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Editorials and the Power of Media

Elisabeth Le



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Editorials and the Power of Media

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by Elisabeth Le

Editorials and the Power of Media

Interweaving of socio-cultural identities

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Foreword

This book completes and concludes almost a decade of work on editorials. Editorials depict how media perceive and react to the world around them. Each editorial defines at a given time how media construct their socio-cultural environment and where they position themselves in it. In this sense, they are snapshots of media socio-cultural identities.

Editorials present many advantages for discourse analysts interested in media and politics: they are short, easily obtainable, and particularly interesting for their persuasive strategies. These advantages, however, do not make their study less labour-intensive or less time-consuming. To be properly understood they need on the one hand, to be submitted to a linguistic, bottom-up analysis that some would (rightly) qualify as "microscopic" and, on the other hand, the complex socio-political context in which they appear requires the analyst to delve into numerous archives of all sorts for the "macroscopic", top-down analysis. Nevertheless, all of this work is certainly justified by the results it produces.

Editorials and the Power of Media stems from the conclusion of *The Spiral of Anti-Other Rhetoric* (Le 2006) in which the question of a daily newspaper's status on the international stage was raised. Media have been the object of numerous studies for the manner in which they present news, but the question of their identity(ies) has not attracted as much attention, although it is crucial for the understanding of media's actions and interactions on the political stage. *Editorials and Media Power*'s conclusion combines the results of the presented original research with the results of my previous work on Europe (2002) and Russia (2006) in particular. From the linguistic point of view, the methodological unity in my work on editorials results from the use of the coherence analysis model presented in Appendix 3 (reproduced from Le, 2006: 197-209). The results of the coherence analysis serve as a structure to which other types of analysis, depending on the purpose of the specific study, are then added and combined. Differences of corpora, methodologies (completing the coherence analysis) and purposes between the different studies allow them to complement each other. However, since almost all of my work has been done on the same newspaper's editorials from 1999 to 2001, there are necessarily some similarities. This explains why section 1.2 is slightly adapted from Le (2006: 42-44), section 6.2 is slightly adapted from Le (2006: 107-111), and section 6.4 is slightly adapted from Le (2006: 111-112). Furthermore, partial linguistic results of this study (most of chapter 2) have already been published,

partly in *RAEL* (2007) and partly in the *Journal of Pragmatics* (2009). From the political communication perspective, both *The Spiral of Anti-Other Rhetoric* and *Editorials and the Power of Media* use Entman's Cascading Activation model (2004) that has been adapted to correspond to each study's specificities.

The main purpose of this book is dual: to contribute to the study of media roles in politics with a methodological "discursive communication identity framework", and to show how media can be political actors on their own. It has been known for a long time that media and politics are intertwined. However, from the media perspective, it was mostly only seen as a "side-effect" of their news-provider role through agenda-setting and news framing. What I am trying to demonstrate here is that media can play a much more autonomous role in politics thanks to a very adroit interweaving of their socio-cultural identities in their editorials. Thus, this book is intended for all of those who are interested in the role of media in politics, be they specialists of media, communication, political science, or other disciplines.

To achieve this main purpose, this book engages in a study of editorials' genre from a linguistic perspective. Linguists, in particular discourse analysts, are therefore another part of the intended audience.

Finally, a study of media political roles cannot be conducted in the abstract. It needs to be carefully grounded on empirical data within their specific socio-cultural context. Two approaches are possible. A broad one would take examples from various media in different socio-cultural contexts in a large time frame. While this would allow examination of the generality of the phenomenon, practical reasons would mean that the analysis could not go very far beyond the surface. For an in-depth analysis, a specific case (i.e. one media / a limited time period) would have to be chosen. This is the approach that was selected for this study as a first attempt to look at the phenomenon with the idea that once the point is firmly made in one case, it could be reinforced (or not) by other in-depth studies with the same methodological framework, or further studies could take a broader perspective. This case study bears on *Le Monde*'s editorials from 1999 to 2001. As such, this book also addresses all those interested in the French political sphere during this period, as well as all those interested in the French daily, *Le Monde*.

Thus, in the pursuit of a very general goal, i.e. the study of media as political actors, this book looks in depth at specific political debates in France from 1999 to 2001. The problem that thereby arises is the difficulty of addressing a very diverse audience. Some might be mostly interested in the linguistic analyses and find the political side a necessary evil, but still an evil to be endured; others might be deterred by the dry technicality and minutiae of the linguistic analyses; and a number might find the detailed description of the French political sphere from

1999 to 2001 simply "boring". Furthermore, one part of the book is quantitative while the other is qualitative; proponents of one type of analysis may not find the other type especially "readable". Unfortunately, all sides of the analysis are necessary to arrive at the results. In an attempt to reconcile these differences, this book is structured so as to allow for several reading paths.

- Chapter 1 situates the research question, presents the specifics of the case study, and exposes the methodological "discursive communication identity framework". Readers interested in the details of the framework will find them in Appendix 5 (methodology tables).
- Chapter 2 presents the quantitative linguistic analysis. Its conclusion offers a provisional definition of editorials' genre that focuses on the "action" part of *Le Monde*'s "inter-actions". Readers particularly interested in the linguistic methodology should read Appendix 2 (complex speech acts), Appendix 3 (coherence model), and Appendix 4 (style analysis).
- Chapters 3, 4 and 5 describe the socio-political context in which the editorials operate thanks to a communicative qualitative analysis, and thereby focus on the "inter-" part of *Le Monde*'s "inter-actions". Readers not particularly interested in the detailed description of the French political sphere at the time can after each introduction skip the demonstration and go directly to the conclusion where they will find enough information to follow the book's general argumentation.
- Chapter 6 concludes the genre analysis by integrating the quantitative linguistic and qualitative communicative analyses. The definition of editorials' genre that is reached leads to a discussion on the interweaving of socio-cultural identities. This interweaving of socio-cultural identities contributes to the editorials' political nature and raises the question of media power in democracy. Finally, the benefits and limitations of the "discursive communication identity framework" are assessed.

Furthermore, while all efforts have been made to provide enough contextual information in each chapter, readers not familiar with the French political system will find more information in Appendix 6.

No book is the result of one individual's work only. I have benefited from the help of many and I thank them all very warmly, in particular:

- the graduate students who worked as my research assistants: Jean-Jacques Defert, Christina Keppie, and Ksenia Svechnikova;
- political news journalists without whose work there would not be much democracy;

– those who with their smile and positive attitude contribute to making life more enjoyable;
– family and friends who keep reminding me of "real life";
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CHAPTER 1

A framework for the study of media socio-cultural identities through their editorials

Editorials are fascinating objects of study. They offer reasoned views of the world in slices of no more than 500 words each. Some of them are also superb pieces of writing. Like "*romans à thèse*",[1] though in only four to five paragraphs, they vividly circumscribe a scene in which real-life characters convincingly deliver their own lines but with the resulting effect that leaves readers with the newspaper's own position. More than fascinating objects and beyond the literary pleasure they may provide, editorials are not without influence in politics and thus one naturally wonders what they really represent and how they function. This book investigates political roles played by media through their editorials. To do so, it looks at media socio-cultural identities through the analysis of editorials' genre from the mostly dual perspective of (linguistic) discourse analysis and political communication.

The first part of this chapter (1.1) exposes the relevance of studying editorials, and the second part (1.2) presents a methodological discursive communication identity framework. The chapter concludes with the definition of the corpus for this specific study (1.3).

1.1 Why study editorials?

Newspapers' editorials look at different domains of life from a political perspective. To contextualize their investigation, it appears useful to look first at studies on media and politics (1.1.1), secondly at the newspaper(s) in which they appear (1.1.2), and thirdly at the political context at their time of publication (1.1.3). This allows for the research question to be defined (1.1.4).

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1. i.e. novels expounding a social thesis.

1.1.1 Media and politics

The connection between media and politics has been the object of numerous studies for several decades (e.g. Bennett, 1996; Curran, 2002; Gans, 2003; Gunther & Mughan, 2000; Hackett & Zhao, 1998; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; McLeod *et al.* 2002; McNair, 2006; Schudson, 1995; Servaes & Lie, 1997; Siebert *et al.* 1956). It has been recognized that media, as news providers, have an impact on the political stage (e.g. Walgrave, 2008). In the numerous studies on the why, how, what, and extent of that impact, the question of media being more than "instances of transmission" of what is happening and of what others say and think has not attracted much scholarly attention. In other words, different facets of media identities have been tackled here and there, but the question has not been approached in a comprehensive manner.

Most of media research still tends to be conducted in the framework of a revised positivist (sender-receiver) transmission model (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) that focuses on issues such as: the content of the message to be transmitted, its coding, the noise occurring on the transmission channel and the resulting distortion of the sent message, the content of the received message and its effects on the sender (Mucchielli & Guivarch, 1998: 19). There is thus a large amount of literature on media organizational structure, content, audiences and effects as reflected in Potter's *Arguing for a General Framework for Mass Media Scholarship* (2009) that "attempts to provide an integrated explanation of the mass media as an industry, the messages that are produced and marketed, the audiences for those messages, and the effects of those messages on individuals and larger social structures" (2009: xxi). In these different aspects of media, on the basis of which he wants to build a general framework, Potter does not mention the question of media's identities *per se* while they would be both the source and the consequence of media's autonomy. Neither does McQuail in his *Mass Communication Theory* (2000, 2005) although he recognizes in the fourth edition of this fundamental and comprehensive image of media research that "the media constitute a separate 'social institution' within society, with its own rules and practices" (2000: 5). In the fifth edition (2005), however, he states that the theme of identity recurs throughout the book. Indeed, research on media organizational structure and media content, among others, does tackle aspects of the question of identity, each from a very specific angle, for example studies on agenda setting, priming and framing (e.g. Reese *et al.* 2003; Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2007). "Agenda setting refers to the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues (e.g. based on the relative placement or amount of coverage) and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audience. […] Priming occurs when news content suggests to news audience that they ought to use specific issues to make political evaluations. […] [Framing] is based on the assumption that how an issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence on how it is understood by

audiences" (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007: 11). Unfortunately, there has been very little research on the origins of these phenomena (Gandy, 2001: 357).

Studies on framing, agenda setting, and priming focus on news reports (including or not commentaries) and may include editorials. Indeed, editorials certainly participate in the actualization of framing, agenda setting (McCombs, 1997), and priming. Actually, they might even be one of their most obvious, most overt manifestations and, in this quality, they would warrant being studied by themselves.

Unsigned editorials, as official expressions of a media position on an issue they choose to highlight over all others in a given context, appear one of the most relevant means of investigating media socio-cultural identities. Approaching the question of media socio-cultural identities through the study of editorials would give insights into the sources of framing, agenda setting and priming.

In this book, the media whose socio-cultural identities are investigated with the study of its editorials is the French elite daily, *Le Monde*.

1.1.2 Le Monde

Le Monde was founded in 1944 by Hubert Beuve-Méry on the instigation of General de Gaulle to replace *Le Temps* that had been the reference daily under the Third Republic. *Le Temps* had voluntarily suspended its publication on 29 November 1942, but two of its directors had been supporters of Marshall Pétain, and thus the newspaper was not allowed to re-appear after the Liberation. The goal pursued by *Le Monde* was to provide France with a reliable and internationally respected newspaper. Thanks to Beuve-Méry, *Le Monde* succeeded in keeping its distance from the government and in this differed from the officious *Le Temps*. The main ideas behind *Le Monde*'s positions could be summarized as a type of humanism that linked defence of freedom and democratic values with social justice and a suspicious attitude towards money because of its corrupting effects. Thus, *Le Monde* appeared fundamentally anticommunist but also in a way anti-American, and it presented itself as a defender of the oppressed. It took a position in favour of decolonization (from 1957 to 1961, *Le Monde* was seized twenty times because of its publication of reports on torture practised by the French army in Algeria). Audience studies starting in 1955 showed that *Le Monde* was read by right-wing and left-wing people, by business leaders and by union members. In 1962, when General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic since 1958, called for a referendum to amend the 1958 Constitution and have the President elected on the principle of direct universal suffrage, Beuve-Méry under the pen name of "Sirius" took anti-Gaullist positions, and *Le Monde* began to lean towards the leftist opposition. By the end of the 1960s when Beuve-Méry retired, *Le Monde* had become the most influential French daily. In the 1980s, because of its leftist orientation, it started losing some of its audience, and was

hit by successive crises that brought it close to bankruptcy in 1982, 1985, 1991 and 1994. However, *Le Monde* remained a reference newspaper. In 1994, because of his tense relationship with the daily's director, President Mitterrand decided to reduce the number of subscriptions by the Élysée (i.e. the Presidential Palace) from 110 to twenty. In spite of this, the President was reportedly still reading *Le Monde*, and his aides went outside the Presidential Palace to buy it (La Balme, 2000: 269).

Le Monde as it appeared from 1999 to 2001 was the product of a number of structural modifications (Le Monde, 2002). In 1985, *Le Monde* established a "Society of readers" (*Société des lecteurs*) composed of readers-shareholders in order to augment the newspaper's capital. The president of the *Société des lecteurs* is *de jure* a member of the Supervisory Committee (*Comité de surveillance*), which has the last say about any investment by the newspaper, and has the right to propose a candidate for the position of Chairman of the newspaper's Executive Board. In 2000, the "Society of the editorial staff" (*Société des rédacteurs*) lost its right to propose candidates for this position but kept its right to veto the nomination. (Poulet, 2003: 119)

In 1968, *Le Monde* was 40% owned by its editorial staff, 5% by its senior executives, 4% by its employees, 40% by its founders and associates, and 11% by its managers. Facing acute financial difficulties, the newspaper augmented its capital, and on September 1st, 2001, it became 52.61% owned by internal shareholders and 47.39% by external shareholders. Among the internal shareholders, the editorial staff represented 30.092% of all shareholders, and was by far the single most important group of owners; it held 33.3% of the voting rights.

