Nigeria, it did not cut its dependency on DCs, but largely replaced British with American domination. The Pakistani political leadership negotiated a long-term military and economic aid pact with the United States in 1954. The continuing political, military, and economic assistance from the United States, which provided the resources and support for a perpetuation of the West Pakistani ruling group, kept the country open to foreign investment and trade, and allied to the West. These ties, however, were costly to the Pakistani population at large, influencing the balance of internal political forces, affecting the shape of class,

making available additional means of repression against dissidents, and ultimately contributing to increased political instability. In Nigeria, British private capital, together with aid programmes, cemented the pro-British sympathy of the Northern-dominated civilian government. The Northern ruling aristocracy, highly sympathetic to British economic and military interests in Nigeria, and opposed to the influence of communist countries, could reasonably expect the British to resist any threat to Northern hegemony and regional security, including the danger of a high concentration of Southern high-level personnel in the North, and threats from radical socialists or from potential Southern dominated ruling coalitions. However, the supremacy of the Northern traditional rulers exacerbated the unrest of the Southern proletariat and bourgeoisie.

By the period after World War II, the international division of labour had shifted so that some LDCs were specializing in light manufacturing goods, in addition to primary products. In 1969/70 in Pakistan, 55.7 per cent of exports and 55.0 per cent of imports were secondary goods (chemicals, machinery, transport, equipment, and manufactured goods) compared to 2.7 per cent of exports and 86.9 per cent of imports in 1954/55'. Yet most of Pakistan's (Ministry of Finance, 1971-72) secondary exports in 1969-70 involved the processing of raw materials, or light manufactures; for example, 40.4 per cent of exports were jute, cotton, or leather goods. On the other hand, Nigeria (1968, p. 20) still maintained a colonial-type pattern in 1965, with 7.8 per cent of exports and 80.9 per cent of imports secondary (industrial) goods.

After World War II, trade with the United States expanded at the expense of the colonial power, Britain. Despite this, in 1965 the United Kingdom was still by far the major trading partner of Nigeria, accounting for 38.5 per cent of the exports and 30.9 per cent of its imports. In the 1960s, the largest share of Pakistan's imports (for example, 38.6 per cent in 1964-65) was from the United States (Pakistan 1972: appendices pp. 71-77).

Both Pakistan and Nigeria were highly dependent on patron nations for external financing. However, the chief form of this in Pakistan was loans, investment, and aid, from the US government, in contrast to private capital flows from the United Kingdom to Nigeria. The United States provided 64.3 per cent of the grants, and 42.7 per cent of total assistance (grants and loans) to Pakistan from 1951 through 1971. The aid consortium, representing the DCs, contributed 93 per cent of total assistance to Pakistan from 1951 to 1957. In 1969/70, Pakistan received

Rs. 3.100 billion in foreign grants and loans, to compare with a balance of trade deficit of Rs. 2.690 billion (from exports of goods and services of Rs. 4.350 billion). Debt service obligations (virtually all of which were owed to the Consortium of western countries, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank) as a percentage of foreign exchange earnings increased from 3.6 per cent in 1960/61, to 9.9 per cent in 1964/65, to 25.3 per cent in 1970/71 (Pakistan 1972, pp. 79–81).

Development plans and strategies, dependent on foreign aid for a large percentage of projects, were submitted to the Consortium, which frequently insisted on changes before committing funds (Hamid 1970, pp. 132–3, 146). The US, for example, with a contribution of 18.6 per cent of the total amount of Pakistani development projects in 1966, could control most of these, as technical and financial assistance was distributed over a large number of government projects (Alavi and Khusro 1970, pp. 64–6).

The overriding influence of the United States in the economy of Pakistan distorted its economic development, and took away potential gains in government policy and technical project development that the indigenes could have received from experience, and learning by doing. Foreign aid gave a major impetus to the emerging industrial capitalist élite (disproportionately migrants from India at the time of partition), allied with and overlapping with large landowners, top civil servants, and army officers in the Punjab. The severance of Pakistan from the more industrialized parts of India and the flight of the previously dominant Hindu mercantile community at the time of partition gave further impetus to the new manufacturing and commercial entrepreneurs of Pakistan. The maintenance of a coalition of the business class with the older élite was only possible with the large injection of military, economic, and technical aid in the 1950s and early 1960s, and the concomitant rapid economic growth, especially industrial growth (MacEwan 1971, p. 48). This support was needed so that enough patronage, perquisites, and resources were available to satisfy the various economic interests within the coalition, and to have sufficient access to a range of sanctions and rewards to consolidate control and to prevent restiveness among the lower élites.

Foreign assistance, primarily from the United States, then, helped in the creation of a new capitalist élite, who in coalition with other conservative forces placed little emphasis on improving the level of living of the poorer half of the population. As indicated below, Pakistan's rapid growth in the first two decades of independence was accompa-

nied by a decline in real wages, and in foodgrains per capita. Assistance allowed the United States to have a role in the shaping of forces contributing to the rising Pakistani élite – an élite whose interest would be consistent with US economic and political hegemony in Asia. However, military support, accounting for approximately one-fourth of US aid to Pakistan in the 10 to 15 years after independence, allowed the ruling élite to maintain power despite this neglect of the population at large (Alavi and Khusro 1970, pp. 64–6).

Yet the existence of this coalition depended on continued military and economic support from the United States. This support plummeted sharply after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, while Pakistan's debt servicing ration was increasing. Total assistance by the US declined from \$964.280 million in the Second Five-Year Plan (1960–65) to \$668.799 million in the Third Five-Year Plan (1965–70), while grants decreased even more drastically (Pakistan 1972, appendix p. 89). The decline in foreign help for the coalition of élite meant that some elements in the alliance would have to be suppressed. The withdrawal of the support of the landed élite threatened the power of the capitalist class, who lacked the power to overcome this élite and its military allies (MacEwan 1971, p. 48).

In Nigeria, in 1964, foreign interests – primarily British – owned three-fourths of the book value of industrial assets from firms in Nigeria with a value of ₦25,000 (about \$70,000) or more. At the same time, 90 per cent of total demand deposits were held in banks where foreign capital was at least a majority. Concessions granted by government to business, such as income-tax holidays, favoured the large corporate foreign sector. Debt servicing became a major problem just before the civil war, as in 1966 the net international outflow was greater than the net inflow of private direct investment, by ₦73.4 million to ₦55.0 million, a reversal from 1960–64 when its annual average was less than the net inflow by ₦33.0 million to ₦12.3 million. Furthermore, a major argument for overseas investment, which centres on the necessity to transfer techniques of modern production, had been of little validity in Nigeria where foreign firms had remained technological enclaves that contributed little to the indigenous sector.

Foreign investors during the civilian regime formed partnerships with members of the governing élite or their business constituents, or with parastatal corporations, which widened the patronage base; or rendered other favours or provided concessions for the business interests of the leading politicians. Business interests by foreigners in

Nigeria were generally supplemented by overseas political, military, and economic assistance, designed to help support those who wished to keep the country open to foreign investment and trade, and closed to communist influences. British trade, investment, and assistance cemented the pro-western sympathy of the Northern-dominated civilian government, which could reasonably expect the British to resist any threat to Northern supremacy.⁶

British foreign policy throughout the Nigerian crises, the two coups in 1966 and from the beginning of the civil war, was consistent with support for an economically integrated area that would leave the Federation open to international trade and investment. After the July 1966 coup, British and (in some cases) American diplomats were influential in dissuading Head of State Yakubu Gowon from announcing the disintegration of the Federation, and in discouraging those who attended the September constitutional conference and the January 1967 Aburi conference from agreeing on confederation. The insistence on a strong Federation helped foreclose a possible compromise between the East and the rest of Nigeria based on a looser confederation.

In June 1967, the British government, a majority shareholder in Shell-BP, countermanded its offer of a token payment of \$UK250,000 on the oil royalties demanded by Biafra. Doubtless, in the wake of a disruption of oil supplied from West Asia, Britain did not wish to risk severing her increasing shares of oil originating outside Biafra, in the Mid-West and offshore oil wells. After the first months of the war, the United Kingdom prodded by Soviet support to Nigeria, increased its military sales and diplomatic support to the Federation, assistance which contributed to the eventual Nigerian victory.

British foreign policy in favour of a united Nigeria and US military and economic support of the dominant coalition of West Pakistanis, helped preclude the possibility of a relatively peaceful breakup of the countries, and exacerbated the level of political violence.

3.1.7 Class formation and conflict

The strength and position of broad socioeconomic groupings in society, conditioned by colonial and neocolonial political and economic factors, constitute important background considerations in explaining secessionist conflict (see Moore 1966). The relative position and regional distribution of such 'social forces' and their representation in the ruling élites of Nigeria and Pakistan served to intensify regional identities and competition and to lay the ground for seces-

sionist civil war. The dynamics of élite formation and class composition in both countries led to the subordination and transformation of intraregional class and ethnic differences to interregional cleavages. At the same time, the decline in economic opportunities relative to economic aspirations intensified the feelings of discontent that helped to fuel the civil war.

In Pakistan, landlords, zamindars, traders, lawyers, and other professionals were formed as a part of the élite in the West in the one-half century before independence, as a result of their leadership role in the movement of Muslim nationalism in India (through the vehicle of the Muslim League, in opposition to the larger nationalist movement, led by the Indian National Congress). These were joined after independence by an emerging class of Muslim industrial and merchant capitalists, the essentially newly created civil service, army officers, and white-collar workers. The competition between elements of the landed, industrial, and bureaucratic élite for state power and economic benefits in a period of decelerating economic growth in the late 1960s, and the higher aspirations of those not yet a part of the élite, helped contribute to the subsequent disintegration of the Pakistan nation-state.

Section 4.3 indicates that land inequality in West Pakistan was more concentrated than in the East and that virtually all indigenous industrial investment, 1947 to 1958, was by west Indian emigrés or West Pakistanis who invested in the Western wing. The industrial élites, with their allies in the bureaucracy, used the levers of the state economic policy and planning to give their enterprises privileged protection from foreign competition; ready access to licences for foreign exchange and domestic inputs at less than a market price; and subsidies or tax concessions. The feudal and business élite in the West feared a strong capitalist and middle class in the East. From 1950 to 1957, with Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy, founder of the Awami League, based in the East, the government awarded more import licences to newcomers in import trade (particularly from the East), distributed US aid for modernizing industry disproportionately to the East, gave the East parity with the West in the allocation of foreign exchange, and proposed to establish a public shipping corporation for coastal trade between the wings to compete with private shippers in the West. The vehement reaction by the coalition of landed and business interests in the West, encouraged President Iskander Mirza to compel Suhrawardy's resignation, after which most measures which benefited aspiring business groups in the East were cancelled (Papanek 1962, pp. 46–58; Ali 1970, p. 61). The class struggle, from the view-

point of major Bengali interests, became increasingly identified as a regional struggle against the supremacy of the Western wing.

In Nigeria, the traditional Northern ruling aristocracy and the nationalist leaders were joined by far-sighted chiefs, senior civil servants and government administrators, leading business people, and professionals in the 1950s to form the political élite. Once this élite mustered a majority at the centre, it was able to control the dispensation of a wide range of political favours and economic sanctions to retain its position and power, and keep the underprivileged classes subordinate.⁷

A major restive element, especially in Nigeria, was the relatively deprived and politically discontented members of the educated classes. Just after 1947 in Pakistan, and in the 1950s and 1960s in Nigeria, a large number of élite positions in the civil service, armed forces, police, government corporations, and universities were opened in a short period of time. However, by the late 1950s in Pakistan, and the middle 1960s in Nigeria, there were only a few vacancies, since the process of indigenization was virtually complete and those who had been only recently recruited were still relatively young.

Younger men, especially in Southern Nigeria (with a high educational rate, and virtually complete indigenization) and East Pakistan, became frustrated with the abrupt decline in openings. The substantial unrest by students, who perceived themselves as a part of a future élite and, at times, an alternative present élite, stemmed, in part, from frustration over the sharp decline in high-level employment. Parallel frustrations were to be found among the military in both countries. One of the roots of the aborted Rawalpindi conspiracy to overthrow the Pakistan civilian government in 1951 was the considerable unrest among officers caused by high expectations created with the swift promotions from junior to senior ranks. A drop in the rate of openings and promotions was a major factor explaining the low morale in the army before the revolt by the Nigerian majors in January 1966. By the 1960s, the scramble for the few remaining posts was very intense, and regional competition for these contributed to the enmity and bitterness which set the spark for the civil wars.

Labour was relatively weak and unorganized in both Nigeria and Pakistan after 1950, with the overwhelming majority of the population 'self-employed' in agriculture, petty trade, or crafts. Thus, in Nigeria, wage-paid employment comprised only about 5 per cent of the economically active population of 17.6 million in 1965. In Pakistan, the nonagricultural labour force constituted 8 per cent of the economically

active population in 1961. Furthermore, in the 1950s and 1960s the labour movement in both countries was fragmented into hundreds of trade unions, and into several feuding, ideologically divided labour federations (Maniruzzaman 1966, p. 94).

Labour discontent in both countries resulted from a growing sense of injustice at the wide gap between the incomes of entrepreneurs and white-collar workers, on the one hand, and blue-collar workers, on the other. After Nigerian independence in 1960, with the British no longer the whipping boy, many workers gradually began to feel that the political élite was making no effort to erase the inequities of the colonial wage structure. This consciousness, together with the awareness of frequent exposes of corruption among African leaders, resulted in the erosion of legitimacy attached to the wide income gap, especially among urban workers.

In the fiscal year 1963/64, supervisors in the public service were paid 33 times as much as daily-paid and semi-skilled workers, compared to a multiple of 5 to 10 in the United States and about 5 in the USSR. Indirect taxes were high, and personal income tax rates were low (that is, a 3.2–6.0 per cent average rate for single persons in the 99th percentile income class – an annual income of ₦700), and regressive in all regions except the East. To exacerbate the frustration, the government, which helped set the pattern for wages and working conditions in the private sector also, had not increased wages since 1959, despite an increase in overall prices by 2.5 per cent annually, and an annual real growth in GDP per capita of about 4 per cent from the fiscal year 1959 to 1963 (Aluko 1969, p. 16; Adedeji 1969, p. 188). Furthermore, the high rate of unemployment and the ethnic competition for jobs contributed to labour unrest.

In response to worker dissatisfaction the major labour federations joined together to form the Joint Action Committee, which mobilized 800,000 supporters to stop work for 13 days in June 1964, to pressure the government to raise wages and salaries. The strike disrupted the vital economic and administrative services of the country, posed a challenge to the legitimacy and authority of the civilian government, demonstrated its ineptness and powerlessness, raised questions about the future use of the army and police for the repression of popular demands, and increased the likelihood of further attempts by dissident forces to use political violence to effect political change (Cohen 1974, pp. 166–8). Much of organized labour supported the progressive opposition to the Northern-dominated coalition in the 1964–65 election boycott and constitutional crisis, and at the end of 1965 workers

helped to foment the mass violence directed against a Northern-supported Western regional government with little popular support. These events, especially the near anarchy in the West, were precipitants for the military mutiny of January 1966 that set the stage for the countercoup and civil war.

One distinct feature of the strategy of Pakistan's Planning Commission, supported by official and foreign economists, was a conscious promotion of income inequality to achieve a high rate of domestic savings and economic growth. The concentration of income and wealth in the hands of high-income groups was a key ingredient in a strategy that used government policies regarding taxes, subsidies, licences, and foreign exchange to redistribute resources from agriculture to industry, and from East to West Pakistan. In the 15 years before 1967, when this strategy was promoted, real wages in industry declined by at least 25 per cent, while the real per capita gross income of the country increased by 21 per cent (Griffin and Khan 1972, pp. 199–206); Pakistan, 1972, appendices pp. 2–3).

In Pakistan, where political parties and independent trade unions were suppressed during the late 1950s, and early 1960s, the most politically mobilized segment of the population was the students. They formed the vanguard of the revolts, subsequently joined by workers, against the rule of General Ayub Khan in the 1960s (Ali 1970). After 1966, however, Pakistani labour was mobilized in both wings as discrepancies between their static or declining real wages, and the increasing incomes for élites became more obvious. Through tactics of direct action, the workers won wage increases, and participated in toppling the Ayub regime.

The demands of labour in West Pakistan, directed against the Ayub government, remained essentially based on class. In East Pakistan, however, labour discontent was also channelled into support for regional autonomy. In turn, the entry of workers into the fray further radicalized the student activity and increased the level of violence in the East.

3.1.8 Development planning and industrial policy

In both countries, the central government pursued projects and policies primarily oriented toward benefits for a 'modernizing' élite – the capitalist and bureaucratic classes in Pakistan, and the politico-bureaucratic élite and their business constituents in Nigeria – and their allies among the landed and feudal upper classes. Planning and implementation were hamstrung by the desire of the ruling élites to keep control of the bounties distributed by government.

In Pakistan, after the Six Year Development Programme initiated in 1951 was not completed because of the lack of planning machinery, the planning commissions of the next three plans (1955–70) relied heavily on foreign advisers (Waterston 1963, pp. 13–129). In Nigeria, the earliest national plans, between 1946 and independence, were framed by colonial administrators. Even the First National Development Plan after independence (1962–69) was drawn up primarily by foreign economists.

Planners in both countries, assisted heavily by US agencies, favoured an emphasis on decision-making by private units, a stress on marginal government adjustment rather than fundamental structural change, the eschewal of increased tax rates at high-income levels (to encourage private incentives), an accent on a high economic payoff from directly productive investment (as opposed to an indirect return from social overhead capital), a conservative monetary and fiscal policy with an emphasis on relatively few expenditures for social welfare, an economy open to foreign trade and investment, and a substantial reliance on overseas assistance. There was little coordination between the planning units, dominated by foreigners, and the government officials in the formulation of the plan. This deficiency was one reason for the lack of implementation of plan projects (Stolper 1962, pp. 85–91; Ghose 1968b, p. 177; Jiliani 1968, p. 362; Allan 1968, pp. 219–21).

Albert Waterston (1963) and Arthur Lewis (1967, pp. 37–9) suggest some major weaknesses of planning in both countries between independence and the civil war were: incomplete feasibility studies and inadequate evaluation of projects, meagre public participation, especially at the regional and local levels; excessive political intervention in the making of economic decisions; lack of authority of the planning units relative to the ministries; insufficient attention to the small indigenous sector; inadequate emphasis on the agricultural sector; and unsatisfactory machinery for the implementation of projects in the public sector. If a strong programme had been designed to foster economic development among the masses, the power and privileges of the ruling élite would have been threatened – especially in West Pakistan and Northern Nigeria. A dispersion of economic power to the multiplicity of small business people without a quid pro quo would have threatened the economic interests of the political leaders – the viability and monopoly return of the business interests influential in government (especially in Pakistan) and the public corporations that served as a basis for the disposal of patronage (particularly in Nigeria). The 1962–68 Nigerian and 1955–70 Pakistan plans encountered major

shortfalls in expenditures as a result of the lack of clear identification of feasible projects, and a lack of details concerning supporting government policies. The lack of preparatory work by specialized professionals resulted from the ineffective coordination, a shortage of high-level personnel, and the introduction of political criteria for determining projects. Ruling élites lacked goals and priorities that could be articulated to the masses, and – preoccupied with the preservation of their power and access to patronage – did not encourage government decision making from below.

The dominant class in both instances had no desire to establish adequate machinery to implement and independently evaluate the plan. If such an apparatus had been controlled by professionals and bureaucrats not oriented toward the interests of the political leaders, this would have undermined a system by which they stood to profit. The lack of department reports, the secrecy of official information, and the paucity of programme evaluation, together with political intervention, allowed the political élite to keep control of the instruments vital for the maintenance of their influence. An emphasis on socioeconomic development for the low-income classes was no priority to ruling regimes preoccupied with the struggle to retain their power and perquisites.

One widely held prescription for increasing the rate of economic development and modernization, but at the same time enhancing the profits or patronage of the political leaders, has been the transfer of resources from the agricultural to the industrial sector. In Pakistan, the process of redistributing resources from agriculture to industry coincided with, and was an integral part of, a redistribution of income from the poor to the rich, and from East to West Pakistan. Because of the financially weak position of the emerging capitalists at independence, rapid industrialization could not be attained in a free, competitive market environment without assistance from government. State guidance was needed to indigenize and modernize the country through industrialization. Foreign exchange policy, together with the compulsory government procurement of foodgrains at low prices for urban areas, the generous tax concessions to industry, and the lack of these to peasant agriculture, had the effect of compelling the transfer of savings from agriculture to industry, especially in the first decade after independence. Conservative estimates, based on world prices, indicate that over 24 per cent of gross product originating in the agricultural sector – or about 70 per cent of its savings – was transferred to the nonagricultural sector in 1964–65. Perhaps as much as 75 per cent of this transfer

was used to increase urban consumption. The transfer of resources from farming occurred throughout the 15 years before 1964/65, when real rural income per capita was declining (Griffin and Khan 1972, pp. 26, 30, 134–6; Griffin 1965, pp. 637, 644–5; Chowdhury 1968–69, pp. 75–6).

In Nigeria, high tariffs on inputs for the production of domestic commodities, together with tariff rebates and tax incentives for pioneering companies and other favoured applicants, had the effect of benefiting selected manufacturing enterprises. Import taxes on a number of industrial materials were so high that many unsuccessful applicants for tariff relief on vital imports could not afford to stay in business, while favoured enterprises made sizeable gains, especially as a result of a lack of competition by other firms within the industry. Parastatal corporations dominated by leading politicians, or foreign or indigenous producers allied with them, were more likely to receive tariff rebates.

In contrast to Pakistan, in Nigeria the greatest pressure for increased protection for manufacturing was not from domestic producers, but from foreign capitalists and their local collaborators, including substantial numbers of the political élite. A primary motive for establishing foreign industry was to transform a highly competitive market in international trade to one where competition was virtually eliminated behind a protective wall (Nafziger 1973, p. 518).

A policy of transferring resources from agriculture to industry through commodity Marketing Board surpluses, agricultural export duties, and limited government expenditures in rural areas benefited the political élite in Nigeria, even though they were less involved in the private industrial sector than Pakistan political élite. Those controlling federal economic policy were involved in government industrial firms, collaboration with foreign enterprise, 'rakeoffs' on the contracts of foreigners, intermediary roles in land deals, sales of inputs and services, and positions on the boards of directors, in addition to private industrial activity.

In Nigeria and Pakistan, as workers and peasants became increasingly conscious of the way in which much of economic policy was being used on behalf of a narrow indigenous ruling élite, discontent with the political leadership intensified.

3.1.9 Regional economic competition and conflict

Regional and ethnic economic competition crosscuts class conflict.⁸ The dominant class accentuated the precolonial and colonial identification

with traditional political and cultural entities, and utilized – in furtherance of their own special interest – these sentiments, which became the ‘political formula’ used to transfer potential hostility from class discrepancies (within their own communities) to the rulers and subjects of others.

Muslim nationalism and the creation of Pakistan helped divert attention away from the way the upper classes were using the state at the expense of the population as a whole. Punjab identification with rapid economic growth and modernization in the region tended to detract from the deteriorating economic position of the Punjabi workers and small farmers.

Although the NCNC, the base for the nationalist movement in Nigeria in the 1940s, started as a pan-regional organization with some radical and trade union support, when the first elections were held in 1951 its strength remained only in the East and Lagos. The Action Group, which in the early 1960s became the first major party to try to mobilize its support on a pan-regional and class basis, was undercut by the ruling regionally oriented parties. From time to time labour parties were formed, but they won virtually no seats because of the small size of the wage-earning class and the cross-pressures between communal and class-oriented parties. Furthermore, in the North, consciousness and political mobilization on a class basis was minimal partly because of the dominance of a political and religious ideology that legitimized authority and inequality (Diamond 1966, p. 34).

Though the number of key ethnic communities and the relative distribution of political and economic advantages differed in Nigeria and Pakistan, in both cases competition for economic and political power became increasingly regional in character. Competition in Nigeria was primarily among the three major ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani (North), Yoruba (West), and Igbo (East), who eclipsed the smaller ethnic groups within these three major regions. The Southerners (Yorubas and Igbos) were aggressive, better educated, and more experienced in the modern sector than Northerners. But in the competition for jobs and business activity, the latter compensated for disadvantages by wielding political power at the federal level. The resentment of Eastern Nigeria arose from this competition for jobs and their substantial loss of relative standing around 1966, as well as the exodus of Eastern refugees from the North and other regions.

In Pakistan, competition was increasingly viewed as being between the Eastern and Western wings, especially with the consolidation of the West into a single province in 1955. While the ‘problem of parity’

was ostensibly one of balancing the power of two wings, in practice it meant that the majority in the East (with 55 per cent of the population) was effectively neutralized so as to give dominant Western interests unbridled sway in both political and economic spheres. It was an exploitative, colonial-type relationship, with some Bengali élite cooperating with the West Pakistanis to gain position and affluence. The resentment of East Pakistan arose partly from the lack of its sharing in the economic fruits of independence and modernization. The hopes of Bengalis, stirred by the fall of Ayub in 1969 and the 1970 elections, were thwarted by the manoeuvres of Western political leaders and the military. While the grievances of the East Pakistanis arose from heightened aspirations to alleviate their low economic position within the country, the discontent of Eastern Nigerians resulted from attempts to maintain a relatively high economic status within the Nigerian Federation.⁹

The dominant structural change in the Nigerian economy before the civil war was the rapid growth in the value of the output of crude oil, 78 per cent yearly between 1958 and 1966. By then Nigeria, with an output of ₦100 million, or 415,000 barrels daily, about two-thirds of which was in the East, ranked fifteenth in the world on the basis of crude oil production in that region alone (Nafziger 1983, pp. 104–07, 147–50).¹⁰ In the fiscal year 1966, the oil sector made a net positive contribution of ₦43.4 million to the balance on current and capital account, to counter a deficit balance of ₦54.2 million in other sectors. This is significant in an economy where merchandise exports were ₦279.0 million in the same year.

When viewed in 1967, the oil sector promised to be even more important in the future. Scott Pearson (1970, pp. 137–52) indicated that the positive balance-of-payments impact of oil in 1973 would be ₦111 million in an independent Biafra whose output would not be disrupted by war, and ₦160 million in Nigeria, each more than double the figure for the entire Federation in 1966. No doubt the political and military élites in the East and the Federation during the early to middle 1960s foresaw the potentially rapid growth in petroleum production. In the East, this perception of the future reinforced the case for autonomy. Biafran separation became inevitable with the creation of 12 states in May 1967, which undercut the regional hegemony of the ruling Igbos, who would have been left with control of the landlocked East-Central State, with merely 6 per cent of Nigeria's oil output in April 1967, and without the East's major industrial city and Nigeria's only oil refinery. Since, by and large, Biafra's potential gain constituted a loss for the Federation, the latter took measures to quash the rebels.

East Pakistan, like Eastern Nigeria and Katanga, resented the low proportion of foreign exchange it could use in relation to that which it generated. The East Pakistani demand for decentralization increased because of its strong prospective international balance-of-payments position, and the fact it could shed the burden of having foreign exchange diverted to the West.

Between 1949/50 and 1969/70, Bengal generated the bulk of Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings (with exports primarily of raw jute, jute goods, and tea) while the West used about 70 per cent of Pakistan's foreign exchange. This policy effected resource transfer from East to West, as the rupee was overvalued in international exchange. The East, as a price taker on its exports, received less local currency than at an equilibrium exchange rate, and still bought manufactured goods at inflated prices due to the high tariff. On the other hand, the artificially induced low price of foreign exchange encouraged an increase in the West's dollar imports of capital goods and industrial inputs, which exacerbated Pakistan's balance-of-payments problems.

In 1959/60, 58.6 per cent of Pakistan's exports were from the East, compared to only 26.6 per cent of the imports; in 1964/65, the corresponding figures were 52.7 and 31.7 per cents; and even in 1969/70, 50.0 and 35.6 per cents respectively. This is despite the fact that exports of raw jute declined and imports of foodgrains increased in the East, while manufacturing exports increased and foodgrain imports decreased in the West during the 1960s (Pakistan 1971, pp. 90–1), as a result partly of economic policy favouring industry and large-scale agriculture, which were concentrated disproportionately in the West.

The West was favoured when it came to development plan expenditures, receiving an expenditure per head 4.9 times as much as the East in 1950/51–1954–55, and even 2.2 times as much in 1965/66–1969/70. During the last part of the 1960s, Eastern agriculture remained stagnant while Western agriculture encountered breakthroughs, especially in wheat. In the West, large subsidies were given for farm inputs such as water, fertilizers, seeds, plant protection service, and pesticides, while the East lacked government assistance in drainage, irrigation, flood control, extension service, and credit. One of the most striking instances of exacerbating regional (and class) differences was that the high-yielding grain varieties associated with the Green Revolution were adapted to cropland under controlled irrigation – land owned primarily by rich commercial farmers in the West (Griffin and Khan 1972, p. 29; Bose 1972, pp. 69–93; Cleaver 1972, p. 181).

A major source of interregional contention in Nigeria was the determination of a formula for the allocation of oil revenue. The East was especially dissatisfied that, after 1959, only a fraction of the revenue from crude petroleum (that is none of the profits tax and only one-half of the rents and royalties) was received by the region of production in contrast to all the revenue from agricultural exports. Before 1959, all the revenues from mineral and agricultural products (that is, export duties) had been retained by the producing region. If all the government revenue from the crude-oil industry in the East in the war-affected year of 1967 had been retained by the region, it would have been equal to 59 per cent of its approved estimates for current revenue. The discontent of the East reached a peak in early 1967 when its Ministry of Information charged that the region had been contributing more to the central treasury than it was receiving, and had benefited least from the siting of Federal investment projects in the previous decades (Nafziger 1973, pp. 532–33).

One of the major grievances of East Pakistan was its substantial underrepresentation among the political élite, the bureaucracy, and the large bourgeoisie, even as late as the 1960s. In 1968, the representation of the East in the Civil Service of Pakistan was only 36 per cent, comparable to the East's representation in other government services. Only in the last part of the 1960s were a few Bengalis appointed to posts as high as secretary in the Central Government. None, however, was secretary or minister in the crucial Ministries of Defence, Home, and (except for a four-day portfolio) Finance. In the army, East Pakistanis constituted no more than 5 per cent of the officers in 1963, a figure that did not change in a major way during the 1960s. While west Indian business communities, Memons, Khojas, and Bohras, which comprised only 0.5 per cent of the Muslim population in Pakistan, accounted for 43 per cent of industrial investment by Muslims, Bengalis, consisting of 50 per cent of the Muslim population of the country, accounted for only 4 per cent of industrial investment in Pakistan between 1947 and 1958 (Ayoob 1971, p. 202; Papanek 1962, p. 54).

The rise of political discontent was dampened in the 1950s in Pakistan, while a façade of democracy was maintained, and the East's representation in the legislature was at least on a par with the West. But after the coup of 1958, with the legislature dissolved, the Bengali upper and middle classes felt politically impotent, with only limited representation in the army and civil service, and one in higher political circles. This feeling of political ineffectiveness, together with the growing economic

disparity between the Western and Eastern wings, was a factor contributing to the increased political violence directed against the military government of Ayub Khan by Bengalis in the 1960s.

In Nigeria, communal identity received its staying power because it was the major framework used by the political élite for distributing jobs to clients. Apart from the persistent clashes between the dominant and minority ethnic groups in the various regions, the Igbos, later dominant in Biafra, were at the centre of the communal competition for employment and business activity. Igbos competed with Yorubas for key positions in the federal civil service, and for other jobs in the modern sector in Lagos and the West, and with them and Northerners for positions in business and employment in government and foreign firms in the North.¹¹

In short, regional economic factors played a major role in fanning discontent in Eastern Nigeria and East Pakistan. East Pakistan, poorer than West Pakistan at independence, became more disadvantaged over time relative to the West. Additionally, the East was making little progress in terms of obtaining high-level positions in the economy and polity. As Easterners grew more conscious of the role of the coalition of Western landlords, industrialists, and army officers in using the levers of the state to increase regional income disparities, they became more restive. Their increasing aspirations and politicization, together with subsequent frustration with Western tactics to nullify any advantages of the electoral majority of their dominant political party, exacerbated their bitterness and discontent. Eastern Nigeria was by no means a disadvantaged region, and was more comparable to Punjab in relative economic position. Discontent in the East was partially linked to the possible decline in its relatively high economic status and the benefits from oil that formed a basis for its affluence. Additionally, policies instituted because of the dominance of the North, such as Northernization of the government and private sectors in the North, and quotas for the recruitment of armed forces personnel to bring Northern representation up to its percentage of the population, added to the anticipated loss of position as a result of the exodus of Igbos from other regions due to the violence of 1966, and led to fear of the relative decline in the Igbo and Eastern standing in positions of high-level personnel in the country.

3.1.10 Summary

Class, regional, and communal conflicts that influence the probability of secessionist war are affected substantially by the nature of the colo-

nial economic system and the post-colonial international economic nexus. In Nigeria and India, British colonial rule brought about imbalances in the mobilization of populations, reinforced or created ethnic identities, and provided a framework for competition between classes and regional groups.

The post-independence political and economic ties of Nigeria and Pakistan to Britain and the United States further intensified these imbalances by strengthening the dominant élite with each less-developed country. Military and economic assistance and private capital from the United Kingdom and the United States served also to shield this élite from peripheral groups within its own nation-state.

The dominant classes utilized sentiments associated with subnational identities to transfer potential hostilities from class disparities within their own communities to differences with and antagonisms toward other ethnic groups and regions. Major political élites pursued and implemented economic policies that served their economic advantage. These policies had the effect of threatening established regional economic interests in Nigeria. Though patterns of perceived deprivation thus differed in the two cases, both Bangladesh and Biafra came to view their membership within a federal union as one entailing persistent economic costs. The precipitants of the two political conflicts – the reorganization of the Nigerian federation and the postponement of the Pakistan constituent assembly – were only final steps on the long road to secessionist civil war.

3.2 Rwanda and Burundi

In Rwanda's precolonial history, there is no evidence of systematic violence between Tutsi and Hutu but clashes between Banyarwanda and foreign tribes or inter-lineage fighting. Indeed ethnographers regard the precolonial relationship between cattle-tending Tutsis as patrons and the Hutu agriculturists as clients as hierarchical, with an elaborate web of economic contracts and ritual exchange that provided for movement between categories (Gaffney 1994, p. 1). From 1959 to 1961, on the eve of Rwanda's independence, a small Hutu élite revolted against the Tutsi élite, protesting against the unequal treatment of the two élites by the Belgian colonial authorities. During that period, the Belgians broke with their protégés among the Tutsi élite and replaced most Tutsi chiefs with Hutu ones. The elections of 1960 and 1961, won by the Mouvement Démocratique Rwandais/Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu (MDR-PARMEHUTU),

completed the ethnic transfer of power to Hutus. Control of the state meant control of access to salaried jobs in the public service or in development projects, or even jobs in the private sector, which required Ministry of Labour permission. A UN Trusteeship Council report (1961) commented that 'An oppressive system has been replaced by another one.' Hutu violence, which killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands of Tutsis from 1959 to 1964, forced half the Rwandan Tutsis into exile, primarily in Uganda and Burundi, from which base armed Tutsis attacked Hutus in Rwanda. Meanwhile, during this period and extending through the 1990s, Tutsis were politically marginalized and restricted by quotas in positions in the civil service and army, although because of their higher levels of education, disproportionately represented in the private sector, especially with foreign firms and agencies.

Yet from the early 1970s to the 1980s, Rwanda's economic growth was positive and faster than growth in the rest of Africa. However, in the late 1980s, with collapsing coffee and tin prices and falling food production, Rwanda's Hutu political élite lacked the revenue and output base to provide the clientage base for regional leaders. In 1989, the central budget was reduced by 40 per cent, cutting spending for education, health, and infrastructure that hurt peasants and workers. At the same time, there was more discontent among Hutu intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and disadvantaged clans, with the narrowing of the ruling group to favour a small clique of army officers and business people (disproportionately from Gisenyi prefecture), the appropriation of forest land for a cattle-raising project that benefited political leaders, and the increased days of forced labour extracted from the population. The press and newly formed associations denounced government corruption and its promotion of ethnic strife to legitimize its hold on power. By late 1990, the Rwandan political system was on the verge of collapse. The civil war between the Tutsi-exile-led Rwandan Patriotic Force and the Rwandan government from 1990 onwards and government violence cost thousands of lives (both Hutus and Tutsis), created thousands of refugees, and diverted public funds. The pogroms of both Hutus and Tutsis in neighbouring Burundi in late 1993 and the assassination of Rwanda's President Juvenal Habyarimana in April 1994 provided the cue for a genocide of approximately 800,000 Tutsis within the next three months, set in motion, with numbing precision and elaborate preparation, by Hutu government officials, local authorities, and militiamen (Médecins Sans Frontières 1995, pp. 32–46; Prunier 1995, pp. 49–280; Uvin 1996; Gaffney 1996b, pp. 10–1). Indeed Human

Rights Watch (1995, viii) cites the Rwandan government in 1994 as an example of how

a government's willingness to play on existing communal tensions to entrench its own power or advance a political agenda is a key factor in the transformation of those tensions into communal violence. ... In the spring of 1994, a small group of Rwandan politicians, in an attempt to maintain their control of the government, directed fellow Hutu – the overwhelming ethnic majority in the country – to kill any and all members of the Tutsi minority, as well as Hutu moderates, who were also seen as a threat to their power ... to destroy the support base of the oncoming rebel army of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), a predominantly Tutsi force.

The political battle for Burundi's independence in 1962 had nothing to do with rifts between Hutus and Tutsis. The Union for National Progress (UPRONA), the nationalist victors of the 1961 election, drew from both ethnic groups. Ethnic chauvinism was initiated by the upper and middle classes who were influenced by the Rwandese revolt of 1959 to 1961. Hutus regarded this social revolution as a model, while Tutsis wanted to avoid this revolt at all costs. The breaking point took place in 1965, when Hutu gendarmes attempted a coup, which was followed by Hutu massacres of Tutsi farmers in midwestern Burundi. The Tutsis' lasting fear and ensuing repression incited efforts to edge out Hutus from political life. In 1972, in southwestern Burundi, Hutus rebelled and slaughtered several thousand Tutsis. The reprisal by the Tutsi authorities resulted in the genocidal killing of much of the Hutu élite, leaving the Tutsis with a monopoly of power in the army and administration. Indeed, although 84 per cent of Burundi's population is Hutu and 15 per cent Tutsi, since 1972 the Tutsis have dominated politics, the army, the universities, and the professions. In October 1993, elements in the armed forces attempted a coup, during which they assassinated Burundi's Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye. During the next two months, Hutu resentment fuelled the killings of an estimated 30,000 Tutsis, with retaliation by Tutsi armed forces, which killed 20,000 Hutus. The rising cycle of violence resulted in 700,000 refugees and hundreds of thousands of others displaced internally (Médecins Sans Frontières 1995, pp. 19–31; Gaffney 1996a; Prunier 1995).

3.3 Sri Lanka

Tens of thousands have died in the Sri Lankan civil war, which began with Sinhalese ethnic riots against Tamils in the early 1980s. In Sri Lanka,

the conflict is between the ruling ethnic group, the Sinhalese, with 74 per cent of the population, and the Tamils with 18 per cent of the population. The Sinhalese urban poor formed a volatile social base, readily mobilized for the benefit of the frustrated Sinhalese bourgeoisie. For the Tamils, demands for a separate state, military resistance, and the fighting of a civil war centred on grievances from discrimination and declining opportunities in education, employment, and other economic activity. The clamour for Tamil autonomy was intensified in 1958, with the banning of the nonviolent Tamil Federal Party and the house arrest of its leaders.

Conflicting historical myths about whether and by how long during the ancient period the Sinhalese (predominantly Buddhists) arrived on the island before the Tamils (largely Hindus) have helped to reinforce post-independence hostilities. The legacy of British colonial rule from 1818 to independence in 1948 exacerbated ethnic animosities.

In the late nineteenth century, Indian Tamils, which presently comprise 5 per cent of the population, were recruited to work on Ceylon's tea and coffee plantations. Indian Tamils, however, were denied citizenship until 1984, and were uprooted from work on the plantations, which were nationalized or distributed as estates only to citizens in the 1970s.

During the early twentieth century, Tamils, as Igbos in Nigeria, limited by population density from expanding their land holdings, were overrepresented in the public services and the professions, and well represented in jobs and businesses outside their regions of ethnic dominance. The majority Sinhalese, who resented the English examinations for the civil service and Tamil representation in government jobs, passed the Official Language Act of 1956, declaring Sinhalese as the only official language of Sri Lanka, a reversal of the early post-independence élite consensus that Sinhalese and Tamil jointly should replace English. Moreover, while Tamil was recognized as the national language of the Tamils and the administration language of the Northern and Eastern provinces, largely Tamil, in 1957, this concession was abrogated under Sinhalese protest the following year. The Tamils saw the economic advantages achieved during the British period rapidly eroded after independence. This is indicated by figures showing declining economic advantage or increasing economic disadvantage over time for Tamils on per capita income, university admissions (especially in science), and civil service employment (especially in the top grade) in relation to the share of population (Table 3.1). To fuel Tamil discontent further, the state sponsored colonization schemes in Eastern Sri Lanka, which were primarily utilized by Sinhalese. Moreover, the slow growth, high unemployment, and weak balance of payments

since independence have made it difficult to form ethnic alliances to share economic largess among both Sinhalese and Tamils (Olsen 1989).

The ethnic polarization between Sri Lanka's two major ethnic communities is exacerbated by some overlapping cleavages. The Sinhalese are predominantly Buddhist and the Tamils largely Hindus, differences

Table 3.1: Some measures of horizontal inequalities in Sri Lanka

	<i>Sinhalese</i>	<i>Sri Lankan Tamils</i>	<i>Ratio of Sinhalese to Sri Lankan Tamils</i>
Per capita income, 2 monthly, 1963 rupees			
1963	62.2 ^a	105.9	0.59
1973	75 ^a	75.8	0.99
Mean per cap. income, rupees			
	All island	NEP ^b	
1963	134	157	0.85
1973	228	273	0.84
1981/2	1111	1113	0.99
Share of University admissions in relation to 1981 share of population: Science			
1969–70	0.78	2.20 ^c	0.35
1977	0.99	1.30 ^c	0.76
Share of University admissions in relation to 1981 share of population: Total			
1969–70	1.09	0.86 ^c	1.26
1977	1.10	0.81 ^c	1.36
Educational attainment: no schooling			
1978/9	21.9	23.5	1.07
Educational attainment: A levels			
1978/9	1.6	1.6	1.00
Civil service employment: % in relation to 1981 share of population			
1955	0.77	1.44 ^c	0.53
1963	0.96	1.29 ^c	0.74
1979	1.15	0.72 ^c	1.60
Share of top grades state employment in relation to 1972 share of population			
1972	0.94	1.39 ^c	0.68
Recruitment to civil service, in relation to 1981 population share			
1970–77	1.18	0.61 ^c	1.93
1978–81	1.26	0.31 ^c	4.01

^a This represents the average of Kandyan Sinhalese and low-country Sinhalese

^b The NEP (Northeast Province) is where Sri Lankan Tamils are concentrated, accounting for 72% of the population

^c Includes Indian Tamils

Source: Stewart, 2001. The authors thank Frances Stewart for permission to reproduce this table.

that reinforce ethnic, regional, and language identities and grievances. In addition, while the Sinhalese were dominant in business and government, the Indian Tamils were disproportionately represented in the working class and as lower caste and class, even alienated from Sri Lankan Tamils.

3.4 Somalia¹²

In a similar way as ethnicity in many other societies, clans in Somalia form an important basis for group identification. Clans played a significant role in the conflict and humanitarian emergency in Somalia. Political élites, and in particular President Siad Barre, used clan identities to mobilize politically, which finally lead to the eruption of the conflict at the turn of the 1990s. And it is for this manipulation of clan identities and their consolidation that Somalia is yet to get on its feet, after 12 years of chaos and anarchy.

The war that ousted Siad Barre in 1991 and the humanitarian crisis that followed had been long in the making. Before the war, there had already been four different waves of refugees: one following the Sudano-Saharan drought (1973–75), another after the Ogaden war of 1977–78, the next from Ethiopia to northern Somalia between 1984 and 1988 and a final one from northwest Somalia to Ethiopia, fleeing Siad Barre's fierce attack on the city of Hargeisa in 1988. Due to the use of heavy bombing and artillery, the death toll of civilians only rose to between 50,000 and 60,000. Following the overthrow of Barre, a humanitarian crisis evolved and a fifth exodus of refugees rushed for Ethiopia. By 1992, the number of refugees in the adjacent region of Ethiopia was close to 600,000 and estimates of the number of returnees ranged from 55,000 to 117,000 (Hogg 1992; Ryle 1992, respectively), while the number of displaced persons was estimated at 305,000 (Ryle 1992). What kind of role did clan identities play in this human tragedy?

3.4.1 A clan identity basis

The reality of clan division and weakness of centralized political institutions in today's Somalia are primarily a product of realities of social interaction in the production of bare necessities for survival and provision of security in the traditional Somali society. As in many other cases, ethnicity, language, and religion owe their relevance in a given situation to an endowed material dimension (Markakis 1987, p. xvii). Pastoral production, the main source of livelihood in Somalia, has

required cooperation primarily within families in the everyday routines. Thus, lineage groups have become important for Somali individuals. The 'uncentralized political organization [in areas inhabited by the Somali] was based on ... "a segmentary lineage system" in which political identity and loyalty were determined by genealogical proximity and remoteness' (Lewis 1997, p. 181) Clans were aggregates of lineage groups, which had elected heads, and a council of family heads (male adults). The head of the clan, the sultan, was a figure-head rather than a powerful person, since most collective goods were produced in smaller units than clans (Lewis 1995, p. 2, in LSE 1995).

For security, traditional pastoral life has required groups who jointly defend their water supply and grazing. These so-called dia-groups were contractual groups that paid and received blood compensation for their members, consisting of few hundred to a few thousand men (Lewis 1965, p. 11), and each provided security to a sub-group of the clan (Markakis 1987, p. 17). Dia brought sometimes fellow clansmen against each other (Lewis 1980, p. 10), and these disputes were then settled within the clan, which consists of several closely related dia-paying groups, by using the help of 'peace-seekers' (Ugas 1997).

Reflecting the nature of moving pastoral production, larger groups than clans did not have much influence in Somali culture of power. Clan families, as the highest levels of potential political loyalty in Somali society, were alliances between related clans, but they were, before the introduction of national politics, too large to act as concerted groups on the ground (Lewis 1995, p. 2, in LSE 1995). Therefore, it can be said that the traditional Somali society was 'democratic to the point of anarchy' (Lewis 1980, p. 10) and very alien to the idea of states and nations. Before European colonization, Somalis did not constitute a state. It was not possible for moving groups of people to create wider stable institutions of cooperation and order. Thus the emergence of stable state institutions was not feasible. This is one of the reasons for the weakness of the Somali state still in the post-colonial context. Furthermore, the pre-colonial tradition of clan divisions is one of the preconditions for present fragmentation of the Somali society: clans have traditionally been oppositional units that can be mobilized in contested situations (Lewis 1995, p. 2).

The objective basis of the society and production is related to the problem that the traditional family/dia/clan loyalties, which are rational in traditional production, are reflected in national politics: politicians are maximizing the utility of their family/clan instead of thinking nationally. Even if national politicians have publicly

rejected clanism, they have done their best to advance clan interests (A. I. Samatar 1988; see also Laitin and Samatar 1988).

3.4.2 Mobilization of clan identity

In a society in which people identify themselves as members of clans rather than as Somalis, mobilization of rebellion can be achieved by using the existing clan identities. The case of Somalia exemplifies how existing group identities can help mobilization and increase the risk of violence. Mobilization along family, lineage, and clan lines makes rebellion not only easy but it also makes it prone to escalation. A conflict between a group of communists and a group of liberals would not involve 'ordinary', politically passive people. However, clan conflicts are like ethnic conflicts: there are no 'ordinary people' but instead everybody reveals his/her side in one's accent or in one's place of residence.

Structures of political organization provide explanations for the motives and means of violence, opportunities for mobilization, and lack of restraints in using violence. The structures have been shaped greatly by clan divisions. They not only constituted sources for political fragmentation and mobilization in political rivalries but also contributed to the motivation of discontent by hampering the foundations of popular sovereignty and democracy in Somalia.

Politics which is structured along class and clan lines – instead of abstract ideological lines – cannot be discussed at the level of principles: politics becomes a battle over national resources (Markakis 1987, p. xvi). For the opposition, the legitimation of power is difficult. If politics were discussed at the level of principles, it would be possible for supporters of the opposition to persuade government supporters to their camp. However, persuading an *Issaq* to become an *Ogadeni* is more difficult. Even a national election can look very much like a clan/class census. For the political opposition, non-violent alternatives for resistance are not available.

3.4.3 Clan-based mobilization of (and against) Siad Barre

Many of the sources of humanitarian emergency in Somalia can be traced to the violent rivalry between élites over state resources. This rivalry was evident already during the first years of independence. Even in the context of formal democracy, the state was the main objective and the main means of political competition for personal wealth in Somalia rather than being a vehicle for the maximization of public welfare. Because of this, political and ideological issues were sidelined

and the most important thing in politics was to assure a governmental position. After the 1964 elections more than one-third of the opposition members of the parliament joined the ruling party in order to assure favours from it. In the election of 1969 Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal openly raided the national treasury to buy votes and pressured the National Police Force to put troops and logistics at the disposal of his party apparatus (Laitin and Samatar 1995, p. 13; Lewis 1985, p. 204) to ensure victory. Furthermore, electoral rules were altered from proportional representation to a winner takes all system, which suited the ruling party well (Laitin and Samatar 1995, p. 13). A few days after the election, all but one member of the opposition joined the ruling party in order to assure participation in the lucrative business of governance (Laitin and Samatar 1995, pp. 13–14).

Thus when Siad Barre established a centralized non-democratic rule in 1969, the loss for democracy was not great. Yet the loss of the rest of transparency in Somali governance and especially the collapse of all possible means of checking and balancing the use of power and force by the government contributed to the increase of violence, corruption, and bad governance in Somalia.

Barre's clan favouritism was based on a mechanism whereby all explicit discussion about clans as political groups was prohibited under the excuse of avoiding a division of Somalia along clan lines. At the same time, Barre tried to increase his own clan's (*Marehan*) political power. The ruling alliance was based on three clans (*Marehan, Ogaden, Dhulbahante*), which contributed to the rise of a rebellious spirit on the part of other clans, not to mention that many of Barre's acts against clans (especially *Issaq* and, after 1978, *Majerteen*) themselves were acts of violence at the same time as they created relative frustration among discriminated clans.

President Barre followed politics of divide and rule to maintain control over state resources and keep the mounting opposition at bay. Barre, who belonged to a small clan, had to mobilize clans and factions in Somali society 'from the outside' and play them against each other, in order to avoid the emergence of a strong anti-government coalition (Ohanwe 1997). Barre's strategy succeeded in a sense that the opposition was divided into several different movements and rebellion took the form of clan-based insurgencies. Numerous attempts to create broad-based fronts or to at least forge cooperation among clan-based organizations failed (Lyons and Samatar 1995, p. 19). These attempts generally also failed later, which made it more difficult to settle inter-group grievances and bring an end to the civil war. Thus for the

opportunistic leaders who took charge of the new rebel movements, clan identity served as an important mobilizable resource. Paradoxically, by having fuelled clan antagonisms Barre made the instrumental use of clan affinities much easier for his opponents, who could build on his work. His strategy finally defeated him.

Rivalry over national resources, mainly tax money, and the ownership of the banana industry, escalated into a conflict where clan identities were used in the mobilization of support for one's egoistic interests (Abdi I. Samatar 1993a, p. 634; Abucar 1995, p. 13, Lyons and Samatar 1995, p. 12; see also Laitin and Samatar 1987, p. 46). Thus, when the war began, 'Warlords, it turned out, were not simply clan leaders intent on destroying their rivals but competitors using weapons, alliances, and propaganda to gain access to productive land, port facilities, and urban real estate, which in turn could be used to sustain networks of patronage and support' (Cassanelli 1996, p. 15).

Clan-related divisions were not the only factors which, reinforced by the authoritarian political structure and politics, explain the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Somalia is a deeply divided society in many other respects. The Somali people have been divided by national borders into five different states in the Horn of Africa, the question of gender has from time to time become a source of tension, and religious differences between three major Islamic cults of order have divided people. A religious division between believers and non-believers, or fundamentalists and moderates, and regional differences and differences in dialect also contribute to the fragmentation of the society.

A class division between the state-dependent modern *petite bourgeoisie*/bureaucrats and the traditional, ordinary Somali, created during colonialism and not changed by independence, played a role in creating the humanitarian emergency, as did the division between agriculturalists and pastoralists. For example, existing class divisions were exacerbated by Barre's favouring of the modern élite in his land policies at the expense of the traditional agriculturalists who nearly fell into land slavery (Bestemann and Cassanelli 1996b, p. 12; Menkhaus 1996, p. 147, Menkhaus and Craven 1996, p. 157). And already the creation of modern structures of governance, especially the introduction of state by colonial masters, caused friction between modern governance and ancient traditional social practices. When the European interest dominated African development, institutions of governance reflected an alien culture and needs that were European rather than Somali. State and modern institutions of governance in Somalia were not a natural response to the modernization of Somali society or vehi-

cles for modernization in Somalia, but rather imported products, which reflected the needs and customs of the colonial power rather than Somalia. When the country became independent, these alien power structures were kept by those for whom they offered power and privileges, and this source of conflict has remained in the post-colonial era.

The unsuitability of these imported structures of governance is well exemplified by the incompatibility of territorial thinking with arbitrary national borders and the traditional patterns of pastoral movement across these borders. Pastoralists would kill their cattle and die of hunger if national borders were to be guarded in a strict manner. This problem can be seen at the root of the popular motivation in the fight for Ogaden and for a greater Somalia even if the official motivation was related to Somali nationalism. The fear of being blocked from escaping droughts across the Ethiopian border can be seen as one of the sources of violence between these countries – violence that was crucial also in the development of domestic conflict in Somalia (Edwards 1997).

Another factor that lowered the threshold of violence in Somalia was violent power relations at the micro-level. In pastoral production, competing for grazing land is a necessity of survival and this is reflected in the cultural values of Somalis (Lewis 1997, pp. 181–3). According to Lewis ‘Somali are a war-like people, driven by the poverty of their resources to intense competition to access for water and grazing’ (Lewis 1961; see also Lewis 1997, p. 181). ‘Claims over pasture and water were the perennial bone of contention among lineage groups and clans. Force was the only effective means to secure such claims and it was a constant factor of nomadic life’ (Markakis 1987, p. 16). Because of this reality of pastoral production, many Somalis considered peaceful order as economically detrimental (Said Samatar 1982, p. 19; cited in Markakis 1987, p. 33). Among some groups homicide was a cultural practice, a prerequisite for attaining adult status and contracting marriage, and provided added motivation for raiding (Markakis 1987, p. 34).

3.4.4 Clan identity as an impediment to conflict resolution

After the demise of Barre, clan structure has affected the nature of humanitarian emergency as well as the efforts to resolve the conflict. The collapse of the state has returned ancient Somali divisions. Somalia reminds Europeans of the place that they first found centuries ago. Somalia has ‘disintegrated into its traditional component units’ and much of the killing after the state collapse has been related to ‘clan-

cleansing' (Lewis 1997, pp. 184–5). The one significant difference in today's fighting compared to that in pre-colonial times is in the sophistication and technological standard of the weaponry used.

The clan-based identity structure of the Somali society, strengthened first by manipulation of political leaders, first and foremost by President Barre, and then amalgamated during the course of conflict, rendered ineffective most international efforts at dispute resolution. In persuading the disputants into compromises, the UN's strategies have wavered between two basic approaches to deal with collapsed states, building on the existing forces (including warlords) or encouraging the new forces of the 'civil society' for which the international forces must provide a security umbrella. In Somalia, dispute resolution takes place at very different levels. The United Nations, alongside regional powers, has invested in high-profile conferences with representatives of the warring factions. This is problematic by giving them legitimacy at the expense of traditional society. Instead of using a real basis of popular support to win international legitimacy, the leaders of the military factions turned it around to use international recognition to leverage local support (Bryden 1997). Warlords and opportunistic politicians had no long-term aims to form a new, sustainable order.

In the north and northeast, Siad Barre had not succeeded in destroying the well-founded traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution and the position of community elders in settling disputes. Thus in these regions, new rule could have been based on existing forces. The international community has not completely ignored the use of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. After the end of 1996, several development projects have been initiated by the Western donor community in the framework of the Somali Assistance Coordination Body to find mechanisms to solve disputes related to local production, funding (through local taxation), and the direction of public goods (Fedeli 1997). However in the south, Siad Barre had destroyed the traditional society and legitimate political groups did not exist.

The worst part of the humanitarian emergency in Somalia was over by 1993 but fighting still went on. It has been notoriously difficult for the different Somali groups to reach any kinds of peace agreements with each other. This is partly related to the traditional fragmentation of the society along clan and class lines. It is difficult for Somalis to talk about the future of Somalia on abstract constitutional or ideological terms. Instead of thinking how politics and administration should be arranged, one ends up talking in group terms. 'Who agrees?', 'who represents?' and 'which groups have rights to what?' become the relevant

questions. But more generally, peace solutions are prevented by a struggle over the access to resources in a future Somali nation-state. The state is still seen as a means to personal enrichment. Fighting is concentrated almost solely on urban areas. When peace comes, the faction who controls Mogadishu and Kismayo will gain access to economic resources, including international aid. This is why peace solutions based on nation-building have had limited chances to succeed.

3.5 Conclusion

Ruling élites in Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sri Lanka utilized sentiment associated with ethnic and regional identities to transfer potential hostilities from class disparities within their own communities to differences with and antagonisms towards other ethnic groups and regions. In Somalia, Siad Barre manipulated clan identities to maintain political power and access to state resources. Common to all leaders in these countries was the pursuit and implementation of economic policies that served their economic advantage. These policies had the effect of increasing ethnic animosities between Igbos and Northerners in Nigeria, Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi, between West and East Pakistan, between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, and between different clans in Somalia. Though patterns of perceived deprivation differed, major ethnic communities in these countries viewed their economic position in the state as threatened, and used violence or repression that contributed to humanitarian disasters. These cases indicate that, contrary to Collier and Hoeffler, ethnic antagonism is not a primary variable affecting war and humanitarian emergencies. Rather ethnicity is a factor that is strengthened and sometimes emerges as conflict takes place.

4

Inequality, Exclusivity, and Relative Deprivation

4.1 Income inequality

Case studies in Chapter 3 showed that both poor economic performance and large inequalities contribute to the antagonisms that fuel humanitarian emergencies. This chapter discusses more explicitly how large income concentrations increase grievances that exacerbate the risk of humanitarian emergencies. Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti's (1996, pp. 1203–38) cross-sectional study of 71 developing countries, 1960–85, finds that income inequality, by fuelling social discontent, increases socio-political instability, as measured by deaths in domestic disturbances and assassinations (per million population) and coups (both successful and unsuccessful). Severe social tensions leading to humanitarian emergencies may also arise under conditions of positive (even rapid) growth and expanding resource availability.

To measure income inequality, we used Gini coefficients calculated from an expanded and qualitatively improved dataset from Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire (1996, pp. 56–91), although we still decided not to use data from studies they relied on which used incomparable research methodologies. We were able to find relationships between Gini and war, which World Bank researchers Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and others, without this dataset, could not find. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 563) indicate 'there is insufficient data to introduce distributional considerations into the empirical analysis'. Our regressions (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999 and Appendix Tables A1.5–A1.9) indicate that high income inequality (measured by a Gini coefficient) contributes to humanitarian emergencies.

Indeed, because of inadequate income inequality data, Collier (2000b, pp. 10–11, 13) argues 'Inequality does not seem to effect the risk of con-

flict. Rebellion does not seem to be the rage of the poor. ... Conflict is not caused by divisions, rather it actively needs to create them. ... However, it is the military needs of the rebel organization which have created this political conflict rather than the objective grievances.¹

WIDER researchers (Nafziger *et al.*, 2000), who include deaths from state violence as a part of humanitarian emergencies, examine deadly political violence more broadly than merely a focus on rebellions, and hold a contrasting view to that of Collier. Indeed the WIDER approach is consistent with the finding that objective grievances of poverty and inequality contribute to war and humanitarian emergencies.

Insurgency is more likely if the less advantaged can identify the perpetrators of their poverty and suffering. Sometimes, as in Nicaragua in the late 1970s and El Salvador and Guatemala in the 1980s, high and increasing inequality, long-term economic decline, and political repression spur guerrilla warfare against a ruling oligarchy. Manuel Pastor and James Boyce (1997) argue that, in Central America, 'longstanding tensions arising from deep economic [inequalities], particularly in the distribution of land, provided the tinder for political violence, macro-economic crises added a spark, external intervention fueled the wars, and armed conflict propelled a downward economic spiral.' Indeed Pastor and Boyce trace the roots of El Salvador's protracted emergency, a civil war from 1979 to 1992, to the late nineteenth century, when state decree abolished communal land and forcibly evicted indigenous communities, converting their land into *latifundia*, large (primarily coffee) estates owned by about sixty families who formed the ruling oligarchy and created nearly the most unequal land distribution in the world. El Salvador's agrarian structure is indicative of the tensions that contribute to political violence: a highly unequal land distribution combined with a proletarianized labour force, maintained in the face of popular resistance by 'intimidation, bloodshed, and other forms of organized violence' perpetuated by the ruling oligarchy that controlled the state (Pastor and Boyce, 2000, p. 368).

Through the demonstration effect of consumption levels of the relatively well off, high income concentration increases the perception of relative deprivation by substantial sections of the population, even when these do not experience absolute deprivation. The risk of political disintegration increases with a surge of income disparities by class, region, and community, especially when these disparities lack legitimacy among the population. Class and communal (regional, ethnic, and religious) economic differences often overlap, exacerbating perceived grievances and potential strife.

Most measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, examine vertical (income class) rather than horizontal (communal) inequality. As Frances Stewart (2000, pp. 15–18) indicates, a society can have sharp inter-group or horizontal inequality amid relatively egalitarian vertical or intra-group income distribution. The following case studies show substantial horizontal inequality, sometimes in addition to sizeable vertical inequality.

4.2 Nigeria: increased élite inequality during rapid growth

Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, and Mexico illustrate the diverse patterns of how discriminatory government policies cause economic inequality, fuel social discontent, and lead to political conflict and humanitarian emergencies. These dynamics may even occur when either the nation's real per-capita GDP is growing, as in Nigeria, or when the disadvantaged group's economic position is improving, as for nonwhite South Africans from the 1970s through the early 1990s. Inequality can manifest itself in relative deprivation, as in South African blacks despite blacks' income growth during the 1960s and 1970s, or in absolute deprivation, as among Igbo political élites during changes in the formula for regional revenue allocation for 1959 to 1967.

As indicated before, humanitarian disasters rarely occur in high-income countries. However, shouldn't we expect some instances where developing countries are split asunder into a humanitarian crisis from conflict over the potential for abundant resources and rapid economic growth? Yes, this can happen, as illustrated by the 1967–70 Nigerian–Biafran war. The war was fought for control of Nigeria's rich resources, especially in oil, but in the mid-1960s, political élites from the Eastern Region (subsequently Biafra) expected economic loss amid rapid Nigerian economic growth. Election fraud and manipulation during Nigeria's 1964–65 elections undermined the previously critical position of Igbos, the dominant ethnic group in the Eastern Region, in the federal coalition. The East, which had produced two-thirds of Nigeria's petroleum, lost profits and other tax revenues from oil under a change in the formula for revenue allocation by the federal government, which ceased distributing mineral (unlike agricultural) export proceeds to regional governments in the 1960s. Moreover, Igbo and other Eastern ethnic groups were losing in the contention for key positions in the federal civil service and modern sector of Lagos, and had fled from business and high-level employment in the politically domi-

nant North. Thus, Igbo political élites, government employees, and émigré business people experienced not only relative, but also absolute, economic decline.

The Nigerian civil war followed a period of 3 per cent real annual growth in GDP per capita from fiscal years 1958/59 to 1965/66 (at constant 1962/63 prices); petroleum expansion led the way, but industrial and agricultural growths were also steady. Moreover, in the mid to late 1960s, Nigeria's regional élites foresaw some of the growth potential of the subsequent decade. Thus, despite the massive resource diversion and destruction, GDP per head only fell 4 per cent yearly during the war. In addition, Nigeria's oil-fuelled real economic growth per person accelerated after the war to 8 per cent yearly from fiscal years 1969–70 to 1978–79 (at 1974/75 prices, a year of high oil prices, thus moderately overstating growth for the period) (Nafziger 1983, pp. 93–122, 139–42, 178–81).

But Nigeria's case is an exception. In few cases is a current humanitarian disaster a conflict over the potential for rapid economic growth; most instead are struggles to maintain slices of shrinking economic pies.

4.3 Pakistan: inequality between West and East

State policies to increase regional inequalities contributed to the war between West Pakistan and East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) in 1971. In Pakistan's military government, the economic and political dominance of élites in the Western wing, who carried out economic policies that exacerbated inequalities between West and East, contributed to the humanitarian crisis of 1971. In the half century before independence in 1947, landlords, traders, lawyers, and other professionals were formed into the political élite, virtually all in the West, by their leadership in the Muslim nationalist movement in India (through the Muslim League). After independence, they were joined by (and sometimes overlapped with) an emerging class of Muslim industrial and merchant capitalists, the essentially newly created civil servants, and army officers, primarily from the West.

In West Pakistan, where the top 0.1 per cent and bottom 64.5 per cent of the landowners each owned 15.0 per cent of the agricultural land in 1960 (Gini index of inequality = 0.81, compared with 0.68 for the East), large landlords were the dominant indigenous social and political group since the early British period. Almost two-thirds of the 310 members of the interim West Pakistan assembly set up in 1955

came from landed interests. In the East, by contrast, landowners were limited to a ceiling of 13 hectares each as a result of land reform legislation passed in the 1950s, which took land from Hindu rajas, who had held 75 per cent of the land (Maniruzzaman 1966, pp. 84–6. Samuel Huntington 1968, p. 382, indicates the Gini index for the West was substantially higher than for East Pakistan).

At independence, when more than one-half of the manufacturing sector was controlled by Hindus, the government, or foreigners, barely 1 per cent of national income originated in manufacturing. By 1959 when the percentage had risen to over 6, Muslims indigenous to the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent controlled two-thirds of the sector (Papanek 1962, p. 49). However, 96 per cent of indigenous industrial investment, 1947 to 1958, was by west Indian émigrés or West Pakistanis who invested in the Western wing. In the East, the petty bourgeoisie, who constituted the top of the class hierarchy, directed their discontent against the dominant landed and business élite in the West, who feared that a major capitalist class allowed to establish itself in East Pakistan, with a majority of the country's population, would give it the political and economic strength to become the dominant force in national politics.

Pakistani policies in the 1950s and 1960s to redistribute resources from agricultural exports (primarily in the East) to industry (largely in the West) increased regional, as well as class and sectoral, inequalities. In Pakistan, the average material level of living was higher in the West than the East in the years just after independence (1947), and these disparities increased over time. In 1949–50 GDP per capita, based on official sources, was 10 per cent higher in the West than in the East. This difference increased to 30–36 per cent in 1959–60, and to 60 per cent in 1969–70. For the West, this represented a real growth in GDP per head of 1.1 per cent annually in the decade 1949/50–1959/60, at the same time this measure was declining in the East by at least 1 per cent yearly. In the next decade, 1959/60–1969/70, real GDP per capita grew in the East 1.5 per cent yearly, and in the West 3.6 per cent annually. The Pakistani government redistributed income from export and subsistence agriculture to industry and domestically oriented commercial agriculture through policies of an overvalued rupee (which favoured imported inputs for industry and large-scale agriculture relative to jute, tea, and other primary-product exports), a compulsory government procurement of foodgrains at low prices for urban areas, generous tax concessions to industry, and the lack of these to peasant agriculture. These policies transferred savings from agriculture to

industry, primarily a transfer from Eastern small farming to Western industry. Conservative estimates, based on world prices, indicate that over 24 per cent of gross product originating in the agricultural sector – or about 70 per cent of its savings – was transferred to the nonagricultural sector in 1964–65. As Eastern peasants and small farmers became increasingly conscious of the way in which much of economic policy was being used largely on behalf of a Western industrial and commercial ruling élite, discontent with the political leadership intensified, contributing to the humanitarian disaster of 1971 (Nafziger 1983, pp. 197–212; Griffin and Khan 1972).

4.4 South Africa: inequality under apartheid

South Africa, in the decades before 1994, was a racist regime, with both vertical and horizontal domination by the whites, who comprised a small minority, about 16 per cent of the population. Wallenstein and Sollenberg (1996, 1997, and 1998) classify the struggle in South Africa, 1991 to 1993, as a war: 3,750 people were killed in internal repression and resistance in 1993, according to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society's *World Disasters Report*, indicating that, if inequality and discrimination are sufficiently grave, even improved material welfare for the disadvantaged group will not guarantee the absence of conflict.

South Africa's real GDP per capita stagnated or declined from the early 1970s through the early 1990s.² However, per-capita incomes of the white population fell, while the per-capita incomes of the black population apparently increased, at least from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s and even through 1980. Still, a survey conducted in 1988 demonstrated that only a very small proportion of a nation-wide sample of the black population was satisfied with various dimensions of their lives. More importantly, the results showed a deterioration of over 40 per cent in blacks' perceived life satisfaction as compared with a survey in 1983 (Möller, Schlemmer, and du Toit 1989). Why did grievances and dissatisfaction among the African population rise as its average income increased?

The political exclusion of blacks by the apartheid regime doubtless accounts for a great deal of the generalized dissatisfaction, but the role of income differentials should not be discounted either. To blacks, the increase in incomes during the previous two decades was insufficient, considering the substantial discrepancies in favour of the white population. In 1992, the GDP per capita of black, Asian, and mixed-race

South Africa was I\$ (international dollars, or US dollars adjusted for purchasing power) 1,710, about the same as Senegal's I\$1,680, and in excess of I\$1,116 for Africa as a whole. Yet this low income for 36.1 million nonwhite South Africans stood in stark contrast to that of 7.3 million whites, I\$14,920 income per capita, a figure higher than New Zealand's I\$13,970 (Nafziger 1997, p. 32). Moreover, the collapse of the growth of nonwhite incomes in the 1980s and early 1990s increased feelings of relative deprivation.

South Africa's Gini coefficient of income concentration was 0.65, with the top 10 per cent of the population receiving more than 50 per cent of the national income, while the bottom 40 per cent received less than one tenth. This made South Africa, alongside Mexico and Brazil, one of the countries with the most unequal distribution of income in the world (Schlemmer and Giliomee 1994, p. 1), and exacerbated mistrust in the nonwhite population. Moreover, the share of households living in poverty in 1991, using the Minimum Living Level, was 67 per cent for blacks, 38 per cent for mixed races, 18 per cent for Asians, 7 per cent for whites, and 49 per cent overall. Furthermore, life expectancy was 52 years for blacks, 62 for Asians and mixed races, 74 for whites compared to 54 for Africa as a whole, while the adult literacy rate was 67 per cent for nonwhites and 85 per cent for whites (Nafziger 1997, p. 32; Auvinen and Kivimäki 1997, pp. 9–10, 16–17; Schlemmer 1994, pp. 99–111; Jenkins and Thomas 2000, p. 7; and Esterhuysen 1992, pp. 21–6).

It was not difficult for the African National Congress (ANC) to mobilize the masses against the apartheid regime as the perceived source of inequality. Both inequality and the emergency resulted from the actions of the regime, which dug its own grave by a conscious policy of discrimination against the majority of the population. Even the destructive political conflict of 1990–94 between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party was directly manipulated and fuelled by the regime in its effort to maintain power (Auvinen and Kivimäki 1997, pp. 9–10, 16–17). South Africa illustrates how economic inequality, combined with authoritarian structures and rules of governance, contributes to humanitarian emergencies.