In 1999–2000,[2] 33% of *Le Monde*'s audience was less than 35 years old and 66% had a higher education (vs. 26% for the entire population); 39% lived in a household whose head was a senior executive (vs. 16% for the entire population). *Le Monde* was the national daily that was the most read by teachers and students. In 2000 it printed an average of 402,444 issues per day; 50% of them were sold in Paris and surrounding-areas, 38.9% in the provinces, and 11.1% outside France (Le Monde, 2002: 29). Since 1997, *Le Monde* has also been available on the internet (www.lemonde.fr).

In the 2002 brochure, *Le style du Monde*, *Le Monde* published its code of ethics (see Appendix 7). In its principles (pp. 6–7), it claims its independence and its pluralism; it affirms not to impose any editorial line on its journalists and to respect the diversity of their opinions provided they do not go against the newspaper's values. Regarding its values, it champions those contained in the French Republic's motto, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*", and it particularly emphasizes its contributions towards justice and solidarity and against racism and exclusion. It is in favour of openness and international cooperation, and against nationalism and isolationism.

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2. 1999–2000 EuroPQN. Sofres poll on a population sample representative of all people living in France (N = 21,472). *Le style du Monde*, 2002: 29.

Le Monde considers itself to be an international newspaper, and it states that most events cannot be understood solely in a national framework: they have to be placed in their international setting. *Le Monde* informs but does not claim to be neutral: it takes positions in its editorials and also in the analyses and comments of its journalists. The articles must present a solid argumentation and avoid a polemical and sarcastic attitude as well as personal attacks. Furthermore, they must not be written in a peremptory tone and they must avoid "giving lessons". A mediator, nominated by the newspaper's director ("*directeur de la publication*"), is responsible for the respect of the journalistic rules as exposed in *Le style du Monde*. They constitute a reading contract with *Le Monde*'s audience.

Because of *Le Monde*'s prominent place in French media and intellectual life, the scandal that the journalists Pierre Péan and Philippe Cohen provoked in February 2003 with the publication of *La face cachée du Monde – Du contre-pouvoir aux abus de pouvoir* was particularly virulent. Indeed, *Le Monde* as the French reference daily, i.e. the newspaper that must be read even if one does not like it, was publicly attacked (albeit not for the first time in its history): Péan and Cohen accused *Le Monde* of having gone from a position of counter-power to a position where it abused its power.[3] These accusations were particularly directed against the Chair of the newspaper's Executive Board, Jean-Marie Colombani, the Head of editorial staff, Edwy Plenel,[4] and the President of the "Readers' Society" and member of the newspaper's Supervisory Committee, Alain Minc. Whatever elements of truth Péan's and Cohen's work contains, it is also a good example of "bad journalism" with factual errors, lack of references, very unclear use of quotations, no separation between comments and facts. It appears that the interest of Péan's and Cohen's book lies not so much in its detailed content but rather in the fact that it exposed a (not unknown) problem within *Le Monde*. *Le Monde* does not leave one indifferent. Patrick Éveno, who wrote *Le Monde*'s history, *Le journal* Le Monde – *Une histoire d'indépendance* (2001),[5] takes sides with Jean-Marie Colombani, Edwy Plenel and Alain Minc. A less polemical criticism than Péan's and Cohen's but a more balanced evaluation of the newspaper than Éveno's is presented by journalist Bernard Poulet in *Le pouvoir du Monde – Quand un journal veut changer la France* (2003), that

3. The publication of this book had the effects of a bomb explosion in the media milieu. Mediation put an end to the judicial side of the affair in June 2004. "*Une médiation judiciaire met un terme à l'affaire de 'La face cachée du Monde'*"; *Le Monde*, 8 June 2004.

4. Edwy Plenel resigned from this position on 29 November 2004. "*Edwy Plenel quitte ses fonctions de directeur de la rédaction du 'Monde'*", *Le Monde*, 1 December 2004.

5. See also by the same author: Le Monde, *Histoire d'une entreprise de presse, 1944–1995*. Le Monde Éditions, 1996. Unless otherwise indicated, information on the history of *Le Monde* is taken from Éveno's 2001 book.

basically reexamines each of Péan's and Cohen's accusations in a more convincing manner. In his conclusion, Poulet remarks that *Le Monde*, because of its pre-eminence, has come to exhibit a number of major defects traditionally present in French media, one of them being militancy. He adds that since the beginning of the 1980's, militancy has been appearing under a new guise, that of a school master who uses human rights as a rule and morality as a sanction, and prefers to comment rather than report balanced facts:

> *Depuis le début des années 1980, le journalisme militant a fait son retour sous de nouveaux habits: il ne défend plus un parti, une idéologie partisane, il a abandonné sa violence explicite. Il est devenu maître d'école, maniant la règle des droits de l'homme et le bonnet d'âne de la morale. Mais il préfère toujours le commentaire et l'engagement à la relation équilibrée des faits.* (2003: 232)

Le Monde's particular financial and organizational structure, its prominent place on the French political stage, and its very contested role and positions make the study of its identity(identities) particularly relevant. These identities will be examined for the 1999–2001 period.

1.1.3 The political context in 1999–2001

The turn of the millennium was marked by a number of marvellous and horrific predictions that such a rare and "mythical" event entails, and also the very real Y2K computer problem that did not turn into the anticipated worldwide disaster but "only" into an extremely costly error to correct. The 1999–2001 period represented not just a symbolic turn in world history; it also happened to be the time just before the event that was to have far-reaching repercussions on national and international policies around the world, i.e. the plane attacks against the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001.

At the end of the 20th century, the world had undergone considerable transformation due to the advancement of science and technology, among whose effects was the dramatic change in the concept of international relations, therefore affecting not only international politics but also national policies. From sole actors, States became only one type of international actors. The globalization movement, i.e. the elaboration by non-state entities of strategies reaching beyond national borders, implied that States would be able to discern which of these non-state, non-intergovernmental, transnational entities to recognize or at least to take into account, and to establish with them a fair and fruitful type of interaction. By the same token, globalization entailed additional exchanges across national borders and nurtured a growing need for individuals and groups alike to define, anchor, and defend their identities. In this rapidly evolving world, some considered the capacity for adaptation as synonymous with the notion of survival, while others tried to keep long-held tenets.

With globalization, States lost part of their sovereign power to the benefit of a number of organizations (e.g. on the influence of media in international relations: Le, 2006), but they still retained much of their official supremacy on the world stage. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the world with only one super-power, the United States. From then on, the United States tended to dominate and rule thanks, among others things, to its control of NATO (e.g. intervention in Kosovo). Europe, i.e. the European Union, was too divided and preoccupied with its own problems to affirm its identity and emerge as a credible counterpart to the USA. Russia, the former super-power, under the erratic guidance of President Yeltsin, was undergoing a severe economic, social and political crisis. India and China, despite their tremendous economic development in the last quarter of the century, were not in a position of world leadership.

The 1999–2001 period witnessed a number of changes affecting these actors. In August 1999, President Yeltsin appointed an hitherto unknown politician, Vladimir Putin, as Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. Putin became Acting President in January 2000 after Yeltsin's resignation. He was then elected President in March 2000. After a disputed and contested election, the republican George W. Bush succeeded the democrat Bill Clinton as President of the United States of America in January 2001. The European Union agreed on a reform of its institutions at the Nice Summit in December 2000 to allow for the accession of ten new member States, seven of them former republics or satellites of the Soviet Union. In this world context, France was plagued by a very thorny political cohabitation between the two heads of its Executive, President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin. The difficulties caused by this cohabitation had a direct impact on the conduct of French internal affairs, and an indirect one on European and, also, world affairs.

1.1.4 Research question

At a turning point in world history and in a globalizing world where transnational actors exert an increased influence alongside States, the political role of news media and their identities deserve closer scrutiny. The French elite daily, *Le Monde*, provides an interesting example of such media because of its specific financial and organizational structure, its prominent place on the French political stage, and its contested role and positions. *Le Monde*'s unsigned editorials appear one of the most relevant means to study its identities as the newspaper's official position on issues it chose to highlight over all others at the time of publication. For these reasons, this study will investigate *Le Monde*'s identities through the examination of its editorials from August 1999 to July 2001.

Identities keep evolving. This study does not purport to investigate '*Le Monde*'s identities', but rather '*Le Monde*'s identities as they appeared from 1999 to 2001'. Despite the ever changing character of identities, some of their characteristics

tend to endure and altogether, they would represent what might be termed "core identities". To check how this would apply to *Le Monde*, a diachronic study would be needed. Because of the very labour-intensive type of analysis conducted here, it has been kept to a synchronic level. While two years might seem to last a long time, it is still only quite a short period in the life of the newspaper.

1.2 A discursive communication identity framework

The investigation of media socio-cultural identities calls for the combination of three perspectives: identity approaches (1.2.1), communication approaches since media's *raison d'être* is to communicate (1.2.2), and discursive approaches because media communicate through discourse (1.2.3). The synthesis of these approaches results in the methodological framework for this study (1.2.4).

1.2.1 Approaches to identity

The question of identity has always been important but, with the development of the globalization phenomenon and its socio-political consequences, it has become more acutely relevant, and numerous studies in different fields have investigated the issue from different disciplinary perspectives. Among the many existing approaches to identity, two are singled out below because of their particularly encompassing background: the "Integrative approach to identity" in social psychology and the "Communication theory of identity" in communication studies. Indeed, the phenomenon of identity is multi-faceted and none of its perspectives can be said to surpass the others. Each of the selected approaches is based in a specific different discipline, but each of them takes into account numerous theories from other disciplines.

Simon's integrative approach to identity (2004) takes as its theoretical platform sociologically oriented perspectives (i.e. Meads' symbolic interactionism, role theory, Stryker's identity theory) as well as European and North American psychologically oriented perspectives (Allport's self-concept, Tajfel & Turner's social identity theory of intergroup relations, Turner's self-categorization theory), to which are added insights from philosophy, anthropology, cultural studies, political science, and psychology, among others. The synthesis of these different approaches allows for a theory that considers identity from a micro-level (i.e. the individual person), the macro-level (i.e. in reference to a social group), and the meso-level that links the micro- and macro-levels. At the micro-level, individual identity "is constructed whenever self-interpretation is based on a more comprehensive set or configuration of different, non-redundant self-aspects (e.g. 'I am female, a Christian, a lawyer, musical, have brown hair, like French cuisine and so forth')" (2004: 50). At the macro-level,

collective identity "results from self-interpretation that centres on a socially shared (collective or social categorical) self-aspect. It is therefore basically one-dimensional (e.g. 'First and foremost, I am a Christian')" (2004: 49). Finally, at the meso-level, individuals (micro-level) come into contact with social structures (macro-level); this is translated into micro-level experiences that eventually have an influence on social structures (macro-level) and individuals (micro-level). In other words, "identity results from interaction in the social world and in turn guides interaction in the social world" (2004: 2). In this theory,

> Identity is relational because it serves to define and reflects one's own position or part in the interactive relationship relative to that of one's interaction partner, and it is situation-specific to the extent to which one's part in a given relationship, or the 'to-be-represented' relationship as a whole, varies with the interaction situation. (2004: 45)

The relationship between individual and collective identities is dialectical; they make each other possible and serve as each other's background in defining where one does or does not belong, in providing people with respect, with a place from which to look at the social world and interpret it meaningfully, and in serving "as a marker that allows people to recognize themselves as the origin of their thoughts and actions and to experience themselves as influential social agents" (2004: 68).

Situated in the field of communication studies, Hecht, Jackson and Ribeau's Communication Theory of Identity (2003) also rests on sociological, psychological and anthropological approaches, but it differs from Simon's integrative approach by its focus on cultural identity. The Communication Theory of Identity is grounded on nine assumptions (2003: 235):

1. Identities have individual, enacted, relational, and communal properties;
2. identities are both enduring and changing;
3. identities are negotiable;
4. identities are affective, cognitive, behavioral, and spiritual;
5. identities have both content and relationship levels of interpretation;
6. identities involve both subjective and ascribed meanings;
7. identities are codes that are expressed in conversations and define membership in communities;
8. identities have semantic properties that are expressed in core symbols, meanings and labels;
9. identities prescribe modes of appropriate and effective communication.

The first assumption is particularly pertinent as it tells us where identities are realized and therefore where they can be discovered. It supposes the existence of four

interwoven layers of identity: the personal layer (i.e. the individual is the locus of identity), the enactment layer (i.e. identity is enacted in communication through messages), the relational layer (i.e. relationship is the locus of identity), and the communal layer (i.e. a group is where identity exists).

Simon's Integrative approach to identity and Hecht, Jackson and Ribeau's Communication Theory of Identity both recognize the same basic aspects of identity: the personal (i.e. micro-) level, the communal (i.e. macro-) level, and their intersection at the enactment and relational (i.e. meso-) levels. In other words, the individual and collective identities of an entity (human or not) can be discovered through the study of its messages and relationships within social groups. In giving a sense of the entity's place in social groups, the definition of its identities will also reveal, at least partly, its functions through its interactions.

1.2.2 Communication studies approach

Communication models can be categorized into three very general groups. First, positivist models are based on a logic of linear causality: messages produce effects, and these effects constitute the focus of study. This type of model ignores the importance of context and accounts only for individual expressions. In this sense, it is not compatible with the two approaches to identity described above. Second, systemic models follow the principle that communication is a product of structured interactions between different actors. Third, constructivist models consider that meaning is constructed by the different actors taking part in exchanges. Thus, without discarding the importance of media effects, systemic and constructivist models appear *a priori* the most relevant for this study. Two models, the Orchestra model in the systemic perspective and the Cascading Activation model in the constructivist perspective, are presented below.