4.5 Chiapas: regional inequality

In Chiapas state, as in Mexico generally, economic and political power remained for decades in the hands of the landowning oligarchy, which had been supported by Mexico's ruling Institutional

Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional* or PRI). Average income, life expectancy, nutrition, and social infrastructure in Mexico's north has been substantially in excess of those in the south, which included Chiapas, and these differences widened during the last quarter of the twentieth century (Sanders 2001, pp. 18–23). Specifically, in Chiapas, GDP per capita, measured in purchasing-power parity dollars, was 43 per cent below, and adult literacy 24 per cent below the national average in the early 1990s (UNDP 1994, pp. 98–9).

On New Year's day 1994, the day when the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) came into force, the Zapatista army (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*, EZLN), representing Indian smallholders and landless workers or *campesinos*, launched a rebellion against the PRI and the oligarchy, which the EZLN held responsible for their poverty and distress. The Zapatistas blamed the PRI policy of increasing economic integration into the world economy for the plight of small Indian grain farmers. Albert Berry (2001, p. 128) contends that 'The periodic overvaluation of the Mexican peso, together with [NAFTA's] freeing of trade, had disastrous effect on small corn producers in that country, contributing to the Zapatista uprising.'

During two weeks of fierce fighting, perhaps 150–200 died before a cease-fire between the EZLN and the Mexican army. About 15,000 to 30,000 people fled the battles to more untroubled areas in Chiapas or in the neighbouring Guatemala. A cholera epidemic, which had spread to the region earlier, intensified during the conflict. The Chiapas conflict can be characterized as a local humanitarian emergency that can develop in regions most neglected and discriminated against by a central government.

The Zapatistas' demands were for eliminating income and land disparities between landowners and *campesinos*, as well as for greater political rights and democracy. For the Zapatistas, the government had betrayed the ideal of Emiliano Zapata, the national hero of Mexico's liberation, by implementing a constitutional reform that resulted in the commercialization of *ejidos*, the common lands, which had enjoyed special protection in the past. The rebels viewed both domestic and foreign forces as the people's enemies. Symbolically, the Zapatistas launched their rebellion on the day when the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) came into force. NAFTA was a threat to Chiapas' smallholder and cooperative primary producers, placing them at a disadvantage relative to high-technology and capital-intensive agricultural production in the US.

Despite the Zapatistas' nationalistic rhetoric, they were also considered Maoists, anarchists, or Trotskyists, depending on the observer. Because of their extensive use of the internet in their information campaigns, they were labelled the first postmodern rebels. The mysterious *subcomandante* Marcos, the media hero of the Zapatistas, characterized his movement as follows:

We have always spoken about the basic rights of the human: [rights to] education, housing, health, food, land, good pay for our work, democracy, [and] liberty. ... If you want to call it Mexican socialism or the Mexican way to liberty, that's a good name for it.

(Weinberg 1995)

In December 2000, Vicente Fox, from the National Action Party became the first Mexican president to take office in a peaceful hand-over of power from one party to another since 1911. In his first half-year, Fox released Zapatista prisoners, closed seven army bases in the Chiapas, and prodded the Chamber of Deputies to vote for a constitutional amendment prohibiting discrimination against and approving limited autonomy for Mexico's 10 million indigenous people. However, the constitutional amendment, when ratified by a majority of Mexico's 32 states, was a revision from Marcos's initial demands, withholding Indian full control over their natural resources and requiring state legislatures to oversee facets of Indian autonomy (Smith 2001). Accordingly, in May 2001 Subcommander Marcos broke off Zapatista contact with the Mexican government, continuing resistance and rebellion. President Fox was caught between the goal of peace with the Zapatistas and indigenous rights, on the one hand, and that of a deeply divided Mexican Congress and concern for the military and economic support of the United States, on the other (Sanders 2001, pp. 18–23).

4.6 Conclusion: greed vs. grievance

Large horizontal and vertical inequalities, frequently overlapping, can be a source of relative deprivation in both rapidly- and slow-growing countries. Class and communal inequalities frequently intersect, exacerbating grievances that contribute to the hostility and insurgency that fuel humanitarian emergencies. Furthermore, once a population is dissatisfied with income discrepancies and social discrimination, as the majority nonwhites were in white-ruled South Africa, the rising expect-

tations associated with only incremental reductions in poverty and inequality may actually spur the revolt, conflict, and state hostile action that increase the probability of an emergency (Davies 1962, pp. 5–19).

Our findings concerning income levels and distribution and the origins of war reinforce the views of most contributors to Berdal and Malone's (2000) volume on economic agendas in wars. Our book indicates that economic agendas and variables – low income, economic regress, income inequality, (and in subsequent chapters) the failure of external economic adjustment, high military spending, the failure of food and agricultural development, the conflict over land and natural resource, and regional and ethnic economic conflict – are important contributors to war (and state violence).

Berdal and Malone ask whether greed or grievance drive contemporary civil wars. Our findings are consistent with most of their contributors but not with those of the World Bank's Collier (2000a, p. 97), published in Berdal and Malone's work. Collier's views are that 'The only result that supports the grievance approach to conflict is that a prior period of rapid economic decline increases the risk of conflict.' Fair enough as far as this goes. Our evidence in Chapter 2 is consistent with Collier's view. However, Collier subsequently states that 'Inequality, whether measured in terms of income or landownership, has no effect on the risk of conflict according to the data. ... The grievance theory of conflict thus finds surprisingly little empirical support' (ibid., pp. 97–8). His sources indicate no use of Deininger and Squire's (or any other) improved dataset on income distribution, which provides our basis for a relationship between income inequality and war. Inequality, whether horizontal or vertical, contributes to grievances by lower-income classes or oppressed or disadvantaged communities. Can we really argue that the East Timorans, the Kashmir *mujahidin*, Chechnyans, Palestinians, the Hutu, Nuba, and southern Sudanese, to name just a few, are motivated only by greed rather than grievance?

Other contributors to *Greed and Grievance*, such as William Reno (2000b, p. 44), see more of a balance between greed and grievance in motivating war or, as Musifiky Mwanasali (2000, p. 145), find it difficult to identify the multiple agendas in wars. Indra De Soysa (2000, p. 123–4), unlike Collier, finds no relationship between the availability of natural resources and the incidence of civil war. However, she does find that the availability of minerals is associated with the incidence of conflict, a view consistent with our discussion in Chapter 8. David Keen (2000a, p. 25) discusses the use of grievance-based bottom-up

violence, frequently embraced by ordinary people as solutions to their problems. This is especially true of ethnic or other groups, such as the Nuba and southern Sudanese, that fall 'below the law', facing extreme exploitation, violence, and famine. This 'process of falling below the law underlines the continuing importance of grievances and not greed in contemporary conflicts' (ibid., p. 31). Keen considers it important to understand how grievance and greed interact, for example, instances where 'greed generates grievances and rebellion, legitimizing further greed' (ibid., p. 32). For him, the seemingly pointless Ethiopia–Eritrea dispute over a small tract of borderland may arise from Ethiopia's resentment at perceived economic privileges for Eritreans (ibid., p. 33). Even 'the civil war in Sierra Leone cannot really be understood without comprehending the deep sense of anger at lack of good government and educational opportunities', an overall context of grievance in which greed played a role (ibid., p. 35). Indeed, for Keen (2000a, pp. 39–40) peacemaking must take into account

the desires and grievances that drove people to war in the first place. This means being ready to *listen* to grievances. Though Collier is right to suggest that rebels may be reluctant to acknowledge the degree to which they are driven to greed, there are equal dangers in suggesting that the expression of grievances tells us nothing about their real motivation. Indeed, if we do not ask people why they are resorting to violence or listen to their own accounts of why this might be, we are lost. Creating a peace that takes account of grievances is a profoundly political endeavour. It means going beyond the mere reconstruction of a peacetime political economy that *generated* war. It also means guarding against the processes of highly uneven development and inequitable growth that may, if we are not careful, continue to be supported by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The greed of economic men and women can help drive war. Indeed our findings in Chapters 7 to 9 reinforce the importance of greed. But just as important are grievances, many based on inequality and relative deprivation, which increase the risk of war, rebellion, and a response by the state of repression and violence.

5

Stagnation, Inequality, Adjustment, and Élite Interests

Adjustment and stabilization programmes, almost universal among developing countries during the 1980s and early 1990s, were mostly introduced in response to chronic macroeconomic imbalances and external deficits, often associated with negative or slow growth. These programmes have been shaped by financing from and conditions set by the Bretton Woods' institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The programmes redistribute the timing and extent of costs and benefits among economic actors. Most expenditure-reducing policies (including government employment cuts, removal of subsidies, increases in real interest rates, and the control of money supply) and of some expenditure-switching policies (such as real domestic-currency devaluation) tend to impose large welfare costs immediately, while their benefits emerge only after one to two years. Stabilization and adjustment programmes affect real wages and staple commodity prices, and may thus elicit protests from the population groups especially affected: the poor and the organized middle class (Auvinen 1996b).

Stabilization and adjustment programmes affect the distribution of power within a country. Thus, in the first place, social conflicts may erupt during the early period of stabilization and adjustment, especially if there are few funds to support the income and social services of those hurt by the programmes. Second, adjustment programmes may become a source of potential instability if the public perceives that structural measures, such as privatization, price decontrol, and public employment policies, favour specific interest groups, such as military and political leaders, leading families, dominant ethnic communities, or high-level civil servants. This can spur regional, communal, and class conflicts. Third, national leaders of developing countries, who

frequently only borrow from the Bank or Fund as a last resort, complain about the secrecy of the recipient country's letter of intent, which reduces internal political dialogue and increases the difficulty of implementing the adjustment programme (Mills 1989). These problems can undermine the legitimacy of political élites, spurring a challenge to the regime.

Trade and exchange rate policies, a part of adjustment programmes, influence the differential origin and allocation of export and other revenues and affect internal sectoral terms of trade. These shape the costs and benefits to classes, regions, and communities; and how these benefits and costs contribute to perceived grievances by classes and communities.

Is there any relationship between political troubles and intervention by Bretton Woods' institutions? Auvinen's (1996a, 1997) statistical analysis of political conflict in developing countries in the 1980s indicates that IMF interventions, with their accompanying austerity measures and reductions in short-term living standards, contributes to political protest and rebellion. Indeed the longer the history of Fund stabilization and adjustment, the more extensive is the political conflict.

In their analysis of Africa, Christian Morrisson, Jean-Dominique Lafay, and Sebastian Dessus (1994, p. 174) contend that 'Most of the stabilization and adjustment measures run the risk of causing political troubles. Cuts in subsidies, tax increases, privatization of public enterprises or removal of commercial protection threaten the income and employment of either large numbers of people or of well-organized groups.' Africa has the highest rate of economic decline and the most IMF/World Bank programmes, and also the highest incidence of political conflict and humanitarian emergencies. According to Morrisson *et al.*'s (1994, pp. 174–91) and Stephan Haggard, Jean-Dominique Lafay, and Christian Morrisson's (1995, pp. 108–09) evidence, IMF interventions require stabilization measures within one year, the most risky of which are a cut in food subsidies and devaluation's fillip to inflation, both of which contribute to strikes, demonstrations, and repression.

Thus, we expected that stabilization and adjustment programmes, which have been shown to contribute to political conflict in developing countries, also increase their vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies. Specifically, we hypothesized a direct relationship between IMF intervention and humanitarian emergencies.

We found (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999), however, that there was an inverse relationship between IMF credits as a percentage of GNP and emergencies.¹ Some of the explanation may stem from the IMF's

refraining from funding 'basket cases' devastated by war and displacement. In that case, the negative coefficient would be picking up a reverse causal relationship.² However, when IMF credits as a percentage of GNP were used as a predictor for *lagged* values of dependent variables, its coefficients are generally larger than those presented in Appendix Table A1.13, indicating that perhaps emergencies keep away the IMF rather than vice versa. Thus, an emergency is likely to reduce the likelihood of receiving IMF and other international support for an adjustment programme.

5.1 Adjustment and élite interests

How élites and masses react to four economic phenomena and their changes – stagnation and economic decline, high and increasing inequality, inflation, and adjustment programmes – influences the probability of political conflict and humanitarian disasters. Élites may be threatened by adverse economic changes and the reaction of non-élites to these changes. The strategies of political élites to maintain power and affluence amid economic crises and shifts may exacerbate conflict and the potential for humanitarian emergencies.

The struggle over economic benefits helps shape, consolidate, and modify ruling élites. Economic growth usually expands the perquisites and benefits that political élites can distribute to allies and subordinates, while economic decline or cuts in expenditure from liberalization shrink the clientele base, often requiring greater coercion and corruption to maintain power. Or in reaction to economic decline and liberalization, ruling élites need new ways of exercising power, and sometimes use foreign firms and private operators to regularize revenues and expenditures. Whether or not élites are successful in creating new patron–client patterns, economic and state expenditure declines increase the potential for destabilizing the polity and threatening a humanitarian crisis.

Africa's political stability has been especially threatened by the widespread negative per-capita growth of the late 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. When growth becomes negative, as in parts of Africa, it becomes more difficult to support so large a ruling élite. Contradictions and disunity can grow among the previously dominant élite. Negative real economic growth narrows the communal and class support of ruling coalitions, and threatens political cohesion.

Slow (or negative) growth, frequently accompanied by chronic external deficits and debts, intensifies the need for economic adjustment

and stabilization. Under current rules of the international economic system, countries requiring adjustment must, as a last resort, either acquire IMF credits or IMF approval for loans, aid, or debt reduction from the World Bank, other international agencies, bilateral contributors, or commercial banks. Those countries that could meet IMF conditions were less likely to be vulnerable to a humanitarian crisis than countries that failed to adjust, thus lacking access to IMF and other funds or concessions. Section 2.1 examines the dynamics of the relationship between economic regress and political decay in Africa.

5.2 Liberalization and adjustment after 1980

More than a decade of slow or negative per-capita growth, rising borrowing costs, reduced concessional aid, a mounting debt crisis,³ and the increased economic liberalism of donors and international financial institutions, forced African élites to change their strategies during the 1980s. In 1987, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Jacques de Larosière asserted: 'Adjustment is now virtually universal [among LDCs]. Never before has there been such an extensive yet convergent adjustment effort.'⁴ After 1979, when most African countries were facing external debt crises and chronic international balance of goods and services deficits, economic policymaking, characterized by structural adjustment, macroeconomic stabilization, and liberalization, has been largely determined by conditions of IMF/World Bank lending. The IMF became gatekeeper and watchdog for the international financial system, because an IMF 'seal of approval' of a country's macroeconomic stabilization programme served as a necessary condition for World Bank or bilateral aid or loans, debt reduction, or commercial bank lending. IMF approval usually required price decontrol, currency depreciation, privatization, government spending reductions, economic structural changes, and various forms of market liberalization. Virtually all LDCs had to adopt these policies to participate in the world economic system.

African and other developing countries that were more successful in receiving IMF (and other international financial and bilateral) credits and aid also experienced less conflict and humanitarian emergencies. As Henry Bienen and Mark Gersovitz (1985) argue, cuts in government spending are less likely to contribute to political conflict than the alternative of debt repudiation and exclusion from credit. Countries must adjust to balance-of-payments imbalances and their adjustment strategies are constrained by both international and domestic factors.

Despite some violent reactions in the short run, the acceptance and implementation of IMF policies rarely lead to large-scale and persistent instability (Bienen and Gersovitz 1985, p. 753). Those that lacked access to the international financial system still had to play by the same rules of adjustment and liberalization, but were nevertheless highly vulnerable economically and politically.

Any substantial economic change, such as the liberalization and adjustment of the 1980s and 1990s, provided chances for challenging existing élites, threatening their position, and often contributing to increased opportunistic rent-seeking and overt repression. And cuts in spending reduced the funds to distribute to clients, and required greater military and police support to remain in power. All these changes increased the potential for political instability and a humanitarian emergency.

With liberalization and adjustment, similar to the controls of the 1960s and 1970s, contemporary African élites used their dependency on the global economy as a way to consolidate power, but they used different approaches. Indeed the distribution of benefits and costs from stabilization and restructuring have influenced the shifts of power and money within African countries. Of course, many African élites saw the handwriting on the wall, with some African political leaders, finance ministers, and government economists (similar to many of their counterparts in Central Europe in the 1990s) experiencing an overnight conversion from Marxism to the liberalism and monetarism of Milton Friedman. Most African élites supported liberalization, maintaining or expanding, with their accomplices and clients, their wealth. For privatization (which required access to credit), price decontrol, and restructuring offered these élites new opportunities for expanded clientage. Moreover, controlling restructuring also enabled these élites to protect their interests from reform and competition. Still, the opportunities also came with the risk of a shrinking power base, increased conflict with newly rising classes, and displacement by new economic and political groups.

Sub-Saharan external debt increased from \$56 billion in 1980 to \$97 billion in 1985, to \$174 billion in 1990, to \$194 billion in 1992, and to \$223 billion in 1995 (World Bank 1993a, pp. 170–1; World Bank 1996c). The origins of the African debt crisis have been widely discussed. In the early 1980s, the sub-Sahara's international goods and services deficits, continuing from the previous decade, worsened from external shocks, such as the recession in the DCs, a declining commodity terms of trade, and the decline in real official development

assistance (ODA), amid rapidly increasing world real interest rates. But there had also been widespread misdirection by political élites during the 1970s, when many African countries borrowed to expand their patronage resource base without increasing their capacity to service foreign debt in subsequent years.

5.3 Adjustment, clientelism, and predatory rule in Africa

After 1979, with the increased emphasis by the IMF, World Bank, and bilateral and multilateral funding agencies on competition, deregulation, liberalization, and the privatization and commercialization of customary state activities, the African political élites needed to form new patterns of clientage in order to maintain legitimacy. Slow growth and chronic external deficits, together with the failure to stabilize and adjust the economy under pressure from the international financial institutions and high-income Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to liberalize and deregulate, was conducive to patrimonialism and predation, especially in Africa.

Authoritarian regimes, which are less dependent on popular pressures and can use repression, may be better equipped to implement adjustment policies than democratic regimes (Lafay and Lecaillon 1992, p. 95; Kaufman 1985; Nelson 1990, pp. 22–4; Sheahan 1980). Many authoritarian governments have also been committed to implementing adjustment policies since their legitimacy is dependent on good economic performance. Thus these governments have been more prone to choose orthodox macroeconomic stabilization policies than their democratic counterparts, especially in Latin America (Kaufman and Stallings 1989, pp. 202–12; Nelson 1990, pp. 334–5). If we identify political authoritarianism with a lack of political rights and civil liberties and abuse of human rights, several different types of governance fall under the definition. One type is the ‘efficient authoritarianism’ of Augusto Pinochet’s Chile (1973–89) or Alberto Fujimori’s Peru (1990–2000). A very different type is the ‘weak authoritarianism’ often found in African soft states, in which the authorities who decide policies rarely enforce them (if enacted into law) and only reluctantly place obligations on people (Myrdal 1968, Vol. 2, pp. 895–900). These states are dependent on buying political support through concessions to powerful interest groups. During the 1960s and 1970s, most African ruling élites eschewed policies promoting competition, decentralized decision-making, and reliance on market prices and exchange rates, as these policies reduced their ability to use subsidies, rebates, and

inducements to strengthen alliances and patron–client relationships. For these élites, the introduction of stabilization and adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s was often a threat to the regime.

In weakened African states, such as Zaire, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, the shrinking external resources after the cold war, together with World Bank (1994, pp. 22–51) support of the private-sector (even management contracting) in place of customary state activities in electricity, transport, telecommunications, water, sewerage, roads, and ports, contributed to a patrimonial state, where rulers strengthened their personalistic grip on power in the midst of state and bureaucratic decay by relying on external private and military resources for survival. Predation in Africa frequently means the consolidation of an avaricious dictatorship (Reno 1995, p. 109). According to Mohammed Ayoob (1995, p. 41), the ‘unrepresentative and authoritarian character of many [African] regimes ... spawns a vicious circle of violence and counterviolence as regimes are challenged and react with brutal force.’

5.4 African cases

Nigeria, a potential humanitarian emergency through the first decade of the twenty-first century, is representative of the changes in Africa in the relative importance of government spending. In Nigeria, government expenditures as a percentage of GDP rose from 9 per cent in 1962 to 44 per cent in 1979 but fell to 17 per cent during World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), such as the one in effect from 1986 to 1990, which emphasized privatization, market prices, and reduced government expenditures. Nigeria centralized power during its 1967–70 civil war with the breakup of four regions into thirteen states, and in the 1970s, as the oil boom enhanced the centre’s fiscal strength. Expansion of the government’s share of the economy did little to increase political and administrative capacity, but it did increase incomes and jobs that governing élites could distribute to their clients (Nafziger 1993, p. 50). But with a decline in GNP per capita, 1980 to 1990, 12 per cent yearly (partly from falling oil prices), and from 1990 to 1994, 4 per cent annually (World Bank 1996a, p. 34), together with growing pressure from the IMF and World Bank, Nigeria had to reduce both absolute and relative sizes of the government sector.

Nigeria’s first structural adjustment loan from the Bretton Woods’ agencies started auspiciously, due to President Ibrahim Babangida skillfully playing the World Bank against the IMF for public relations gains. From 1985 to 1986, Babangida conducted a year-long dialogue with

the Nigerian public, resulting in a rejection of IMF terms for borrowing. The Babangida military government secured standby approval from the IMF but rejected its conditions, while agreeing to impose similar terms 'on its own' approved by the Bank. In October 1986, the Bank, with Western commercial and central support, delivered \$1,020 million in quickly disbursed loans and \$4,280 million in three-year project loans (Nafziger 1993, p. 130).

However, in subsequent years, Nigeria's state élites, encouraged by Bank/Fund secrecy, inaugurated and maintained economic adjustment without a supportive constituency. The regime continued power through tactics of 'political manipulation, populist side-payments, élite dispensation, expansion of the parallel economy, and overt repression' (Lewis 1996, p. 87). Liberalization and privatization opened the gates to state élites appropriating public assets for private purposes. Privatization created a wide circle of beneficiaries, as well-connected insiders took advantage of sales and divestiture of liquidated state companies. The opening of bank licences in Nigeria in 1986 provided a new source of patronage and rent distribution, as investors and managers from the military, civil service, manufacturing, trade, and the professions scrambled to enter banking, especially attracted by dealing in foreign currency.

In the 1990s, the Nigerian government lost hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue from top government officials smuggling petroleum and selling it illicitly. 'For élites,' Peter Lewis (1996, p. 91) contends, 'the state provided special access to nascent markets and illegal activities, and manipulated key policies to provide opportune "rents".' Indeed high-ranking venal military officers and ineffectual civilians abandoned macroeconomic management to use policy levers to enhance their own wealth and provide perquisites for clients. By 1994: 'more than a thousand million dollars annually – equaling as much as 15 per cent of recorded government revenues – flowed to smuggling networks and confidence teams, many of whom operated with connivance of top élites' (Lewis 1996, p. 97). A circle of military élites and civilian allies made extravagant gains, creating a *nouveau riche* in currency trading, finance, trade, real estate, and speculative activities in contrast to middle-income and low-income populations, whose real incomes were declining.

The end of the cold war injected more stringent conditions for and reduced amounts of DCs' bilateral and World Bank/IMF aid, exposing the weaknesses of African states like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Congo. Rulers were forced to share the economic levers (resources) they had used to exercise power through patronage. Liberia's Samuel Doe used

foreign investors or NGOs to replace the patronage base lost from declining foreign aid. But these resources were not fungible, and this new source of patronage risked being available to armed strongman rivals of Doe. For example, Charles Taylor used his position as head of the General Services Agency in the early 1980s to make millions of dollars and build up patronage opportunities. Doe, without the basis for popular support, was vulnerable to the proliferation of warlord politics, including that of Taylor and other warlords, who assassinated Doe in 1990 (Reno, 2000a, pp. 232–46).

Chapter 8, section 1, shows how, after the cold war, the IMF and World Bank increased its pressures for liberalization and adjustment in Sierra Leone, and how Freetown responded by becoming more predatory but organized its patronage in the private instead of public sector.

In 1994, Zaire received creditor leniency in return for austerity plans reducing public employment from 600,000 to 50,000. But with the shrinking patronage base, to prevent a coup from newly marginalized groups in the army or bureaucracy, Mobutu Sese Seko – similar to rulers in other retrenching African states – needed to reconfigure political authority; in this situation, foreign firms and contractors served as a new source of patronage networks (Reno 1996a, p. 9). However, indigenous commercial interests that profit from the new rules are not independent capitalists whose interests are distinct from the state. Indeed, the International Monetary Fund, with lending conditioned on adjustment programmes and reducing government expenditures, promulgated measures that facilitated the dismantling of state building and the construction of a predatory and patronage-based system benefiting Mobutu and the governing upper classes (Emizet 2000a, p. 267). As Reno (1996b, p. 16) points out, ‘Those who do not take part in accumulation on the ruler’s terms are punished.’

Kisangani Emizet (2000a, p. 269) describes Mobutu’s approach:

Political order and authority under Mobutu was institutionalized through increasingly visible patterns of inequality and corruption. Mobutu’s major source of corruption or co-optation was a position in the executive branch. To control ministerial appointments, Mobutu used frequent reshuffling of the government. From 1965 to 1990, Mobutu reshuffled the government 43 times. This manipulation resulted in frequent embezzlements and mismanagement of the public domain. Fully aware of the insecurity of their jobs, the managers of state domains were unwilling to work for the welfare of the public. Corruption became the ‘system’ ... and wrongdoing was the

rule. By mid-1975, every public service was for sale as bureaucrats could barely survive on their meagre salaries. [Another] strategy ... was a policy of 'musical chairs' that consisted of reappointing disgraced members of the party to government posts.

In Liberia, warlord Charles Taylor used foreign firms and foreign trade of minerals to dominate Liberia and parts of Sierre Leone throughout most of the 1990s (Reno 1995, p. 111). Taylor built his own patronage network by controlling private banking, transport, communication, and trade (especially transborder smuggling) rather than a state bureaucracy (see section 7.1).

5.5 Adjustment in the former Yugoslavia

Another example of how failed adjustment policies contributed to a humanitarian emergency is the former Yugoslavia. Susan Woodward (1995b) blames the Yugoslav conflict not on historical ethnic hostilities but on the disintegration of government authority, and breakdown of political and civil order from transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy. Yugoslavia's rapid growth during the 1960s and 1970s, fuelled by foreign borrowing, was reversed by more than a decade of an external debt crisis amid declining terms of trade and global credit tightening during the 1980s and early 1990s, forcing austerity and declining living standards. Moreover, with the winding down of the cold war and the decline of the importance of Yugoslavia as an independent communist state, the country received less debt relief and concessional aid from the West. In an economy declining largely from reduced external resources and returning guest workers, the political conflicts over the distribution of falling economic resources and rising debt obligations between central and regional governments and the nature of economic and political reform became constitutional crises, and ultimately a crisis of state among politicians unwilling to compromise. For example, economic decline fuelled rising Serbian nationalist agitation, contributing to the 1987 'putsch' within the League of Communists of Serbia by Slobodan Milosevic, whose faction broke with the pattern of ethnic compromise; recentralized power within Serbia; overthrew the political leadership in Montenegro and in Serbia's autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina; tried to subvert Croatia and Slovenia, the two republics that most vociferously opposed him; and tried to enlarge Serbia at the expense of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Lukic and Lynch 1996, pp. 144–99).

For Woodward (1995b, p. 383):

The primary problem, however, lay in the lack of recognition and accommodation for the socially polarizing and politically disintegrating consequences of [the 1980s] IMF-conditionality program ... The austerities of policies of demand-repression led to conditions that could not easily foster a political culture of tolerance and compromise. Instead, the social bases for stable government and democratization were being radically narrowed by economic polarization between rich and poor, fiscal crises for most government budgets, deindustrialization without prospects of new investment in poorer regions, growing uncertainty and individuals' resort to nonmonetary means of obtaining necessities because of rising inflation, and serious unemployment among young people and unskilled workers that began to affect even the secure jobs and incomes of public-sector professionals, skilled workers, administrators, and their children. The architects of the programs of macroeconomic stabilization and economic austerity ignored the necessity of creating not only social safety nets but even more important a political capacity to recognize and manage these conflicts.

Amid Yugoslavia's austerity and economic collapse, Bosnia-Herzegovina, an agricultural, forestry, and mineral exporter at the periphery of the economy, was among the most vulnerable, hurt substantially by declining terms of trade and by the loss of export markets to the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. Additionally, Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered substantial deaths, dislocation, and devastation after the outbreak of war in March 1992 (Woodward 1996).

5.6. Asian and Latin American cases

Stabilization and adjustment programmes play a role in conflict in other developing countries, even where they are not simple causal factor in humanitarian emergencies. In El Salvador, these programmes reduced the distress of its civil war of 1979 to 1992, at least for the ruling élites. The conflict derives from the conversion of indigenous communal property to *latifundia*, large coffee estates owned by a few families at the core of the ruling oligarchy. As of the 1970s, El Salvador's land distribution was the most unequal in the world (section 4.1 and Pastor and Boyce 2000, p. 368).

El Salvador's unequal agrarian land structure, together with its proletarianized labour force, arose from conflict and repression. Pastor and Boyce analyse the interaction of economic performance, macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment, and the civil war from 1979 to 1992. Although land distribution was a key issue, the 1980 agrarian reform, a governmental structural reform, was inadequate to halt the outbreak and acceleration of conflict. The new owners who gained from the redistribution to the peasants suffered from substantial debt, inadequate credit, and little government support. The financial and political aid of the United States (and its support of IMF lending) ameliorated the adverse effect of structural adjustment and macroeconomic stabilization in El Salvador, especially during the government of José Napoleon Duarte, the leader from 1980 to 1989 (*ibid.*, pp. 371–73).

IMF adjustment was also a part of the late 1990s' Indonesian political crisis, but again not as a causal factor in conflict. Suharto, dictator in Indonesia from 1966 to 1998, was forced from office by riots and protests. The Asian financial and economic crisis, falling prices for petroleum and other commodities, and the worst drought in 50 years, contributed to the economic and political crisis. During the period 1997–98, Indonesia faced regional, ethnic, and religious conflict, particularly in Aceh, the Moluccas, and Irian Jaya (US Department of State 2000), which Christian Morrison (2000, p. 232) labels a limited humanitarian emergency.

Joseph Stiglitz (2002, p. 18) contends: 'After the 1997 Asian crisis, IMF policies exacerbated the crises in Indonesia,' partly from cutbacks for fuel and food subsidies for the poor (*ibid.*, p. 20). According to household surveys conducted by Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics, poverty rates increased from 11 per cent in 1997 before the crisis to 39 per cent in 1998. Real wages for unskilled labour in the towns fell 20–40 per cent, and nutritional levels also declined during the same period. However, these changes were not a result of stabilization programmes *per se* but from the massive outflow of short-term capital accompanying the Asian financial crisis, which contributed to monetary contraction and decreases in social spending that reduced industrial employment and increased poverty (Morrison 2000, pp. 232–3).

Stiglitz (2002, p. 71) criticizes the US government and the IMF in pushing nations, such as Indonesia, to live up to agreements that were signed by corrupt predecessor governments. The economic crisis, together with US–IMF pressure, exacerbated the political and economic pressure that may have worsened the military repression and violence

associated with East Timor's extrication from Indonesia. Indonesia had occupied East Timor from 1978 to 1999, during which hundreds of thousands of Timorese were killed. In 1999, East Timor was administered by the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) until independence in 2002 (US Department of State 2000). In September–October 1999, 3,000 people died, 500,000 persons were displaced, and many women were raped during the 'scorched earth' withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor (Belo 2001).

5.7 Conclusion

In Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, the state was the major focus for struggle among ruling élites and between them and the masses. Ruling élites used taxes, government spending, public programmes, market intervention, and indigenization policies to maintain their size and stabilize their rule. But Africa's slow economic growth, particularly since 1979, compelled these élites to reduce the size of the coalition they supported or use repression to extract a greater share of the majority's tiny surplus, increasing the probability of coups or other regime turnovers, and eventual humanitarian disaster. Ironically, heightened insecurity put pressure on the state class to rely even more on short-run palliatives that benefited the military, civil service, and other privileged groups but increased economic disparities and further alienated the masses.

During the 1980s and 1990s, élites in LDCs faced increasing pressure from slow growth and international debt crises, as well as external pressure by donors and international financial institutions to liberalize and privatize. Pressures to cut the size of the state, amid shrinking resources, put substantial constraints on the ability of élites, particularly in Africa, to reward and sanction political actors, contributing to greater instability and the potential for humanitarian emergencies.

6

Authoritarianism, Democratization, and Military Centrality

6.1 Authoritarianism

From the discussion in the previous chapters we can conclude that, if a government is able to deliver material goods, it can at least temporarily gain support and prevent economic deprivation. But legitimacy is not only materially defined. Political deprivation arises from a lack of meaningful participation in making political decisions, whether this participation is prevented by law or through repression. In effect, a constant and frequent use of repression indicates lack of legitimacy and political capacity (Jackman 1993). Efficient repression may prolong authoritarian rule, as demonstrated for example by Augusto Pinochet's Chile and Hastings Kamuzu Banda's Malawi, but eventually the people are likely to challenge the regime from a 'desperate bargainer' position. Democratic regimes do not guarantee the absence of conflict, but since they are likely to be more widely accepted, expressions of discontent are not aimed at challenging their basic tenets. Large-scale conflict and humanitarian emergencies are virtually non-existent in democratic societies.

6.1.1 Authoritarianism and the extent of conflict

What are the empirical findings on the relationship between extent of political conflict and authoritarianism? On the one hand, openness in a political system encourages political actions of all kinds, and not all of them are likely to be voiced through formal institutions of interest articulation. Graham and Gurr showed that democracies typically had more extensive 'civil conflict' than autocracies. Gurr and Eckstein see chronic low-level conflict as 'a price democracies have to pay for

freedom from regimentation, from the state or from authorities in other social units' (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p. 452).

Democratic political regimes do not repress their citizens or inflict severe sanctions on protestors. Authoritarian regimes are prone to repress unrest (see Hibbs 1973), and the citizens are more likely to refrain from rebellious action when these regimes are in power. Turkey (1980–84) and Morocco (after 1984), for instance, imposed 'long term and systematic repression – serious restrictions on civil and human rights, persistent arrests of suspected 'activists', use of heavy prison sentencing and torture, banning of political movements and opposition trades unions – on protestors' and were spared from serious unrest until the end of the decade (Seddon 1992, p. 49). The threshold of rebellious political action is higher and therefore authoritarian regimes are likely to experience less political protest than democracies.

Authoritarian political structures are conducive to conflict also because repression increases opposition group activity. By adopting coercive politics against dissidents, the regime loses legitimacy, and its actions thereby become the catalyst for the mobilization of previously neutral actors (Davis and Ward 1990, pp. 451–2). Repression may also harden the determination of the members of the opposition group, and ignite a tougher response from the rebellious groups. As a consequence, relatively innocent incidents of protests may escalate into large-scale rebellions with a large number of casualties.

However, most research (see Auvinen 1996a, p. 79) has detected an inverted U-relationship between type of political regime and political conflict: mild repression incites conflict and only intense repression deters it.¹ The rationale behind the inverted U-curve is that

the severe costs of rebellion in an extremely repressive political system inhibit resource mobilisation by dissident groups, the availability of reasonably effective peaceful means of political action in a nonrepressive political system makes rebellion an undesirable strategy of opposition for most people, but rebellion is likely to be the preferred strategy of opposition for many dissident groups in the context of a semirepressive political system in which resource mobilisation is possible and peaceful opposition typically is ineffective.

(Muller and Weede 1990, p. 627)

A distinction is sometimes made between structural or institutionalized repression and behavioural repression. Structural repression refers

to the repressive capability of the regime while behavioural repression refers to actual acts of coercion by the government or parts thereof. The two are not necessarily the same because even the most democratic regimes do not guarantee the absence of repression. This is demonstrated by the occasional use of repression by Western democracies (Henderson 1973 p. 133). Nevertheless, Muller and Weede (1990) found that the inverted U-curve story applies to both structural and behavioural repression.

Muller and Weede suggest that an inverted U-curve relationship supports a theory of belligerents as rational actors. An actor who calculates utilities, and, particularly, his/her costs of action, takes into account the fact that when the level of repression is high, the expected benefits of either rebellion or peaceful collective action will be relatively low because of high costs and a low expectancy of success. When repression is low, the expected benefits of rebellion will be exceeded by the expected benefits of peaceful collective action. When repression is moderate, the expected benefits of rebellion will exceed those of peaceful collective action (*ibid.*, p. 628). This explanation of conflict as a function of rational actors calculating costs and benefits provides some support to the 'greed' theory, even if only political – and not economic – benefits are evident. However, Muller and Weede admit that you may arrive at the same proposition from a relative deprivation perspective (*ibid.*, p. 647)² that corresponds to the 'grievance' theory we discuss in this book.

6.1.2 Authoritarianism and the form of conflict

Authoritarian regimes are more susceptible to rebellion than political protest. In Gurr and Lichbach's study, autocratic governments faced proportionally three times as much revolutionary opposition, but were less likely to hear reformist demands than the democratic governments (Gurr and Lichbach 1979, p. 69). In Chile, the *coup d'état* of 1973 interrupted a long tradition of democratic rule. Legitimate opposition was disallowed and repressed, which led to the development of new and radical forms of political resistance.

The prevailing norms of the political regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian, influence the tactics of dissidents and the responses of the élites to them. Democratic élites are disposed to make appreciable concessions to protest whereas authoritarian regimes of left and right are more likely to rely on repression. In democratic countries, this reinforces the utility of protest over rebel-

lion whereas in autocracies, it increases the relative usefulness of rebellion for challengers who are desperate enough to act at all.

(Gurr and Lichbach 1986, p. 12)

Democracies may not discourage political protest, but they are successful in eliminating or strongly reducing the probability of rebellion. Gurr and Lichbach found that in democratic countries, dissidents very rarely had revolutionary objectives; reformist demands were ten times more common (*ibid.*, p. 69). According to Graham and Gurr (1979), civil conflicts were less deadly in democracies than in autocracies. Hibbs (1973) shows this employing Cutright's (1963) index of political development, although the relationship disappears if economic development is controlled for.³ Hazlewood divides political systems into polyarchic, centrist, and personalist. He finds that in polyarchic systems the number of revolutions, guerrilla wars, and assassinations was smaller but that the number of governmental crises and riots was larger compared to the sample mean. Personalist states were above the mean for all states on these five conflict indicators and above the mean for each of the other groups on all indicators except riots. Centrist systems had the lowest mean values on all indicators except revolutions (Hazlewood 1973, p. 184).⁴

6.1.3 Authoritarianism and irregular executive transfer

The chances of peaceful regime change are limited under authoritarian rule. In the 1980s, before the end of the cold war, political liberalisation was infrequent. The most common mechanism of changing an authoritarian regime was by force, sometimes through mass rebellion or revolution but more commonly through a *coup d'état* by the élite. Political authoritarianism was the most important determinant of political instability in Central America, save in Costa Rica, where peaceful and routine procedures for the transfer of political power were established. 'The seeds of discontent for the next crisis cycle have been planted during the period of stable military rule without concurrent mechanisms for channelling this discontent into peaceful regime change' (Lindenberg 1990, pp. 416, 419). In autocratic regimes, coups are inevitably the privileged mode of succession. More than 80 per cent of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced at least one successful or unsuccessful coup from the 1950s to early 1980s (Johnson *et al.* 1984). In most cases, authoritarian regimes followed one another. More than two-thirds of the executive transfers between 1965 and 1987 were 'irregular' (Hughes and May 1988). Adelman and Hihn

conclude that 'the possibility of political instability, or that of discontinuous political transitions, can be greatly reduced if governments make a conscious effort to pursue a development process that leads to greater social mobility and is combined with increased political participation' (Adelman and Hihn 1984, p. 20).

In closed political systems élites are the main contestants for political power and enrichment. The main élite groups may unite to support the government if economic growth is sufficient to accrue benefits to all of them. On the other hand, economic hardship is likely to entail distributional effects and form cleavages within the élite, so that the threat of a *coup d'état* by relatively deprived groups increases. Democratic regimes imply more open decision making. Political participation and competition should reduce the exclusiveness for enrichment in political office. The élite is more likely to be divided into different pluralist power-centres that compete for political power within democratically functioning institutions (Morrison and Stevenson 1971, p. 349). Of course, élites may use democracy's liberties for personal enrichment and corruption (see Chapters 2 and 5). Nevertheless, democratic regimes are likely to discourage coups although they may encourage political protest as a favoured mode of dissent.

Although democratic political regimes may be less susceptible than authoritarian regimes to élite instability in general, and irregular executive transfer in particular, they too have been overthrown during periods of economic hardship. On the basis of Latin American developments in the 1960s and 1970s, the bureaucratic-authoritarian approach postulated a causal link between economic crises and political authoritarianism in countries at middle levels of economic development (O'Donnell 1973; 1978). The military took political power when it perceived that democratic regimes were incapable of coping with the social consequences brought about by economic decline. This argument lost much credibility in the 1980s when democratic regimes replaced authoritarian regimes in Latin America (see Frieden 1989, p. 123). O'Donnell explained this new development by an increased intrinsic value attached to democracy. This value change was brought about first by discrediting groups that sought a violent and immediate route to socialism and secondly, by experiences with authoritarian regimes who, despite using unprecedented repression and violence, failed to bring about economic progress (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986, pp. 15–17). Democracy became a 'preferable alternative' to authoritarian rule.

In fact, Latin American democracies were more durable than autocracies during both the 1930s and the 1980s' debt crises. No democratic government was brought down in the 1980s as a result of continued debt outflow (Drake 1989, pp. 53–4). In Asia, Pakistan, South Korea, and the Philippines all moved towards more democratic rule. In some African countries the trend was slightly different. Ghana (1981), Nigeria (1983) and Sudan (1989) experienced a shift from fairly democratic to authoritarian regimes as a result of *coups d'état*. Notably in Ghana a 'democratic paralysis' had brought the economy to the brink of collapse before the coup. Overall, however, the recent empirical evidence runs contrary to the bureaucratic-authoritarian argument.

Authoritarian regimes have been able to cling to power during periods of relative prosperity but they are more prone to collapse during economic crises than democracies. All of the breakdowns of authoritarian regimes discussed in the collection by O'Donnell and others (1986) were accompanied by economic crises (Bermeo 1990, p. 372). Dictatorships have a narrow base of legitimacy and support, which make them dependent on their ability to provide economic efficiency and social order (Drake 1989, pp. 53–4). Democracies have other sources of legitimacy as well as a broader support base.⁵ Compared to democracies, authoritarian regimes are also more dependent on foreign lenders to stay in power. Turkey and Morocco, which did not experience social unrest in the context of adjustment policies, were both generously supported by the IMF and World Bank and other lenders. This 'made possible a degree of "cushioning" in the economy which would otherwise have been impossible' (Seddon 1992, p. 49).

6.2 Democratization

6.2.1 A democratic wave

In the early 1990s, with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the apparent end of the Russo-American cold war, Western scholars and national leaders expected a surge toward liberal economic reforms and competitive democratic elections. Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa, the regions of the world most vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies, appeared ripe for extensive economic and political liberalization.

Huntington (1993, p. 6), writing on the eve of these events, visualized this as a later stage of a wave of democratization in new countries. He defines democracy, not by source of authority or purpose, but as

Joseph Schumpeter did (1942, p. 269), as a procedure, 'a institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote.' Huntington (1993, p. 7) adds the proviso that 'virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote'. For him, 'elections, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy' (*ibid.*, p. 9).

A democratic wave indeed washed the less developed world, particularly Africa, picking up speed at the turn of the decade. But as any wave, it had the shape of an inverted U-curve. Regimes sticking to stern authoritarian rule do not accept group organization and are likely to repress rebellious action. Weak pro-democracy forces will not act in anticipation of this repression but instead will wait for a political opening. Political opening allows room for the organization of the opposition groups, which are often prime catalysts in political liberalization and democratization. The end of the cold war provided such an opening in several countries. The beginning of the wave was accompanied with extensive popular protests against economic austerity, corruption and one-party rule and, near the breaking point of the wave, with increased ethno-political conflict (Gurr 1994, p. 364). While the wave moved along its inverted U-curve path it constantly crashed into rocks. Increasing political opportunities and aspirations were not realized and produced frustrations, when old authoritarian regimes resisted and sometimes protected their prerogatives with violence.

Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle (1997, p. 3), Africanists who broaden Huntington's concept of the democratic wave to include political protest, civil and political rights, and competitive elections, contend that

the first half of the 1990s saw widespread political turbulence across the African continent, which can be summarized with ... transitions away from one-party and military regimes start[ing] with political protest, evolv[ing] through liberalization reforms, often culminat[ing] in competitive elections, and usually end[ing] with the installation of new forms of regimes. ... [These movements and institutional rearrangements] amounted to the most far-reaching shifts in African political life since the time of political independence 30 years earlier.

Within three to four years after the early 1990s, most African protest movements resulted in the accession to office of new governments

chosen in a 'feverish round of elections'. From the perspective of the late 1990s, Bratton and van de Walle are uncertain that this early regime transition marked a watershed in African politics. Indeed past practices of clientelism, rent seeking, fraud, and monopolistic styles of rule remained pervasive in Africa.

Thandika Mkandawire (1999, pp. 119–36) regards African countries adopting formal institutions of democratic rule, but constrained by their own technocratic governance, and the manipulation by the political élites, as well as the structural adjustment of international agencies, as 'choiceless démocraties'. Jean-François Bayard, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou (1999, pp. 2–3) note ironically that

the democratization process begun in 1989–91 ... has actually increased the tendency towards the erosion of national sovereignty, since aid donors now attach conditions governing human rights to the loans and grants which they offer. But these conditions ... have little effect on the substance of relations between the élites of the various *anciens régimes* and those people who are intent on pursuing a political revolution. They have, however, had the effect of obliging the main actors to change their system of legitimation.

They also state:

With South Africa providing the only really important exception, the process of democratization has been captured, under the guise of competitive elections, by the authoritarian groups already in control of state power (notably in Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Gabon, and Kenya), or it has given rise to new regimes whose weakness offers little promise of future stability (Mali and Benin) or produced others which cannot easily be considered genuinely democratic ... or else democracy has been snuffed out by the intervention of the armed forces.

(Ibid., pp. 4–5)

Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla (2001, p. v.) indicate that 'New and transitional democracies everywhere are at risk of reverting to autocracy.' Nigeria's transition to democracy is at risk, and whether it succeeds is likely to influence the stability of West Africa (ibid., p. 2). 'Most new democracies in poor countries shift back toward autocracy within five years' (ibid., p. 3).

6.2.2 A democratic peace?

Humanitarian emergencies often result from the abuse of political power, especially authoritarian power, and are virtually non-existent in *established* democratic societies. Rummel's study of democide indicates that although power kills, 'democracies don't murder their citizens' (Rummel 1997, pp. 91–8). Gurr, Marshall and Khosla (2001, p. v) find that 'Democratic governments now outnumber autocratic governments two to one and continue to be more successful than autocracies in resolving violent societal conflicts.'

The concept of democratic peace may only be applicable to long-standing democratic societies and to inter-state rather than intra-state conflict.⁶ For emergencies often occur in societies making the transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Collier 1998, pp. 11–12; Väyrynen 2000b; and Sandbrook 2002), including the electoral democracies with few civil and political freedoms that have abounded in Africa in the 1990s as 'virtual democrac[ies] ... deliberately contrived to satisfy international norms of "presentability" ' (Joseph 1998, pp. 3–4). The opposition parties, free press, labour unions, and strong civil society needed to support a transparent, accountable democratic society were still lacking (*ibid.*, pp. 4–9).

Jack Snyder and Karen Ballantine (1996) argue that in democratizing countries with weak civil societies, and where media are controlled in oligopolistic or monopolistic fashion, free speech can actually exacerbate relations between communities. Indeed Holsti contends that 'elections in weak, multi-communal states', where social cleavages are deep, may contribute to emergencies. In these states, elections may 'have a very different meaning than they do in liberal democracies, for they signify not the victory of a shifting coalition that can be unseated later, depending upon performance, but the virtual or real *perpetual* rule of one group over other(s). ... Elections in these circumstances are not instruments of conflict resolution, but tipping events that help transform social tensions into pogroms, armed combat, riots, and "ethnic cleansing" ' (Holsti 2000, pp. 266–7). For Ake (1996, p. 42), 'even at its best, liberal democracy is inimical to ... people having effective decisionmaking power'. For Fareed Zakaria (1997, pp. 22–43), democratically elected regimes in weak states in the third world 'are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms'. Zakaria (1997, pp. 22–9), who observes the lack of 'free and fair elections ... the rule of law, a separation of powers, the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property', and economic liberalism, labels these regimes

'illiberal democracies'. Strongmen in these illiberal democracies create electoral rules of the game to divide, co-opt, and subdue the opposition; maintain private armed forces and death squads; and detain political opponents; in ways that distort democratic institutions (*ibid.*; Joseph 1998, pp. 14–15; Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998, p. 33; Gyimah-Boadi 1998, p. 20).

Given the process of state building, Sandbrook (2002, p. 159) contends that 'Democratization ... [the movement from authoritarian to democratic rule], is a highly disruptive process.' He cites several African 'countries in which democratization has recently aggravated ethnic/communal divisions and accelerated a downward spiral into deadly conflict': Congo-Brazzaville, Central African Republic, and Kenya. Marina Ottaway (1995, pp. 235–6) identifies the critical dilemma:

[D]emocratization ... is a highly disruptive process in itself: it encourages the conflicts that exist in a collapsing state to manifest themselves freely, but without the restraint of the checks and balances, and of agreement on the basic rules, that regulate conflict ... in a well-established democratic system. Democracy as a stable state is highly desirable, but democratization, or the process of getting to such stable democracy, can trigger highly undesirable side effects.

The effects can trigger conflicts 'to manifest themselves freely, but without the restraints of the checks and balances, and of agreement on the basic rules that regulate conflict' (Ottaway 1995, pp. 235–6). Democratic contestation can heighten inter-ethnic mistrust, animosity, and polarization (Sandbrook 2001), contributing to a humanitarian emergency. However, one-party and military governments are even less adept than newly democratizing states at avoiding ethnic conflict. Moreover, democracies can manage ethnic divisions, facilitating compromise, inclusion, and cooperation across cleavages, if its institutions encourage consensual governance rather than 'winner-take-all' approaches (*ibid.*). For Atul Kohli (1997, p. 325), the key is for democracies to accommodate movements for communal or ethnic self-determination. While mobilized groups in a well-established democratic state with firm but accommodating leaders, are likely to confront state authority, 'such movements eventually decline as exhaustion sets in, some leaders are repressed, others are co-opted, and a modicum of genuine power sharing and mutual accommodation between the movement and the central state authorities is reached' (*ibid.*, p. 326).

Ganguly (1997, p. 144) indicates that civil violence in India is exacerbated because of democratic institutions. Increased education, technology, media communication, and grassroots political power mean that previously disenfranchised groups increase their standards of living. These groups, such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (the dominant party in India's ruling coalition in the years just after 1998) and reactionary elements of the Hindu community, become increasingly politically mobilized.

Democratization includes the growth of institutions independent of the state – private and nongovernmental entities such as labour unions, religious organizations, educational and scientific communities, and the media. These components of civil society are crucial in developing mediation and problem solving for reducing the risk of humanitarian emergencies (Carnegie Commission 1997, pp. 109–11).

Sandbrook and Oelbaum (1997, pp. 643–6), while conceding that 'institutional performance is shaped by traditions established over many years', contend that donor pressure for liberalization and democratic governance, even with deeply rooted patrimonialism, may facilitate the gradual institutional change essential to support economic development. In a democratic society, where power is dispersed and 'there is rule of law, equal opportunity, accountability of power, and a leadership sensitive to social needs, primary group identities [and enmities] will be less appealing. In such circumstances, [economic collapse and] humanitarian emergencies are less likely to occur' (Ake 1997, p. ix).

Still, Benno Ndulu and Stephen O'Connell (1999, p. 51) use Bratton and van de Walle's (1997) classification of 45 sub-Saharan countries by political regime in 1988 (excluding settler oligarchies of Namibia and South Africa): multi-party systems, one-party systems, and military oligarchies. Ndulu and O'Connell show that, in total, the five multi-party systems – Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe – started out richer (in 1960) and grew rapidly, expanded their advantage in real GDP per capita over time (Figure 6.1). Although one-party regimes, whether competitive or plebiscitary, grew in the 1960s, they barely increased after 1970. Finally, military oligarchies started as the poorest of nations, and despite limited growth in the 1970s, have remained the poorest. To Ndulu and O'Connell, this reinforces Seymour Martin Lipset's hypothesis (1959) of the correlation of economic development with democratic institutions. Democracy is difficult to sustain where there is no accompanying economic development.




Figure 6.1: Real GDP per capita by political regime
 (©American Economic Association)

Note: Forty-seven countries of sub-Saharan Africa are classified according to their political regime in 1988. Two are the ‘settler oligarchies’ of Namibia and South Africa and eight (Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sao Tome, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan) lack data. The 37 for which there are data are divided into the following:

Multi-party systems: Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, Zimbabwe.

Military oligarchies: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Uganda.

Plebiscitary one-party systems: Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Swaziland, and Zaire.

Competitive one-party systems: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Seychelles, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia.

Sources: Bratton and van de Walle 1997; and Ndulu and O’Connell 1999, p. 51.

Ndulu and O’Connell (1999, pp. 52–3) emphasize the association of good governance with African growth and the neopatrimonial feature, or personalized patterns of authority and obligation, with African authoritarian regimes, and their resulting slow growth. Under neopatrimonial rulers, investment by African élites shifts from readily taxable forms toward mobile capital and even capital flight (Ndulu and O’Connell 1999, pp. 54–5). African political élites also prefer quantitative restrictions and licencing over price-based policies, because of the scope for targeting these benefits to favoured parties.

The struggle over declining economic benefits affects the composition of ruling élites and the nature of patron–client patterns, thus potentially destabilizing the polity. In return, as pointed out in section

2.1, these changes in the political system may constrain policies toward economic growth and development.

In sum, the inverted U-shape democratic wave is turbulent and often colliding with rocks, particularly near its breaking point. Increased political rights lead to increased political actions. Not all of these actions are pacific, and are often matched by repressive acts and violence by the powers that were. However, the risk of serious conflict and humanitarian emergency will be substantially reduced when the wave has reached a sandy beach and has become familiar with its pleasant texture.

6.3 Military centrality

In our econometric analysis, we found military centrality, as indicated by the ratio of military expenditure to GNP, the strongest and the most robust correlate of humanitarian emergencies (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999, p. 280; Appendix Tables A1.5, A1.6, and A1.14). This finding is consistent with the military centrality theory, which focuses on the military's prominent and highly political role in closed political systems.

There is a two-way causal relationship between military expenditures and emergencies. A strong military is apt to overthrow either a democratic or authoritarian regime, which may lead to political instability and a humanitarian crisis. For civilian regimes in LDCs, powerful armed forces constitute a constant threat. Particularly during economic austerity, they are afraid to cut back military spending. Furthermore, they may strengthen the military to stave off threats from the opposition. This, in turn, entails heavy socio-economic costs for the population, inducing further discontent and increasing the risk of rebellion. In very poor countries, such as Afghanistan and North Korea in the years before 2003, budget allocations for the military may produce downright starvation and destitution.

Especially violent and protracted emergencies necessitate high military spending. Nevertheless we want to emphasize the reverse dynamic, explaining how military centrality contributes to humanitarian emergencies through four different dynamics.

First, military resources are used to support authoritarian political structures, which are susceptible to violent and destructive forms of conflict. Prolonged repressive authoritarian rule is likely to create a sense of injustice and deprivation within the opposition, eventually transforming it to 'desperate underdogs', who will fight regardless of

the consequences if they feel they have nothing to lose. South Africa's black population was driven to such a position by the apartheid regime.

According to students of the South African transformation (du Toit 1996; Nel 1996; Friedman 1995; interviews in Auvinen and Kivimäki 1997), supported by opinion polls in 1986 and 1987,⁷ the black community of South Africa could be regarded as a desperate underdog. The desperate uprisings of 1963 and 1976 and the violent popular upsurge after 1984 as well as comments by Cyril Ramaphosa, later to become the African National Congress's chief negotiator (Fisher and Albeldas 1987, pp. 283–94), reinforce the view that South Africa would have lapsed into civil war no matter how strong the repressive machinery of the white establishment was and no matter how little hope there was for the African National Congress coalition to win militarily (Auvinen and Kivimäki 1997, pp. 7–9).

Military centrality may intensify conflicts and spark new ones. Given a strong military, a government is likely to deploy it to crush or preempt various kinds of challenges by desperate underdogs or other forces created by the system. Scant military resources indicate that the government is predisposed to solving crises by other, more pacific means. A strong military is likely to exert power over government decisions and favour strong over weak responses to suppress conflict. Excessive force and firepower against peaceful demonstrations are likely to trigger further violence, as happened in South Africa in 1990–92 and in Pinochet's Chile.⁸

Second, since authoritarian rule relies on military power, one usually needs considerable military resources to challenge it. Provided that repressive rule has not yet generated an opposition of desperate underdogs, political opponents will not attempt to challenge the regime until they have managed to collect enough military capacity. As in the case of desperate bargaining, the resulting conflict is likely to be bloody and intense. Military centrality thus has an impact on the form of conflict: large military resources may deter popular protest but encourage opponents to build up resources for large-scale warfare; rebellion promises a better chance of success than protest, or the only chance.

Third, military centrality is conducive to irregular executive transfers, which can lead to humanitarian emergencies. Craig Jenkins and Augustine Kposowa found military centrality the most consistent independent force behind coups. The greater the resources of the military, the more likely were military interventions. While this finding was based on Africa, it is supported by earlier studies (Jenkins and Kposowa

1990, pp. 862, 869; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993, p. 147). In many LDCs, military takeovers of governments have occurred routinely (see Johnson, Slater, and McGowan 1984), although in most of Latin America they seemed to have discontinued during the 1980s.⁹

Frequently these coups have led to humanitarian crises. To illustrate, the military has traditionally occupied a central position in Haitian politics. From the late 1930s until 1957, when François Duvalier (better known as Papa Doc) assumed the presidency, 'the army exercised effective power and decided for how long the sitting president would be able to retain power' (Lundahl 2000, p. 341). Duvalier was able to undermine the military's power with the help of his own paramilitary force, the *tonton macoutes*. The Duvaliers were able to stave off the threat of the military until 1986, when François's son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, was finally ousted in a coup. When the army reconstituted itself in Haitian politics, a new wave of coups and counter-coups followed. In September 1991, the military overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, as it felt threatened by his plans to return the police force from the military to civilian control 'since this struck at the heart of their [the military's] illegal activities' (Dupuy 1997, pp. 116–18). This move led to a humanitarian crisis in Haiti with notorious consequences (see Lundahl 2000). Other instances include Nigeria's two coups in 1966, which set the stage for the 1967–70 civil war, and Pakistan's military coups in 1958 and 1969, which contributed to the conflict between East and West Pakistan in 1971.

Military coups have often been economically motivated. Jenkins and Kposowa (1990) found that debt dependence was a major predictor of coup activity in black Africa from 1957 to 1984. Guillermo O'Donnell's (1973, 1978) bureaucratic-authoritarian thesis suggests that Latin American militaries intervened in politics during periods of economic hardship, legitimizing the action by the need to establish order amid social unrest. Even more generally, economic crises tend to strengthen the military's position. Civilian governments avoid cutting back military budgets and privileges to keep the armed forces satisfied (Kimenyi and Mbaku 1993, p. 395). African governments favoured defence in budgeting during periods of austerity (although they discriminated against defence when budget resources were increasing) (Gyimah-Brempong 1992, p. 191).

There is a vicious circle: during economic hardship the repressive machinery needs to be strengthened, or at least not to be cut back in proportion to other sectors, to withstand the opposition's potential mobilization against austerity. The inability to reduce military spend-

ing, in turn, is a further economic burden on the citizens. Where per capita incomes are low, even small changes in budget allocation have great distributive impact on the peoples' welfare. Money for the military allocates funds away from other goods and services, including health care, clean water, and housing. In extremely poor countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Chad, more funds for defence contributed to increased hunger (Gyimah-Brempong 1992).

The vicious circle indicates a fourth dynamic: military centrality reduces a population's welfare and dampens economic growth. Most empirical evidence supports an inverse association between military expenditure and growth – 'the tank-tractor trade-off'. Saadet Deger and Ron Smith (1983, p. 352) found that military spending had a small positive effect on growth through modernization effects but larger negative effects through reduced savings, which resulted in a net negative effect of military expenditure on growth. In Sudan, military expenditure had substantial economic costs, particularly on investment, human resource accumulation, trade balance and economic growth, although Nadir Mohammed (1992) also mentions some limited positive spin-offs to the productive sectors. In conclusion, there are several mechanisms through which military centrality causes or exacerbates humanitarian emergencies, whether by generating violent conflicts or economic destitution.

6.4 Conflict tradition

Not all economically destitute countries with inegalitarian income distributions and predatory political structures supported by a strong military establishment were subject to humanitarian emergencies. In our econometric analysis (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999, pp. 271–2, 278–9), we found a connection between violent conflict in the 1960s and 1970s (specifically 1963 to 1977) and humanitarian emergencies in the 1980s and 1990s (see also Auvinen 1996a, pp. 78–9). Conflict cultures vary from one country to another and have been shaped by history. Certain forms of conflict are institutionalized in some countries, and would never occur in other countries.

Ted Robert Gurr and Raymond Duvall used conflict traditions as an indicator of the justifications for political violence. 'Tension', a multiplicative term incorporating stress, strain, and conflict traditions, 'is the primary driving force behind manifest conflict' (Gurr and Duvall 1973, p. 157). Ted Robert Gurr and Mark Irving Lichbach's (1986) pure 'persistence of conflict model' also explained some of the variance in political conflict.

Citizens adapt to a certain, acceptable level of violence through the cultural experience of violence (Gurr 1970, pp. 155–92). A tradition of intensive political violence makes societies more susceptible to war and humanitarian emergencies. Countries with a history of mass political mobilization for conflict, such as Colombia, Burundi, and Rwanda, are likely to be more susceptible to new conflict components of humanitarian emergencies than other, historically more peaceful countries.

The histories of Latin America and Africa abound with irregular executive transfers. Haiti is a prime example. Despite the army's political weakness and the consequent absence of irregular executive transfers between 1957 and 1986, Haiti has nevertheless had twelve successful coups since 1956 (Brogan 1992). This is a continuation of the trend in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to Robert Heintz and Nancy Gordon Heintz (1978, p. 404), Haiti experienced more than a hundred more or less successful uprisings between 1843 and the landing of the US Marines in 1915. As many as 17 of the 22 presidents during this period were deposed by a *coup d'état* or revolution (Lundahl 2000).

Although Asia has experienced relatively fewer coups, some countries such as Thailand stand out. Typical features of conflict behaviour in South Korea have been self-immolations by fire and huge riots with a very small number of deaths. A war-induced humanitarian emergency would be unlikely in such a country. In Chad, a civil war involving several foreign interventions has continued, with only three short interruptions, since the late 1960s (Brogan 1992, pp. 19–26). The selection of the forms to express grievances is strongly affected by the conflict culture.

Intensity of past conflicts, as indicated by a large number of casualties, indicates that violence is not atypical for a conflict culture. Colombia is a violent society. During *La Violencia* in 1946–65, some 300,000 people were killed in the fighting between partisans of the Conservative and Liberal Parties. In 1988, when the country was not involved in active warfare, it experienced about 20,000 murders – about six times the murder rate in the United States (Brogan 1992, p. 513). Past violence is likely to lower the threshold for using violence as a means of expressing dissent, making intensive forms of political conflict normatively justifiable.¹⁰

6.5 Conclusion

The relationship between authoritarianism and the extent of conflict is characterized by an inverted U, with conflict less likely in a political

system that is extremely repressive *or* has low repression. The chances of peaceful regime change are limited under authoritarianism.

Scholars writing in the early 1990s discerned a democratic wave among developing and post-communist countries. However, many initial transitions from one-party and military regimes to democracies shifted back to autocracy within a few years. Moreover, democracy rarely persists where there is no economic development.

Elections in weak, multi-communal states, with deep social cleavages and little tradition for liberal democracy are often highly disruptive, aggravating ethnic divisions and spurring a downward spiral toward deadly political violence. Democratic contestation can heighten inter-ethnic conflict, contributing to an emergency. However, one-party and military governments are even less adept than newly democratizing states at avoiding ethnic conflict.

Military centrality is associated with humanitarian emergencies. Military resources support authoritarian politics, which contribute to violent forms of politics. Authoritarianism relies on military power, encouraging opponents to build up resources for major warfare. Military centrality is also conducive to coups, which can lead to emergencies, and military spending has a negative effect on economic growth which is inversely related to emergencies. Finally, past violence is likely to lower the threshold for using violence to express dissent.

7

The Failure of Agriculture: Food Entitlements, Élite Violence, and Famines

Agriculture is a major component of GDP in low-income countries and a major influence on the rest of the economy through its contribution to food supplies, foreign exchange, labour supply, capital transfer, and markets. Frequently the failure of food and agricultural development is a key element of a protracted stagnation or decline, and rising social tensions. In several sub-Saharan African countries, agricultural stagnation is associated with slow technological and institutional modernization, unfavourable government policies and factor market distortions, and obsolete agrarian structures. Declining rural productivity contributes not only to increased dog-eat-dog contention among severely impoverished rural populations, but also spurs rural–urban migration, increasing urban unemployment, underemployment, and political discontent, which may contribute to humanitarian emergencies.

Failure of agricultural development and international economic deterioration affect income and its distribution domestically by region, ethnic group, and class. This distribution affects social mobilization, which can set the stage for potential crises.

7.1 The food crisis

Our econometric work, including a test of lags and leads, suggests that slow growth of food production per capita was a source of humanitarian emergencies, where these are defined to exclude its nutritional component (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999, p. 280; and Appendix Tables A.6 and A.12). This relationship was even stronger than the reverse chain from emergencies to slow food growth.

We can illustrate the relationship between food availability and humanitarian emergencies in sub-Saharan Africa. Africa's food crisis since the 1960s has made it especially vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies. Andrea Cornia, Richard Jolly, and Frances Stewart (1987) explain how declining real household income (through falling income or rising food prices among low-income households) reduces household food availability, decreasing nutrient intake and increasing malnutrition, and increasing disease and mortality (especially among infants and children).

From 1962 to 1989, food output per capita grew at an annual rate of 0.5 per cent in developing countries, 0.3 per cent in developed countries, and 0.4 per cent overall, but declined 0.8 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, meaning that food production there grew more slowly than population. (The data are calculated from Figure 7.1, using a five-year moving average to smooth out weather fluctuations.) Food production per person increased from 1962 to 1989 in all world regions except the sub-Sahara (Figure 7.1).

Africa's daily calorie consumption per capita in 1989, 2116 (the same as in the early 1960s and less than the 2197 of the mid-1970s), was 92 per cent of the requirement estimated by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 1988–90; calorie consumption in all other regions exceeded the FAO figure (UN Nations Development Programme 1994, pp. 27, 118–20, 132–3, 207–08). Africa's food security index was low




Figure 7.1: Growth in food production per capita, 1960–91 (1960 = 100)

Source: Nafziger 1997, p. 176.

(and falling since the 1960s) (Jazairy, Alamgir, and Panuccio 1992, pp. 27, 398–99), not only because of large food deficits but also because of fluctuations in domestic output and foreign-exchange reserves, as well as declining foreign food aid. In 1989, Economic Commission for Africa Executive Director Adebayo Adedeji (1989, p. 2) spoke of ‘the humiliation it has brought to Africa in having to go round with the begging bowl for food aid’.

Illustrative of the enormity of sub-Saharan Africa’s difference from other LDCs is that while the sub-Saharan and India both produced 50 million tons of foodgrains in 1960, in 1988 India produced 150 million tons (after the Green Revolution and other farm technological improvements) and sub-Saharan Africa (with faster population growth) had stagnated at little more than 50 million tons. India’s yield per hectare increased by 2.4 per cent yearly, while the sub-Saharan’s grew at a negligible annual rate of 0.1 per cent. Thus, the sub-Saharan, which was on parity with India in 1960, produced only about one-third of Indian output in 1988 (Singer 1990, pp. 178–81).

Additionally, increasing population density on cultivable land has already exacerbated conflict and humanitarian disaster in low-income Africa and Haiti. Mats Lundahl (2000, p. 335) finds the fundamental economic cause of Haiti’s protracted emergency during the last two decades of the twentieth century ‘the interplay between population growth and soil erosion: a process that in the long run tends to make rural per capita income decline at an accelerating pace’. Population pressure on limited land contributed to the diaspora from the Eastern Region to the rest of Nigeria in the one to two decades before the 1967–70 civil war. The East had a 1963 population density of 1,088 per square kilometer compared to the whole country’s 404. Contemporary Rwanda and Burundi, with only 5 and 6 per cent respectively of their population living in urban areas, have a population density of 1,295 persons per square kilometer (Gaffney 1996, p. 17).¹ This is about the same as that of Italy (1298), which is 67 per cent urban, and exceeds population density in France (717), which is 74 per cent urban. While parts of Asia have also faced high agrarian population densities, more rapid economic growth, with its accompanying expansion of employment in industry and services, has generally reduced the political salience of these pressures.²

7.2 Agricultural policies before liberalization

Africa’s deteriorating food position began before the droughts in the Sahel (including the Sudan and Ethiopia) in 1968 to 1974 and in 1984

to 1985. While the roots of Africa's food crisis go back to colonialism (Eicher and Baker 1982, pp. 20–3; Ghai and Radwan 1983, pp. 16–21), the continuing crisis is largely due to African government's neglect of agriculture. Here we concentrate on the policies of African political élites and government decision-makers in the decade or two before 1979, the period of liberalization.

After independence, African political élites required the support of urban élites and working classes to maintain power. Élites increased their political benefits, not through market prices for smallholders, research and extension on traditional food crops, or recognizing traditional communal property, but by expanding patronage through commercial and estate agriculture, easing land purchase by the urban affluent, and selective projects and subsidies. Furthermore, African governments preferred project-based to price-based policies to increase agricultural supplies because projects help to build and reinforce a political patron–client system.

Despite development plans proclaiming agriculture's priority and rhetoric stressing the poor rural masses, governments used pricing and exchange rate policies, spending on investment and social services, and subsidies and protection to allocate most resources to cities, a policy of urban bias. African politicians responded to the more powerful and articulate urban dwellers. Thus, during the last quarter of the twentieth century, the policies of ruling élites diverted farmland from growing food crops, such as sorghum, millet, and local brands of maize, roots, and tubers for hungry villagers, to produce cash crops, including rice, wheat, hybrid maize, and export crops, like tobacco and natural rubber; this production shift and the greater concentration of wealth and income distribution and its effect on food demand meant that food crops declined more rapidly (or grew more slowly) than cash and export crops (Cornia 1994, pp. 217–9). Political leaders spent scarce capital on highways and steel mills, instead of on water pumps, tube wells, and other equipment essential for growing food. Moreover, governments used high-cost administrative and management talent to design office buildings and sports stadiums rather than village wells and agricultural extension services.

In sub-Saharan Africa, there is generally an inverse relationship between farm size and land yields because of the low imputed costs to own labour and the low costs of monitoring and supervising labour on small farms (Cornia 1994, pp. 217–29). Yet, there is a policy bias toward large farms, since government leaders and ministry officials increase clientage more by expanding production in the estate and

commercial sector than by the growth of smallholder agriculture. And they profit more by subsidizing farm implement, fertilizer, and seed costs than by spurring prices to produce farm goods. Political élites can manipulate farmers better through market intervention than with a free market.

Most African states have tried to keep food prices low to satisfy urban workers and their employers (multinational corporations, indigenous capital, and government). Urban unrest from increasing living costs sometimes has contributed to governments losing power or even being overthrown. To insure political survival, insecure African ruling élites forwent policies promoting rural innovation and reducing urban–rural income gaps.