The Orchestra model (Mucchielli & Guivarch, 1998: 37–39) finds its roots in the "symbolic interactionism" of Herbert Blumer (1937). The last systemic model to appear (and prefiguring constructivist models), it introduced for the first time the notion of collective performance, a notion especially relevant for looking at media within society. The model is based on the metaphor of musicians working together within an orchestra. They each have a specific assigned place on stage, play a different part and combine into the musical production. The expected result depends on the participation of all and of each of them as planned by the system embodied in the scores. The quality of the production depends on the quality of interactions between musicians: it is one thing to play one's part at the right time with the right tempo, it is another to play it harmoniously with the others. The main focus of the Orchestra model is the collective performance: what is the outcome; how does it come about; what satisfaction does it bring to the audience? To do so, the model asks questions such as: who are the players; what is each player's part and

role *vis-à-vis* the others; which system of interactions is in place; how are the players synchronized; how is their behaviour regulated? Each editorial represents an orchestra's collective performance of a particular score with the players being the voices appearing in the editorials. Thus, the Orchestra model allows a look inside the editorials in order to consider them as a whole standing for a media, and this particular media can then be examined as one of the players in a larger orchestra (i.e. society). Thus, thanks to the notion of collective performance, media identities can be investigated from a society-centric perspective.

The constructivist Cascading Activation model (Entman, 2004) stems from the fields of communication and political science and bears on framing, a key concept in the study of media news (Bryant & Miron, 2004; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). The standard definition of framing is

> selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution. (Entman, 2004: 5)

Designed to investigate the flux of ideas that participate in the construction of media frames, the model appears especially relevant for the study of editorials' content. The model

> suggests how ideas cascade downward from the administration's first public expressions about an event. Activation of thoughts and feelings in the minds of journalists and leaders almost immediately spawns conversations that spread ideas between participants. Journalists canvass their networks of legitimate and customary sources ([…]) to learn how they are connecting ideas and feelings: are sources saying the same things in unison, are they arguing with each other, are they quiet on particular matters? During this time, too, reporters and editors talk to each other, compare impressions, and monitor competitors' coverage. The more often journalists hear similar thoughts expressed by their sources and by other news outlets, the more likely their own thoughts will run along those lines, with the result that the news they produce will feature words and visuals that confirm the same framing. If ideas expressed are more varied, framing may be less one-sided. (Entman, 2004: 9)

While the major current of information goes down to the media and then to the public, it goes partly back up as the public gives feedback to the media, and media frames are received and reacted to by the elites and the administration. Elaborated in the U.S. for the study of foreign news, this model can be adapted to other national contexts and situations. In particular, the relationship between the Executive (the administration in the U.S.) and other elites (e.g. the Legislative, political parties, unions) will depend on the political system (see Le, 2006 for an example of the model's adaptation to France). The Cascading Activation model provides a framework to look at interactions between society actors (i.e. Executive, other elites, media, and public)

and to see how these interactions are reflected in editorials. Thus, because of its specific focus on news frames, the Cascading Activation model provides a means to investigate media identities from a media-centric perspective.

As part of society, media reflect but also influence society. The investigation of their reflection of society requests a media-centric perspective while their influence in society is better seen from a society-centric perspective. Thus, the study of media identities would gain from being conducted from a combined media- and society-centric perspective (on the necessity of combining bottom-up and top-down approaches in the study of organizational identities, see: Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004; Taylor & Cooren, 1997). The combination of the Cascading Activation model with the Orchestra model provides such a model (Figure 1.1) by linking framing and culture as defined by society interactions (van Gorp, 2007). Both models participate in the media-centric and society-centric approaches. With the Orchestra model, the analysis starts from the media-centric perspective and arrives at the society-centric perspective, while with the Cascading Activation model, the analysis starts from the society-centric perspective and arrives at the media-centric perspective. The inner circle represents the media-centric approach: the voices of the Executive, of other elites and of the public are orchestrated by media with their own directing voice and this orchestra direction results in news frames. The outer part of the diagram represents the diverse actors in society, with the participation of media through their news frames.

1.2.3 Discursive approach

Media's only means of (inter)actions are their discourse. The analysis of their discourse for the purpose of discovering their identities can be envisaged from the perspectives of Critical Discourse Analysis and genre analysis.

The investigation of media identities is closely linked to that of their power. The main discursive approach dealing with such an issue, Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak & Meyer, 2001), does not prescribe a specific research methodology. Rather, it regroups different approaches that conceive of discourse as an integral part of the social world. As such, discourse is being shaped by the social world and is shaping it. Therefore, the study of discourse should involve that of language use, transmission of beliefs, and social interaction. The choice of linguistic features to be analyzed depends on the specific research objectives, and so also does the choice of specific theories for the study of the social context to which the analyzed discourse belongs.

In this study, the question of media identities is addressed through the analysis of their editorials. Editorials as a specific type of article are described by their genre. "A genre reflects, constructs, and reinforces the values, epistemology and power relationships of the group from which it developed and for which it functions, though the force fullness of that reinforcement might vary in different kinds



Figure 1.1. Combined media- and society-centric model

Main interactions

Secondary interactions

In bold and underlined font: society-centric approach

In standard font: media-centric approach

of groups and in different kinds of genre sets" (Devitt, 2004: 64). Thus genre analysis has a role to play in this study of media socio-cultural identities.

Genre studies can be classified in three main approaches (Hyland, 2002). In the first, the New Rhetoric group, the emphasis is on the ethnographic investigation

of contexts to determine "the motivated, functional relationship between text type and rhetorical situation (Coe, 2002: 195)" (Hyland, 2002: 114). Paltridge (1994), for example, states that "the genre analyst needs to move away from the physical aspects of language and how they reflect reality to how the text, as a whole, is conditioned by external considerations" (1994: 296). The second approach to genre studies is based on Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (1994) and underlines "the importance of social purposes of genres and of describing the schematic (rhetorical) structures that have evolved to serve these purposes" (Hyland, 2002: 115). Finally the third approach, developed in the field of English for Special Purposes, considers genre as "a class of structured communicative events employed by specific communities whose members share broad communicative purposes (Swales, 1990)" (Hyland, 2002: 115). Hyland observes that these approaches, despite their differences, tend to evolve towards a study of genre that involves not only schematic structures but also register, style, lexis and other rhetorical features. In sum, it is to be noted that, in all of these studies, genre is first defined in terms of the function/purpose of the text type. An important consequence is that the investigation of text genre must pay close attention to the text content and the socio-political context(s) in which it is produced and meant to be received. In other words, it cannot be automatically assumed that, for example, the genre of editorials in Newspaper A will be the same as the genre of editorials in Newspaper B, wherever A and B are published, or even that the genre of editorials in Newspaper A is unique whatever the issue to which they pertain. These points are confirmed by empirical studies on Finnish editorials (Tirkkonnen-Condit, 1996: 259):

> argumentation styles in the Finnish editorials seemed to vary according to a more specifically defined 'culture': the explicitness in argumentation depended on whether the paper represented an opposition party or a party in office, whether it had a status as a major national paper or as a regional paper, as a quality paper or as a tabloid paper.

The few studies conducted on editorials' general structure can be categorized into three groups. In the first group, Bolívar (1994) showed how British editorials, considered as an instance of interactions between the writer and the reader through the text, are composed of three turns: "the lead introduces the aboutness and a posture, the follow responds and the valuate closes the cycle with an evaluation. Both the lead and the valuate represent more definite attitudes, but the follow acts like a mediator, a sort of 'cushion' or transition towards the final evaluation" (1994: 293). In this study, Bolivar demonstrates how the structure of the editorials she analyzed conforms to her unit of analysis, the "triad", that is comparable to the "exchange" unit used in the analysis of oral discourse (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975). While the "exchange" is composed of the "initiation", the "response" and the "follow-up", the "triad" consists of the three turns, the "lead", the "follow" and the "valuate". These

turns are differentiated through eventual changes in markers of modality, tense or mood. Triads can be combined with each other to form higher-level triads, and thus reveal the text's hierarchical structure. In her conclusion, Bolivar underlines that this three-part structure cannot be presumed universal. In other words, she states that her model of analysis, while relevant for English editorials, might not be so for editorials in other languages or cultures. Riazi and Asar (2000) used Bolivar's model for the analysis of sixty Persian editorials randomly chosen from six newspapers, and found that these editorials also were organized on the basis of triads.

The second group of studies focuses on rhetorical structures. Hawes and Thomas (1996), using Halliday's definition of theme (1985) and working with sixty editorials published in two British newspapers in October 1991, looked at how thematic progression organizes a text and produces different effects: a constant progression[6] is favoured by "demagogues" while a derived progression[7] is more often used for an intellectual audience. Tirkkonen-Condit (1996) compared the argumentation styles in (60) American, (60) British and (180) Finnish editorials, and found that Anglo-American writers always explicitly state the main point of their argument in a thesis summary, while Finnish writers do not include thesis summaries when they deal with sensitive issues in order to mitigate potential disagreements. These two studies provide interesting information on the editorials' rhetorical structure and persuasive strategies, but they focus more on argumentation styles than on editorials as genre.

Finally, in the most recent study, Ansari and Babaii (2005) used Halliday and Hasan's "Generic Structure Potential" (1989) to analyse 30 *Washington Times*' editorials published from February to April 2003. "Generic Structure Potential" (GSP) consists in the identification of obligatory and optional rhetorical units. The authors note that in their analysis, "the chunking of the texts into smaller meaningful rhetorical units was the hard job" (2005: 281); to do so, they used linguistic cues marking internal coherence and typographical cues, but they do not present a systematic way of using these cues. The GSP they present in conclusion

> is a condensed statement suggesting that an unmarked English newspaper editorial typically carries a headline and addresses an issue which may or may not require some background information occurring either before or after it. It then starts off an argumentation for or against the addressed issue by an initiation statement that is optional. It makes the arguments, and finally takes a position about the issue discussed. This latter process may recur. This [is] to say, an argumentation process begins with a series of arguments and ends with the articulation of a position. This process can then be repeated until the planned conclusion is drawn. (2005: 289)

6. Constant progression: theme 1 → rheme 1, theme 1 → rheme 2, etc. The themes remain constant.

7. Derived progression: theme D1 → rheme 1, theme D2 → rheme 2, etc. The themes are derived from a superordinate explicit or implicit idea in the text.

Basically, Ansari and Babaii tell us that editorials are argumentative texts (i.e. a series of arguments followed by a conclusion, i.e. a position on the issue). They do not demonstrate any specificity in this type of texts because their methodology is not comprehensive enough for that.

In sum, studies on editorials' general structure are few, and they have been rather limited in the applicability of their methodology to other corpora and in their combination of structural and functional analyses. They also have been limited by their corpus because of its (most often) small size, its selection in terms of content, the short time span of publication, and the language of their publication (mostly English). Thus, the genre of editorials largely still remains to be investigated. To this end, this study will follow a text-driven (as opposed to ethnographic) approach to the study of editorials' genre.[8] In their "text-driven procedure for genre analysis", Askehave and Swales (2001: 207) propose five steps of study: (1) structure + style + content + 'purpose'; (2) 'genre'; (3) context; (4) repurposing the genre; (5) reviewing genre status.[9] These steps are compatible with the Critical Discourse Analysis approach. The first step concerns language use; the second is a provisional conclusion of the first; the third can be designed to encompass the study of transmission of beliefs and social interactions; the fourth and the fifth conclude the study on the role played by editorials.

1.2.4 Methodological framework

The combination of the identity, communication and discursive approaches explained above results in the following three-tiered methodological framework for this study (Table 1.1). The first level is a media-centric approach based on the orchestra model. The orchestra's performance under the direction of the conductor is investigated quantitatively through the editorials' language use (i.e. structure, style and content) towards an official purpose. The resulting overall picture gives a first definition of editorials' genre and a first glimpse of *Le Monde*'s collective identity (Chapter 2). The second level is society-centric and looks at the social interactions in which *Le Monde* takes part. This qualitative analysis, which is conducted on a few specific issues chosen for their saliency, is more amenable to the exploration of *Le Monde*'s individual identities (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). The society-centric approach at the second level is primarily descriptive. The conceptualization part takes place at the third level that concludes the study in combining the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses. In looking at editorials in

8. For the necessity of adding an ethnographic approach, see below 6.4.

9. The use of scare-quotes for 'purpose' in step 1 and 'genre' in step 2 indicates their provisional status.

Table 1.1. A discursive communication identity framework

		Discursive Approach		*Communication Approach – Combined Model* (Cf. figure 1.1)	*Identity Approach* (Cf. table A5.4)	*Methodology*	Object of analysis	Results
		Critical Discourse Analysis	*Genre Analysis*					
Media	→	Language use (linguistic and rhetorical analysis)	(1) Structure + style + content + 'purpose'; (cf. table A5.1)	Media-centric analysis; (cf. table A5.2)	Foreground: collective; Background: individual	Quantitative (complete corpus)	Editorials	Performance /Actions: (2) 'genre'
Society	→	Social interactions	(3) context	Society-centric analysis; (cf. table A5.3)	Foreground: individual; Background: collective	Qualitative (specific issues)	Socio-political context	Interactions
Society	→	Transmission of beliefs	(4) purpose	Society-centric analysis; (cf. table A5.3)	Individual/ Collective	Combination: quantitative/ qualitative	Editorials in their socio-political context	Evaluation of performance/ Interactions: (5) LM's identity through the genre of its editorials

Note: The numbers (1 to 5) refer to the five stages of Askehave and Swales' text-driven procedure for genre analysis (2001).

their socio-political context, it allows defining the editorials' purpose and genre. The evaluation of *Le Monde*'s performance as an orchestra reveals the interplay of its individual and collective identities (Chapter 6).

Readers interested in the methodological details of the linguistic analyses will find them in Appendix 2 (complex speech acts), Appendix 3 (coherence model), and Appendix 4 (style analysis). Appendix 5 contains tables explaining how the different parts of the methodological framework hold together and complement each other.