7.3 Agricultural policies during liberalization

During the liberalization of the 1980s and early 1990s, the World Bank, IMF, and external donors, in setting conditions for agricultural policy in Africa for adjustment loans, emphasized eliminating price distortions. However, empirical studies indicate that farm price distortions comprised only a fraction of the explanation for Africa's falling average agricultural output (Cleaver 1985; Cornia 1994, p. 221). The rest of the explanation is from infrastructural and other institutional factors such as the insecure tenancy of cultivators, the highly inefficient new private commercial agricultural production, the limited emphasis on traditional food crops in agricultural research and extension, the increased transaction and litigation costs, and the land, credit, and insurance market imperfections, such as small farmers' lack of access to credit, that contribute to greater dualism. But in Africa, the stress of externally funded adjustment programmes on commercialization means a decline in the production of traditional food crops, increased farm shares to medium and large farmers, and an increase in the purchase of farmland by urban élites as a hedge against inflation (Cornia 1994, pp. 222–31).

The emphasis on individual property-rights systems by international financial institutions and African élites has reduced agricultural efficiency. Under most traditional community or village systems, farm families not only have tenure security but land rights are highly transferable. Greater agricultural intensification from population growth gives rise to pressure for increasingly formal private property rights. Ironically, however, registering individualized land titles reduces tenure security in the short run, as the number of land disputes surge.

Clever, well-informed and powerful individuals jockey to have parcels not previously theirs registered in their own name, while rural masses may be unaware of the implications of registration. Women especially face difficulties in having their customary rights recognized by political authorities. And in the longer run, the high costs of land registration and lack of familiarity with the government bureaucracy displace weak or politically marginalized groups, and redistribute land to the commercial and estate sectors, increasing the concentration of land holdings. As an example, Kenya's systematic compulsory individualized titling of all farmlands since the 1950s contributed to a substantial gap between the control of rights reflected in the land register and recognized by most local communities, providing opportunities for affluent town dwellers to establish property rights through land registration. In Nigeria, under cover of national development projects, state officials granted extensive land tracts to friends, dispossessing many villagers from their customary lands. Redistribution through individualized titling not only increased inequality but also reduced labour intensity, capital formation, and innovation, contributing to the inverse relationship between farm size and yields noted above (Cornia 1994, pp. 222–31).

7.4 Food entitlements, élite violence, and famines

Case-study evidence suggests that humanitarian emergencies increase nutritional vulnerability. Relief agencies indicate 20 million deaths from severe malnutrition in 1991 in six African countries where food trade was disrupted by domestic political conflict – Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Angola, and Mozambique. Moreover, while, on the one hand, food deficits contribute to refugee problems, on the other hand, the five million or so refugees annually fleeing civil wars, natural disasters, and political repression (including before 1990, South Africa's destabilization) added to Africa's food shortages (Daley 1992, p. 115; Goliber 1989, pp. 10–11).

Since we are interested in famine as a component of the dependent variable, we integrate politics and economics to explain famine. The conventional economic approach examines food (or total) output and its distribution, focusing on agricultural production, poverty rates, and Gini indices of concentration. According to this explanation, famine arises from a decline in food availability (Ravallion 1997, pp. 1207–08). Amartya Sen (1981, 1983b) and Drèze, Sen, and Hussain (1995), criticize this explanation, emphasizing that nutrition depends on society's

system of entitlement. Entitlement refers to the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she possesses. An entitlement helps people acquire capabilities (like being well nourished). In a market economy, the entitlement limit is based on ownership of factors of production and exchange possibilities (though trade or a shift in production possibilities). For most people, entitlement depends on the ability to find a job, the wage rate, and the prices of commodities bought. In a welfare or socialist economy, entitlement also depends on what families can obtain from the state through the established system of command. A hungry, destitute person will be entitled to something to eat, not by society's low Gini inequality and a high food output per capita, but by a relief system offering free food. Thus, in 1974, thousands of people died in Bangladesh despite its low inequality, because floods reduced rural employment along with output, and inflation cut rural labourers' purchasing power.

Sen argues that food is 'purchased' with political pressure as well as income. Accordingly, one-third of the Indian population goes to bed hungry every night and leads a life ravaged by regular deprivation. India's social system takes nonacute endemic hunger in stride; there are no headlines or riots. But while India's politicians do not provide entitlements for chronic or endemic malnutrition, they do so for potential severe famine through food imports, redistribution, and relief. In Maoist China, the situation was almost the opposite. Its political commitment ensured lower regular malnutrition through more equal access to means of livelihood and state-provided entitlement to basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter. In a normal year, China's poor were much better fed than India's. Yet if there was a political and economic crisis that confused the regime so that it pursued disastrous policies with confident dogmatism, then it could not be forced to change its policies by crusading newspapers or effective political opposition pressure, as in India (Sen 1983a, pp. 757–60; Sen 1983b; Sen 1986, pp. 125–32; Sen 1987, pp. 10–14).

Our political economy approach, however, analyses the behaviour of ruling élites during periods of Darwinian pressures and food crises. This approach goes beyond the Sen approach, to examine ruling élites' deliberate withholding of entitlement, or even use of violence, to achieve their goals of acquiring or maintaining power, which often involves benefits at the expense of other segments of the population. Thus, according to our political economy analysis, Mao's effort to increase control (and reduce the influence of pragmatist Liu Shaochi)

through collective-intensive water projects during the 1958–60 Great Leap Forward contributed to China's famine, in which per capita food production from 1957–59 to 1959–61 dropped 25 per cent. Indeed amid Mao's campaign for increasing collectivization in 1959, the pressure of the party establishment contributed to false reports of bumper crops (Prybyla 1970, pp. 264–9; Lardy 1983, pp. 152–3; Putterman 1993, p. 11; Ravallion 1997, pp. 1225–6).

Sen turns a blind eye to the possibility that the state may be the cause of famine through deliberate policy to transfer resources and food entitlements from a politically marginal group to a politically favoured one. To be sure, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (1989, pp. 5–6) point out that, 'The dependence of one group's ability to command food on its relative position and comparative power *vis-à-vis* other groups can be especially important in a market economy.' But for the two authors, famines and food shortages result from entitlement and state policy failure, and not from state action to damage the food entitlements of a group. They attribute the Soviet famines of the 1930s and the Kampuchean famines of the late 1970s to inflexible government policies that undermined the power of particular sections of the population to command food. Drèze and Sen's emphasis is on the need for public action by a benign state, making decisions about more or less food entitlements, rather than an ill-intentioned state making decisions to intervene in favour of one group at the expense of another and its food entitlement. For Drèze and Sen (1989, pp. 17–18), avoiding famine involves the 'division of benefits [from the] differential pulls coming from divergent interest groups', not stopping the denial of groups' entitlements.

As Keen (1994, p. 5) contends, in Drèze and Sen's view, 'There are victims of famine, but few immediate culprits or beneficiaries.' Drèze and Sen do not consider the possibility that states or politically powerful groups that control states may obstruct relief and contribute to famine for rational purposes of their own. Indeed the Drèze and Sen conception of the state is essentially a liberal one, in which the failure to factor in the public interest is perceived as a failure of public policy. Most scholars and international agencies share the Drèze–Sen view, widely perceiving famine as relief 'blunders' and the result of poverty and market forces, and failing to see how markets are shaped or forced by state-condoned raiding, collusion, and intimidation.

Amid state building in Africa and other socially heterogeneous post-colonial societies, Ake (1997, p. 2) sees widespread conflict and emergencies (including famine) as almost inevitable, since

State-making is perhaps best understood as the political equivalent of primitive accumulation, except that it is more violent still. It entails conquest and subjugation – conquest, because the state power which is projected in the process is arbitrary power since those on whom it is projected originally owed no political allegiance to the state makers. State making entails revoking the autonomy of communities and subjecting them to alien rulership within a bigger political order, laying claim to the resources of the subordinated territory including claims over the lives of those who live there. To effect these claims, the state must appropriate and monopolize the means of violence.

Indeed Charles Tilly (1985, p. 169) views state-building as ‘a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs’.

For ruling élites to organize war and conflict involves shifting alliances with groups and individuals in authority at the local level. Where the centre lacks the resources to ‘buy’ the loyalty of local élites, it may procure their loyalty by tolerating exploitation at a local level. In political conflict, the need to form alliances with local groups and élites may contribute to increased levels of abuse of civilians and the natural environment. Even civilians may find it safer and more advantageous to join armed exploiters rather than risk becoming one of the unarmed exploited (Keen 1996).

The political economy approach to famine, associated with the emphases by Alex de Waal (1989), Mark Duffield (1994), and David Keen (1994) on famine as an outcome of government’s forcible asset transfer from the politically weak to the politically strong, contrasts with that of Sen’s economic approach. Duffield and Keen point out that in the 1980s, the Sudanese government, under pressure from a shrinking economic pie, stripped the politically marginal Dinka of cattle and other major assets, distributing these to more favoured ethnic groups (Keen 1994; Duffield 1994, pp. 50–69).

Should we interpret Somalia’s case by using the Sen–Drèze approach or the political economy approach? Sen and Drèze emphasize erroneous economic policies, while political economy concentrates on the deliberate policy choices of Siad Barre and his cronies.

Let us begin with the Sen–Drèze paradigm, which provides a useful first reading of Somalia’s agricultural crisis. In Somalia, traditional agricultural production was not very efficient, but it was diversified and well adjusted to the risks related to frequent weather fluctuations

(Menkhaus 1996, p. 134; Besteman and Cassanelli 1996a, pp. 201–02). The colonial powers extracted the best lands for market-oriented production, which reduced food security and the security of locals generally (Mwaura 1997). This tendency continued after independence. In the 1970s, President Siad Barre tried to modernize through socialist policies and the diversion of the agricultural surplus for the growing urban population, especially its need for capital accumulation. After the Ogaden War in 1977–78, Barre again changed his economic policy orientation, changing land ownership and liberalizing agricultural production in a corrupt and capricious manner (Samatar 1988).

Production became more capital-intensive and increasingly oriented toward the market, particularly exports. Local agricultural incomes remained stagnant (Samatar 1993b). Maximizing output took precedence over food security, as the land was owned by cronies and foreigners whose livelihood did not depend on the vagaries of the weather and farm output. Production became increasingly unpredictable so that famine became more widespread among the locals (Shipton 1990, p. 358; Besteman and Cassanelli 1996b, p. 7). Thus, modern production patterns, together with the inability to coordinate aid internationally, were sources of famine and humanitarian emergency (Auvinen and Kivimäki 2000, pp. 199–201).

The second reading, the political economy paradigm, extends the analysis beyond the Sen–Drèze approach, to include class and the interests of political leaders and the general population. Siad Barre's class favouritism is evident in his approach towards rural people. Instead of investing state funds on irrigation schemes, rural infrastructure, or income opportunities for pastoral side-income, Barre's policies were directed toward making income tax collection among pastoralists more efficient (Schraeder 1986), controlling pastoral trade more effectively, extracting more money from this trade (Samatar 1992), and modernizing rural land ownership in favour of the modern and urban classes.

Barre manifested his favouritism toward the modern élite in his land policies in three ways: socialist agricultural development programmes, modernization of the Land Law in 1975, and the liberalization of agricultural business in the 1980s. The rural development programme and especially the Land Law of 1975 were modern interventions in land ownership, causing much anxiety and insecurity by eradicating the legitimacy of the customary, traditional land tenure. The development programme meant that parastatal companies took control of most arable lands in the 1970s (Menkhaus 1996, p. 147; Menkhaus and

Craven 1996, p. 157). The Land Law of 1975 finally made the state leasehold title the only legal means of claiming land rights. The law tipped the basis of tenure claims in favour of those with privileged access to registration (Besteman and Cassanelli 1996b, p. 12). Instead of state planning, modern élites were now able to use privatization programme and the Land Law of 1975 in their rush to gain control over traditional lands (Menkhaus 1996, pp. 148–9). The collapse of traditional land ownership and the consequent descent of traditional agriculturists into a situation approaching land slavery was accelerated by urbanization and the consequent increase in the demand for food, which increased the value of land in the 1980s, causing an increased interest among owners of capital in arable land (Cassanelli 1996, p. 20). As indicated in Chapter 8, the struggle for land resulted in a humanitarian emergency.

De Waal contends that marginalized communities in southern Somalia became destitute not only from drought but from forcible alienation of farmland and pasture. Victims usually lacked lobbying power, not purchasing power (Keen 1994; Duffield 1994, pp. 50–69; de Waal 1994, p. 141).

As Duffield (1994, p. 55) asserts:

The emergence of a political economy that includes asset transfer is extremely destructive and creates ever-deepening poverty and misery. Moreover, since subsistence assets are a finite resource, once such an economy is established it demands fresh inputs as the wealth of different groups is exhausted. Asset transfer becomes a moving feast on an ethnic table ... [and] once systemic, becomes synonymous with cultural genocide and the destruction of group rights.

Famine is an extended economic and political process, usually a result of the disruption of a way of life, involving hunger and destitution and not just death, and often long-term rather than just transitory. The state may withhold relief from famine victims, allowing more politically influential groups to appropriate the food and resources.³ Belligerents, such as Nigeria and Biafra in 1967–70 and the Sudanese government in the 1980s, are especially likely to block food supplies in a civil war. And even international agencies, non-governmental organizations, and other donors, facing government obstruction of relief and under pressure to cooperate with national authorities to at least provide relief in government-held areas, may discount indepen-

dent accounts of famine that reflect on their negligence (Keen 1994; de Waal 1989). Contrary to Sen's entitlement approach, the political economy approach emphasizes that famine and humanitarian emergencies arise not from policy errors but, and perhaps more importantly, from deliberate policy choices by ruling élites, who are trying to preserve or enhance power, thus requiring the analyst to examine the benefits and costs of famine and emergencies to major players in the conflict.⁴

8

The Conflict over Land and Natural Resources

Collier and Hoeffler's econometric analysis (1998, pp. 568–9) shows that the possession of natural resources increases the occurrence and duration of civil war. Mwanasali (2000, p. 145) indicates the reasons why. 'Primary commodity exports present several advantages to the belligerents. Because they are generic products, rather than brand names, their origin can easily be concealed. They are usually the most heavily taxable, especially in kind, and their production or marketing does not require the complicated processes, as is the case of manufactured goods.'

Primary goods include both agricultural (usually renewable) and mineral (largely nonrenewable) commodities. Indra De Soysa's statistical tests (2000, pp. 123–4), however, show 'that the incidence of civil war is completely unrelated to the per capita availability of natural resources, defined as the stocks of both renewable resources ... and nonrenewables'. However, once De Soysa refines her independent variable to include only mineral resources, her result is highly significant. She finds that 'the higher the per capita availability of ... mineral wealth, the greater the incidence of conflict' (*ibid.*, p. 124).

Thus mineral resources, not natural resources generally, increase the incidence of war. Here Collier's contention that 'greed' drives wars centered on the struggle for mineral wealth is valid. However, as indicated below, the conflict for land can be better explained as a grievance arising from perceived injustice and relative deprivation.

The following, based mainly on work by WIDER researchers (Nafziger *et al.*, 2 vols., 2000), explains why minerals contribute to conflict and state violence, and why the struggle over land can also exacerbate the risk of a humanitarian emergency.

8.1 The conflict over minerals

The struggles for control over minerals are important sources of conflict. In Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo-Kinshasa, rulers and warlords use exclusive contracts with foreign firms for diamonds and other minerals to 'regularize' sources of revenue in lieu of a government agency to collect taxes (Reno 1996b, 1998, 2000b).

What is the historical background for the increasing importance of minerals as sources of war since the early 1990s? In the struggle for allies during the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union provided military and economic aid for developing countries. Sovereignty provided the opportunity to extract resources from the major powers in exchange for diplomatic support. Yet aid could provide the basis for supporting a patronage system for either the state or for insurgents in opposition.

When the cold war ended in the early 1990s, nation-states and rebels in the developing world required different strategies and new sources of funds. Afro-Asian and Latin American countries needed control of resources to provide military and police power but only minimal services to control territory. Indeed with the IMF/World Bank emphasis on the market and private enterprise, rulers often undermined their own bureaucracies to build personal power at the expense of health, education, and agricultural development (Reno 2000a, pp. 231–2; Väyrynen 2000b, pp. 437–79).

Thus weakened states, with shrinking external resources, supported the private sector (even management contracting) in place of customary state activities in electricity, transport, telecommunications, water, sewerage, roads, and ports. This contributed to a patrimonial state, where rulers strengthened their personalistic grip on power amid state and bureaucratic decay by relying on external private and military resources for survival.

After the decline of aid after the cold war, Sierra Leone was more susceptible to pressures for liberalization and adjustment from the IMF and World Bank. In 1991, the IMF, the Bank, and bilateral creditors offered loans and debt rescheduling worth \$625 million, about 80 per cent of GNP, if Sierra Leone reduced government expenditure and employment. In response, Freetown heeded the World Bank's advice (1994, pp. 22–51) to use private operators to run state services for a profit. But privatization did not eliminate the pressures of clients demanding payoffs but merely shifted the arena to the private sector. Sierra Leone's ruling élites, needing new ways of exercising power, used foreign firms to consolidate power

and stave off threats from political rivals. To stay in power, many African rulers, under pressure from rivals, become warlords. In the 1990s, Sierra Leonean heads of state relied on exclusive contracts with foreign firms for diamond mining to 'regularize' revenue, foreign mercenaries and advisers to replace the national army in providing security, and foreign contractors (sometimes the same mining or security firms) to provide other state services. In the process, rulers found it advantageous to 'destroy state agencies, to "cleanse" them of politically threatening patrimonial hangers-on and use violence to extract resources from people under their control' (Reno 1996b, pp. 7–8, 12).

In Liberia, Charles Taylor used external commercial networks (foreign firms), some a legacy of the Samuel Doe regime of the late 1980s, to amass internal power, including a large proportion of old Liberia, and at times, the eastern periphery of Sierra Leone. Taylor's territory had its own currency and banking system, telecommunications network, airfields, export trade (in diamonds, timber, gold, and farm products) to support arms imports, and (until 1993) a deepwater port. For Taylor, a warlord during most of the 1990s before being elected Liberia's president in 1997, controlling territory by building a patronage network was easier than building a state and its bureaucracy (Reno 1995, p. 111). Indeed Taylor had access to annual revenues exceeding \$100 million, with an upper limit around \$200 million, from 1990 to 1996 (Reno 2000a, pp. 243, 252).

Even Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko (1965–97), like other hard-pressed rulers in weak African states, mimicked 'the "warlord" logic characteristic of many of [his] non-state rivals' (Reno 1996b, pp. 7–8, 12). But with the shrinking patronage base from foreign aid and investment, to prevent a coup by newly marginalized groups in the army or bureaucracy, Mobutu, similar to rulers in other retrenching African states, needed to reconfigure his political authority. In this situation, foreign firms and contractors served as a new source of patronage networks. However, indigenous commercial interests that profit from the new rules are not independent capitalists with interests distinct from the state's. As Reno (1996b, p. 16) points out, 'Those who do not take part in accumulation on the ruler's terms are punished.' Mobutu weathered the collapse of the state bureaucracy, but fell because his strategy of milking state assets had reached a limit, seriously weakening the patronage system (*ibid.*, pp. 9–16; Reno, 1998, pp. 147–81). In 1997, his forces fell to the Alliance des Forces Democratique pour la Liberation (AFDL) of Laurent Kabila, the eventual president of the Democratic Republic of Congo until assassinated in 2001.

In Angola since 1992, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has controlled some 70 per cent of the country's diamond production (in the northeast), supporting a continuing war in opposition to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government, financed primarily by oil income. This war has created conditions for local traders, middlemen, and regional commanders to accumulate fortunes. The MPLA business élite has benefited from Angola's war economy by selectively granting foreign investment opportunities in oil and diamonds, allocating foreign exchange and import licences, and selling weapons to UNITA. Belligerents on both sides have prospered. Wealth concentration is high; Kenneth Walker reports (2001) that 'in the capital Luanda, [while] most people have no electricity or water, and roads are unpaved and crisscrossed with open sewers ... [the] ruling party and government élite are doing ... so well ... that Luanda has the highest number of luxury cars per capita of any African city.' This collusion between supposedly warring parties to enrich themselves is not unique to Angola, having also occurred in Cambodia, Liberia, Bosnia, and other countries at war (Gamba and Cornwell 2000, pp. 157–72; Berdal and Malone 2000, pp. 5–6).

State failure, as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Zaire, increases vulnerability to war and humanitarian emergencies. Yet, in a weak or failed state, some rulers, warlords, and traders are more likely to profit from war and violence than peace. Indeed, as Väyrynen (2000b, p. 442) argues, war, political violence, and state failure do not result from the incapacity of public institutions but from the fact that rulers, warlords, and their clients benefit from the harm thereby befalling a substantial share of the population. Holsti notes (1996, p. 40) that 'In particular, weak states – not in the military sense but in terms of legitimacy and efficacy, are and will be the locales of wars. To the extent that those issues might be settled once and for all ... it will be by armed combat.'

Minerals provided incentives to continue intervention in neighbouring countries. Rwanda and Uganda's involvement in Zaire's conflict enabled them to export 'raw materials such as gold or cobalt even though they did not naturally possess them' (Mwanasali 2000, p. 140).¹ Zaire's neighbouring countries also looted timber, palm oil, coffee, elephant tusks, and precious metals, which upon export through the black market became a major source of foreign exchange for Zaire's resource-deprived neighbours. A major private bank in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania was established to recycle earnings from smuggled precious

metals (*ibid.*, pp. 140–1). It is not surprising that Congo's neighbours mentioned here, as well as other neighbours, have lacked an incentive to stop the war.

The illegal trade of drugs such as coca and opium, in a way similar to diamonds in Sierra Leone and Angola, provide large windfalls from international trade for belligerents to support war and insurgences. In Colombia, violence by paramilitary death squads allied with the government and by guerrilla movements, such as the FARC (Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), is enhanced by the struggle to share drug profits. The Colombian guerrilla groups earned substantial funds through extortion and drug trafficking, allowing them to continue their activity. Drug lords, whose power has declined since 1989, cooperate with both guerrillas and (especially) paramilitaries.² In comparison, however, Ghana lacked the tradable resources to become a predatory society (Väyrynen 2000b, pp. 444–63).

Relative deprivation also helps explain the increased violence by belligerents and their clients. An abrupt rush of mineral wealth increases the expectations of prosperity, not only by the allies of rulers and warlords that control the resource but also the lure to potential rebels of combat to control the resource. Indeed, as Gurr (1970, pp. 73, 79) indicates, the intensity of deprivation felt increases with the discrepancy between potential and actual conditions, and with the length of time the deprivation persists. In Congo, Colombia, and Sierra Leone, the length and intensity of perceived deprivation were considerable.

8.2 The conflict over land

The struggle for land and employment fuelled the increased rural violence in Colombia from 1946 to the present, and the anger and violence that contributed to war and ethnic violence in Rwanda in 1994 and in Somalia in the early 1990s. This violence is in contrast to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, where early post-World War II land reforms assuaged agrarian discontent.

In Somalia, the modernization of governance after independence offered the state a voice in agriculture, especially after Italian banana plantations were nationalized by President Siad Barre in 1979. Consequently agriculturists became much more interested in the state than pastoralists. Furthermore, state policies in the 1970s and in the 1980s dramatically reduced the real incomes of the pastoralists relative to farmers (Jamal 1988a and 1988b). A part of the land-related disputes and violence in southern Somalia resulted from inter-group hostility

produced by the relative deprivation of the pastoralists. Many pastoralists migrated to the cities, with most disgruntled refugees and urban poor, who faced hardships from the high cost of maintaining their traditional diet. Some rivalry in national politics between north and south Somalia can be seen in the light of conflict between pastoralists and cultivators, but here different colonial histories (British colonialism in the north, Italian in the south) and sometimes differences in clan affiliations were equally important.

The conflict between modern and traditional land ownership clearly led to anger and resentment against the privileged élite by the traditional owners of lands. This frustration has an important role in the explanation of violence in Somalia as killing in the agricultural areas was largely motivated by revenge against the groups assumed to have benefited from the rule of Siad Barre (Cassanelli 1996, p. 14).

During *La Violencia* in Colombia, 1946 to 1965, a period of political gang fighting between partisans of the Conservative and Liberal Parties as well as a peasant war, some 300,000 people died and 800,000 were left homeless. Extensive rural violence results from a history of struggle for land that began in the late nineteenth century. Peasant families moved into frontier areas, clearing and planting the land. Then came land entrepreneurs expecting to create large farms by asserting property ownership and turning frontier settlers into tenants. From 1870 to 1920, the peasants resisted the encroachment of land entrepreneurs. In 1874 (and 1882), national legislation supported settler rights. However, the laws were ineffectual, as landlords tended to win disputes through the support of local authorities. Settlers' (or colons') memories of these injustices remained strong for decades after. In the 1920s and 1930s, peasants took the offensive against large estate owners, who prowled for additional land in response to the growing international demand for coffee. Moreover, the authorities increasingly supported land reform, feeling that the monopoly of land by the great *latifundia* was the root of agricultural backwardness. The depression of the 1930s, with low wages and arduous work conditions for the peasants, together with the return to power of the Liberal party, spurred concerted action by colonos to reclaim land. However, since the peasants could not force the landlords to give up their claims, the result was chronic conflict (Berry 1997, pp. 40–3; Legrand 1986).

The Supreme Court and Congress promulgated several initiatives during the 1920s and 1930s. In the late 1930s, one programme involved purchase of three large haciendas in areas of the most serious conflict and the transfer of titles to colonos who had occupied the land

in the late 1920s and early 1930s. However, this programme failed when the fiscal cost was too high, so that the government decided that peasants should pay full market value. But the peasants refused to pay for land that they believed to be public land legally available to them. By 1936, with more urban political strength and the balance of power shifting to landlords, new land legislation on land, in practice, reinforced the position of the large estate owners. The fact that legislation and policy failed to deal with the underlying tensions between settlers and landlords, and that landlords evicted peasants or replaced them with wage labour, contributed to the escalation of rural violence in the 1940s (Berry 1997, pp. 40–3; Legrand 1986).

The Colombian frontier ideology of peasant protest centred on reclaiming public lands. This effort at reclamation has been at the heart of rural unrest and periodic localized violence, and ultimately guerrilla warfare and militia counter warfare that continued in Colombia through most of the remainder of the twentieth century. Land scarcity, a lack of increase in land productivity, and a lack of employment opportunities outside agriculture, combined to maintain a high level of tension in the rural population (Berry 1997, pp. 40–3).

The economic struggle, including fears of economic redistribution from possible political change, fuelled the increased tensions in Rwanda in the early 1990s. Catherine André and Jean-Philippe Platteau's in-depth study (1998, pp. 1–47) of a densely populated village in northwestern Rwanda in the late 1980s and early 1990s shows how increasing land inequality put severe strains on rural areas, intensifying the competition for land during a period of rapid population growth and sluggish non-agricultural opportunities. The rising inequalities in land distribution and rapid land dispossession through the illegal land market, although only one among several contributing factors, exacerbated the anger and violence that contributed to the Rwandan war and genocide in 1994.

The flight and death of Tutsi landholders, first in the early 1960 and later in 1971, freed up land for Hutus but also provided a false sense of optimism. Farmers introduced double or even triple cropping, and increased interplanting, yet yields remained low, as technology remained crude and modern inputs, such as fertilizers, were short. Even farm intensification was not sufficient to satisfy rural food requirements, so households had to seek alternative income (*ibid.*, p. 4).

After the mid-1980s, per capita farm production declined, accompanied by a reversion of daily kilocalories per head the 1960s. Landholdings were fragmented and miniscule (usually less than 0.05

hectares). Common pastures were privately appropriated. Under the struggle for bare survival, more people were excluded and marginalized under both customary and modern land tenure systems. The average size of individual and household farmland fell. In 1993, 37 per cent of the village's households *operated* less than one-fourth hectare of land while 45 per cent *owned* less than one-fourth hectare, an increase in the concentration of both land ownership and operation. Yet industrial growth was inadequate to reduce land pressure, as off-farm employment opportunities fell in the 1990s. Moreover, many who purchased land had both off-farm and farm incomes. Moreover, since poor and landless households were excluded from off-farm patronage, agricultural income and off-farm income were highly correlated, so that overall income inequality exceeded farm income inequality. Famine increased as farmers replaced food crops by exports, such as flowers and vegetables. Amid population growth, a Malthusian trap, developing new land and reducing fallow had reached its limit in the late 1980s to early 1990s (*ibid.*, pp. 3–16)

Traditionally most land was occupied under customary or occupancy rights, with low land inequality before 1980. However, in the 1980s, with land scarce, commercial entitling began and landlords bought land previously under customary rights. Indeed by 1993 one-half of the village's farmland had been purchased compared to one-fourth in 1988.

Most land sales were illegal, as land could be sold only if the seller could prove retention of at least two hectares of land for the subsistence of the family. Yet the 1993 average ownership of land size per household was only 0.43 hectares, and most sales were distress sales for subsistence or even sheer survival. Some were forced to sell land because of the expense of litigation and land disputes. Many sellers, most of working age, thus lost their customary rights. In addition, a group often sold land when one person defaulted. However, even land buyers were rarely wealthy but were expanding land ownership to ensure against the landlessness of the next generation (*ibid.*). The bitter tensions from commercialization contributed to questioning the market-allocated individualized property rights.

The increasing hardships of everyday life led to emotional outbursts of anger and sheer violence, including destruction of assets, thefts, physical assaults, and threat of poisoning by the poor and landless. Over time, the indigenous rules of customary land tenure became more exclusionary, restricting the land rights of return migrants, separated or divorced women, wives under polygamous arrangements, widows,

orphans, and other vulnerable portions of the population. Those married outside the traditional *inkwano* system, especially the children of poor parents, were usually no longer protected by customary land tenure. Furthermore, the illiterate and most vulnerable lost from the land dispute resolution (*ibid.*, 29–34).

Land disputes poisoned daily relationships, undermining social life and brutalizing family relations. Increasingly, women, youngest sons, and other marginalized persons lost their claims to land and faced a blighted future, while old people felt abandoned and forced by their children to lose income from land (*ibid.*, pp. 24–9, 34–7).

Collective survival was threatened in the late 1980s from the struggle for bare survival. Land hunger was so great that desperate people were ready to seize any opportunity to improve their position. In addition, the village's anxiety increased from a potential loss of favour from President Habyarimana's rule, the closeness to the FPR (*Front Patriotique Rwandais*), and the fear of a Tutsi land and jobs grab. The civil war of 1994 provided an opportunity to settle old scores. The major targets for killing were not only ethnic (Tutsis) but people with comparatively large land property (especially the old) and those who aroused jealousy because of economic success. Those who behaved individualistically, with little redistribution toward less fortunate villagers, were more likely to be killed. All in all, when intense land pressure threatens farm people's livelihood, as in pre-1994 Rwanda, we need innovations, non-agricultural development, and fertility reduction (*ibid.*, pp. 37–44).

Much of the killing in Rwanda in 1994 was directed at people with land and at times cows, whose assets became available to others. Land pressure and scarcity of the other forms of farm capital provided an incentive for violence by the poor and overpopulated. The rising poverty and growing land concentration from the commoditization of land contributed to reduced customary social protection, with people feeling exempt from customary rules and restraints (*ibid.*, pp. 2–3).³

Land rights were major sources of ethnic conflict in Kivu, Congo, near the borders of Rwanda and Burundi. In 1972, the Banyarwanda, many natives of Rwanda and Burundi, received Zairean citizenship from Mobutu and Bisengimana Rwema, his Banyarwanda chief of staff. The nationalization of small and medium-sized firms and farms in 1973 helped Banyarwanda acquire vast areas of land in North Kivu, which they used as pasture in a region where agriculture was the livelihood for more than 70 per cent of the population. Local Hunde-Nyanga-Temob accused the Tutsi immigrants of marginalizing them and jeopardizing their land ownership rights (Emizet 2000b, pp. 166–7).

In contrast to Colombia, Rwanda, and Congo, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan undertook land reform that defused the discontent of the landless and tenants. Just before World War II, nearly two-thirds of Japanese cultivators were tenants. Yet the average non-cultivating landlord held only 18.5 hectares. After the war, the Allied Occupational Authority, led by the United States, responded to the demands of an impoverished peasantry, promulgating land reform, taking land from nonworking landlords, limiting owners to about hectares, and giving land to former tenants, measures which reduced agrarian dissatisfaction and accelerated the increase in agricultural productivity (Nafziger 1995, p. 94).

From 1949 to 1952, Korea and Taiwan, with assistance from the US government, undertook land redistribution that reduced substantially the inequality of land holdings from Japanese colonialism. Resistance was not substantial, as many landowners were Japanese, and the Taiwan and Korean governments supported indigenous landed classes in investing in trade and industry. The new farm owners received protection and subsidies, an increased procurement price for grain, credit, extension services, and other technical assistance, while agricultural research and infrastructure were expanded. In both countries, land ceilings were low, and virtually no landless class remained. Rapid growth in the industrial sector in all three East Asian countries absorbed the moderate growth in the urban labour force, some of which was released from agriculture's increased productivity (Nafziger, 1997, pp. 52–7; Berry 1997).

In India, Kerala was virtually the only state with successful land reform, abolishing landlordism and vesting the land in the former tenants in the early 1970s. Kerala was governed by a democratically elected Communist Party of India (CPI) government, which mobilized a coalition of rural poor, urban workers, and other reformist groups. The weaknesses in Kerala's reform were the lack of technical and financial support, and the lack of provision for landless farm workers. A farm workers' strike in 1974 forced the state government to pass legislation limiting the work day to 8 hours, establishing a minimum wage, and guaranteeing permanent employment. However, rising labour costs reduced the incomes of the new farm owners. Overall yields increased very slowly, despite increased incentives for cultivators, together with new high-yielding varieties of grain and complementary inputs. Still Kerala avoided the grinding rural poverty present in many other Indian states during the 1980s and 1990s (Berry 1997).

Land reform and redistribution in Colombia and Rwanda might have avoided deadly conflict. A land reform distributing land to the cultivator, similar to what Japan, Korea, and Taiwan undertook, might have eliminated the agrarian violence at the centre of disputes in Colombia during the second half of the twentieth century. Rwanda might have reduced its land disputes and litigations if it had established a system providing for secure property and use rights for cultivators (see Chapter 9 for more detail). But in the absence of a counterfactual, we can state that while the political opportunities for land reform are limited, land redistribution to the relatively poor farming classes can help reduce the risk of a humanitarian emergency in the form of extensive agrarian violence.

8.3 The conflict over environmental resources

The overwhelming majority of the rural poor in LDCs meet their basic needs directly or indirectly from the environment. The welfare of these poor is inextricably linked to the state of the environment. Slowly developing natural and human-made environmental problems, such as declining crop yields and depleted forestlands, make people more vulnerable to economic stress. A degraded environment, when combined with a lack of assets, social support, off-farm earnings, and migration outlets, can increase peoples' vulnerability to emergencies (Kibreab 2002).

Environmental regeneration and conservation programmes can fortify the resilience of those who live on the brink of subsistence. Many people living on the edge of survival are resource insecure. To commit scarce resources such as land and labour to environmental programmes, they will investigate benefits and costs, including whether ownership and use rights to the resources are secure (*ibid.*).

Benefit-cost analysis, however, requires two steps beyond individual calculations. First, a social benefit-cost analysis must examine society's net benefits, where private profitability is adjusted for external costs or benefits, indivisibilities, monopolistic restraints, and factor price distortions. But mainstream environmental economists usually fail to raise questions of power, analysing social benefit disconnected from interpersonal gains and losses. So the second step is to examine the distribution of benefits and costs among the population.

James Boyce (2002, p. 24) poses three questions when political leaders determine land distribution or environmental policy: 'Who reaps the benefits? Who bears the costs? Why are the winners able to

impose costs on the losers?' The 'soft' state's lack of protection for peasants, landless workers, and smallholders may be less that of a public policy failure than intentional misdirection by ruling élites. Similar to our argument in Chapter 7, state leaders may not so much lack administrative competency as political will.

In northeastern African countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, escalating violence, conflicts, insecurity, and misguided government policies have led to the breakdown of longstanding resource management strategies for coping with and recovering from environmental degradation and the resilience of the physical environment. State ownership of land and the other renewable resources has been one ultimate cause of land degradation, predisposing these countries to famines and chronic humanitarian emergencies (*ibid.*). In these and other African countries, Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons' (1968, pp. 1244–5) implies that just as the herders' cattle eventually overgraze a pasture open to all, so do businesses and individuals overuse resources free for all to use. Individuals exploit an unpaid or open access resource as if they were facing an infinite discount rate; if they do not use the resource today, then the resource will be unavailable tomorrow. This overuse of the commons is attributable not just to unclear ownership rights to land but also to large public or commercial estate ownership associated with the unclear and often capricious rules of access, exclusion, and use implemented during individual registration of communal property (Cornia 1994, pp. 226–31). These rules may also displace peasants that have traditional community use rights with 'modernizing' agricultural élites, often allied with leading politicians, as in 1960s Nigeria or 1970s Sudan.

In the Sahel, pressures for government to maximize export revenue and domestic fiscal position have contributed to an overexploitation of natural resources. The state encourages the cultivation of cash crops, disregarding their long-run sustainability and neglecting subsistence crops, contributing to the redistribution of benefits away from small farmers producing for family and village consumption. Moreover, the state ownership of natural resources undermines the ownership and user rights of traditional resource users without creating substitute institutional arrangements for conservation. Or in other instances, as in Sudan, Kenya, and Tanzania, those allied with political élites, both during the colonial and independence periods, seize land, resulting in more exploitative land practices and the encroachment on the livelihoods or even the eviction of peasants. Ironically, these crises for rural people may result from state management of environmental resources

or the establishment of plant and animal reserves, or the way that expansion of commercial agriculture has forced smallholder farmers to cultivate marginal areas and adopt unsustainable land-use practices that deplete soil nutrients. A soft state often lacks the administrative, enforcement, and financial capability of controlling these resources and the will to apply land law with impunity; these conditions, together with the land degradation that results from uncertain user rights, threaten longstanding coping strategies and increase the ecological stress of peasants. Environmental protection and regeneration depend not only on respecting the user rights of traditional people, but relying on their active participation in decision making (Kibreab 2002).

As Gaim Kibreab (2002) argues:

Most of the traditional resource management systems and productive activities that evolved over time were, therefore, devised to avoid, overcome or minimize the impact of environmental hazards. However, in the last decades these traditional coping strategies have been weakened and as a result the rural poor have increasingly become vulnerable to slow onset emergencies triggered by natural and man-made disasters. ... When degradation of the natural resources in the safer areas became life threatening, people were left with no alternative but to become internally or externally displaced. To see these population displacements as being primarily caused by environmental degradation is to mistake correlation with causation. In war-torn societies, conflicts, insecurity and violence are primary causes of environmental change, breakdown of coping strategies, food insecurity and consequently of population displacement and not the other way around.⁴

8.4 Conclusion

Since the end of the cold war, soft states unable or unwilling to build a state bureaucracy have emphasized control over mineral resources, such as oil or diamonds, in demand internationally. Rulers or warlords in these states frequently profit more from war than from peace. Land is also a basis for contention, especially in societies where land is scarce and its use rights are unclear and insecure.

People whose land ownership and use rights are poorly defined are more likely to degrade their environment. When people experiencing this degradation live on the edge of subsistence, they are more vulnerable to famine and other humanitarian emergencies.

9

Preventing Humanitarian Emergencies: Policy Implications

This chapter does not focus on responses such as the immediate delivery of food and medicine to refugee camps or the repatriation of displaced people. Rather we concentrate on long-term or immediate policies linked to our analysis of root causes, before concluding with an analysis of the benefits of war, the factors associated with the cause and prevention of humanitarian emergencies, and the importance of greed in analysing war.

Although war is beneficial to some, it is costly to society as a whole. Frances Stewart, Cindy Huang, and Michael Wang (2000, pp. 67–103) calculate that the economic cost of the cumulated lost income associated with wars since 1980 was nearly six times the 1995 national income in El Salvador, four times the 1995 national income in Ethiopia, and perhaps 13 times as much in Nicaragua. Nafziger (1983, pp. 119–45, 161–9) estimates that federal Nigeria forfeited 27.4 per cent of real GDP (and even a larger share of *civilian* real GDP) during the three fiscal years of the war, 1967/68–1969/70; secessionist Biafra's *percentage* loss (some double counted among Nigeria's loss) was 2–3 times greater during the same period.¹ GDP estimates understate Nigeria's losses, since a conservative estimate for capital destruction² from the war as a percentage of GDP was 5–10 per cent. Preventing conflict by reducing its causes can reduce costs substantially. The benefit–cost ratio of avoiding conflict is probably high, and is perhaps greater than the ratio from crisis management after the emergency begins.

Emergencies have numerous sources. As indicated before, important economic elements are low average income, protracted economic stagnation and decline (especially in food output), high income inequality, high military spending, and conflict over the control of mineral exports. Political elements include government exclusion of particular

ethnic or social communities, rule by entrenched minorities, weak state legitimacy, and a tradition of violent conflict. Only a portion of violence results from insurgent action. In fact, the majority of casualties from humanitarian emergencies are from government-sponsored or organized politicides. Amid war and scarcity, ruling élites may benefit from spearheading genocide or tolerating crime or mass murder by allies among militias, war profiteers, and ethnic champions. Indeed, some interests derive economic advantage by war and state violence; stopping deadly political violence requires changing the balance between benefits and costs among belligerents.

What about international military intervention to prevent humanitarian emergencies? Raimo Väyrynen (2002b, p. 135) is pessimistic about using strategic or military approaches for prevention. He contends that ‘effective preventive [military] action requires a concerted long-term strategy by the international community to reduce economic and social vulnerabilities and maintain political stability in peripheral societies. At present no such strategy exists.’ Indeed, he asserts that the international community lacks the institutions and resources to prevent emergencies through military action.

Thomas Weiss (2002, p. 229) argues that military intervention as an ‘essential preventive capacity for times of crisis is non-existent’. To be sure, Weiss believes that swift multilateral military intervention could be of value if the international community had the requisite institutions and will. However, in practice, according to Weiss, the ‘military prevention of CHEs [complex humanitarian emergencies] is highly problematic because of the decentralized and anarchic nature of international relations, the relative weakness in multilateral agencies, and the lack of perceived vital interests by most major powers’ in humanitarian emergencies. This has been especially true since the end of the cold war, which has ‘meant the evaporation of the *raison d’être* for the bulk of military spending in the West’. Major powers, especially the United States, are so preoccupied with saving public resources and so fearful of getting bogged down in a quagmire that national and international leaders rarely move quickly to commit armed forces.

9.1 Key measures to prevent humanitarian emergencies

Thus, we concentrate on political economy, not military, approaches to preventing humanitarian emergencies. The major questions of sections 9.1–9.2 include:

1. What political and economic policies, both long-term and short-term, are most likely to reduce LDCs' vulnerability to emergencies and their reoccurrence?
2. What political and economic levers can national policy makers and international actors pull to reduce the probability of humanitarian emergencies?

We include both initial emergencies and their reoccurrences, because research indicates that emergencies often persist. Populations adapt to the cultural experience of violence. Past violence, as in the case of Colombia, is likely to lower the threshold for using violence as a means of expressing dissent, making intensive forms of political conflict normatively justifiable. Our econometrics (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999, p. 286) indicate that, other things equal, a doubling 'in deaths from political violence [1963 to 1977] would have increased an emergency's probability [in any given year, 1980 to 1994,] by 4.4%' (see Table A1.8).

We must distinguish between short-term and long-term strategies to prevent humanitarian emergencies. The chapter stresses reducing structural vulnerabilities and inequalities and strengthening the preconditions for stability, and less on short-term diplomatic or military operations or medium-term political or constitutional arrangements. The differences in perspectives are between longer-term political or economic approaches and shorter-term military or political actions.

Long-term efforts include undertaking structural and institutional change, building capacity, and spurring economic and political development. Much of the longer-term focus of this chapter is on economic approaches. Long-run political changes include democratization and human rights monitoring and intelligence, which not only have the potential to lead to preventive action but also can serve as an early-warning device.

Short-term measures are usually political and military, and include constitutional arrangements to share power, pressures by regional organizations (such as the African Union – formerly the Organization for African Unity – and Organization of American States), conflict transformation, partition, diplomatic mediation, arms bans, sanctions, peacekeeping operations, and military intervention. Short-term development and humanitarian aid may also help ameliorate potential conflict.

The discussion of long-term economic policies is more optimistic than that of short-term strategies. Väyrynen (2002b) feels that short-term strategies are generally not promising, as third parties are unwilling to

become involved, especially in military approaches, or their policies are ineffectual in preventing the outbreak of a crisis. Indeed, short-term actions, in which options are limited, are often too late to eliminate or modify the underlying causes.

Long-term social and economic forces are deeply embedded in the polity, increasing the difficulty of prescribing policies to prevent conflict and state violence. Short-run enmities may be intractable, constraining the options of those wishing to mediate.

In the first two sections of this chapter, we focus on a long-term politico-economic approach to prevention in which policies are linked to the research project's analysis of root causes. Domestic responses include accelerating economic growth through domestically-planned macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment, designing appropriate economic and political institutions, improving the capability of the state to collect taxes and provide basic services, undergoing agrarian reform and land redistribution, and secure property and usufruct rights for traditional community or village land-rights systems. These responses need to examine the effect of policies on the weaker segments of the population – the poor, minorities, rural and working people, and women and children.

Enhancing growth and improving income distribution, as well as reducing the risk of humanitarian emergencies, requires changes in the international economic order. This order encompasses economic relations and institutions linking people from different nations, including the World Bank and the UN Development Programme that lends capital to developing countries; the International Monetary Fund, which provides credit to ease short-term international payments imbalances; the World Trade Organization, which administers international-trade rules; bilateral and multilateral trade, aid, banking services, currency rates, capital movements, and technological transfers; aid consortiums; and international commodity stabilization agreements. The premise is that modifying international trade, foreign investment, aid (especially for agriculture and for cushioning external shocks), debt rescheduling, and capital movements would be mutually advantageous, enhancing the economic development of LDCs, and, through economic linkages, the prosperity of the developed world as well. But even where the economic interests of industrialized and developing countries conflict, industrialized countries may benefit from cooperation in international economic institutions by facilitating democracy and development in poor countries, so that they can contribute to global peace and stability.

While the chapter discusses policies to reduce the risk of emergencies in LDCs, we recommend concentrating resources on sub-Saharan Africa and other highly vulnerable economies (see Table 2.2). Following our line of argument, such concentration should have intrinsic value in itself beyond preventing humanitarian emergencies, such as increasing economic growth and reducing poverty.

Still our intention is not to write a textbook on how low-income countries can achieve rapid growth and reduced inequality. One of us has already written such a text (Nafziger 1997). Rather we are especially focusing on socio-politico-economic measures that directly promote political integration and avert humanitarian emergencies. Not surprisingly, many of these measures also contribute to economic development.

9.2 Long-term preventive responses

Sub-sections 9.2.1–9.2.4 on international factors discuss the policies of international agencies, bilateral donors, private firms, and NGOs, in concert with LDCs, in reducing the risk of emergencies. The emphasis is on stabilization and adjustment; the policies of the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization; international aid and debt relief, foreign investment, and economic sanctions. Sub-sections 9.2.5–9.2.8 examine how LDCs' policies to affect economic and political institutions (democratization and revenue collection), income distribution (reducing regional, ethnic, and educational disparities), poverty reduction (safety nets for the poor), and food security (agrarian reform, secure property rights, and aid for agricultural development) can reduce vulnerability to emergencies.

9.2.1 Stabilization, adjustment, and reform

Greater international support for domestically planned macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment

Chronic stagnation and decline in incomes exacerbate the feeling of relative deprivation, and may, as section 2.1 argues, put a ruling coalition in a quandary in trying to maintain the coalition but avoid political instability and the risk of an emergency.

Economic stagnation, frequently accompanied by chronic international balance on goods and services deficits and growing external debt, intensifies the need for economic adjustment and stabilization. A persistent external disequilibrium has costs whether countries adjust or not. But non-adjustment has the greater cost;³ the longer the disequilibrium, the greater is the social damage and the more painful the

adjustment. We indicate (Nafziger and Auvinen 2000, pp. 109–17) that countries that failed to adjust were more vulnerable to an emergency. Non-adjustment can contribute to poverty, displacement, and humanitarian crises, as in the former Yugoslavia and Algeria in the 1980s and early 1990s. Woodward (1995b) blames the Yugoslav conflict on the disintegration of government authority and breakdown of political and civil order from the inability to adjust to a market economy and democracy. Yugoslavia's rapid growth during the 1960s and 1970s, fuelled by foreign borrowing, was reversed by more than a decade of an external debt crisis amid declining terms of trade and global credit tightening, forcing austerity and declining living standards. In Algeria, the lack of adjustment, stabilization, and growth in the 1980s strengthened Islamist party opposition, which recruited substantially among discontented unemployed young men for terrorism (Morrisson 2000, p. 225).

The slow growth, reduced external funding, and increased liberalism compelled a change in strategies by LDC élites during the last two decades of the twentieth century. These changing strategies provided opportunities for challenging élites and increased rent seeking, inciting further politico-economic changes (see section 5.2).

As indicated in the conclusion to Chapter 5, political élites in LDCs faced pressure from stagnation, chronic international deficits, and donors and IFIs to undertake macroeconomic and structural reforms, including reductions in spending. All these changes increased the potential for political instability and an emergency. More foreign investment and more coherent long-term aid programmes to increase the LDCs' own planning for macroeconomic stabilization, structural adjustment, and government spending would reduce the vulnerability of these countries' leaders to domestic discontent.

Changes in the Bretton Woods institutions' goals, instruments, and openness

Here we discuss changes in goals, instruments (especially trade and external capital-market liberalization), and the transparency of adjustment programmes of the Bretton Woods' institutions, the IMF and the World Bank. In these institutions, the collective vote of high-income OECD countries comprises a substantial majority of the total.⁴

Goals. Although stagnation, a current-account deficit, and inflation are components of a macroeconomic disequilibrium, IMF stabilization

programmes in developing countries focus on the last two components, while neglecting stagnation.⁵ Michael Bruno and William Easterly's study for the World Bank (1998) shows no negative correlation between inflation and economic growth for inflation rates less than 40 per cent annually. Indeed Joseph Stiglitz (1998, p. 8) argues that below this level, *'there is little evidence that inflation is costly'* [his italics]. This implies, as Christopher Cramer and John Weeks (2002) argue, that the focus of IMF orthodox programmes on inflation (often draconian monetary measures) is usually unnecessary, and that reviving growth should generally take precedence over monetary and fiscal orthodoxy.

Indeed, as long as the IMF continues its orthodox emphasis, one essential reform is to strengthen independent financial power within the world economy – independent of the IMF 'Good Housekeeping seal' for stabilization programmes required before the World Bank, OECD governments, or commercial banks will provide loans, debt writeoffs and writedowns, and concessional aid. Stiglitz (1998), as a World Bank economist, argues against: stabilization programmes designed to reduce annual inflation below 15 per cent, simple rules for deciding the optimal level of budget deficits, financial liberalization without the construction of a well-functioning regulatory system, and adjustment without paying attention to building new economic institutions.

For Cramer and Weeks (2002, p. 53), the 'evidence [is] that adjustment did not stimulate recovery in LICs' or low-income countries. The World Bank, in its 1992 overview of adjustment, identified growth as the 'long-term objective' and discussed 'moving from adjustment to growth'. Indeed, for the Bank, the aim of adjustment loans 'is to support programs of policy and institutional change to modify the structure of an economy so that it can maintain its growth rates and the viability of its balance of payments' (ibid., citing World Bank 1992a, p. 1).

The poorest countries, primarily from the sub-Sahara, that are most vulnerable to conflict and war, would benefit from the expansion of funding from Japan, the European Union, or its member states, or from banks or regional development banks independent of two sides (the IMF and the United States government) of the triangle of the Washington institutions' lending and policy cartel.⁶ Official donors and lenders, with their emphasis on democratization, political stability, and socio-economic development and their provision of project and humanitarian aid, have a broader agenda than the IMF's priority

on the balance of payments (or even the World Bank's on development and adjustment). Thus, donors should not condition funds on the recipient country's stabilization agreement with the IMF. Bilateral agencies (and the EU) need to be more active in designing and monitoring the programmes they co-finance with the IMF and World Bank. In addition, the monitoring by bilaterals should be separate, or at least supplementary, to that of the international financial institutions (IFIs) (Aguilar 1997, pp. 50–2).⁷

'Good governance' needs to be another goal of international financial institutions, especially the IMF. The IMF's governance conditionality includes anti-corruption, support of private property rights, budget management, and administrative capability. This implies that the state is not predatory, that political élites' capital does not flee to offshore bank accounts, that leaders are serious about building economic and political institutions, and that rulers are accountable to the populace. Accountability entails restraints on the authority of rulers, institutions independent of the state, the rights of citizens to mobilize to change policy, and a respect for human rights. Indeed without rulers being minimally accountable to society, IFI funds are likely to be misused or squandered. Moreover, the need for a governance conditionality applies not only to IFIs but also other international agencies, DC donors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Trade liberalization. In the long run, liberal international trade is a source of growth (Sachs and Warner 1997,⁸ and Nafziger 1997, pp. 492–537). However, David Greenaway, Wyn Morgan, and Peter Wright (1997, pp. 1885–92) show that, in the short run, trade liberalization by developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s is associated with a deterioration in growth.⁹ Trade liberalization amid stabilization, even if politically possible, may perpetuate a government budget crisis. As Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye argue (1991, pp. 181–207), given labour and resource immobility, early liberalization of external trade and supply-side stimulation in 'one glorious burst' results in rising unemployment, inflation, and capital flight and the subsequent undermining of adjustment programmes. Frequently, the World Bank has asked for liberalizing trade early without limiting the imports that it should be applied to. For example, in Kenya in 1980, the foreign-exchange requirements associated with trade liberalization, the major component of the Bank's first structural adjustment loan, became unsustainable, so liberalization had to be abandoned.

Trade-reform failures such as these are consistent with the theory of the second best. An application of this theory suggests that trade liberalization while other prices are still controlled may be worse than having all prices distorted. Trade liberalization, a desirable goal over time, needs optimal sequencing to contribute to growth. Thus, while we favour trade liberalization in the long run, abrupt adjustment to trade liberalization is likely to lead to a financial or economic crisis that triggers adverse political effects.

External capital-market liberalization. The IMF pressures low-income countries for rapid external capital-account liberalization (Fischer 1997, pp. 321–24). Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1991, pp. 181–207) and FAO (1991, pp. 101–03) suggest the following, more gradual sequence for trade, exchange, and capital market liberalization: (1) devaluing domestic currency to a competitive level, while simultaneously restraining monetary and fiscal expansion to curb inflation and convert a nominal devaluation to a real devaluation, (2) liberalizing imports of critical capital and other inputs, (3) promoting exports through liberalizing commodity markets, subsidies, and other schemes, (4) instituting prudential regulations and other financial-sector reforms, (5) allocating foreign exchange for maintaining and repairing infrastructure for production increases, (6) removing controls on internal interest rates to achieve positive real rates, and expanding loans agencies to include farmers and small business people, (7) reducing public sector deficits to eliminate reliance on foreign loans at banking standards without decreasing real development spending, and reforming agricultural marketing to spur farmers to sell their surplus, (8) liberalizing other imports, rationalizing the tariff structure, and removing price controls and subsidies to the private sector, and (9) reducing external capital-account controls.

This sequence recognizes the necessity of reforming internal capital markets before liberalizing international capital movements. Despite the IMF recognition of exceptions (Mussa, Swoboda, Zettelmeyer, and Jeanne 1999, pp. 9–12; *IMF Survey*, 20 October 1997, pp. 321–4), IMF recommendations and implementation put too much emphasis on opening capital markets to external flows in early stages of capital market reforms. Taiwan, Colombia (Cardeñas and Barrera 1997), Chile, and Malaysia have used a prudential and regulatory framework, together with controls or surcharges on short-term capital to decrease reverse capital flows, thus reducing the cuts in import capacity, government budget, and social expenditures that threaten the stability of

ruling political coalitions. On the other hand, abrupt financial liberalization, with its increased vulnerability to short-term capital flights and non-performing bank loans, rarely provides the short-term vehicle for rapid growth that helps support LDC regimes to maintain political power (Cornia and Lipumba 1999, pp. 317–19; Mkandawire 1999, pp. 341–2; and Mosley 1999, pp. 367–84).

Open debate. Cramer and Weeks (2002) contend that the Bretton Woods institutions' programmes need to be subject to open debate before agreements with governments, so as to reflect the priorities and perceptions of the host country. Avramovic (1991, p. ii) argues that 'Adjustment and development programmes should be prepared, and seen to be prepared, by national authorities of [the] countries rather than by foreign advisors and international organisations. Otherwise commitment will be lacking.' Transparency and substantial local contribution should reduce the social tension accompanying adjustment that sometimes contributes to political instability that portends humanitarian emergencies.

Renato Aguilar (1997, p. 13) finds that 'Experience suggests that programs with a high degree of ownership on the part of the government have a higher probability of success.' Still, he recognizes that the host country, with a shortage of skills, may lack the qualified people to analyse the programme. Or the government, under pressure from donors, may lack the political will to be accountable for designing the structural programme, and would prefer for international financial institutions (IFIs) to be the scapegoats for essential contraction, reallocation, and restructuring. Open discussion with ministers, civil servants, parliamentarians, and the public so that they are aware of the contents of the programme increases the responsibility of the host country and the probability of its success.¹⁰

High-income OECD countries' interests. These modifications of goals, instruments, and policies regarding openness of Bretton Woods' institutions, especially for the IMF, would not only enhance the economic development of LDCs, but also, through economic linkages, the prosperity of the DCs as well. An IMF and international economic system that emphasize economic growth rather than price stability (that is, less than 15 per cent inflation annually), abrupt trade and financial liberalization, and short-term adjustment¹¹ would potentially reduce economic stagnation and collapse, and the risk of humanitarian emergencies. The most important catalyst for this shift in emphasis would

be the IMF and its majority shareholders, the US and other high-income OECD countries, whose political interests may converge with the LDCs (see section 9.4 below).

Reduction in trade barriers against Africa and other third world countries, to reduce external vulnerability and provide more scope for export-led growth, thus decreasing vulnerability to political instability and potential emergencies

Low-income countries face constraints on expanded international trade and integration to spur growth and stability. While the World Bank and International Monetary Fund often require that individual countries undertaking adjustment expand the export of existing primary products, low price and income elasticities of demand for these exports limit the potential growth for all adjusting countries combined. Moreover, even after the Uruguay Round of 1986–94, the industrial countries' effective rates of protection against LDC agricultural, manufacturing, and processing exports are still high (World Bank 2001b). Indeed the higher the stage of processing, the greater the industrial countries' effective protection against developing countries. Furthermore, the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) allows DCs to limit 'disruptive' textile and clothing imports from LDCs through 2005. And in agriculture, the net producer subsidy equivalents for wheat exports were 44 per cent in the United States, 46 per cent in the EU, and 99 per cent in Japan, with even higher rates for rice, milk, and other basic farm products (UNCTAD 1994, pp. 139–49);¹² the net producer subsidy for US agricultural exports following the 2002 farm bill is even higher.

The Lomé conventions, a series of trade and aid agreements between the EU and 66 LDCs from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP), included reductions in trade barriers against an important component of the developing world. These agreements were implemented in 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1989 (revised in 1995, expired in 2000). The conventions allowed freer access to the EU for many ACP products, mechanisms for stabilizing foreign exchange earnings from certain commodities and minerals, and a channel for EU aid.

EU trade preferences to ACP, however, breach the World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995, which administers rules of conduct in international trade. But even if the EU could obtain a waiver for a new Lomé, its renewal would only be beneficial under limited circumstances. For liberalization under the WTO/General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade's (WTO/GATT's) Uruguay Round of tariff reductions and textile quota elimination from 1992 to 2005 would erode ACP's Lomé convention privileges. The Uruguay Round,

while generally beneficial to developing countries because of the lowered trade barriers against their exports, is resulting in displacement of African exports in EU markets by Asian competitors (Hertel, Masters, and Elbehri 1998, pp. 228–9). It is even doubtful that an EU offer of an enhanced generalized system of tariff preferences (GSP), equivalent to current Lomé benefits, to least developed ACP countries, while providing a less lucrative GSP to ACP developing countries (Thomas 1997), would benefit ACP countries generally, as GSP benefits are limited in coverage, are granted one year at a time, and can be altered and withdrawn unilaterally by grantors (Oyejide 1998, pp. 130–7). The EU can help low-income ACP, only if trade preferences are substantial and longstanding, and if preferences are complemented by aid and loans to reduce ACP vulnerability to external shocks.¹³

9.2.2 Aid and debt relief

Aid to vulnerable economies

Since the late 1980s, the real value of aid, that is, official development assistance (ODA), bilateral or multilateral funds with at least a 25 per cent grant element, has fallen overall, but even faster to least developed countries or LLDCs (OECD 1997, pp. 66–73). Still, as FitzGerald (2002, p. 75) indicates, ODA to GDP in LLDCs, 1988 to 1994, was 25 per cent, equal to 111 per cent of the LLDCs' domestic capital formation.

We expected (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999) that ODA would be inversely associated with humanitarian emergencies. However, in our empirical examination, we found neither positive nor negative association between ODA and humanitarian emergencies. To be sure, a significant influence on the economy, such as development aid, can influence peoples' collective identities, potentially countering mobilization along antagonistic ethnic or clan lines, by encouraging widely distributed productive resources and competition that avoids material benefits from the '*de facto* control over national resources' (Samatar 1992).

But international aid in Somalia failed to achieve this. Auvinen and Kivimäki's (2000) research on Somalia points out how access to aid, which was based on the ability to control the state, became a primary source for creating deadly competition within society. Even during Somalia's early years of independence and a parliamentary democracy (1960 to 1969), the state was the major objective and the main means of political competition for personal wealth rather than being a vehicle for maximizing public welfare. Development aid was an important

source for state resources in Somalia. Much economic aid ended in the pockets of the president's allies, with little going to sustainable development projects. In addition, aid was an important source of élite competition and motivation for the contentious mobilization of Somalian society by clan. For other patrimonial or predatory states, such as Sierra Leone, Zaire, Rwanda, Angola, Afghanistan, and the former Yugoslavia, aid also increased class and communal antagonism rather than restraining competition and improving resource distribution.

Moreover, many poor countries are hampered by a high dependence on aid.¹⁴ This dependency includes food and commodity aid that competes with domestic production and, for some LLDCs, aid flows large enough to contribute to an overvalued domestic currency that is biased against exports.

When donors underwrite most of the development budget, they insist on continual, extensive project supervision and review, so that recipient government agencies are more answerable to them than to their own senior policy officials. Donors frequently recommend and supervise poorly conceived projects. But even when well conceived, officials in poor countries fail to learn how to do something until they have the power to make their own decisions. The proliferation of donors and requirements has resulted in weakened institutions and reduced management capacity. For example, in 1981, Malawi, lacking the indigenous capacity to manage 188 projects from 50 different donors, hired donor country personnel (sometimes with donor salary supplements) to take government line positions to manage projects. However, Malawi was not able to increase its capacity to run its own affairs and establish its own policies (Morss 1984, pp. 465–70). Tanzania, on the other hand, retained its best economic analysts at home in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but 'the price of keeping top professionals at home [was] to see them absorbed into the domestic consultancy market, sustained by donor-driven programmes of [technical assistance]' (Sobhan 1996, p. 119). Rehman Sobhan (*ibid.*, pp. 111–245) points out that the opportunity cost of this cooption by the donors was diversion from contributions to teaching and domestic policy debate and initiative. But the cost of aid in reduced domestic initiative and technical learning may be even greater for other highly vulnerable low-income countries than for Malawi or Tanzania.

However, the problem is not so much the size of aid flows as the manner in which ODA is given and utilized. Aid flows to poor countries are complicated by high conditionality, and are both 'volatile and unpredictable' (FitzGerald, 2002, p. 76). To reduce the risk of conflict,

aid needs donor coordination reflecting long-term programme coherence and an orientation toward increasing productive capacity, providing infrastructure, and reducing poverty and communal inequality. Donors also need to emphasize aid to ruling groups, economic classes, and communities that have strong economic incentives to increase political integration and reduce the potential for conflict and repression (FitzGerald, 2002, and Edgren 1996, p. 9).

Cushioning the effects of sudden external shocks

Research shows that abrupt external shocks can contribute to stagnation or precipitous slumps, increasing vulnerability to political disintegration and humanitarian emergency (FitzGerald, 2002).¹⁵ An external debt crisis, with declining terms of trade, global credit tightening, and falling debt relief and concessional aid from the West, forced austerity and declining living standards in Africa in the 1980s and early 1990s, putting additional pressure on its government authority and its political and civil order.

The IMF's compensatory and contingency financing facility is used to finance a temporary shortfall in export earnings or to bolster IMF-supported adjustment programmes. This facility, however, is a drop in the bucket compared to the needs to rescue countries, such as low-income African countries, that experience temporary external shocks. Despite limited funding, the European Union's Stabex, which covered primary products from 66 ACP countries from 1975 to 2000, was a more effective programme for cushioning external shocks. However, in 2000, the EU discontinued Stabex, folding it into a general aid programme, combining support for adjustment, project aid, good governance, and price stabilization (Brown 2000, pp. 367–84) but hampered by the limited amount of funding available. Discontinuance was wrong, as DCs need to provide a larger share of loans and concessional aid to reduce the vulnerability of low-income countries to external shocks and potential political instability.

Rescheduling and writing down debt

The highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) owe almost their entire debt to official bilateral or multilateral creditors. HIPC creditors can probably reduce relative deprivation from the distress of the poor and vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies by decreasing the HIPC's high debt-service ratio, the ratio of annual debt service (interest and principal payments) to exports of goods and services. The HIPCs' 1985–94 *scheduled* debt-service ratio was 64.0 per cent, with the ratio

actually paid 22.2 per cent (UNCTAD 1997a, p. 46), meaning that more than one-fifth of annual export receipts was used to pay debt servicing. Reducing the debt overhang not only removes a major barrier to investment (Deshpande 1997, pp. 169–87), but also increases the adjustment time horizon, so that political élites, many of whom have inherited their debt burden from previous regimes,¹⁶ have time to plan more stable structural changes.

Since 1990, Chancellor and (subsequently) Prime Minister John Major and Prime Minister Tony Blair (with Chancellor Gordon Brown) have taken the initiative, in advance of other Group of Eight (G8) industrial nations, in rescheduling the entire stock of debt owed by African low-income countries to Britain in one stroke, increasing their debt cancellation, and stretching and increasing the flexibility of the repayment schedule of the fraction of their debt remaining. NGOs and churches in Britain, and subsequently its government, with Brown's 1997 presentation of a Commonwealth 'Mauritius Mandate', calling for firm decisions on debt relief for at least three-fourths of the eligible HIPC's by 2000, helped spur a movement for Jubilee 2000, debt remission for selected HIPC's.¹⁷ In 2000, the US approved debt relief of \$435 million for HIPC nations.

The World Bank/International Monetary Fund HIPC initiative, begun in 1997, usually required successful adjustment programmes for three to six years, after which Paris Club creditors will provide relief through rescheduling up to 80 per cent of the present value of official debt (UNCTAD 1997a, pp. 45–9). In 1999, an enhanced HIPC initiative reduced the requisite successful adjustment programme to three years before promising relief. The World Bank and IMF, in principle, maintained the conditions (sound macroeconomic policies and improved governance) for debt writeoffs. Still, by the end of 2000, the IMF and Bank, with a flurry of activity, under pressure from Jubilee 2000, had provided concessional funds, based on profits from lending and the sales of gold, and had persuaded bilateral creditors to write off debt. The IFIs and DC creditors began the three-year process of reducing the debt of Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gambia, Guyana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. However, since the G8 failed to commit to front loading debt writedowns, the immediate effect in decreasing actual debt-service payments, once the debtor meets conditions, is small. Moreover, reducing debt payments in later years will depend on uncertain private and government donations to HIPC funds.¹⁸

The DCs' and the IFIs' continuation of writing down debt, liberalizing trade, and increasing aid to counter external shocks, could spur HIPC leaders to undertake political and economic reforms, at least in some countries listed in the previous paragraph, if not to Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan, where political conflict or blatant corruption precludes even minimally effective capital utilization. Indeed, as section 2.1 indicates, in predatory states such as Sudan and Sierra Leone, the ruling groups use their power to plunder the economy through corruption and business activity.

The immediate cost to DCs of a programme similar to Jubilee 2000 for non-predatory states is negligible. Efforts to 'wipe the slate clean' for selected HIPCs, could free political leaders, especially in Africa, of their inherited debts, and provide some breathing space to enable them to focus on long-range planning and investment to improve the general welfare and reduce their vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies.¹⁹

9.2.3 Investment

As discussed previously, external deficits are costly, increasing pressures on political élites in developing countries to reduce government expenditures, thus limiting the ability of élites to attain stable ruling coalitions. As real aid to LDCs fell during the 1990s, foreign direct investment (FDI) and other private flows have comprised an increasing portion of resource flows to developing countries. Indeed in 1995, private flows consisted of 56 per cent (of which FDI was 21 per cent) of total net resource flows by OECD countries to developing countries (OECD 1997, pp. 64–5).

The World Bank (1997a, p. 2) states that 'participation in the global production networks established by multinational enterprises provides developing countries with new means to enhance their economic performance by accessing global know-how and expanding their integration into world markets'. Indeed private capital flows to LDCs soared to \$245 billion or 4.5 per cent of their GDP in 1996, a four to five-fold increase in foreign flows as a percentage of GDP since 1990. But the share of the poorest countries, especially those from sub-Saharan Africa, with low credit ratings, fell during the same period (*ibid.*, pp. 14, 51), a continuation of a fall that began in the early 1980s (FitzGerald 2002). In addition, private capital flows are highly volatile, especially in countries that have liberalized their financial markets. After the 1997–98 Asian crisis, for example, private capital flows to LDCs fell substantially.

More than half of private capital flows to LDCs are loans, which contribute to future debt service, and portfolio investments, which are subject to reverse capital flows. FDI does not generate debt servicing or capital outflows, and can potentially finance a savings or balance of payments deficit, transfer technology to increase productivity, fill some shortages of high-level skills, provide training for domestic managers and technicians, generate tax revenue from income and corporate profits tax, and complement local entrepreneurship by subcontracting to ancillary industries, component makers, or repair shops, or by creating forward and backward linkages.

Investment inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital investment in Africa were 7 per cent in 1995. However, while annual foreign direct investment flows to least developed countries, those highly vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies, tripled between 1986–90 and 1991–96, the least developed countries' share of developing-country inflows was only 1.8 per cent (UNCTAD 1997a, pp. 9, 52). Moreover, low-income countries other than China accounted for only 5.9 per cent of the \$99,670 million FDI flows to LDCs of 1995 (ODI 1997, p. 2).

Still, there is a possibility of attracting FDI to low-income countries, not just to those with potentially large markets, such as China and India; but with non-resident nationals, as China or India; with resident nationals managing cross-border investments, as in Malaysia, Mozambique, South Africa, or East Africa;²⁰ or with extractive industries, like Nigeria or Angola. Vietnam introduced FDI legislation in 1987–88, which together with the lifting of US economic sanctions in 1994, increased FDI inflows from \$8 million in 1988 to \$150 million in 1995. Bangladesh's FDI reforms in 1991, which facilitated the establishment of foreign-owned subsidiaries, increased inflows from just a trickle in the 1980s to \$125 million in 1995. Ghana, as a result of Ashanti goldfield privatization, increased annual FDI inflows seventeen-fold from a \$11.7 million average during 1986–92 to an average of \$201 million in 1993–95 (ODI 1997, p. 2). Chad is to receive substantial investment in petroleum, pending a World Bank loan facilitating an 1100-kilometre pipeline from landlocked Chad through Cameroon to an Atlantic Coast terminal. Even Cambodia, which created a legal framework and the necessary institutions to promote FDI after 1993, increased its FDI capital inflows from virtually nothing in 1990 to \$656 million in 1996 (UNCTAD 1997a, pp. 54, 316).