1.3 Definition of the corpus

As stated above in the discussion of the discursive approach, the fact that genre is first defined in terms of the function/purpose of the text type implies that genre studies must pay close attention to the content homogeneity of their corpus. In other words, editorials of different newspapers may not be defined by the same genre, and even the genre of editorials within the same newspaper may vary with their content type.

This case study takes the content component of genre studies into account with a corpus of 150 editorials (divided into three thematic groups and one random group) that were published in the same newspaper, the French elite daily *Le Monde*, from August 1999 to July 2001 (for a list of the editorials, see Appendix 1). During this period, no major change affected either *Le Monde*'s editorial board or the general close political context in which *Le Monde* was situated; these factors, combined with the two-year length of the time of the editorials' publication, are assumed to provide a sufficiently representative background for a genre study.

The period from 1999 to 2001 is characterized by important issues in identity construction at different levels and, therefore, appears especially relevant for the study of media roles. Indeed, during this time, *Le Monde* was experiencing on the one hand an increasing financial success and, on the other, a significant institutional malaise as evidenced by a very polemical and controversial book on the newspaper's power (Péan & Cohen, 2003). This malaise was due to important structural changes (Éveno, 2001), and a number of politicians and journalists accused *Le Monde* of abuse of power (Poulet, 2003). On the internal political stage, several substantial "*cohabitation*" issues arose between a right-wing President of the Republic and a left-wing Prime Minister, and raised serious concerns about the appropriateness and viability of the Fifth Republic's institutions. The international stage was marked by the arrival of a hitherto unknown politician, Vladimir Putin, who was trying to reposition the Russian Federation on the world stage. As for the

European Union, it was in deep institutional debates about its impending enlargement from 15 to 25 members.

The corpus of 150 editorials for this study (see Appendix 1) reflects these main issues; it comprises four groups: (1) all editorials (38) about internal politics whose topic is linked to a top front-page article in the same day issue – top front-page articles deal with issues the newspaper deems most relevant (Kress & van Leeuwen, 1998); (2) all editorials (33) on Russia; (3) all editorials (26) about the European Union and dealing with institutional matters or relations with other States; (4) among the remaining editorials, 53 randomly chosen that reflect the overall distribution of topic categories during this period (internal politics: 24; external politics: 24; European politics: 5).

This corpus of editorials is completed by another corpus for the qualitative analyses so that editorials can be considered within their political context (for information on French political life, see Appendix 6). For the entire period, all weekly question periods in both chambers of the Parliament (*Assemblée nationale* and *Sénat*), all daily evening TV news from the public channel, A2 (*Antenne 2*), as well as all major opinion polls were searched for pertinent information. This was completed by official documents when relevant. Parliamentary debates and especially TV news are easily and readily available to the public and therefore constitute an ideal platform for all political, social actors and experts to present their views; as for opinion polls, they inform us on the public's reactions.

This first chapter has set the framework for studies of media socio-cultural identities through their editorials and the specifics for the case study. The methodology that has been determined is comprised of two steps: a quantitative linguistic analysis of editorials in a media-centric perspective, and a qualitative communicative analysis of editorials in a media-centric and society-centric perspective. The first step is conducted in Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 2

Structures of *Le Monde*'s editorials

As explained in the preceding chapter, the linguistic analysis of the corpus corresponds to the first of five steps in genre analysis as defined by Askehave and Swales (2001: 207). It includes the analyses of structure, style, content and (provisional) purpose. This linguistic analysis is quantitative and conducted on the complete corpus except for one component of the content analysis and the definition of the purpose that is given by *Le Monde* itself (see Chapter 1, Table 1.1). The purpose of this linguistic analysis is to look at editorials according to the orchestra model with particular attention to the orchestra conductor in order to reveal aspects of *Le Monde*'s collective identity as an entity by itself.

The question of *structure* is addressed through a complex speech act analysis based on a coherence analysis. This allows us to see what editorialists do; the manner in which they do it is investigated through their style. *Style* is examined with two types of analysis in interpersonal discourse semantics. First, an analysis of personal markers reveals how *Le Monde* distinguishes itself from others and presents itself professionally; second, the analysis of the ATTITUDE component of the APPRAISAL system investigates the type of arguments (i.e. rational vs. emotional, positive vs. negative) editorialists use. This analysis of argument types is also one of the components (i.e. the quantitative one) of *content* analysis. Readers interested in the details of this methodology for the study of structure, style and content will find them in Appendices 2, 3 and 4. This chapter presents the results of the linguistic quantitative analysis for the complete corpus.

The complete corpus contains four groups of editorials. The Internal, Europe, and Russia groups were chosen for investigation of any difference in *Le Monde*'s editorials when they deal with French, European, or international affairs. These three thematic groups can also be compared with the fourth, Random, group representing "ordinary" (i.e. not focused on highly marked topics) editorials in general (i.e. the totality of the Random group) or in particular (i.e. the Internal group is compared with the editorials on internal politics from the Random group, the Europe group with the editorials on European politics from the Random group, and the Russia group with the editorials on external politics from the Random group). This allows us to see how much each thematic group is representative of all editorials pertaining to the same category of issues (i.e. internal, European or

external politics). However, because there are only five editorials on European politics in the Random group, their statistical comparison with the Europe group must be taken cautiously.

The data presented below result from the coding of the entire corpus by the author. In order to verify the stability of the coding, a graduate student coded 33 randomly chosen editorials (22% of the corpus) independently. The comparison of the two codings led to the revision of 3.7% of the original author's coding for these 33 editorials. Then the coding of the entire corpus was checked for any discrepancy between the original and revised codings. The resulting coding of the corpus is considered stable enough for reliable results.

All analyses whose results are presented below rest on a prior coherence analysis that is shown in detail in Appendix 3. This logico-semantic analysis of coherence brings to the fore "macrostructures" (i.e. Mcr: sentences at the paragraph level that mark the ending point of the paragraph argumentation and are most likely to remain in long-term memory) and "text macrostructures" (i.e. TMcr: sentences at the text level that mark the ending point of the text argumentation and are most likely to remain in long-term memory). It also allows the identification of "themes" (i.e. Th: sentences at the paragraph level that indicates the "aboutness" of the paragraph and marks the starting point of the paragraph argumentation), and "text themes" (i.e. TTh: sentences at the text level that indicate the "aboutness" of the text and mark the starting point of the text argumentation). The subsequent analyses yielded the following results in terms of the editorials' ATTITUDE values (2.1), of the editorials as complex speech acts (2.2), of the addressees' of the editorials' directives (2.3), and of the newspaper's self-representations (2.4). The synthesis of these results (2.5) offers a provisional definition of *Le Monde*'s editorials' genre.

2.1 Editorials' ATTITUDE values

The APPRAISAL system (Martin & White 2005) whose ATTITUDE component is used here is inscribed in Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (Halliday 1994). According to SFL, there are two main functional components in language meaning: "ideational" (i.e. representation) and "interpersonal" (i.e. exchange). These two meanings are bridged by a third, metafunctional, component, the "textual" (i.e. message). The discourse semantics APPRAISAL system develops the "interpersonal" in articulation with the NEGOTIATION system that focuses on the interactive aspects of discourse, and the INVOLVEMENT system that focuses on non-gradable levels of negotiation (e.g. solidarity). The APPRAISAL system itself is composed of ATTITUDE (i.e. feelings), ENGAGEMENT (i.e. positioning of the speaker towards expressed value positions and potential responses to them), and GRADUATION (i.e. variety of intensity

levels in evaluations). The ATTITUDE component of the APPRAISAL system (used in this study) is composed of three types of feelings: AFFECT (i.e. emotional reactions), APPRECIATION (i.e. assessment of individuals), and JUDGMENT (i.e. assessment of situations). (A detailed description of the linguistic ATTITUDE analysis is given in Appendix 4 Section 2.)

While differentiating between AFFECT (AFF) on the one hand and APPRECIATION (APP) and JUDGMENT (JUD) on the other did not pose any particular difficulty, the distinction between evaluation of situations (APPRECIATION) and individuals (JUDGMENT) was not as clear since individuals are involved in situations and situations result from the actions of individuals. Thus, in the results of the macrostructures' APPRAISAL coding (Table 2.1), we will underline only the quasi absence of AFFECT (2.1%) compared to APPRECIATION (45.7%) and JUDGMENT values (52.2%) as expected, and the clear predominance ($p = 0$) of negative values (71.2%). In other words, *Le Monde*'s editorialists rely almost exclusively on socio-cultural codes of values (as opposed to expressions of emotions) to convey their mostly negative evaluations of the issues in discussion.

Table 2.1. Positive and negative AFFECT, APPRECIATION and JUDGMENT values in all macrostructures

All Mcr	*POSitive*				*NEGative*				*Total*	
	editorials		*occurrences*		*editorials*		*occurrences*		*occurrences*	
	n	***n/150***	***n***	***%***	***n***	***n/150***	***n***	***%***	***n***	***%***
AFF	5	3.33	8	3.5	6	4	9	1.6	17	2.1
APP	52	34.66	93	40.6	110	73.33	271	47.8	364	45.7
JUD	67	44.66	128	55.9	119	79.33	287	50.6	415	52.2
Total	–	–	229	100	–	–	567	100	796	100
%				28.8				71.2		100

APPRECIATION and JUDGMENT values are based on socio-cultural codes of values, but they may still trigger emotional responses by their positive or negative orientations. Table 2.2 presents the percentages of positive and negative ATTITUDE (AFFECT, APPRECIATION and JUDGMENT) values. It appears that all four groups are significantly different in their respective proportion of positive and negative values (Chi-square test: $p = 0$). Each group contains a majority of negative values (total of 71.3% for the entire corpus), but the Russia group is the most negative (86.7%) and the Europe group the most positive (44.3%). The Internal group is situated in the middle.

Table 2.2. Positive and negative ATTITUDE values in all macrostructures

All Mcr	*All POSitive*		*All NEGative*	
	occurrences	*%*	*occurrences*	*%*
Random	110	36.8	189	63.2
Internal	35	21.5	128	78.5
Europe	51	44.3	62	55.7
Russia	27	13.3	176	86.7
Total	223	28.7	555	71.3

The difference between the Europe group with the editorials on European politics of the Random group is not significant. This means that, in regard to positive and negative values, the Europe group would be representative of *Le Monde*'s editorials on Europe. However, this is not the case when the Internal group is compared with the editorials on internal politics of the Random group, or when the Russia group is compared with the editorials on external politics of the Random group (for both comparisons – Chi-square test: $p = 0$). Thus, in regard to positive and negative values, the Internal group is not representative of *Le Monde*'s editorials on internal politics, and the Russia group is not representative of *Le Monde*'s editorials on external politics.

2.2 Editorials as complex speech acts

The purpose of an utterance is recognized by the type of speech act it represents. Bach and Harnish (1979) distinguish four types of speech acts: "constative" (i.e. stating how something is), "acknowledgment" (i.e. expressing feelings concerning a certain event or state of affairs), "directive" (i.e. trying to get the listener to do or not to do something), and "commissive" (i.e. speaker's intention and belief that his utterance obligates him to do something). A complex speech act characterizes a set of sentences as a single utterance. This speech act analysis is explained in detail in Appendix 2.

Le Monde's stand on different issues appears in the manner in which it says things, i.e. through the type of speech acts it uses in its argumentation (Table 2.3). Not surprisingly, no commissives (COM) were found and practically no acknowledgments (ACK: only 1% in total). The editorials' macrostructures appear almost exclusively under the form of constatives and directives, with significantly ($p = 0$) more constatives (CON: 80.8%) than directives (DIR: 18.2%). This significant predominance

of constatives over directives is also verified (p = 0) among text macrostructures (not shown in Table 3.3 – CON: 63.4%; DIR: 34.3%). The Internal, Europe, and Russia groups are significantly different in their respective proportions of types of speech acts (Chi-square test: p < 0.025). The Russia group contains the most constatives (85.6%) and the fewest directives (13.4%) and the Internal group contains the most directives (24.5%) and the fewest constatives (74.5%). The Europe group, covering issues neither really internal nor completely external, occupies the middle place (82% of constatives and 17.3% of directives). None of the Internal, Europe, and Russia groups is significantly different from its respective corresponding parts in the Random group. Thus, in regard to the types of speech acts they contain, the Internal, Europe, and Russia groups would seem to be representative, respectively, of *Le Monde*'s editorials on internal, European and external politics. Thus, the further away (and most foreign) the power centres, the less *Le Monde* dares say directly what to do or not to do, and the more it uses (mostly negative – see above) statements to say that something should not have been done. In other words, instead of addressing political elites openly, it sets a stage for public opinion (i.e. LM's audience) to influence these elites.

Table 2.3. Types of speech acts in all macrostructures

All Mcr	*Random*		*Internal*		*Europe*		*Russia*		*Total*	
	n	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*
CON	255	81.2	152	74.5	109	82	173	85.6	689	80.8
DIR	55	17.5	50	24.5	23	17.3	27	13.4	155	18.2
ACK	4	1.3	2	1	1	0.7	2	1	9	1
COM	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total	314	100	204	100	133	100	202	100	853	100

One editorial may contain several text macrostructures, but its last one occupies a special position as it concludes the general argumentation, just as the first text theme starts it. For this reason, it is considered here that the complex speech act represented by the general argumentation is determined by the first text theme (TTh) and the last text macrostructure (TMcr). According to this definition, *Le Monde*'s editorials take predominantly the form of only two types of complex speech acts (Table 2.4): constatives (CON-CON: 31.3%) and constatives concluding with a directive (CON DIR: 56.7%), this latter form being significantly more frequent (p < 0.01). While the strong use of constatives is not surprising considering

the purpose of editorials (i.e. stating the newspaper's position), the importance of directives concluding the general argumentation underlines the active engagement (as opposed to one of "watchdog") that *Le Monde* takes in the public sphere.