Since the mid-1980s, with falling trade, transport, and communication barriers, multinational corporations (MNCs) have increased their international outsourcing, importing components from low-cost

production locations abroad and exporting to overseas assembly or processing locations. As an example, following the rise of the yen after 1985, Japan's major electronics manufacturers outsourced assembly and other final stages of output to Asian countries (World Bank 1997a, pp. 42–3). Japanese companies' borderless economic system of trade and investment selected sophisticated activities, including research-and-development-intensive industries for the newly industrializing countries (NICs) South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, while assigning labour-intensive production and assembly, with standardized technologies to China and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) four – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Indeed, in 1993, Malaysia was third to the US and Japan in producing semiconductors and the world's leading exporter of computer chips. These companies used a flying-geese pattern, with Japan at the lead, the NICs toward the front, and the ASEAN four close behind (Nafziger 1997, pp. 525–6).

Sony, an example of this global seamless network, has factories for audio, television, and video products and parts in the NICs, Thailand, and Malaysia, the major distribution warehouse in Singapore, and linkage of these units on-line with Japanese, US, European, and Southeast Asian companies as well as important co-operating firms (Shojiro 1992a, pp. 37–8). In a similar fashion, an automobile produced in the US embodies labour, assembly operations, small and advanced components, styling and design engineering, advertising and marketing services, and data processing from scores of units, in both LDCs and DCs, around the world.

With institutional changes, discussed below, a number of low-income countries could begin participating in the new international division of labour created by outsourcing from high-income OECD countries. But this flying geese pattern may also apply to non-OECD leader countries. The Economic Commission for Africa (1989) estimates that, during the 1980s, Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries other than South Africa lost one-fourth of their GDP from South Africa's destabilization. However, since 1994, a democratic and prosperous South Africa should provide the economic leadership to spur SADC's economic development. South Africa, with its trade and FDI (including those by MNCs in the country), could serve as a 'growth pole' for other SADC members of the region – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (UNCTAD 1997b, pp. 64–6).

Of course, FDI is not a panacea. Malaysia and Thailand have sacrificed their economic autonomy to participate in producing less sophisticated, labour-intensive, low value-added production in an internationally organized division of knowledge. Their short-run prosperity from integration within this external system came at the expense of the technological learning and skill acquisition essential for rapid growth near the turn of the twenty-first century. Takeshi Aoki (1992, p. 97) mentions the lack of indigenous mastery of industrial technology, the few Malay entrepreneurs, and the substantial shortage of skilled workers, technicians, and engineers as major obstacles to Malaysia's future growth. For Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1992, pp. 145–8), some major barriers to Thailand's prospective development are the concentration of technological transfer within MNCs, the lack of innovation and adaptation by Thais, and the falling research-and-development capability. Indeed, Malaysia and Thailand have emphasized peripheral intermediation in technologically complex industrial industry rather than indigenous innovation and technology generation in less complex industry that provides more scope for gains from learning.²¹

Still, developing countries need a policy to increase FDI and other external resources. In 1988, the World Bank established Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) to help developing countries attract foreign investment. MIGA provides investors with marketing services, legal advice, and guarantees against non-commercial risk, such as expropriation and war (Aguilar 1997, p. 10). And in addition, LDCs need to undertake major institutional changes, not only to facilitate foreign and domestic investment but also to provide the scaffolding for other economic policies that reduce a country's vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies.

9.2.4 Economic sanctions and controls

The international community can use sanctions against predatory rulers who repress local minorities or violate international law, or warlords who sustain deadly violence through their control over precious minerals.

The UN Security Council's embargo of Iraq since 1990, under the leadership of the US government, did little to deter Saddam Hussein's development of weapons of mass destruction. However, the sanctions, with Saddam Hussein's predatory rule, 'have generated persistent deprivation, chronic hunger, endemic undernutrition, massive unemployment and widespread human suffering' throughout most of the 1990s

(Alnasrawi 1996a, p. 11). Numerous other efforts at sanctions have been largely ineffective, including the sanctions against Serbia (the former Yugoslavia) from 1992 until the defeat of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. As Woodward contends (1995b, p. 293; 1995a, p. 147), during the early 1990s

the sanctions, instead of undermining the sitting regime, increased the power of the government and of Milosevic personally, because the resulting supply shortages and inflation ... required the state to act. In rationing necessities and imposing anti-inflationary restrictions, the government could determine which enterprises would gain subsidies, which workers would therefore become unemployed, and whether farmers, veterans, pensioners, and the army would have income.

After the Dayton peace agreement in November 1995, Bosnia became a seat of organized crime. Amid economic sanctions, the absence of effective law and police organization facilitated gang enrichment, especially in Breko and Bijeljina, through smuggling and black markets across ethnic and political lines. Bosnia's political leaders profited too much from controlling this alternative economy to give up control or permit a transition to the market (Väyrynen 2000b, p. 467).

Still, economic sanctions imposed on apartheid South Africa may have helped convince the white minority to reconcile with the majority in 1994. Moreover, the sanctions by the Organization of African Unity on Burundi in 1996 after a military coup may have 'helped to prevent the repetition of the Rwandan tragedy' (Väyrynen 2002b, p. 139). Economic sanctions, in conjunction with other instruments, may achieve the goals of changing regime behaviour (Väyrynen 2002b).

We saw in Chapter 5 that warlords in Liberia and Sierra Leone have used control of diamonds and the military to rule over a shadow state with virtually no bureaucracy or public services. Other predatory élites have used 'oil wells, hardwood forests ... poaching, and cattle trade to accumulate foreign exchange for arms' (Väyrynen 2001).²² Sanctions would be expected to have some impact here.

The *Observer International* (Hill 2002) reports that Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda converted \$20 million cash to diamonds mined by the Revolutionary United Front rebels in Sierra Leone. Qaeda transported these diamonds across borders without detection, converting them to laundered banknotes used to buy arms. Wouldn't an international agreement to certify all diamonds entering international markets

reduce the access of warlords to funds for repression and military operations? However, as of early 2002, international sanctions are weak and legislation by major consuming nations, such as the United States, to boycott 'blood' diamonds, is riddled with loopholes. Vested interests opposed to or ambivalent about an effective global agreement include Ukraine and African countries that launder diamonds smuggled from war zones, producing nations that fear damage to legitimate producers, and an industry concerned about controlling supply. Moreover, organized international sanctions can increase opportunities for profitable dealing, spurring incentives to use violence to control trade.

Another way of reducing war and emergencies is to establish new and develop existing controls in armaments. One of the most promising approaches is to limit the traffic and proliferation of small arms, which kill more people today than major weapons systems.

9.2.5 Economic and political institutions

Institutions

Economic policies are no better than the institutions that design, implement, and monitor them (Aguilar 1997, p. 16). Stabilization and adjustment programmes, foreign aid, and foreign investment are not likely to be effective in spurring a country's economic development and reducing the risk of humanitarian emergencies if economic and political institutions are poorly developed. Building institutions and investing in infrastructure are essential to spur investment by nationals and foreigners in directly productive investment projects (Hirschman 1958). Low-income and other vulnerable countries need to develop a legal and judicial system; monetary and fiscal institutions; capital, land, and exchange markets; a statistical system; and a civil society independent of the state to achieve the development to reduce the risk of humanitarian emergencies.

Douglass North (1997, p. 2) indicates that 'Institutions are the rules of the game of a society composed of the formal rules (constitutions, statute and common law, regulations), the informal constraints (norms, conventions and internally devised codes of conduct) and the enforcement characteristics of each. Together they define the way the game is played.' Sandbrook (2002, p. 158) defines political institutions as the 'rules of the game that shape the behaviour of people when they contest and exercise power, as well as their, and the general public's, expectations regarding the actions of others'.

Many developing countries lack the economic institutions and governance structures (efficient and transparent administration and

legislature, enforcement of contracts and property rights) of highly institutionalized democratic countries that reduce capriciousness, predatory behaviour, and potential conflict. Sandbrook (2002) stresses building the rule of law, constructing an effective, efficient and non-partisan civil service, circumscribing the patronage system so that it does not destroy the productive economy, and instituting accountability at all levels, a daunting task of reform. Third World countries need a legal and judicial system, with such components as trademarks, registration of signed contracts, letters of credit, contract law with stipulated penalties for non-performance, product liability suits, corporate and enterprise legislation, and a police force to enforce against force, theft, fraud, and violation of contracts (Lin and Nugent 1995, p. 2346).²³ To be sure, neo-patrimonial or predatory rulers may not be interested in this reform, as it would eliminate an important source of patronage (Sandbrook 2002). But a political élite interested in accelerating growth and reducing vulnerability to emergencies should put a high priority on legal and bureaucratic reform.²⁴

In most low-income countries, land, capital and credit, insurance, and forward and other exchange-rate markets are poorly developed. As discussed below, land markets should assign property rights to cultivators, but without undermining usufruct rights for traditional community or village land-rights systems. Exchange markets that increase the efficiency of transactions not only enhance growth but external adjustment, thus reducing political instability.

Macroeconomic stability is enhanced by a robust capital market and financial system, which select 'the most productive recipient for [capital] resources [and] monitor the use of funds, ensuring that they [continue] to be used productively' (Stiglitz 1998, p. 14). Government needs to develop a bond market to facilitate the raising of resources for social spending and economic development. Also important is a central bank, with a director and staff chosen for their technical qualifications, which uses economic criteria for making decisions about monetary expansion (Uche 1997). However, Ajit Singh (1999, pp. 341, 352) argues that, while improving the banking system is important for increasing low-income countries' savings and investment, a stock market is 'a costly irrelevance which they can ill afford'; for most others, 'it is likely to do more harm than good', as its volatility may contribute to 'financial fragility for the whole economy', increasing 'the riskiness of investments and [discouraging] risk-averse corporations from financing their growth by equity issues' (ibid., pp. 341, 352).

Low-income countries need to expand social overhead capital formation to increase the productivity and attractiveness of both domestic and foreign private investment. This includes investments in infrastructure such as transport (roads, railroads, coastal shipping, ports, harbours, bridges, and river improvement), communication (telegraph, telephone, and postal services), electronics, power, water supply, education, extension, research in science and applications of technology to commercial practice, and trade fairs and exhibitions. A high quality communications system, with competitive prices, is essential to increase the productivity and propensity to invest. In transport, communication, education, and science, the state plays a major role in making investments.

A major investment in infrastructure is the development of a statistical service, with timely, accurate, and comprehensive data, widely accessible to relevant publics. For example, LDCs need poverty and income distribution data to provide safety nets and more even development (discussed below). The database should be national in coverage, comparable across time and place, and include household surveys or censuses, with information on noncash income such as food and other goods produced at home (Fields 1994; Nafziger 1997, pp. 125–69). In addition, if investors and members of the public had access to better information, developing countries would not continue unsustainable policies of bad debts to banks or exchange transactions of the banking system (Fischer 1998, p. 12).

Improving the state's capability to collect taxes and provide basic services

One important institutional capability is a country's capacity to raise revenue and provide basic services. In several low-income countries, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, and Somalia, the state has failed to provide minimal functions such as defence, law and order, property rights, public health (potable water and sewage disposal), macroeconomic stability, and protection of the destitute, to say nothing of intermediate functions such as basic education, transport and communication, pollution control, pensions, family allowances, and health, life, and unemployment insurance (World Bank 1997b, p. 27). Countries whose fiscal positions are deteriorating and can no longer provide basic functions face an increasing risk of humanitarian emergencies. A vicious circle of declining legitimacy, fiscal mismanagement, and the further erosion of legitimacy from a decline in the quality of public services can contribute to a country's emergency. Examples include Russia, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Mengistu's Ethiopia.

Governments need to maintain or re-establish a social compact with all their citizens, including the poor, in which some basic needs are met in return for tax contributions according to the ability to pay. One way to increase legitimacy and raise tax revenue is to replace widely evaded direct taxes, such as personal income taxes, with indirect taxes, such as a value-added tax (VAT), a tax on the difference between the sales of a firm and its purchases from other firms. The appeals of the value-added tax are: simplicity, uniformity, the generation of buoyant revenues (from a high income elasticity), and the enabling of a gradual lowering of other tax rates throughout the system (for example, the lowering or elimination of the distortions of a cascade tax, such as the simple sales tax that takes a straightforward percentage of all business turnover, so that tax on tax occurs as a taxed product passes from manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer).

The most frequently used approach for levying the VAT is the subtractive-indirect (the invoice and credit) method. Under this approach, the firm issues invoices for all taxable transactions, using these invoices to compute the tax on total sales. But the firm is given credit for the VAT paid by its suppliers. To a substantial degree, the VAT is self-enforcing, as the firm has an incentive to present invoices to subtract the VAT on purchases from the VAT on sales; these invoices provide a check on VAT payments at earlier stages, and reduce leakage from cheating or corruption. In Turkey, an additional cross-match is by consumers, who with receipts for purchases, can offset a proportion of the VAT paid on their retail purchases against their income-tax liability.

But the VAT faces administrative problems, especially among the numerous retailers in low-income countries. The cost of compelling compliance among these retailers, who may pay for their purchases out of the till and keep no records of cash transactions, are substantial relative to the tax collected. So despite the distorting effect on capital, enterprise, and resource allocation, many low-income countries have to levy taxes simpler to administer such as corporate taxes; taxes on international trade, where goods pass through a limited number of ports and border crossings; taxes on sales by manufacturers, where numbers are fewer and control is easier; or taxes on luxuries.²⁵ For many of these countries lack the capability to administer, collect, audit, monitor, and hear appeals from value-added taxpayers and evaders (Nafziger 1997, pp. 402–07). In the final analysis, governmental legitimacy requires the capability of levying taxes and providing basic services, even when, at the margin, this is at the expense of efficiency and private savings (Toye 2002).

Building economic institutions and infrastructure, including a well-regulated tax system, is essential for spurring investment to increase the economic growth and stability necessary for reducing the risk from humanitarian emergencies.

Democratization

Chapter 6 discusses the process of democratization, indicating that the movement from authoritarian rule to a democracy can be a highly disruptive process. This is especially true if electoral democracy was deliberately contrived to satisfy international norms of presentability. Democratic contestation can heighten ethnic animosity, as in Rwanda in 1994. Strongmen can manipulate illiberal 'virtual' democracies to divide and co-opt the opposition, maintain private militias and death squads, and detain the political opposition in ways that distort democratic institutions.

A major part of democratization, especially in politically divided societies, is the growth of a robust civil society – institutions independent of the state, such as labour unions, churches and mosques, scientific societies, schools and universities, and independent journalists. Donor pressure for liberalization and democracy needs to be restrained, so that the emphasis is on the gradual building of a rule of law and democratic institutions rather than attaining a Westminster-type democracy with trappings associated with Western liberal democracy.

Sandbrook (2002, pp. 159–60) stresses several ways to reduce the likelihood that democratic contestation does not engender deadly conflict. Democracy must 'restore political institutions capable of managing the conflicts and competition arising from ethnic/communal cleavages ... forge the institutional preconditions for functioning markets and poverty alleviation ... and ... empower local communities and ordinary citizens to become defenders of their local resource base.' However, there is no single institutional response to the challenge to maintain political order. 'Institutions will need to be tailored to fit the traditions, socio-economic conditions, political problems, and segmental divisions of individual countries.' Before elections, all groups participating, including major ethnic groups, should agree on the rules of the game.

Sandbrook (2002, p. 161) favours proportional representation rather than the 'first-past-the-post' plurality system, with its danger of an ethnically exclusive government and major groups excluded from power. One example, Sudan's parliamentary governments (1956–58, 1965–69, 1986–89) comprised two major sectarian parties with northern Muslim

domination that generally excluded the south, west, and east from power. All three regimes suffered from a *coup d'état* and inflamed ethnic and religious divisions. In addition, federalism 'can reduce ethnic conflict by removing some divisive issues from the central government's jurisdiction ... and by lessening disputes among regions by redistributing revenues from the centre to the regions' (ibid., p. 163).

Majoritarianism and 'winner-take-all' approaches undermine political stability because they exclude some groups from power and resources. To achieve consensual governance and consolidate democracy, all major groups must be included in sharing power and public goods (Sandbrook 2002). For Väyrynen (2001): 'The issue is less that of formal representative institutions, such as elections and parliaments, than of a national political contract where key players participate and share the benefits and costs of ruling the country. Such a contract facilitates participation, increases transparency, and establishes political accountability among rulers.'

9.2.6 Safety nets for the poor

As indicated before, there may be a fine line between an emergency and endemic poverty. Adjustment and stabilization programmes, without compensatory transfers or other safety nets for the incomes and livelihoods of poor households, can trigger a humanitarian crisis. Thus, we might expect that donor or lender support, through IMF, World Bank, or OECD government concessional funds, for provision of social funds can contribute to poverty reduction and the political sustainability of the adjustment process. These funds might include moneys for public works, food-for-work projects, and retrenched public-sector workers, as well as nutrition, potable water, and health care for disadvantaged classes. These programmes, if timely and well targeted, will help garner popular support for needed adjustment and reduce the society's vulnerability to hunger, disease, displacement, and even war or physical violence.

As an example, under the World Bank structural adjustment programme in Ghana in 1988, a PAMSCAD (Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment) provided funds for public works and food-for-work projects to reduce the immediate harm to retrenched public-sector workers from privatization programmes, designed to increase productivity in the long run (Nafziger 1993, p. 175; Morrisson 2000). Yet as Frances Stewart and Willem van der Geest (1998) show, retrenched and redeployed public sector employees, which were relatively well off, benefited substantially, while poor households benefited little.

Indeed, Stewart and van der Geest's survey of ten developing countries undergoing adjustment during the 1970s and 1980s indicates that only social funds programmes designed and funded domestically have been successful in reducing vulnerability to hunger, disease, and displacement. In contrast, external programs have usually failed.

The schemes that succeeded (all in the 1970s) included Botswana's employment programme during severe drought, Chile's emergency employment effort during economic stagnation and rising unemployment and poverty, Costa Rica's social spending targeted toward the poorer segments of the population, and Maharashtra state, India's, employment guarantees on demand. These schemes, which utilized self-targeting through low wage payments for unskilled work, were effective in alleviating poverty and reducing vulnerability to hunger, disease, and displacement from adjustment. Yet, while these programmes were funded domestically, we should not rule out the success of externally funded programmes if domestically designed and sensitive to locally specific needs.

9.2.7 Reduction of inequalities

Uneven development between regions and ethnic communities

Communal factors contributing to conflict include educational discrepancies, regional and ethnic employment differentials, inter-regional revenue allocation, and language discrimination, which disadvantages minority language communities. In Africa, differences in regional and ethnic opportunities for employment and asset acquisition during the waves of indigenization of the 1960s and the 1970s, and privatization of the 1980s and the 1990s have been important sources of conflict.

Policies include targeting programmes for the poorest regions and communities and employment and educational preferences for disadvantaged communities. India has an affirmative action programme favouring the placement of outcastes and other economically 'backward castes and tribes' in educational institutions and government positions. A number of countries, including India, use industrial incentives and subsidies to help economically backward regions and train businesspersons from underprivileged groups. Upgrading housing in blighted urban areas can increase real income among the poor. Finally, some developing countries, in a reversal of the policies of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, have stressed development in the rural areas where most poor live. Undertaking these policies to reduce the risk of conflict requires not only economically feasible programmes, but also coalitions of interest groups – employers, government agencies, educators, and members benefiting directly – to support economic opportunities for members of disadvantaged communities.

Educational inequality

The World Bank (1996c, pp. 34–5) shows that, on average, low-income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, spend substantially more on education for households in the richest quintiles than those in the poorest ones. Although secondary and (especially) university education is highly subsidized, the private cost is still often a barrier to the poor. Providing free, universal primary education is the most effective policy for reducing the educational inequality that contributes to income inequality and political discontent. Near-universal primary education in Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia have dampened some discontent in these countries, while the low rates of primary school enrolment in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Somalia, and Sudan have perpetuated class, ethnic, and regional divisions and grievances in educational and employment opportunities.

Still, virtually universal basic education is not a panacea. In Sri Lanka, with continuing high enrolment rates in primary and secondary school, the majority Sinhalese perception of Tamil economic success as a threat to their own economic opportunities increased during the period of slow growth and high unemployment after independence in 1948. This perception contributed to governmental policies of educational, language, and employment discrimination against Tamils, beginning in the mid-1950s, which contributed to the Sri Lankan civil war of the last quarter of the twentieth century. Thus, in Sri Lanka, educational policy favoured the majority community.

Generally, however, expanding educational opportunities for low-income minority regions and communities can reduce social tension, political instability, and the potential for a humanitarian emergency. Politically, the support for expansion in education, especially basic schooling, can come from educators, and peasant and working-class constituents whose children lack access to education, and nationalists who recognize the importance of universal literacy for national unity and labour skills for modernization. Examples of these coalitions supporting universal basic education include Meiji Japan (Nafziger 1995, pp. 36–7) and Africa in the 1960s.²⁶

9.2.8 Food and agriculture*Agrarian reform and land redistribution*

In most societies, land is the most important asset that families either have or aspire to have. Land inequality contributes to low incomes and income inequality (Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder

1995, pp. 2694–707), which are major sources of humanitarian emergencies in developing countries. Section 4.1 discussed the tensions from unequal land distribution in Central America. El Salvador's 1992 peace accords included a land-transfer programme to benefit ex-combatants for both the government and the rebel Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), but unfortunately the programme was delayed and is too small to serve as a model for other countries vulnerable to emergencies.

Land reform and redistribution, with relatively low ceilings on parcel size, the inclusion of tenants and landless workers, and a good package of complementary measures such as infrastructure, credit, and technical assistance, can potentially reduce rural discontent. Indeed land distribution in the early 1950s in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, coupled with credit and extension services for small farmers, contributed to the later widespread rural prosperity that reduced vulnerability to political violence. In India, in contrast to the states of Punjab, Haryana, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Meghalaya, and Nagaland where rural unrest festered in the midst of the absence of significant land reform and redistribution, the state of Kerala undertook radical, comprehensive land reform and redistribution in the 1970s that reduced the number of discontented landless or land-poor people (Berry 1997).

Land reform has frequently failed because of the political opposition of landlords, the transfer of holdings to relatives, or because the new landowners do not have access to credit, water, fertilizer, extension assistance, and other services. The World Bank and many OECD donors are willing to support market-assisted land reform, where willing buyers negotiate deals with willing sellers, with the hope, usually illusory, that 'government would facilitate the process by providing incentives to potential sellers and by helping potential buyers to acquire the means to buy'. The Bank also sees market-assisted reform as feasible during a 'farm debt crisis when land prices are depressed' (World Bank 1996c, p. 15). However, besides these situations, which are rare, for political reasons, the World Bank and external donors have usually failed to support this most fundamental 'structural' adjustment in agriculture, land redistribution.

Frequently, however, land redistribution is not to the cultivator, the landless worker, or tenant, but to urban élites and affluent farmers who are influential with political élites. Distributions by East African governments from Europeans to Africans are examples of this problem. Zimbabwe's current land distribution emphasizes the politically

connected rather than the cultivators. And from 1954 to 1974, Kenya replaced the colonial land tenure system with a new system in which Africans acquired land from whites in the central and western highlands. The government purchased land from the former owners and redistributed land to Africans under the 'one million acre settlement programme'. Thousands of hectares were transferred to Africans through land settlement schemes, large-scale individual purchases, land buying companies, and cooperatives. The landless, however, were not the main beneficiaries. Indeed, many tenants, squatters, and other landless peasants were evicted with land privatization. For the political leadership redistributed most of the land to itself, allies, and clients, many of whom had no experience in farming. The Kenyan case illustrates how politics can limit the success of programmes that ostensibly redistribute land to the cultivator.

Still, the examples of Japan, Taiwan, and Korea indicate the potential for land reform, if accompanied by nonfarm output and employment growth, to reduce agrarian discontent. Where there is political will, land redistribution, coupled with credit and services for small farmers, can reduce poverty and inequality in agrarian societies and their vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies. Moreover, Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess (2000, pp. 389–430) show that where vested interests block land redistribution, more modest agrarian reform, such as reform of the terms of tenancy and the abolition of intermediaries between owner and tenant, has a major impact in reducing rural poverty. And donors and international agencies can often provide the additional resources making land redistribution or at least tenancy reforms feasible.

Secure property and usufruct rights or traditional community or village land-rights systems

Property rights usually assign to individuals the rights to and rewards from using resources, thus providing incentives to invest in resources and use them efficiently. Given the high cost of supervising agricultural wage labour, clearly allocating land rights to owner-operators would generally increase the efficiency of farm production (Binswanger and Deininger 1997, pp. 1965–6).

However, private property rights do not always produce the most efficient farming arrangements where information costs are high and markets for finance and insurance are imperfect (*ibid.*). Moreover, the emphasis by the IMF, World Bank, and African élites on the abrupt shift from traditional use rights to individualized titling from purchases and sales in a land market has reduced agricultural efficiency, torn safety nets

for the poor, and increased risk. Under most traditional community or village systems, farm families not only have inheritable use rights to cropland, pastures, and forests, but these land rights are highly transferable. These systems provide tenure security at low cost, thus not discouraging individuals from investing in the operation (ibid., p. 1966). Agricultural intensification from population growth gives rise to pressure for increasingly formal private property rights. But the precipitate registering of individualized land titles, in the name of modernizing land-rights systems, reduces tenure security in the short run, as the number of land disputes surge, as rural masses, unaware of the implications of registration, are outmanoeuvred by clever, well-informed and powerful individuals. To avoid undesirable effects, Hans Binswanger, Klaus Deininger, and Gershon Feder (1995, p. 2721) recommend that 'titling programs should be accompanied by publicity campaigns to ensure widespread knowledge of the rules and procedures. Both equity and efficiency considerations argue that titling programs be systematic rather than on demand.'

In Ethiopia, political conflict, land insecurity, and environmental degradation form a vicious circle, which contributes to further conflict. The insecurity and conflict of the past quarter of a century has compelled people to concentrate in safer zones, thus intensifying the process of degradation of the available local resources, especially for people living on the razor-edge of survival (Kibreab 2002).

In light of these problems, in sub-Saharan Africa, secure property and use rights usually means maintaining the tenure security but highly transferable land rights under traditional community or village land systems. Secure property and usufruct rights contribute to safeguarding environmental resources and agricultural land productivity, which by increasing food output and sustainable economic growth also reduces the potential for humanitarian crises.

Aid for food and agricultural development

Section 7.1 shows that slow food output growth from the 1960s to the 1980s and 1990s was a source of humanitarian emergencies in LDCs. During the same period, the real value of food aid dropped: from the 1960s to the 1970s and 1980s, falling even further during the 1990s (Nafziger 1997, pp. 445–6; Pinstруп-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch, and Rosegrant 1997, p. 26). Given the reduction in other aid, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) contends that:

The substantial reduction in food aid deliveries ... has disturbing implications for food security. The need for aid to combat food

insecurity has not diminished. ... Food aid will have an important role for some years, not only in addressing humanitarian emergencies but also in directing resources to many of the world's most vulnerable food-insecure people to help them permanently escape poverty and assure food security.

(Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch, and Rosegrant 1997, p. 26)

In light of these findings, OECD countries, especially the United States, need to restore the real value of food aid to the levels of the 1970s and 1980s (or even those of the 1960s), with a priority to least developed countries. However, as IFPRI argues, donors should consider 'gradually replacing program food aid with increasing cash assistance for commercial food import', because of the high transactions costs of most food aid (*ibid.*).

Perhaps even more important than food assistance is a focus on long-term agricultural research and technology in developing countries. Only a small fraction of global agricultural research is spent on these countries. Developing countries need their own agricultural research, since many of their ecological zones (especially the arid and semi-arid tropics) are quite different from those of North America and Europe. Food grain growth in India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Mexico would not have exceeded population growth in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s without the investment in improved packages of high-yielding seed varieties, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, improved transport, and extension.²⁷ Low-income countries vulnerable to emergencies also need substantial agricultural investments. However, agriculture suffered disproportionately from the decline in LDC aid in the late 1980s and 1990s, as real aid to developing-country agriculture declined from \$19 billion in 1986 to \$10 billion in 1994 (Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch, and Rosegrant 1997, p. 27). A priority for reducing long-term food insecurity and vulnerability to emergencies is for rich countries to restore their agricultural technical aid to real levels in the 1970s and 1980s.

9.3 The benefits of war

9.3.1 Goals of political élites in weak states

This section shows how rulers of shadow states and warlords use control of natural resources, land, or food to maintain political control

and increase their and their allies' prosperity. Belligerents can use the chaos of war to further their interests, which are frequently economic.

In poorly institutionalized, weak or failed states, political élites are more concerned with disaffected internal forces than with fear of external aggression. Most military spending in LDCs 'is not aimed at external enemies, but at internal ones (real or imagined)' (Henderson and Singer 2000, p. 282). While élites often provide militaries substantial advantages in budgeting, this may hurt investment, growth, and welfare, crowding out education, health, and social welfare.

Only a portion of violence results from actions by rebels or war between well-armed opponents. In fact, the majority of casualties from humanitarian emergencies are from government-sponsored or organized politicides. Amid war and scarcity, ruling élites may benefit from spearheading genocide or tolerating crime or mass murder by allies among militias, war profiteers, and ethnic champions. Indeed, some interests derive economic advantage by war and state violence; stopping deadly political violence requires changing the balance between benefits and costs among rulers and their collaborators (Nafziger, Stewart, and Väyrynen (eds), Vols. 1 and 2, 2000).

For ruling élites to organize war and conflict involves shifting alliances with groups and individuals in authority at the local level. Where the centre lacks the resources to 'buy' the loyalty of local élites, it may procure their loyalty by tolerating exploitation at a local level. In political conflict, the need to form alliances with local groups and élites may contribute to increased levels of abuse of civilians and the natural environment. Even civilians may find it safer and more advantageous to join armed exploiters rather than risk becoming one of the unarmed exploited (Keen 1996).

9.3.2 The shadow state

Reno (2000b, pp. 48, 54–5) explains that the ruler of a failed or shadow state deliberately minimizes his public goods to the population, limiting freeriding benefits to followers he controls with his means of violence. This system of payouts and coercion is the starting point for inequality, destitution, greed, and grievances that provoke civil wars in these states. For Reno (2000b, pp. 45–7)

The shadow state is the product of personal rule, usually constructed behind the façade of *de jure* state sovereignty. Nearly all

governments recognize shadow states as interlocutors in global society ... even ... where formal state capacity is practically nil.

As an example, Angola holds a seat in the UN, has an entry for its GDP and international trade in World Bank and IMF data banks, receives foreign aid and investment, and is recognized by most outsiders as sovereign. In 2001, Angola's president and head of government (since 1979) was the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola's (or MPLA's) José Eduardo dos Santos. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola's (or UNITA's) late Jonas Savimbi controlled diamond mines in the centre and north of Angola and substantial international and transborder trade (Duffield 2000, p. 74). Although economically viable, UNITA lacked the access to credit from established lending institutions or access to the diplomatic resources available to the MPLA government. External support and recognition of *de jure* sovereignty of such states with weak internal administrations as Angola, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo-Kinshasa relieves their rulers of the need to provide basic services, collect tax revenues from indigenous establishments, and build the bureaucratic, political and economic infrastructure for economic growth based on a diversified local base. For many years, Angola and Congo have relied on foreign patrons and investors for support of enclave operations, such as petroleum and diamonds.

Income acquired independently of the country's population gave rulers the option of pursuing policies that hampered the productivity and wealth accumulation of that population. Rulers depending on foreign firms and support had little legitimacy or compliance with the local population. However, rulers preferred conserving resources spent on local infrastructure, instead using them to pay key strongmen in return for their compliance and support.

As Reno (2000b, p. 46) contends, 'These private uses of state assets and prerogatives created a framework of rule outside formal state institutions, a shadow of state bureaucratic agencies based on personal ties.' Richard Joseph's 'prebendalism' extends Weber's observation (quoted in section 2.2) that a patrimonial ruler lacks a separation of 'private' and 'public', treating political power and administration as part of his personal property. A prebendal refers to 'patterns of political behaviour which rest on the justifying principle that such offices should be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of officeholders as well as their reference or support group' (Joseph 1987, p. 8).

To make patronage work for political control, 'the ruler must prevent all individuals from gaining unregulated access to markets. A shadow state ruler thus logically seeks to make life *less secure* and *more materially impoverished* for subjects' [italics in the original] (Reno 2000b, pp. 46–7). Thus, the shadow state ruler, similar to Zaire's Mobutu and Liberia's Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor, minimizes economic security and public goods for the population, thus ensuring that individuals will have to seek the ruler's personal favour to enjoy any security or public good. Indeed shadow states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Mobutu's Zaire are better understood as private commercial syndicates rather than as sovereign states.²⁸

Most states involved in civil war are decaying or failing. Väyrynen (2000b, pp. 450–1) generally agrees with the previous analysis of the shadow state but distinguishes between state failure and state decay. A failed state manifests itself in contested borders and the failure to perform the basic functions of the state. Those governing gradually lose 'their ability to set and maintain rules of social behaviour, allocate resources effectively, and to conduct organized foreign policy'. In contrast, the predatory ruling élite of the decaying state 'has power, but is deformed and uninterested in developing the society'. This state 'uses its assets to satisfy only its [rulers'] material and political interests' (ibid.). The ruling élites take funds from a common pool, not returning the money to the treasury for productive use for society.

State failure may deteriorate into collapse when the state can no longer control its territory and protect the citizens under the rulers' patronage. Ultimately the ruling clique may only be able to safeguard the capitol, so that military coups have a better chance for success if begun at the periphery, as in Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Zaire (ibid., p. 451). The rulers of a decaying state, while only concerned about their own economic welfare and political survival, may ultimately be threatened by the long-term degeneration of the political economy that jeopardizes their ability to provide support and patronage for the small cliques and allies that sustain the rulers.

In weak states, in the absence of central funding, élites may 'privatize' war by exploiting the civilian economy or tolerating or encouraging paramilitaries or ethnic militias that commit crimes. One example is in the 1970s when Sudan President Gaafar Mohamed el-Nimeiri, to forestall further coup attempts, appeased the deprived Baggara of western Sudan by sanctioning their raiding and exploitation of the Dinka and Nuer in the south (Keen 1998, p. 29). 'In Angola, Ethiopia,

Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Zaire ... governments and faction leaders have used underpaid or unpaid fighters who derive at least part of their income from preying on civilians, or from illegal production and trade' (ibid. p. 25). This weakens discipline within military organizations.

9.3.3 War makes crime legitimate

The view of many scholars and journalists that war is irrational and dysfunctional is wrong. Rather war provides cover for crimes that benefit the perpetuator economically, crimes with legitimacy only during war. These crimes are not aberrations but increasingly a part and parcel of war. During war, some groups are 'effectively "above the law" (that is, immune from prosecution and punishment while others [are] effectively "below that law" (that is, unprotected, in practice, by national or international law)' (Keen 2000b, p. 293).

Moreover, the idea that war has only negative economic consequences for belligerents and that winning is the combatants' predominant aim is misleading. Indeed the point of conflict may be the legitimacy that it confers on activity that would be punishable as crimes in peacetime. During counter-insurgency, officials can encourage militias and paramilitaries in committing crimes, creating a 'climate of impunity' condemned by human-rights organizations (Keen 1998, p. 26). One example is the months following the vote for independence by East Timor from Indonesia in 30 August 1999, when Indonesian security forces and allied militias forcibly expelled or killed hundreds of thousands of East Timorese.

Keen (1998, pp. 15–17) lists the economic benefits arising from war, benefits realized from being freed from breaking the law. (1) Soldiers use pillaging to replace or supplement wages, as in the Americas by Spanish conquistadors in the sixteenth century, Congo (Zaire) since independence in 1960, and both sides of contemporary wars in Sierra Leone and Angola. (2) Warlords, mafia-type bosses, or security personnel may offer 'protection' from violence for payment. Examples include the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, regional warlords in Liberia and Somalia, and Mozambique's rebel Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo) movement for 'protecting' the Beira oil pipeline. (3) Officials, soldiers, and their business allies may control or monopolize trade. War may cause price movements profitable to some, may facilitate threatening or constraining trading rivals, may exempt favoured traders from restrictions, may allow warlords and allies to avoid taxes, and may expedite kickbacks when procuring arms

(see Chapter 8). (4) Warlords and collaborators may threaten individuals or groups to force them to work cheaply or for free, or in extreme cases, as Myanmar and Sudan, allow slavery to re-emerge. (5) Conflict may depopulate large areas, allowing new groups to claim resources such as land, water, and minerals, as in Sudan in the late 1980s. Gaining access to resources encouraged factions in northern Iraq and in Somalia to cooperate with the regime in repressing neighbouring clans and factions. (6) Foreign relief aid provides opportunities for rent-seeking opportunities for military and political élites and local groups supporting them. (7) The military benefits when war justifies a sizeable army, higher salaries, and a major role in government and the private sector.

9.3.4 War as profitable

These economic benefits, which especially loom large in low-income countries, have resulted in cooperative conflict in Liberia (where both sides avoid pitched battles), Sierra Leone (where government and opposition coordinate the looting of villages), the former Yugoslavia (where Serb, Croatian, and Muslim traders benefited from the premium paid for smuggling goods across enemy lines), Peru and Chechnya (where enemy forces pay ransoms for captured fighters), and Cambodia, Chechnya, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Sri Lanka (where fighters sell arms and ammunition to the other side). Increasingly civil wars that began with political aims, as in Sri Lanka, Angola, and the former Yugoslavia, have evolved into conflicts in which short-term economic benefits predominate (*ibid.*, pp. 12, 17–18).

As Juha Auvinen and Timo Kivimäki (2000, pp. 217, 220) point out regarding Somalian warlords: 'Many of them had a vested interest in continued conflict and instability: for a man of war, peace would entail loss of power. ... [Indeed,] the beneficiaries from the humanitarian emergency in Somalia had no interest in ending the crisis but instead wanted to continue profiting from it.' On the other hand, El Salvador maintained peace after accords signed in January 1992 because a growing business and political élite, including elements in both the governing ARENA (Nationalist Republican Alliance) party and the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front), the former rebel group, benefited from the surge in economic growth with the cessation of war.

Congo's (Zaire's) Mobutu Sese Seko was an early practitioner of predatory rule. In Zaire, Mobutu was responsible for institutions that strengthened his centralized leadership and control. He institutionalized corruption and state terrorism, and created party institutions parallel to state organs and a private network of security personnel (secret police

and private army) that he controlled completely. Mobutu's army contributed to lawlessness in Zaire, becoming an 'occupying force, raping schoolgirls in various provinces, harassing and killing innocent people, [and] destroying and stealing private property' (Emizet 2000a, p. 268). The main motive of this corrupt kleptocracy, a government of thieves, was to enrich and safeguard Mobutu and his sycophantic inner circle.

For Mobutu, being Head of State allied with the US and the West against communist countries provided access to arms and financial aid (through the early 1990s) from abroad to enhance his personal wealth. In 1988, US House Foreign Affairs Chair Howard Wolpe asserted: 'Literally hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars have vanished into the hands or bank accounts of the president and his collaborators' (Davidson 1991, p. A-11). Peter Körner and colleagues estimate Mobutu's 1984 overseas wealth at four to six billion dollars, invested in Swiss bank accounts and Western real estate, enough to solve Zaire's debt crisis. Indeed, if Mobutu (and his allies) had not taken out of the country a large proportion of funds the Zairian government borrowed abroad, Zaire might not have had a debt crisis (Körner *et al.* 1984, p. 137). In 1977, President Mobutu denounced *le mal zairois* (the Zairian disease), stating that 'everything is for sale, everything is bought in our country. And in this traffic, holding any slice of public power constitutes a veritable exchange instrument, convertible into illicit acquisition of other goods' (Lemarchand 1979, p. 237).

A major strategy for Mobutu retaining power was 'frequent reshuffles ... to avoid any power consolidation by people who could challenge his authority' (Emizet 2000a, p. 270). As section 5.4 indicates, no government minister or employee or militia member was secure unless he worked unstintingly for Mobutu's wealth accumulation. The goal of Mobutu, as other warlords, was to prevent private elite groups emerging without Mobutu's clientage.

Keen (1998, p. 11) paraphrases Carl von Clausewitz: 'war has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means. War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power, and even protection.' Chapter 8 showed the alternative systems rulers and their allies use for distribution of food and land and access to minerals.

9.4 Preventive measures: a conclusion

This chapter stresses long-term policies to reduce the risk of humanitarian emergencies. International and domestic actors must take early

preventive action, since options narrow and become more expensive when the conflict or emergency starts. Since low average income, slow economic growth, and high income inequality are important contributors to emergencies, policies need to strengthen and restructure the political economy of poor, economically stagnant, and inegalitarian countries. But we have especially emphasized here preventive policies that contribute to political integration and the averting of humanitarian emergencies, even separately from their contribution to economic growth and egalitarianism.

Preventive measures can be undertaken by a wide variety of actors – the country's civil society and government, transnational NGOs, rich-country governments, and international agencies. OECD governments, the UN, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund must lead in providing support to reduce the risk of emergencies to those sub-Saharan African (and other poor) countries, whose political élites are subject to the rule of law and accountability of power. In the late 1990s, providing international support for predatory rulers similar to Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko and Nigeria's Sani Abacha was harmful.

The major changes LDC governments need to make are economic and political institutional changes – the development of a legal system, enhanced financial institutions, increased taxing capacity, greater investment in basic education and other forms of social capital, well-functioning resource and exchange markets, programmes to target weaker segments of the population, and democratic institutions that accommodate and co-opt the country's various ethnic and regional communities. Institutional and infrastructural development increases the productivity of private investment and public spending and enhances the effectiveness of governance.

DC governments, MNCs, and transnational NGOs, as well as international agencies, such as the UN, Bretton Woods' institutions, and the World Trade Organization, disproportionately dominated by rich countries; bear substantial responsibility for modifying the international economic order to enhance economic growth and adjustment. While developing countries have lacked the power to compel DCs and international agencies to adhere to the declaration on principles and programmes of the UN General Assembly's sixth and seventh special sessions (1974–75), developing countries can demand greater voice and consideration of their economic interests within present international economic and political institutions. Third World countries, by working with their allies within the Nordic countries, the European Union, Japan, and the Group of 8; the World Bank, International Monetary

Fund, and World Trade Organization; and within UN agencies such as the General Assembly, UNCTAD, the UN Development Programme, UNICEF, and regional agencies, can ensure that LDC economic and political interests are more strongly considered. These interests can generally be served by enhanced LDC flexibility and self-determination in designing paths toward adjustment and liberalization; a shift in the goals and openness of the Bretton Woods' institutions (especially the IMF); the restructuring of the international economic system for trade and capital flows; more technological transfer by foreign companies, bilateral donors, and international agencies; a greater coherence of aid programmes; and increased international funding to reduce food crises, directly help the poor, ameliorate external shocks, and write down debt burdens. Developing countries can use the Group of 15, Group of 20, Group of 77, and UN and other fora to take initiatives and apply pressure to DCs to undertake these changes in the international order.

Since the policies of governing élites are at the root of most humanitarian emergencies, and since usually some powerful factions in society benefit from emergencies, there may be a number of countries vulnerable to emergencies not amenable to political economy solutions. Yet a large number of countries vulnerable to emergencies have the will to change. Thus, there is substantial scope for international, national, and nongovernmental economic and political actors to coordinate their long-term policies to reduce the developing world's vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies.

9.5 Conclusion

Let us summarize our findings about the three major objectives of the study (section 1.1).

9.5.1 Factors associated with humanitarian emergencies

The major factors associated with emergencies (wars and state violence) are slow economic growth and low average income (especially in food and agriculture), failed external adjustment policies, large income inequalities (by income class and community), military centrality, conflict over mineral exports, and predatory and authoritarian rule.

Similar to World Bank researcher Paul Collier, we find that economic stagnation and decline are major factors contributing to war and humanitarian emergencies. Unlike World Bank researchers, however, we find a relationship between income inequality and humanitarian emergencies.

Both economic stagnation and large income inequalities affect relative deprivation, a perception of social injustice from a discrepancy between conditions expected and procured. This deprivation spurs social discontent, which provides motivation for collective violence. Additionally, to forestall threats to the regime, political élites may use repression to suppress discontent or increase their share of the shrinking surplus. All in all, our research indicates that poverty and inequality are major factors giving rise to grievances that contribute to war and state violence.

Ironically, although World Bank researchers do not identify inequality or its associated grievance as contributing to war, World Bank policy makers assume the importance of reducing inequality (and poverty) to achieve peace. In 2001, World Bank President James Wolfensohn asserted that 'If you cannot deal with the question of poverty, if you cannot deal with the issue of equity, then you are not dealing with the question of peace.'

9.5.2 Policies for preventing emergencies

Given the contribution of low average income, slow economic growth, and high income inequality to humanitarian emergencies, we argued that Third World states, with the support of the international community, must strengthen and restructure the political economy of poor, economically stagnant, and inegalitarian countries. The major changes LDC governments need to make are economic and political institutional changes – the development of a legal system, enhanced financial institutions, increased taxing capacity, greater investment in basic education and other forms of social capital, well-functioning resource and exchange markets, programmes to target weaker segments of the population, and democratic institutions that accommodate and co-opt the country's various ethnic and regional communities. Institutional and infrastructural development increases the productivity of private investment and public spending and enhances the effectiveness of governance.

On the other hand, industrialized countries and international agencies bear substantial responsibility for modifying the international economic order to enhance economic growth and adjustment. Developing regions can demand greater consideration of their economic interests within present international economic and political institutions. The interests of the Third World can generally be served by its enhanced flexibility and self-determination in designing paths toward adjustment and liberalization; a shift in the goals and openness of the IMF

and World Bank; the restructuring of the international economic system for trade and capital flows; the opening of rich countries' markets; more technological transfer by foreign companies, bilateral donors, and international agencies; a greater coherence of aid programmes; and increased international funding to reduce food crises, directly help the poor, ameliorate external shocks, and write down debt burdens.

9.5.3 The importance of greed in driving civil war

Like Collier, we found that in shadow states, some rulers, warlords, soldiers, and traders benefit from war. Those who profit from war have an incentive to start and continue wars. Indeed the agents of failed states have powerful motives to maximize violence in lieu of the state provision of public order (Reno 2000b, p. 55). Since some interests derive economic advantage by humanitarian emergencies, stopping these emergencies requires changing the benefits and costs among rulers, their allies, and the general population.

We find no evidence for Collier's contention that primary commodity exports increase war. However, mineral exports are associated with the increase of conflict.

In war, political élites can use food or foreign exchange as weapons in war and government-sanctioned killings. In the 1980s, Sudan's rulers used control of the state to withhold food and other supplies from ethnic adversaries.

Greed has a major role in driving war and state violence, as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Zaire demonstrate. But grievance based on income inequality and discrepancy is also important; a major contributor to the increase in war and state violence in developing countries.

Notes

1 A Humanitarian Emergency: War, Genocide, and Displacement

- 1 GDP (gross domestic product) is the total output of goods and services in terms of income within a country's boundaries, and GNP (gross national product) is the total output of goods and services in terms of income earned by a country's residents.
- 2 After the massive slaughter of Hutu by Tutsi in Burundi in 1972, Leo Kuper (1981, p. 161) charged that the sovereign state claims the right to commit genocide, a right then not contravened by the UN.
- 3 The sources for this list of countries are Nafziger and Väyrynen (2002), Väyrynen (2000a, Vol. 1), and Nafziger *et al.* (2 Vols., 2000).

This list of thirty-five encompasses the list of twenty-three humanitarian emergencies (excluding the Philippines in 1980) listed in Auvinen and Nafziger's econometric study (1999, p. 274) plus twelve others. This 1999 study uses the same indicators, methods, and data sources as those indicated in sections 1.4–1.5 and the Appendix to Chapter 1. The twelve others become fifteen if one includes Kosovo (which occurred after our econometric work), Bosnia, and Croatia (Väyrynen, 2000a, Vol. 1, p. 61; and Nafziger and Väyrynen 2002), which replace the 'former Yugoslavia' in our database, and Eritrea (independent in 1993), whose war deaths and refugees are classified as a part of Ethiopia's civil war. Väyrynen mentions Chechnya and lists Algeria, Georgia, South Africa, and Turkey as meeting our criteria (Väyrynen 2000a, Vol. 1, p. 61). Emizet (2000a, Vol. 2) and Reno (1998, pp. 113–14 and 2000, Vol. 2) indicate that Väyrynen's statistics understates Congo-Kinshasa's and Sierra Leone's deaths respectively. Congo-Brazzaville's, Guinea-Bissau's, and Indonesia's (Indonesia and East Timor) emergencies took place in years after our data source. We did not include Kashmir because refugees from the wars between India and Pakistan were measured as refugees internal to the two countries, and, thus, were not counted as international refugees (see A1.3, which explains how our econometric study measured humanitarian emergencies).

Our definition of 'humanitarian emergencies' determines the selection of countries. One reviewer suggests that we include HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan African and other developing countries within our definition. Others think that we should list North Korea, with its widespread chronic malnourishment. We agree that these countries have experienced humanitarian disasters, sometimes as serious as countries on our list. However, we omit these countries because extending our definition and list would require analysis beyond the scope of this study.

- 4 The US Mission estimates an increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced people from 12 million in 1983 to 44 million in 1994.
- 5 Singer and Small (1994 and update).

- 6 The usual probit coefficients give us the effect on the odds and are thus difficult to interpret. However, we follow a standard procedure of evaluating the coefficients at the mean of the dependent variable which allows us to assess the change in the probability of humanitarian emergencies resulting from one unit increase in an explanatory variable (here GDP growth). (See Appendix on sources and methods; Appendix Table A1.8 presents the probit analysis.)
- 7 Despite a population of less than one million, six more significant continental microstates are included in the dataset: Belize (population in 1995, 211,000), Djibouti (615,000), Equatorial Guinea (415,000), Guyana (821,000), Suriname (423,000), and Swaziland (841,000). Their common borders with other nations and/or natural conditions make them much more susceptible to humanitarian emergencies than the small island states excluded from the analysis.
- 8 The World Bank (1996e, pp. 188–9) divides countries into four groups on the basis of per capita GNP. In 1994, these categories were low-income countries (\$750 or less), lower-middle-income countries (\$751–2,900), upper-middle-income countries (\$2,900–8,500), and high-income countries (more than \$8,500). While the margin of error is substantial and the boundary between categories rises each year with inflation, few countries shifted categories between 1974 and 1999 (Nafziger 1997, pp. 9–37). When we use the World Bank concept, all transitional countries are also developing countries.
- 9 In interpreting our results, we have considered (1) problems in the measurement and validity of different components of emergencies (discussed in the Appendix; Melkas 1996; and Väyrynen 1996) and (2) missing observations systematically related to low levels of economic development (one of our explanatory variables) or wars (a component of humanitarian emergencies by our definition).
- 10 The measure, HUMEMERG, is explained in detail in the Appendix to Chapter 1.
- 11 We explain this measure, DEATHREF, in more detail in the Appendix. An increasing, albeit less pronounced, trend also characterizes HUMEMERG.
- 12 Note that the logarithmic scale used in calculating the averages eliminates the impact of extremely high values.
- 13 This measure, COHE, is explained in detail in the Appendix.
- 14 DEATHREF in section A.1.3.
- 15 HUMEMERG in section A.1.3.
- 16 By adding a constant 100 to CALAVE and INFAVE we eliminate the possibility of obtaining – what would be counterintuitive – negative composite measures of complex humanitarian emergencies. Dividing the scores of CALAVE and INFAVE by 10 avoids large scores of the composite indicators.
- 17 We also created a fourth variable,

$$(4) \text{ COHE2} = \text{DEATHPOP} * \text{REFUPOP} * ((100 - \text{CALAVE}) / 10) * ((100 + \text{INFAVE}) / 10),$$
 which added to HUMEMERG the information on hunger and disease. However, this variable suffered from lack of observations – all four dimensions had to be present in order for the variable to be registered – and was therefore dropped from the analysis.

2 Poverty, Stagnation, Unemployment, and Inflation

- 1 'Low' and 'middle' refer to the country's per capita income, not the relative incomes of the participants in violent resistance and terrorism. Krueger and Maleckova (2002) show that, within their society, the Hezbollah in Lebanon who engaged in violent attacks, and the settlers in Israel who attacked Palestinians in the West Bank in the early 1980s were relatively prosperous, well educated, and from high-paying occupations.
- 2 This study is more applicable to preventing terrorism by the state or by warlords, the most frequent contributor to deaths from humanitarian emergencies, than terrorism by those trying to undermine the state. Richard Falk (2002, p. 11) indicates that the word terrorism initially 'describe[d] political violence derive[d] from the government excesses that spun out of control during the French Revolution'. He deplores 'the regressive narrowing of the concept of terrorism to apply only to violence by nonstate movements and organizations, thereby exempting state violence against civilians from the prohibition on terrorism. ... Such a usage is ethically unacceptable, politically manipulative and decidedly unhistorical.'
- 3 Relative deprivation is consistent with Collier's opportunity-cost explanation for armed conflict (2000a, p. 94). Collier points out that the most important factor for attracting recruits to a rebellion is the proportion of young men between 15 and 24 years who join. Essentially, the cost of attracting rebel soldiers depends on alternative income-earning opportunities. Indeed for both the state and insurgents, the cost of enlisting soldiers is directly dependent on income and inversely related to the unemployment rate (see discussion of Northern Nigeria below). Even when belligerents use no compulsion, young men tend to be 'drafted' by economic circumstances.
- 4 We found, like Collier and Hoeffler (1998), that the incidence of armed conflicts in Africa exceeded the incidence in other developing regions in the 1990s. If Africa's economic performance had been as high as that of non-African LDCs, Africa's incidence of conflict would have been similar to that of other developing regions (*ibid.*).
Stewart, Huang, and Wang, 2000, p. 71, indicate that Africa had by far the greatest number of deaths (direct and indirect) from conflict, 1960 to 1995, as a proportion of the 1995 population, 1.5 per cent, compared to 0.5 per cent in the Middle East, 0.3 per cent in Asia and 0.1 per cent in Latin America.
- 5 Moreover, since 1990, the sub-Sahara's life expectancy has stagnated, primarily due to the high adult prevalence of HIV/AIDS (World Bank 2000a).
- 6 Felipe (2000, pp. 64–5) indicates that parts of East and Southeast Asia experienced a 'lost decade' centred on the Asian financial crisis, 1997–99, similar to Latin America's lost decade of the 1980s and sub-Saharan Africa's of the 1980s (perhaps extending to the 1990s). The question is whether the most vulnerable Asian economies – Indonesia, Lao PDR, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, and the Philippines – will face the downward spiral of negative growth, political decay, and further negative growth that some of sub-Saharan Africa faced.
- 7 Note that the percentage fall from 1980 to 1992 is not the same as the percentage-*point* fall in Figure 2.1.

- 8 Also Barro (1991) finds a direct association between economic growth and political stability but shies away from positing causation in either direction.
- 9 Angola and Mozambique, together with the other seven Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC now SADC) states – Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – lost substantially from South African military and economic destabilization, including the disruption of transport links. The ECA (Economic Commission for Africa 1989) estimates that the nine SADCC states lost \$60 billion GDP (or one-fourth), 1980–88, from South Africa’s impairment. South Africa was supported in its policies in the 1980s by the ‘constructive engagement’ of the United States and Britain.
- 10 Stewart (1993, pp. 357–80) shows that daily calories as a per cent of requirements fell in five of seven African countries at war during the 1980s: Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan; remained the same in Mozambique; and increased in Uganda.
- 11 This and other reasons for the economic collapse are reported in Nafziger 1997, pp. 586–96.
- 12 Al-Marhubi (1997, p. 317) finds that ‘countries with greater inequality have higher mean inflation, even after controlling for other country-specific inflation correlates’.

3 Ethnicity, Political Economy, and Conflict

- 1 The scope of this section precludes a detailed consideration of the factors contributing to the success of the secession of Bangladesh, almost entirely without indigenous military forces when the conflict broke out on 25 March 1971, and the failure of Biafra, whose army officers possessed the experience and skills which led Odumegwu Ojukwu to boast, with some basis, at the beginning of the war, that Biafra had the best army in black Africa. In short, however, we suggest that the difference in success can be explained by the assistance to Bangladesh by a relatively powerful neighbouring country, India; the substantial excess in foreign military and diplomatic assistance from major powers to Nigeria over Biafra; the logistical problems encountered by Pakistan in transporting supplies 1,600 kilometres across hostile territory; the lack of international assistance to Biafra to ensure its continued production of oil; and the international recognition of the blockade of Biafran ports by Nigeria’s small naval unit.
- 2 Trade in the upper North, which had been substantial with Mediterranean cities since the Middle Ages, dropped markedly during the colonial period.
- 3 In 1955, Punjabi control was solidified by the merging of the several provinces of West Pakistan into a single unit, which was given equal representation with the more populous East. In 1970, popular discontent in both East Pakistan and the non-Punjabi regions of the West forced a return to four West Pakistani provinces, and representation based on population. In 1966, the military government of General J. T. Aguiyi-Ironsi, brought to power following a coup the preceding January, decreed that a unitary state and unified civil service was to replace the four-region federation, previously dominated by the Northern Region. The new military regime, which

resulted from a countercoup of July, reverted to a federal structure on 27 May 1967, composed, however, of 12 states. As indicated below, this new structure was the precipitant for Biafran secession on 30 May 1967.

- 4 Wright (1973) notes these groups' replacement of the earlier, predominantly immigrant, élite of lawyers, professionals, and landlords.
- 5 Such findings suggest the need for comparative studies – in former French, Portuguese, Belgian, and other non-British colonial territories, in countries where independence was achieved through protracted violent struggle, or in countries that somehow avoided colonial dependence. It would also be valuable to speculate on what the potential for political violence would have been in Nigeria, Pakistan, or other countries in the absence of colonialism, that is economic isolation, economic independence, or imperialism without colonialism. See Manning 1974, pp. 17–23.
- 6 The counterpart to a high degree of integration within the world economy is a low degree of interregional economic integration (for example, trade flows and migration), a partial determinant of the extent of political cohesion. The 1,450 kilometre corridor between East and West Pakistan, together with the location of a hostile country in between and the long distance by ship, precluded an integrated national economy. Interzonal trade flows as a percentage of GDP in 1969/70 was only 3.68 per cent, higher than the figure one would get if we calculated the GDP originating in the exporting zone of the goods entering into interzonal trade. Pakistan, 1971, pp. 100–01, and Pakistan 1972, appendices pp. 4–5. For a discussion of the low degree of interregional trade flows in pre-war Nigeria, see Nafziger 1983, pp. 94–98.
- 7 For an elaboration on class formation and contradictions among the élites, see Sklar 1965, pp. 201–13.
- 8 For an elaboration of the criss-cross of ethnicity and social class, see Himmelstrand 1969, pp. 81–103.
- 9 To use Gurr's (1970, pp. 46–52) terminology, the East Pakistanis suffered aspirational deprivation while the Eastern Nigerians underwent decremental deprivation.
- 10 Although Nigerian income and population data are subject to a sizeable margin of error, the figures available indicate that the East ranked between the West and North in GDP per capita, 1963/64. Time-series data indicate that the rate of growth in per capita products between 1962/63 and the coups was fastest in the East (Adedeji 1969, p. 291).
- 11 The contribution of communal competition, economic regionalization, and interregional migration to the disintegration of the Federation, and the relationship between problems of employment and pressures for new states and secession are explored more at length in Nafziger 1973, pp. 525–30.
- 12 The authors are indebted to Timo Kivimäki for important ideas in this section.

4 Inequality, Exclusivity, and Relative Deprivation

- 1 Collier (2000b, p. 97) indicates that 'Inequality, whether measured in terms of income or landownership, has no effect on the risk of conflict according

to the data.' His sources indicate no use of Deininger and Squire's improved dataset on income distribution, which provides the basis for a relationship between income inequality and war.

- 2 In 1990, real GDP per capita was about 90 per cent of its level in 1975 (Esterhuyse 1992, p. 23). See also Nafziger 1997, p. 15, citing annual World Bank data.

5 Stagnation, Inequality, Adjustment, and Élite Interests

- 1 In the empirical analysis, the expected centrality of the IMF was supported by the fact that a dummy variable for the World Bank's structural or sectoral adjustment program had no explanatory power.
- 2 We applied a two-stage least squares model and different lag structure to inspect the relationship between LIMFGNP (the log of the use of IMF credit as a percentage of GNP) and humanitarian emergencies. The two-stage least squares results, with LIMFGNP as the other endogenous variable, do not dramatically differ from those of the OLS (ordinary least squares) model.
- 3 Nafziger 1993 discusses Africa's slow growth and external disequilibrium, and subsequent efforts to adjust in more detail.
- 4 *IMF Survey*, 23 February 1987, p. 50.

6 Authoritarianism, Democratization and Military Centrality

- 1 This thesis was introduced by Buss (1961, p. 58) and was developed in Gurr's relative deprivation model (1970) where 'utilitarian and normative justifications', the views on the utility and appropriateness of collective violence, affected the likelihood of political violence. Utilitarian and normative justifications were in secondary position as compared to relative deprivation which was a necessary condition for political violence. See also Markus and Nesvold (1972), London and Robinson (1989); Boswell and Dixon (1990); and especially Muller and Weede (1990). A squared term has been used to capture the curvilinearity of the relationship (see e.g. Boswell and Dixon 1990).
- 2 Whereas in resource mobilization/rational actor theories the inverted U-relationship relates to the opportunities for resource mobilization and to the calculation of costs and benefits by rational individuals, frustration-aggression/relative deprivation theories view it as being analogous to the concept of punishment in psychological theories (see Markus and Nesvold 1972, p. 235).
- 3 On difficulties related to Cutright's index see Bollen 1980.
- 4 The sample consisted of 83 developing and developed countries in 1958–60; African countries are not included in the analyses.
- 5 'Their [the dictatorships'] legitimacy often rests largely on their purported ability to provide economic efficiency and social order. Depression and debt disaster severely undermine those capabilities. ... More significant ... may be the advantages of democracies. One virtue is that they have other sources of democracy. They can claim to be elected, representative, popular,

and fair. They can convey a more equitable image of the distribution of sacrifices. In the absence of “economic goods”, democracies can distribute “political goods”, such as freedom of speech and assembly, which also provide safety valves for discontent,’ (Drake 1989, pp. 53–4)

- 6 Raknerud and Hegre (1997, pp. 385–404) show that while democracies almost never engage in war against each other, in the Third World democracies are as prone as authoritarian countries to experience intrastate war.
- 7 Opinion polls of primarily urban, male, professional blacks in 1987 indicate that attitudes towards violence had become more radical despite the fact that very few people believed violence would bring about a solution to the conflict (Hirschman 1987, pp. 341–369).
- 8 According to Gurr (1994), ethno-political conflicts tend to begin with limited protests and clashes that escalate into sustained violence.
- 9 Hunter (1994) points out, though, that, even in the 1990s, civil–military tensions persisted in Latin America. In Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the military has intervened in politics as a reaction to domestic and international challenges to their professional standing and corporate integrity.
- 10 Victor T. Levine (2000) examines US President Thomas Jefferson’s famous dictum in 1787 that the ‘tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants’. Levine demonstrates (ibid., pp. 266–76) that ‘democracies born in violence are more prone to periodic violent challenges than those that are born peacefully ... [that] periodic violent challenges in democracies make them less, rather than more, stable (i.e. violence begets violence) ... [and that] when democracies break down, they do so usually when citizens become accustomed to resorting to violence to get what they want, that is, when a “culture of violence” is created.’

7 The Failure of Agriculture: Food Entitlements, Élite Violence, and Famines

- 1 Section 8.2 elaborates on how the conflict over land in Rwanda fuelled the increase in tensions contributing to war and genocide in 1994.
- 2 Northern India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are examples of exceptions within Asia.
- 3 Indeed Kofi Annan (1996, p. 178) contends that ‘In Somalia, ... it became patently clear that the continuing high death rate was being caused not so much by the absence of food and the presence of natural disaster as by a group of ambitious armed men who prevented food from reaching the needy.’
- 4 In this vein, Keen’s book (1994) about Sudan in the 1980s is entitled *The Benefits of Famine*.

8 The Conflict over Land and Natural Resources

- 1 Ugandan and Rwandan forces and their Congolese allies have also collected taxes and customs duties in Congo, 1999–2001 (ibid., p. 142).

- 2 Le Billon (2000, p. 24) lists the following examples of key drugs involved in wars during the 1990s: Afghanistan (opium/heroin), Myanmar (heroin), Colombia (heroin, cocaine), Lebanon (hashish, heroin), Peru (cocaine), Philippines (marijuana), Senegal (marijuana), and Turkey/Kurdistan (heroin).
- 3 Uvin (1998, pp. 131–252) uses structural violence to explain the origins of Rwanda's 1994 war and genocide. Structural violence, which includes factors built into society's structures, contributes to the deprivation of basic material needs, human rights, and higher needs, a form of violence. While not contributing to killing or refugee flight, as direct violence does, structural violence harms people emotionally and intellectually and denies them dignity and integrity, and may increase the potential for acute violence and conflict (*ibid.*; and Galtung 1969).
Structural violence, which Uvin (1998, pp. 132–3; and 2000, Vol. 2, pp. 165–6) views as psychological or spiritual harm, may correspond to economic, social, or political deprivation. The structural violence to blacks in twentieth-century America and apartheid South Africa meant high rates of poverty, unemployment, and workplace discrimination; few business opportunities; and low educational attainment. The structural violence in Rwanda manifested itself in war, genocide, famine, refugee displacement, distress sales, asset destruction, thefts, poisoning, physical assaults, inequality, and poverty.
- 4 Renner (2002, p. 151) notes the fact that countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Colombia, which 'account for 10 per cent of the world's intact forests' and 'are also home to some of the world's biodiversity hotspots', are countries where 'resource conflicts are raging'.

9 Preventing Humanitarian Emergencies: Policy Implications

- 1 The overall cost to El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Nigeria and others at war does not contradict the fact noted in this book that a *portion* of a population usually benefits from war.
- 2 Gross domestic product is output before subtracting either capital consumption or destruction. Net domestic product figures, by convention, include capital consumption but *not* capital destruction.
- 3 A major contribution to non-adjustment is the distortion to both internationally and domestically traded goods from an overvalued domestic currency. Nafziger 1988, pp. 150–60 discusses the political economy of African governments' resistance to exchange rate adjustment.
- 4 The US view of policy for LDCs is the most dominant among high-income OECD countries. The US view (Summers 1998, p. 14) corresponds closely to IMF policy, as the US alone has veto power over IMF loans. Indeed Thacker's econometrics (1999, pp. 38–75) provides 'strong evidence that the political interests of the US drive much of the behavior' of the IMF. Barro and Lee 2002 confirm these econometrics, showing that IMF lending to a country is significantly related to the politico-economic proximity of that country to those of the major shareholders of the Fund – France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and (especially) the United States. Proximity is mea-

sured by bilateral trading volumes with and similarity of voting patterns in the UN General Assembly to these shareholders. Moreover, 'the size of IMF lending is insignificantly related to economic growth in the contemporaneous five-year period but has a significantly negative effect in the subsequent five years' (ibid., p. i). See also Nafziger 1995, pp. 153–74 on the OECD model for LDCs and the US's role in that model.

- 5 FAO (1991, p. 89) contends: 'An important aspect of [IMF] loans and their associated policies is that they do not present a growth package as such, ... [but] their primary role is to serve as a balance-of-payments support.'
- 6 The third side of the triangle is the World Bank (Nafziger 1993, p. 211).
- 7 Ehrenpreis (1997) indicates that the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency or 'Sida is planning to integrate [programme-aid] support more closely with the over-all country strategy planning of development cooperation.' Sida is to define criteria related to the policy reform process without, however, setting the same conditions as the World Bank or IMF.
- 8 International trade is liberal if average tariff rates are below 40 per cent, average quota and licensing coverage of imports are less than 40 per cent, the black market exchange-rate premium is less than 20 per cent, and there are no extreme controls (taxes, quotas, or state monopolies) on exports (ibid., 339). Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) criticize the Sachs–Warner approach.
- 9 Lundberg and Squire (1999), who use Sachs and Warner's measure for openness, find that openness is negatively correlated with income growth among the poorest 40 per cent of the population of LDCs but positively correlated with growth among higher-income groups.
- 10 An open process may mean less draconian measures more fully supported by élites and publics, a tradeoff probably beneficial for both the IFIs and the host country. See Dessus, Lafay, and Morrisson 1998, pp. 91–119.
- 11 Nafziger 1993, pp. 96–177 discusses the short time horizon of the IMF, and, to a lesser extent, the World Bank.
- 12 Since 2000, the US has provided trade access to African countries that open their markets to US trade and investment. While opening markets, especially for trade, should be part of a long-term policy goal, immediate trade and capital liberalization is likely to trigger further external economic crises, which increase the risk of political instability.
- 13 France and the EU also need to help the fourteen francophone African countries that are members of the zone of the *franc de la Communauté financière de l'Afrique* (CFA franc zone) to adapt to the introduction of the European Monetary Union, with its euro currency.
- 14 Riddell (1996, p. 40) defines aid dependency as the process by which aid makes no significant contribution to self-sustained development. For our purposes, we would add that the aid makes no contribution to reducing vulnerability to war or humanitarian emergencies.
- 15 FitzGerald (2002) shows the relationship between external shocks and humanitarian emergencies, but is more sceptical than we are about the intermediate variable, per capita income stagnation or decline.
- 16 Ndikumana and Boyce (1998, pp. 195–217) argue that successor governments, such as those in Congo, should be able to repudiate their liabilities

- for prior predatory regimes' debts (for example, the spiriting by Mobutu of official borrowed capital for his personal accounts overseas) on the basis of creditor complicity in odious debt.
- 17 For a discussion of the various initiatives for debt reduction, conversion, or rescheduling, see Nafziger 1993, pp. 178–218 and OECD 1997, pp. 87–91.
 - 18 Finally, World Bank official Isac Diwan admits that only 40 cents of every dollar of cancelled debt constitutes additional resources for debtors (World Bank, *Development News*, 15 February 2001). Nafziger (1993, pp. 190–92) discusses the complicated reasoning behind statements similar to Diwan's.
 - 19 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (1998, p. 6) has 'suggested that creditors consider clearing the entire debt stock of the poorest African countries while expanding the Highly Indebted Poor Countries program of the World Bank'.
 - 20 See FitzGerald (2002) on non-resident nationals and cross-border investments.
 - 21 For a discussion of the costs and benefits of foreign direct investment, see Nafziger 1997, pp. 451–2.
 - 22 Foreign armies or predatory gangs have also used control of the export of Congo-Kinshasa's columbite-tantalite, used in cell phones, to accumulate foreign exchange to support their military activities.
 - 23 Posner (1998, pp. 1–11) argues that poor countries that lack the resources for a costly, ambitious creation of a first-class judiciary or extensive system of civil liberties can support economic reform with more modest expenditures on substantive and procedurally efficient rules of contract and property.
 - 24 See Ndikumana 1998, pp. 29–47.
 - 25 Nafziger 1997, p. 391 provides some cautionary notes, including a warning against a tax levied only on imports, which would stimulate domestic investment in luxury goods.
 - 26 'Maintaining Class: the Role of Education', chapter 10 in Nafziger (1988, pp. 127–39) discusses the political barriers to universal quality education.
 - 27 In some regions of these countries, research and development of high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice in the Green Revolution has had a negative effect on income distribution, farm labour displacement, rural unemployment, and environmental degradation. However, the overall impact, including the effect on incomes and food supplies, has generally been positive (Nafziger 1997, pp. 227–9, 353–4).
- Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch, and Rosegrant 1997, p. 30 warn against misapplying environmental concerns about chemicals and fertilizers in rich countries to developing countries. These countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, need expansion in their use of fertilizers.
- 28 Reno (2000b, pp. 45–8) discusses the concept of shadow state in more detail.

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