Table 2.4. General line of argumentation – complex speech acts

1st TTh →	*Random*		*Internal*		*Europe*		*Russia*		*Total*	
last TMcr	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*
CON → CON	17	32.1	7	18.4	9	34.6	14	42.4	47	31.3
CON → DIR	28	52.8	25	65.8	16	61.5	16	48.5	85	56.7
DIR → DIR	3	5.7	4	10.5	1	3.9	–	–	8	5.3
Others	5	9.4	2	5.3	–	–	3	9.1	10	6.7
Total	53	100	38	100	26	100	33	100	150	100

The general line of argumentation in the Internal group is the most directive (CON-DIR: 65.8%; and DIR-DIR: 10.5%) and the least constative (CON-CON: 18.4%), while the Russia group is the least directive (CON-DIR: 48.5%; DIR-DIR: 0%) and the most constative (CON: 42.4%). The Europe group is in the middle (CON: 34.6%; CON-DIR: 61.5%; DIR-DIR: 3.9%). Although the four groups are not significantly different, the Internal group is significantly more directive (CON-DIR and DIR-DIR) and less constative (CON-CON) than the Russia group ($p < 0.05$, in both cases).

The Internal and the Russia groups would seem to be representative of *Le Monde*'s editorials on internal and external politics in regard to their complex speech acts (i.e. there is no significant difference between the Internal group and the editorials on internal politics in the Random group, and there is no significant difference between the Russia group and the editorials on external politics in the Random group). While this is not the case for the Europe group, it should be borne in mind that the Random group contains only five editorials on European politics and thus the statistical results may be biased.

In summary, while the speech acts at the macrostructural levels revealed a significant predominance of constatives, the complex speech acts representing the editorials' general line of argumentation reveal a significant predominance of directives. In other words, the editorials' main goal is to say what or what not to do (directives) and, to that end, position statements are made (constatives). The favoured type of general line of argumentation (i.e. complex speech acts) in each group concurs with the previous findings (see Table 2.3) that the further away the centre of power, the less direct *Le Monde* is.

All text macrostructures taking the form of constatives or directives (Table 2.5) are significantly more negative in each group (p values varying between 0 and 0.05),

but each group is significantly different in its proportion of positive/negative constatives and directive (Chi-square test: p = 0). The Russia group presents the most negative directives (100%) and negative constatives (80.4%), but the Internal group does not lag far behind in its number of negative directives (97%). In other words, *Le Monde* says what or what not to do in a text macrostructure most of the time, and almost all the time in the case of the Internal and Russia groups, on the basis of its dissatisfaction with what is happening.

Table 2.5 also shows that in each group, most positive text macrostructures are constatives, and most negative text macrostructures are directives. The differences between positive constatives and negative directives in the Internal group (pos CON: 19%; neg DIR: 97%; p = 0) and the Russia group (pos CON: 13.7%; neg DIR: 100%; p = 0) are similar and very high. The difference is also significant, albeit less, for the Random group (pos CON: 34.6%; neg DIR: 67.9%; p < 0.01), but not for the Europe group (pos CON: 60%; neg DIR: 73.7%). This would seem to confirm *Le Monde*'s less negative stance towards European matters compared to internal and external (i.e. in this case, Russian) issues.

Table 2.5. Speech acts and positive/negative/neutral values in text macrostructures (TMcr and TThMcr[a])

TMcr +	*Random*		*Internal*		*Europe*		*Russia*	
TThMcra	*CON*	*DIR*	*CON*	*DIR*	*CON*	*DIR*	*CON*	*DIR*
Positive	29	17	8	1	12	5	7	0
	34.6%	30.3%	19%	3%	60%	26.3%	13.7%	0%
Negative	48	38	21	33	5	14	41	17
	57.1%	67.9%	50%	97%	25%	73.7%	80.4%	100%
Neutral	7	1	13	–	3	–	3	–
	8.3%	1.8%	31%	–	15%	–	5.9%	–
Total	84	56	42	34	20	19	51	17
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

[a] sentence that is a text theme and text macrostructure.

It should be noted that the Internal, Europe, and Russia groups are significantly different from their respective corresponding editorials in the Random group (respectively, p < 0.025, p < 0.001, p < 0.01). Thus, in regard to positive, negative or neutral orientation of speech acts in text macrostructures, the Internal, Europe, and Russia groups cannot be considered representative of *Le Monde*'s editorials on, respectively, internal, European, and external politics.

2.3 Editorials' addressees

When the type of complex speech act for each editorial is defined, it still remains to be seen to whom that speech act is addressed. In the case of constatives, commissives or acknowledgments, it can be assumed that the addressee is the newspaper's general readership. However, the same assumption cannot be made with directives. In issuing directives, especially when these are to be found in macrostructures (Mcr and TMcr), *Le Monde* takes a very active part in public debates. Defining the addressees of these directives allows us to circumscribe not all but at least the main actors of the public debate as constructed by *Le Monde*, i.e. those whom *Le Monde* considers to be in a position of power. The methodology for defining directives' addressees in explained in Appendix 2 Section 3.

The identification of the directives' addressees in all macrostructures (Table 2.6) cannot precisely delimit the public spheres in which *Le Monde* acts, but it still gives a clear indication of them. It appears that *Le Monde* operates in a French public sphere for its editorials on internal politics (100% of its directives' addressees), European for European politics (87%), and international for issues about Russia (71.4%). The Internal, Europe, and Russia groups are significantly different in respect of their directives' addressees ($p = 0$), and they seem to be representative of *Le Monde*'s editorials on internal and external politics (i.e. the Internal and Russia groups are not significantly different from their respective corresponding editorials from the Random group – the data did not allow the same statistical test on the Europe group).

Table 2.6. Addressees of directives in all macrostructures

All Mcr – DIR	*Random*		*Internal*		*Europe*		*Russia*		*Total*	
	n	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*
To France	34	65.4	55	100	2	8.7	2	7.15	93	58.9
To Europe	6	11.5	–	–	20	87	2	7.15	28	17.7
To States	11	21.2	–	–	1	4.3	20	71.4	32	20.3
To All	1	2.9	–	–	–	–	4	14.3	5	3.1
Total	52	100	55	100	23	100	28	100	158	100

Among the 158 directives' addressees in all editorials, "ordinary society" (i.e. those not identified through their affiliations with power institutions) figures rather rarely: "French society" appears only six times (included in "to France"), "European society" twice (included in "to Europe"), and "all" (in general) five times. Instead, *Le Monde* addresses mostly the "powerful", those who can be identified through their affiliations with institutions. *Le Monde*'s editorials are addressed to all of its

audience, most of it being composed of "ordinary people"; however, rather than entering into a direct debate with them, *Le Monde* merely "shows" them how it directly addresses institutions. By entering into a direct dialogue with the representatives of these institutions, *Le Monde* puts itself at par with these institutions.

2.4 Newspaper's self-representation

Finally, an analysis of metadiscursive markers (i.e. "*Le Monde*", "*nous*", "*notre*", "*nos*", "*on*", questions and imperative) allows identifying the various roles played by *Le Monde*. The analysis is explained in Appendix 4 Section 1. Its results (Table 2.7) reveal that *Le Monde* presents itself predominantly as a social actor in its own name (LMactor: 73.6%), significantly less ($p = 0$) in the traditional journalistic role of news provider (LMnews: 20.5%), and rarely as a representative of society (LMrep: 5.9%). The further away from France the centres of power are, the more *Le Monde* would tend to act as a social actor (Internal: 70.7%; Europe: 77.5%; Russia: 81.7%) and the less as a traditional news provider (Internal: 20%; Europe: 17.5%; Russia: 16.7%). However, the percentages do not vary sufficiently for any significant difference between the groups. There is also no significant difference between the Internal, Europe, and Russia groups with their respective corresponding editorials in the Random group. Thus, the Internal, Europe, and Russia groups would seem to be representative of *Le Monde*'s editorials on internal, European, and external politics.

Table 2.7. *Le Monde*'s self-representation in all sentences

All sentences	*Random*		*Internal*		*Europe*		*Russia*		*Total*	
	n	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*
LMnews	24	24.5	15	20	7	17.5	10	16.7	56	20.5
LMactor	68	69.4	53	70.7	31	77.5	49	81.7	201	73.6
LMrep	6	6.1	7	9.3	2	5	1	1.6	16	5.9
Total	98	100	75	100	40	100	60	100	273	100

For each of these three functions, Table 2.8 presents the number of times they are represented by each metadiscursive marker. If one looks at the table rows for each function, it appears that each of them is mostly represented by one type of metadiscursive marker: LM-news by "*Le Monde*" (33/56 = 58.9%); LM-actor by *"on"* (122/201 = 60.7%); and LM-rep by *"nous"*/*"nos"* (11/16 = 68.8%).[1] If one looks at

1. Only the raw numbers are given in the table and not the percentage for ease of presentation of the table.

the table columns for the metadiscursive markers, it appears that "*Le Monde*" (73.3%) and *"nous"/"nos"* (43.5%) are in the majority used to represent LM-news (significantly more than by *"on"*, p = 0), while *"on"* (94.5%), questions (98%) and the imperative (100%) are in the majority used to represent LM-actor. LM-actor is by far the most represented function (73.6%), and it is represented by *"on"* in 60.7% (122/201) of the cases, significantly more than by any other means (p < 0.01). *"On"* is the most frequently used metadiscursive marker to represent *Le Monde*'s functions in general (47.3%), and in 94.5% of its uses it represents *Le Monde* as a social actor (LM-actor).

Table 2.8. Distribution of metadiscursive markers to represent *Le Monde*'s functions (in all sentences)

	"Le Monde"		*Nous/nos*		*on*		*questions*		*imperative*		*Total*	
	n	***%***	***n***	***%***	***n***	***%***	***n***	***%***	***n***	***%***	***n***	***%***
LM-news	33	73.3	20	43.5	3	2.3	0	0	0	0	56	20.5
LM-actor	12	26.7	15	32.6	122	94.5	49	98	3	100	201	73.6
LM-rep	0	0	11	23.9	4	3.1	1	2	0	0	16	5.9
Total												
n	45	100	46	100	129	100	50	100	3	100	273	100
%	16.5		16.8		47.3		18.3		1.1			100

The entire corpus contains 45 tokens of "*Le Monde*" in 28 editorials. Two of them contain five such tokens each. In "*Les raisons d'une publication*" (22 September 2000), justifying the publication by *Le Monde* of Méry's tape transcripts (see below 3.1.2), the last paragraph exposes the concept the newspaper has of its role: "*il n'est pas de favoriser tel ou tel parti, tel ou tel candidat*" [it is not to favour this or that party, this or that candidate], and it concludes (in the text macrostructure): "*S'agissant d'une affaire* [*Méry*] *qui met en jeu le fonctionnement même de la démocratie, il est de notre devoir de les* [*risques*] *assumer*" [since the Méry's affair compromises the functioning of democracy itself, it is our duty to assume these risks]. In "*Contre la torture*" (20 May 2001) published to justify the newspaper's large attention given to Paul Aussaresses's revelation of his participation in torture activities during the war in Algeria, *Le Monde* recalls in seven sentences the position of Hubert Beuve-Méry, *Le Monde*'s founder, against the war in Algeria and torture, and it concludes (in the text macrostructure): "*C'est en regardant la vérité en face qu'on parviendra peut-être à construire une mémoire commune*" [it is by looking straight at the truth that we may eventually be able to build a common memory]. In this particular editorial, *Le Monde* bases its authority on

Beuve-Méry's well established reputation[2] (through a "legitimacy by filiation", see below 6.3.3), and uses the indefinite "*on*" to act as a leader. It should be noted that these two editorials, containing the most tokens of "*Le Monde*" as well as other markers representing *Le Monde* ("*nous*", "*nos*"), were both published to justify decisions of *Le Monde* that did or were likely to raise strong protests. It is in cases of "self-defence", i.e. when it is or might be "attacked" because of the positions it takes, that *Le Monde* comes to the front under its own name.

"On" is represented by 129 tokens and functions differently than "*Le Monde*". Whether one looks at which functions *"on"* represents or how LM-actor is represented, there is a clear connection between *"on"* and *Le Monde* acting as a social actor. This is particularly important when one thinks about the fuzziness of whom *"on"* stands for, the (criticized) role of LM-actor in the public sphere, and the frequency with which *Le Monde* plays this role (73.6% of all *Le Monde*'s functions).

Because of its close connection with the role of LM-actor and because of its indefiniteness, *"on"* appears thus as an especially intriguing marker and its use warrants further inquiry. When *"on"* does not include *Le Monde* and exclusively represents "others", *Le Monde* can present the indefiniteness of these others' identity as a danger and position itself against this danger. Logically, the greater the danger, the more seriously *Le Monde*'s position should be considered. However, when *Le Monde* includes others in its *"on"*-social actor, it creates some sort of complicity with this "other" by empowering it. *Le Monde* flatters this other by giving it an active role on the public stage it might not have claimed for itself and, by this token, *Le Monde* influences it. This *"on"*-social actor thus takes on a social weight due to its human basis that the addressees cannot ignore. As with the *"on"*-social actor, *Le Monde* plays on both sides of the interactions (addressers and addressees) to reach its goals. To consider the discursive functions of *"on"*, *"on"* must first be placed within the hierarchical structure of the text, so as to reveal which elements in the argumentation it affects (2.4.1). Then, a few examples illustrate how *"on"* affects the argumentation (2.4.2).

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2. In 1969 when Beuve-Méry retired, the London *Times* is reported to have written, *"Les grands directeurs sont rares. M. Beuve-Méry en a certainement été un"* [Great (newspaper) directors are rare. Mr. Beuve-Méry has undeniably been one of them.], and the *Washington Post*, "Le Monde *est l'expression d'une aspiration spécifiquement française à la rigueur intellectuelle*" [*Le Monde* represents the specifically French pursuit of intellectual rigour] (Le Monde, 2002 : 23).

2.4.1 The place of "*on*" in the argumentation

The place of *"on"* in the argumentation must be considered at different levels. Where does *"on"* occur in the text hierarchical structure, i.e. in the development of the argumentation or in its main points (i.e. macrostructural sentences)? What type of speech act/macrostructure is *"on"* attached to either by leading to it or appearing in it? Are those macrostructures mostly of a positive or negative orientation? Finally and most generally, in what general type of editorials (positive or negative) does *"on"* mostly appear?

The position of *"on"* within the text hierarchical structure indicates its role within the editorial's argumentation. As Table 2.9 shows, *"on"* represents predominantly and similarly (i.e. no significant difference) LM-social actor (51.5%) and others (45.6%). As *"on"* including *Le Monde* but not representing LM-social actor occurs rarely (7/237; 2.9%), only the two cases of *"on"*-social actor and *"on"*-others are compared from now on.

Raw data in Table 2.9 show that *"on"*-social actor and *"on"*-others occur in a similar proportion (no significant difference) in non acrostructural (non-Mcr) positions (*"on"*-social actor: 63 + 27 / 122 = 73.8%; *"on"*-others: 65 + 17 / 108 = 75.9%), i.e. in the development of the argumentation leading to the semantic content of a macrostructure, and in text macrostructural positions (*"on"*-social actor: 7 + 5 / 122 = 9.8%; *"on"*-others: 5 + 3 / 108 = 7.4%), i.e. in the editorials' main points.[3] Thus, it appears that *"on"* occurs mainly in the development of the argumentation. This fact is, however, not particularly surprising when one looks at the total number of non-macrostructural sentences (2597) versus the total number of text macrostructural sentences (307). When this fact is taken into consideration, it appears that *"on"*-social actor and *"on"*-others are equally distributed (no significant difference) in non macrostructural sentences (*"on"*-social actor: 63 + 27 / 2597 = 3.5%; *"on"*-others: 65 + 17 / 2597 = 3.2%), and in text macrostructural sentences (*"on"*-social actor: 7 + 5 / 307 = 3.9%; *"on"*-others: 5 + 3 / 307 = 2.6%). These results also show that *"on"*, whether it represents LM-social actor or others, is similarly distributed between non-macrostructural sentences and text macrostructural sentences (*"on"*-social actor, non-Mcr: 3.5%, TMcr: 3.9%; *"on"*-others, non-Mcr: 3.2%, TMcr: 2.6%). The only significant difference between *"on"*-social actor and *"on"*-others concerns their thematic position: when *"on"* occurs within a paragraph theme, it is more often ($p < 0.05$) *"on"*-social actor (57.5%) than

3. Non-macrostructural sentences appear in rows 1 (-) and 2 (Th) of Table 2.9. Text macrostructural sentences appear in rows 6 (TMcr) and 7 (TThMcr) of Table 2.9.

"on"-others (36.1%). In other words, *Le Monde* puts itself in the limelight more often than others by starting its argumentation with what it says or does.

Table 2.9. Positions of *"on"* in the editorials' hierarchical structure

	"on"/LM-actor		***"on"/LM-not actor***		***"on"/others***		***Total***	
	n	***%***	***n***	***%***	***n***	***%***	***n***	***%***
–[a]	63	48.1	3	7.3	65	49.6	131	100
Th	27	57.5	3	6.4	17	36.1	47	100
Mcr	11	64.7	–	–	6	35.3	17	100
ThMcr[b]	2	66.6	–	–	1	33.3	3	100
TTh	7	38.9	–	–	11	61.1	18	100
TMcr	7	58.3	–	–	5	41.7	12	100
TThMcr[c]	5	55.6	1	11.1	3	33.3	9	100
Total	122	51.5	7	2.9	108	45.6	237	100

[a] –: sentence that is neither a theme nor a macrostructure at any level.

[b] ThMcr: sentence that is both a theme and a macrostructure.

[c] TThMcr: sentence that is both a text theme and a text macrostructure.

If we look at the types of macrostructure (in terms of speech act and positive/negative orientation) to which *"on"* is linked (Table 2.10), we see that *"on"* appears in a similar proportion (i.e. no significant difference) in each type of macrostructure whether it represents *Le Monde* as a social actor or excludes *Le Monde* (with one exception – see below).[4] Furthermore, when one takes into account the percentage of each type of macrostructure, it then appears that both types of *"on"* are proportionally distributed between them. The only exception to the above findings concerns the cases of *"on"* leading to or appearing in a macrostructural directive with a negative orientation (DIRneg). In this latter case, *"on"*-others (23.1%) occurs significantly ($p < 0.05$) more often than *"on"*-social actor (13.1%), and affects proportionally significantly ($p < 0.05$) more macrostructures DIRneg than other types (14.6% of all Mcr are DIRneg, but 23.1% of *"on"*-others appear in DIRneg). In conclusion, *"on"*-social actor is not used to affect one type of macrostructure proportionally more than another, but *"on"*-others affects proportionally more macrostructural directives with a negative orientation (for an example, see 2.4.2, "*Loi de la jungle en Guyane*").

4. Either by appearing in the argumentation leading to them or directly in them.

Table 2.10. Types of macrostructural speech acts in which *"on"* appears

	on /LM-actor		on /others		All Mcr	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
CON pos	28	22.9	18	16.7	193	22.1
CON neg	59	48.4	53	49	419	48
DIR pos	1	0.8	1	1	22	2.5
DIR neg	16	13.1	25	23.1	127	14.6
Other pos	3	2.5	–	–	5	0.6
Other neg	6	4.9	–	–	8	1
Neutral	9	7.4	11	10.2	98	11.2
Total	122	100	108	100	872	100

In regard to the positive, negative or neutral orientation of the macrostructure *"on"* is leading to or appearing in, Table 2.11 shows that *"on"*-social actor and *"on"*-others are used in similar percentages (i.e. no significant difference) in the different types of macrostructural speech acts, and that they do not occur proportionally more in one type of speech act or the other (as evidenced by the comparison with the percentage of all positive, negative or neutral macrostructures).

Table 2.11. Types of *"on"* in positive, negative and neutral macrostructures

	Mcr with "on"/LM-actor		*Mcr with "on"/others*		*All Mcr*	
	n	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*
POS	33	27	19	17.6	220	25.2
NEG	80	65.6	78	72.2	554	63.5
NEU	9	7.4	11	10.2	98	11.2
Total	122	100	108	100	872	100

The final text macrostructure of the editorial is what gives it its general tendency. When it is positive, the purpose of the editorial is to encourage. On the contrary, when it is negative, the point is to criticize. It appears that the more often *"on"* is used in an editorial, the more likely it will occur in connection with a negative macrostructure (Table 2.11; *"on"*-social actor: 65.6%; *"on"*-others: 72.2%), and the more likely this editorial will have a final negative text macrostructure (Table 2.12).

Furthermore, 83.2% of editorials with *"on"* of any type have a final negative text macrostructure (Table 2.12), and 82.8% of editorial with *"on"*-social actor have a final negative text macrostructure (Table 2.13). However, when one compares these results with the percentages of editorials with a positive or negative final macrostructure, it appears that proportionally, *"on"* (of any type or *"on"*-social actor) does not occur more in editorials with a final negative text macrostructure.

In other words, *"on"* (of any type or *"on"*-social actor) is proportionally not used more often in generally negative editorials.

Table 2.12. Editorials with any type of *"on"*

# of "on"	*Appearing in # of edit. with final*		*Total*
(any type)	*TMcr NEG*	*TMcr POS*	
7	1	–	1
	(analyzed below)		
6	2	–	2
5	8	–	8
4	11	1	12
		(analyzed below)	
3	8	2	10
2	27	4	31
1	27	10	37
Total	84	17	101
	83.2%	16.8%	100%
All editorials	119	29	150
(with/without *"on"*)	78.6%	19.3%	100% (2 edit. with final TMcr NEU)

Table 2.13. Editorials with *"on"* -social actor

# of "on"/LM-actor	*Appearing in # of edit. with final*		*Total*	
	TMcr NEG	*TMcr POS*		
6	1	–	1	
	(analyzed below)			
4	6	1	7	
		(analyzed below)		
3	7	–	7	
2	14	3	17	49
1	25	7	32	76.6%
Total	53	11	64	
	82.8%	17.2%	100%	
All editorials	119	29	150	
(with/without *"on"*)	78.6%	19.3%	100% (2 edit. with final TMcr NEU)	

In summary, *"on"* has been found to represent equally two preponderant functions, *Le Monde* as a social actor (51.5%) and others, i.e. excluding *Le Monde* (45.6%). The quantitative analysis of the place of *"on"* in the argumentative hierarchical structure revealed that, in absolute numbers, *"on"* is used significantly more often in relation to negative speech acts. However, relatively (i.e. in relation to the percentages of positive and negative speech acts), *"on"* is not used significantly more or less in one case or the other. In comparison with the percentages of positive or negative editorials (according to their final text macrostructure), *"on"* (whatever its function) does not occur significantly more often in positive or negative editorials. The use of *"on"*-social actor and *"on"* not including *Le Monde* is remarkably similar in terms of place in the text hierarchical structure and in terms of the type of macrostructure (speech act, positive or negative orientation) they lead to or are in. Furthermore, *"on"* of either type has in general not been found to affect one type of speech act/macrostructure proportionally significantly more than another. This suggests that *Le Monde* does not purposely use *"on"* to emphasize its numerous criticisms, but rather that it takes advantage of *"on"*'s "power" whenever it feels the need. In other words, *"on"* functions as a general rhetorical tool. *"on"* is not used with a specific purpose except in one case: *"on"*-others (i.e. excluding *Le Monde*) affects proportionally more directives with a negative orientation. Thus, except for this last case, the power of *"on"* does not come from the manner in which it is used by editorialists but can be said to be inherent to its "indefinite nature".

2.4.2 "*On*"'s indefiniteness: Examples

The qualitative analysis of four editorials is given below to illustrate the power of *"on"*'s indefiniteness. The editorials are those with the most occurrences of any type of *"on"* with a final negative text macrostructure ("*Loi de la jungle en Guyane*") and with a final positive text macrostructure ("*Leçon danoise*"), and the ones with the most occurrences of *"on"*-social actor with a final negative text macrostructure ("*Le FMI et la Russie*") and with a final positive text macrostructure ("*L'Europe du cinéma*").

In "*Loi de la jungle en Guyane*" (The Law of the Jungle in Guyana), published on 7 July 2001, the seven instances of *"on"* represent powerful lawless "others" whom *Le Monde* contrasts with the powerless (French) State before calling for a change in policy (in the final text macrostructure). The situation is firmly set in the first paragraph (sentences 1 to 11) that defines the text theme. In four consecutive sentences (2 to 5), the "others" are presented as operating lawlessly on the French Republic's territory (sentence 1): "*on y tue*, [*on y*] *torture*, [*on y*] *massacre*, *on y mène des expéditions punitives*" (there, one kills, [one] tortures, [one] massacres, one leads punitive expeditions). Although this state of affairs has been going on for ten years

(sentence 6) and the State knows about it (sentence 7), the State cannot and does not want to put an end to it (sentences 8 and 9). This takes place in Guyana (sentence 10) and *Le Monde*, as a news provider, publishes a report to denounce this situation (sentence 11 – text theme). Here, it is important to note that it is general knowledge that numerous cases of criminal activities take place on French territory and always will, whatever the French State does; what makes the situation different and worse in this editorial is the "indefiniteness" of the perpetrators, who are furthermore portrayed as actors (*"on"* is always subject). Thus, *Le Monde* builds a firm basis for its rightful behaviour on the strong opposition it places between a dangerous *"on"*, made even more menacing by its "indefiniteness", and the highest legal authority (i.e. the State) that cannot, and even does not want to do anything. The position between this powerful criminal *"on"* and the powerless State is reinforced in the editorial's argumentation with more examples of *"on"* acting lawlessly and of the State doing nothing. A strong case having thus been established, *Le Monde* can shift from a personal position in the text theme ("*L'enquête que nous publions…*" [the report that we are publishing…]) to an impersonal position in the text macrostructure ("*il est temps de réviser une politique qui…*" [it is time to review a policy that…]) that provides a broader basis to its own standpoint. Thus, by its skillful use of *"on"*, *Le Monde* has facilitated the shift from its role as a news provider (text theme) to that of an advice-giver (text macrostructure).

Of the four instances of *"on"* in "*Leçon danoise*" (Danish Lesson), published on 30 September 2000, one theoretically represents everybody ("*qu'on ose l'avouer ou non*" [whether one dares recognize it or not]), two represent "others" (i.e. some of the eleven members of the European Union who chose to adopt the Euro), and one represents a group of which *Le Monde* could be (and very probably is) part ("*même si l'on peut regretter le choix…*" [even if one may regret the choice…]). The first instance of *"on"* (in "*qu'on ose l'avouer ou non*"), while logically embracing everybody, leads to a macrostructure talking about political elites, and thereby refers to their totality. The purpose of this *"on"* is thus to put together all members of the political elite without distinction whatever their positions on a particular issue. The two instances of *"on"* representing some members of the Union allow *Le Monde* to criticize their behaviour ("*les non-dits et autres ambiguïtés que l'on pratique*", "*on n'y a pas suffisamment mesuré, ou publiquement avoué*" ["what one leaves unsaid or ambiguous", "there, one has not sufficiently measured or publicly recognized"]) without naming them, thus not giving them a chance to defend themselves without at the same time recognizing their doings. Finally, the most ambiguous *"on"* appearing in "*même si l'on peut regretter le choix…*" (even if one may regret this choice), when placed in its context and co-text, is quite revealing of *"on"*'s strategical use. Indeed, *Le Monde* is in favour of the Euro. Thus, *Le Monde* is definitively part of this *"on"* and does (in a way) regret the Danish choice to reject the Euro as expressed in a paragraph theme. However, starting the paragraph argumentation on a broad and indefinite basis

with this *"on"* allows *Le Monde* to finish it also on a large and general basis in the paragraph macrostructure: "*mieux vaut rester hors de l'euro plutôt que…*" (it is better to stay out of the Euro zone rather than…). The repeated use of *"on"* whose indefiniteness permitted not to draw a clear line among members of the political elite, among members of the European Union, and between *Le Monde* and others helps *Le Monde* take a finely nuanced position: while it has publicly taken position in favour of the Euro, it does neither criticize nor even really regret its rejection by the Danish population: "*ce n'est pas un drame*" (it is not a catastrophe) as it says in the editorial's final text macrostructure.

"*Le FMI et la Russie*" (The IMF and Russia), published on 6 August 1999, contains six instances of *"on"*, each representing LM-social actor, in its first six sentences. These sentences are part either of the first paragraph ending with the text theme or of the second paragraph ending with the text macrostructure.[5] The first three uses (in sentences 1 and 2) describe the state of knowledge of *Le Monde* and others on the relationship between Russia and the IMF: "*on croyait tout savoir*" (one thought one knew everything), "*on en savait sans doute encore moins encore qu'on ne le croyait ou le craignait*" (without doubt one probably knew even less than one believed or feared). This naive ignorance shared by *Le Monde* must be offset, and sentence 3 affirms that those who were "blissfully ignorant" are nonetheless able to decipher what a Pricewaterhouse-Coopers report says: "*on sait le décrypter*" (one knows how to decipher it). These first three sentences lead to the first paragraph's macrostructure that functions as the text theme for the editorial and states how incriminating this report is for Russia as well as for the IMF. The editorial's argumentation is contained in the first two paragraphs. In the first, it starts with "we were wrong", and continues with "we are intelligent and we can learn"; in the second, it finishes with "this is what we have learned": "*on y découvre*" (in it one discovers) (sentence 5), "*on y apprend*" (from it one learns) (sentence 6). This sixth sentence, the editorial's text macrostructure, denounces the complicity of the IMF in the embezzlements of IMF funds by Russia. In this editorial, the use of a *"on"* that includes *Le Monde* and others allows *Le Monde* to share the responsibility of having been wrong (and thus lessens its lack of perspicacity), to assert its abilities without appearing unduly immodest, and in concert with others to accuse the IMF and Russia. Because of the very specialized content of the Pricewaterhouse Coopers report, there is no doubt that *Le Monde* and not any citizen is speaking in this editorial; the indefiniteness of *"on"*, however, gives *Le Monde* a more powerful voice.

5. This editorial represents one of the not so common cases when the text macrostructure is not in the last paragraph.

"*L'Europe du cinéma*" (Cinematographic Europe), published on 25 November 2000, celebrates the fact that the European Union allocated €400M to the European audiovisual sector. Three of the four *"on"*-social actor underline how the success of European cinema is visible: "*on le voit*" (one sees it) [text macrostructure], "*on le voit aussi*" (one sees it also) [text theme], "*on remarque*" (one notices) [text theme]. The last instance of *"on"*-social actor notes how a Spanish film is easily recognized as a European success: "*on peut rattacher*" (one can put in this category). In this editorial, the indefiniteness of *"on"* highlights how European films successfully cross national borders and thus underlines the importance of paying attention to European cinema.

While the quantitative analysis of the place of *"on"* in the text argumentative hierarchical structure did not reveal any specific use of *"on"*, the qualitative analysis of *"on"* has underlined how *"on"*'s indefiniteness exerts its power in combination with its place in the hierarchical structure.

2.5 Synthesis: A provisional definition of *Le Monde*'s editorials' genre

The above results of the (quantitative) study of structure, style and content pertain to the first step in Askehave and Swales' genre analysis (2001). Another component, 'purpose' (2.5.1), needs to be added to complete this first step and to lead to the second one, the provisional definition of *Le Monde*'s editorials' genre (2.5.2). Two examples (2.5.3) illustrate this genre and show how *Le Monde* defines its individual identity on the basis of its French collective identity.

2.5.1 The official purpose of *Le Monde*'s editorials

As stated in Chapter 1, genre is first and foremost defined in terms of the function/purpose of the text type. Editorials are usually defined as short pieces of writing that state the newspaper's position on topic it deems important (Albert 1989: 72). *Le Monde* (2002: 59) does not depart from this definition: it specifies that editorials are 90 lines long (400–500 words), and it is particularly clear about their function:

> *L'éditorial exprime la position du* Monde *ou sa réaction à propos d'un évènement marquant. À sa manière, concise, il n'hésite pas à porter la* «plume dans la plaie». *Cet article fait préalablement l'objet d'une discussion entre son auteur et la direction de la rédaction*
> *Remarque : L'éditorial, non signé, peut être modifié par la direction du journal sans l'aval de son auteur.*

> [Editorials express *Le Monde*'s position or its reaction to a notable event. In its way, and with conciseness, it is not afraid to "stir the pen into the wound". This article is first discussed by the author and the Editorial Head.
> Note: Unsigned editorials may be modified by the newspaper's Director without the author's permission.]

This official definition by *Le Monde* of its own editorials can now be compared with what *Le Monde* in fact does with its editorials as perceived through the synthesis of the above analyses of structure, style and content.

2.5.2 A provisional definition of editorials' genre in *Le Monde*

The analyses of structure, style and content focused on speech acts at the macrostructural level, complex speech acts representing the general line of argumentation, delimitation of the public spheres through the definition of the directives' addressees, positive and negative ATTITUDE values, and the professional roles in which *Le Monde*'s editorialists presented themselves. A comparison among the three thematic groups on Internal, European and Russian affairs with corresponding editorials on internal, European and external politics from the Random group allowed checking of the three thematic groups' representativity of *Le Monde*'s editorials on internal, European and external politics (with a cautionary note about European politics).

In general, each of the three thematic groups appears representative of *Le Monde*'s editorials on the same category of issues (internal, European, external) from the Random group. However, this is not in the case when positive and negative ATTITUDE values (at the macrostructural or text macrostructural levels) are considered. A very plausible explanation for this difference is given by the manner in which editorials were chosen for each thematic group. Indeed, the thematic groups are composed of editorials chosen for their saliency by their link with a front-page article (Internal group), or by their coverage of issues deemed particularly newsworthy at the time (institutional debates within the EU, Russian politics). Thus, it would seem more surprising if the thematic groups did not somewhat differ from the "norm" (as defined by editorials on the same category of issues in the Random group) than if they did.

The analysis of ATTITUDE values underlined the crucial reference role played by socio-cultural codes in *Le Monde*'s presentation and evaluation of events. Very rarely did *Le Monde*'s editorialists appeal directly to their readers' emotions. The majority of negative values in all groups gives evidence of *Le Monde*'s general critical stance, but the proportions of negative vs. positive values vary significantly

depending on the general category of issues (internal, European, external) and particular topics within it. Thus, the Internal group differs significantly from the editorials on internal politics of the Random group mostly by being less positive; and the Russia group differs significantly from the editorials on external politics of the Random group by being less positive and more negative. In this respect, saliency (as defined by the composition of the thematic groups) is linked to "bad news" and *Le Monde*'s criticism.

The speech act analysis revealed that *Le Monde*'s argumentation in its editorials is mostly based on constatives (i.e. on having the general audience share *Le Monde*'s beliefs) so that this support will give more force to *Le Monde*'s main and final point, and thus have specific (powerful) addressees follow *Le Monde*'s directives. A comparison among the three thematic groups suggests that the further away from France the power centre, the less *Le Monde* dares tell it directly what or what not to do, and the more negative statements it makes. In other words, *Le Monde* is not less shy in critically addressing foreign officials than national ones, but it makes sure not to enter into diplomatic incidents by infringing openly on their domestic affairs.

In their directives, *Le Monde*'s editorialists address those they mostly associate with decision-making power in the matters under discussion, i.e. the main actors in the debated situations. While these addressees do not completely delimit the extent of the relevant public sphere, they nonetheless roughly circumscribe it. It appears that the public spheres would be predominantly French for internal issues, European for European issues, and international for foreign (Russian) issues. As it is possible to conceive that *Le Monde* could address only the French public sphere to discuss issues on European or external politics, the results show that *Le Monde* sees itself as having a role at the national, European and international levels. Furthermore, as *Le Monde* interacts through its directives mostly with powerful officials from diverse institutions and very rarely with society, one could say that *Le Monde* puts itself at par with national, European, foreign, and international institutions.

It would thus appear that *Le Monde* has a concept of its place in society that is far from being insignificant. This seems confirmed by the great frequency with which editorialists present *Le Monde* as a social actor in its own name (73.6%), and not in its traditional journalistic role of news provider (20.2%). Because of the specific purpose of editorials (i.e. stating the media position and not "just" reporting), it is not particularly surprising that *Le Monde* does not mainly appear as a news provider, but the difference between the two roles is nonetheless noteworthy. This role of social actor is played for the most part under the name of *"on"* (60.7%). *Le Monde* plays with the indefiniteness of this personal pronoun to facilitate its shift from news provider to advice-giver, to give itself the means of taking a finely nuanced position, and to acquire a more powerful voice.

In summary, the combined analyses conducted in the proposed methodological framework for the study of editorials' genre reveal *Le Monde*'s editorials as:

> short argumentative texts that are developed by a media presenting itself as a national, European, and international social actor. At the macro-level, editorials are generally composed of constatives, most often containing a negative evaluation in reference to socio-cultural codes of values, and are followed by a directive. Editorials are addressed to recognized institutional actors on the national, European, and international levels both openly (by their directives) and covertly (through the effects of the media persuasive skills on the general audience). The more salient (in terms of extend of coverage) the issue dealt with in the editorial, the more negative the evaluation appears; and the further away from France the issue, the less openly directive (in terms of speech acts) but more negative (i.e. covertly "directive") *Le Monde* tends to be.

According to Askehave and Swales' "text-driven procedure for genre analysis" (2001: 207), the above definition of *Le Monde*'s editorials is only provisional. It would need to be reexamined and eventually revised after a context analysis. At this stage, it can nonetheless be compared with *Le Monde*'s official definition of its editorials. It appears that the genre of *Le Monde*'s editorials, as provisionally defined above, does not contradict *Le Monde*'s own, traditional definition. However, it certainly goes further by underlining the type of involvement *Le Monde* assumes as a direct actor on the socio-political stage at various levels, i.e. *Le Monde*'s concept of itself.

Two examples, one on external politics and one on internal politics from the Random group, illustrate *Le Monde*'s type of argumentation and its involvement in the public sphere through its editorials.

2.5.3 Examples: *Le Monde*'s individual identity on the background of its French collective identity

Both editorials are examples of the complex speech act: constative leading to a final directive with a negative evaluation. The first one deals with external politics and embodies the value of Fraternity, i.e Solidarity, that is part of the motto of the French Republic and is central in *Le Monde*'s list of professed values (Monde 2002: 6). The second example concerns a matter of internal politics, more specifically the question of construction of national identity in a democracy. Both editorials defend standpoints that are far from being consensual either in the international or the national public sphere. The editorials' main elements in its hierarchical structure (i.e. themes and macrostructures) as uncovered by the coherence analysis are used below to provide "methodical" summaries (as opposed to "intuitive") at different levels.

Published on 23 September 1999, a few days after the arrival of the UN multinational force in East Timor, "*Nord-Sud : la fracture*" [North-South: the split] very firmly takes a position in favor of the right of intervention on humanitarian grounds. A two-level analysis of the editorial reveals its argumentative strategy.

The first-level analysis follows the progression of argumentation at the all-sentence level,[6] that is, whatever the sentence's hierarchical level but with a closer look at the themes and macrostructures. In the first paragraph, *Le Monde* acknowledges the existence of a dangerous and unhealthy split [Th] between North (rich Western States) and South (a number of African, Asian and Near-East States) [Mcr] that has been visible for some years [Th] but that has just openly appeared at the 54th session of the United Nations General Assembly [Mcr]. This split is defined by the positions taken by the North and South towards the right of humanitarian intervention (respectively, for and against). These positions are exposed in the second paragraph for the North [Mcr], and in the third for the South [Th] that criticizes the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the UN intervention in East Timor [Mcr]. In the fourth paragraph, *Le Monde* explains how these two interventions differ (the NATO one in Kosovo was decided against Serbia's will and without the UN agreement, while the UN one was agreed on by Indonesia and decided by the Security Council), and takes note of the South's mistrust of the UN [Th]. *Le Monde* agrees with the South that the North does not use the same moral criteria in its reactions to politically strong States (i.e. Russia and China) [Mcr]. In the fifth and final paragraph, *Le Monde* uses this criticism of the South against the North to imply that the North undermines its own position by its attitude [Th]. From the beginning of the editorial until this point, the editorial's argumentation has been developed in a rather well balanced manner: the opposing positions have been exposed; reason and fault have been found in both. In the remainder of the fifth paragraph, *Le Monde* adds to this balance (that gives an impression of objectivity) the weight of the universal (and therefore not objectionable) principle of peaceful settlement of conflicts to impart the last sentence, with no explicit addressee and thus apparently addressed to all, with even more force: no good arguments can be found against the right of intervention on humanitarian grounds [Mcr].

The second-level analysis takes place at the macrostructural level[7] of the editorial's hierarchical structure. With a negative evaluation, the two editorial's text themes (both CON neg) assert the opposing positions between rich Western States and a number of African, Asian and Near-East States. The argumentation itself is presented in four macrostructures. The North (i.e. West) position is shown

6. The coherence analysis is conducted on the basis of all sentences.

7. The coherence analysis is conducted on the basis of all macrostructures only.

under a positive light (CON pos); it is followed by criticisms of the North's attitude formulated by the South (two successive macrostructures – CON neg), criticisms to which *Le Monde* partly subscribes (CON neg). This development is concluded in the text macrostructure (DIR neg – see explanation below): no good arguments can be found against the right of humanitarian intervention. Thus, while the editorial first gives the impression that it deals with a general world issue (North and South), the development of the argumentation shows that, in fact, it is the North (more precisely, its attitude as opposed to its positions) that is being discussed. In this light, the conclusion takes a more defined meaning: *Le Monde* categorically tells the West that it does not have any good argument not to intervene. The specific cases in question are China (Tibet) and Russia (the second Chechen war had just begun).

When combined, the first-level and second-level analyses underline the skillfulness of *Le Monde*'s argumentation. Indeed, the editorial under the guise of generality, objectivity and with the weight of universal principles that are embodied in the French Republic's motto, leads its readers to agree with its injunction to the West that is far from being generally accepted: intervene whenever the humanitarian situation makes it necessary, whatever the political weight of the involved State.

The second example, "*Les harkis et la mémoire*" [Harkis and memory] (8 February 2001), deals with a matter that has deeply marked French society and that is still very much an object of malaise today: the war in Algeria. Harkis, i.e. Algerians who fought within the ranks of the French army against the Algerian National Liberation Front during the war of independence, were murdered in great number after the withdrawal of the French troops from Algeria in 1962. Those who escaped to France and their descendants found there only very bad living conditions, discrimination, and social exclusion. Over the years, their situation improved but far from enough. In 1997, a few Harkis went on a hunger strike to publicize their plight, but they still did not receive any official acknowledgment from the French State of its wrongdoing. On 11 November 1999, Harkis were forbidden to lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Paris and, in June 2000 during an official visit to France, the Algerian President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, refused them the right to return to Algeria. It was in a context of growing resentment that, about a year before the presidential elections,[8] the right-wing French President with the support of the left-wing government announced on 6 February 2001 that a Day of National Tribute to the Harkis would be held. *Le Monde*'s editorial opposed this National Day and asked instead for a clear and complete condemnation of colonial wars.

8. It must be remembered that at that time, the French presidential mandate was seven years.

At the all-sentence level, the editorial's very first sentence asserts that the duty of memory consists in looking at history face to face and in telling as much as possible of this history without omitting anything for alleged reasons of State security [ThMcr]. Still in the first paragraph, *Le Monde* then recalls that French people have already started looking at what happened during the Algerian war of independence, including the use of torture by both sides. In the first sentence of the second paragraph, it stresses how this debate on torture in Algeria is part of a necessary work on memory [ThMcr], as much as is the rightful recognition of French wrongdoing to the Harkis [Th] because they have suffered from racism, they have been marginalized and ostracized as if France had disowned them after using them [Mcr]. In the third paragraph, *Le Monde* states that collective memory, that represents the ground for a nation's identity, is necessarily diverse and contradictory [Th]. However, an official commemoration of this memory cannot be dissociated from its content, and not all painful content deserves to be commemorated [Mcr]. The fourth paragraph develops this idea in three sentences. Celebrating a Day of National Tribute to the Harkis would amount to defending a colonial war that was one of the Republic's errors [Th]. It might endanger France's relations with independent Algeria [Mcr], and in France it merely serves electoral purposes as a token gesture towards those whom the debate on torture made uncomfortable [Mcr]. The editorial ends with a single-sentence paragraph: "Tomorrow's Republic should rather be constructed on the clear and complete condemnation of colonial wars" [ThMcr]. Just as in the case of the previous editorial, this all-sentence analysis makes *Le Monde*'s argumentation appear well-balanced: after a start that promises to be open to all, the side in favor of the issue is first considered, and then it is the turn of the side against. The conclusion that follows is made all the more difficult to oppose by the fact that it flows naturally from an apparently fair argumentation.

At the macrostructural level, the editorial starts with a definition of the duty of memory: it consists of looking at history face to face and of telling as much as possible of this history without omitting anything for alleged reasons of State security [TTh – CON neu]. The argumentation is then developed in three macrostructures. A renewed debate on torture in Algeria is part of a necessary work on memory [Mcr – CON pos]. It is true that the Harkis have suffered from racism, they have been marginalized and ostracized as if France had disowned them after using them [Mcr – CON neg]. However, an official commemoration of this memory cannot be dissociated from its content, and not all painful content deserves to be commemorated [Mcr – CON neg]. The editorial's three last sentences conclude: this commemoration might endanger France's relations with independent Algeria [TMcr – CON neg], and in France it merely serves electoral purposes as a token gesture towards those whom the debate on torture made uncomfortable [TThMcr – CON neg]. Finally, *Le Monde* tells the French Republic how to construct

French national identity: "on the clear and complete condemnation of colonial wars" [TThMcr – DIR neg]. This macrostructural analysis reveals clearly what is truly important for *Le Monde*: good relations with former colonies that became independent States, and strong condemnation of colonialism; anything else is merely bad politics.

The juxtaposition of these all-sentence and macrostructural analyses show how *Le Monde* manoeuvres between two seemingly opposite causes: the impossibility of not recognizing the plight of the Harkis who fought with the French army (unless one is ready to throw away values of fraternity, solidarity and justice, part of the French collective identity), and the very strong position that *Le Monde* took against the war in Algeria and for Algerian independence.

These two examples illustrate how the general structure of *Le Monde*'s editorials serves their purpose, but they also show the key role of socio-cultural codes, i.e. *Le Monde*'s values. In its editorials, *Le Monde* constructs an argumentation with constatives that evaluate, mostly negatively, situations and people, before it tells specific addressees what to do. At the all-sentence level, the argumentation progresses in a balanced and nuanced manner, and relies on values that are part of the French common cultural ground. This apparent objectivity and this appeal to feelings of national belonging aim to get readers to accept the editorial's conclusion as the natural, logical one. This conclusion, however, when considered in the light of the argumentation at the macrostructural level, rests on an interpretation of the situation that belongs to *Le Monde*, in other words, that reflects its specific, individual identity within the French public sphere. The combination of all these elements explains how *Le Monde*'s editorials appear at the same time so "very French" (as seen from outside of France – collective identity) and "very *Le Monde*" (as seen from within France – individual identity). Part of "being *Le Monde*" consists in participating actively in public debates, and editorials are significant means (albeit not the only ones) to this end.

As was seen above, the analysis of the complex speech acts represented by the editorials, completed by the analysis of the directives' addressees and by the roles in which *Le Monde* presented itself certainly uncovered the concept *Le Monde* has of its role in the national, European and international public spheres. It showed very clearly that *Le Monde* as a media is not only a place where some public sphere's interactions can take place, but also that *Le Monde* is a full participant in public spheres with its values and positions. The analysis also revealed the importance of socio-cultural values, but it did not focus on them. In the constructivist approach, identity is considered as being constructed through interactions. What the above analysis of complex speech acts permitted is the study of "actions"; the "inter-" part still has to be investigated. This requires the study of what *Le Monde*'s values

and positions are in connection with the values and positions of other participants in the same public sphere. This is where the "context analysis", third step in Askehave and Swales' "text-driven procedure for genre analysis" (2001: 207), comes into place. It is presented in the next three chapters, one each on internal politics, European politics, and external politics.

CHAPTER 3

French institutional issues and *Le Monde*

This chapter is the first part of the editorials' qualitative communicative analysis that consists first of a media-centric frame analysis and second of a description of interactions in the public sphere for the analysis of *Le Monde*'s interactions in society according to the Orchestra model (see 1.1.2). With the goal of describing the collective performance, the model raises the following questions: who are the players; what is each player's part and role *vis-à-vis* the others; which system of interactions is in place; how are the players synchronized; how is their behaviour regulated? In a media-centric perspective, this approach is conducted with the definition of the editorials' substantive frame (Entman 2004) and a description of the different voices (i.e. actors) appearing in the argumentation. In the society-centric perspective, the interactions between the public sphere's actors appearing on TV news, in the Parliament (for information on the French political system, see Appendix 6) or through the collective voice of opinion polls, are first described in detail. The combination of the two perspectives then gives an account of *Le Monde*'s positions and actions in context. However, before this can be done, it is necessary to start with a brief introduction of the debated French institutional issues.

In order to understand the particular political climate in France in the period 1999–2001, it is useful to go back to the origins of the French Fifth Republic. In reaction to the very high level of governmental instability and the institutional paralysis that ensued under the Third and Fourth Republics, because of their parliamentary regimes and electoral systems, the constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958) instituted a mixed regime, combining parliamentary and presidential features, and put into place a new electoral system that allowed multipartism but also strongly favoured the emergence of two dominant currents, the "left" and the "right" (see Appendix 6).[1] It thereby allowed diversity while restraining the dangers associated with rapidly changing political alliances. At the instigation of General

1. However, the electoral system does not necessarily result in a right-left opposition during the second and final round of the presidential elections, as shown by the 2002 elections that opposed Jacques Chirac (RPR-right) and Jean-Marie Le Pen (FN-ultra right).

de Gaulle who was President of the Republic at the time, a 1962 referendum that a number of jurists called unconstitutional approved the principle of presidential elections by direct universal suffrage (Article 6). This provided the office of the President with an added authority that enabled de Gaulle in a 1964 press conference to describe the President's role as that of a guide who defines the general lines of the Nation's politics, and who assigns to the government, in particular the Prime Minister, the responsibility of implementing the President's policy.[2] In March 1986, the legislative elections gave the right-wing RPR-UDF coalition a relative majority. Two weeks before the final results, the socialist President had declared that he would not relinquish his constitutional power of nominating the Prime Minister, and that he would choose a member of the majority.[3] Thus started a "cohabitation" period between a President (François Mitterrand) and a Prime Minister (Jacques Chirac) of opposed political orientations. This first cohabitation period (1986–1988) defined a new institutional practice based on a strict reading of the Constitution: the Prime Minister and his government implement their program under the critical eye of the President who at any time may resign or dissolve the National Assembly (i.e. lower chamber of the Parliament) and call for new elections. While far from being easy, the first cohabitation period (1986–1988) and the second one (1993–1995) were expected and had been thus more or less prepared in contrast to the third, much longer one (1997–2002), that followed a surprised dissolution of the National Assembly. The ensuing elections gave the left-wing opposition an absolute majority. As this happened in the third year of Jacques Chirac's seven-year presidential mandate, the right-wing President and the socialist Prime Minister (Lionel Jospin) were doomed to cohabit for five years, the length of the legislative mandate, until the end of Chirac's presidency, i.e. until the time when both would face their electors in the legislative and eventually presidential elections.

The two-year study period (1999–2001) begins in the third year of the third and longest cohabitation, when it started taking a markedly worse turn with the

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2. "[*L*]*es Conseils et les entretiens sont là pour permettre au chef de l'Etat de définir à mesure l'orientation de la politique nationale et aux membres du Gouvernement, à commencer par le Premier, de faire connaître leurs points de vue, de préciser leur action, de rendre compte de l'exécution.*" *Conférence de presse du général de Gaulle* – 31 January 1964. URL: www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/cohabitation/de-gaulle-1964.shtml; accessed: 30 July 2008.

3. "*Le Président de la République nomme qui il veut. Il doit naturellement se placer en conformité avec la volonté populaire. (...) Je devrai m'adresser à une personnalité de la majorité pour conduire le gouvernement. (...) Personne ne désignera le Premier ministre à ma place, croyez-moi*" (TF1, 2 March 1986). URL: www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/cohabitation/campagne.shtml; accessed 30 July 2008.

President and the Prime Minister attacking each other publicly, and it ends one year before the presidential and legislative elections. The repeated mention of Jacques Chirac's name in a number of politico-financial scandals contributed to the tense political climate. The question of his presidential immunity was raised a number of times starting in August 1998. As President of the Republic, he enjoyed immunity until the end of his term. Thus, unless re-elected President in 2002, he would have to face criminal charges at that time.[4] The affair culminated with the publication of Méry's posthumous confessions by *Le Monde* on 21 September 2000[5] (i.e. three days before the important constitutional referendum on the reduction of the presidential mandate from seven to five years). Jean-Claude Méry, a property developer, had raised funds for the RPR (*Rassemblement pour la République*) led by Jacques Chirac from 1976 to 1994. In the videotape containing his confessions,[6] Méry not only described in detail the RPR's illegal fundraising but also explicitly stated Chirac's direct involvement in these activities. The scandal linked to Méry's tape did not stop there. Two days after *Le Monde*'s publication of the tape's transcripts, the magazine *L'Express* revealed that Méry's tax lawyer, who also worked for the journalist who made the tape, had given the original tape in the summer of 1998 to the former socialist finance Minister, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, in exchange for an important tax-break for one of his famous clients. Asked about this, Strauss-Kahn answered he had never watched the tape (because he did not think it was important and at the time he did not have a suitable video player) and he did not remember where he had placed it. This was presented publicly as a scandal involving the left (the Prime Minister's side) contained in a scandal involving the right (the President's side).

Issues concerning the institutions of the Fifth Republic (i.e. cohabitation, independence of the Public Prosecutor's Office from the Executive, length of the presidential mandate, order of the presidential and legislative elections, presidential immunity) were chosen for the qualitative analysis because of their prominence on the political stage during the period under study. First, they are presented as

4. On 10 October 2001, the "*Cour de Cassation*" (i.e. highest civil Court of Appeal) ended the juridical uncertainty about the Head of State's penal status, and stated in a binding decision that the Head of State enjoys immunity from prosecution until the end of his presidential mandate. He can appear as a witness, but he cannot be summoned.

5. *Le Monde*, 22 September 2000. *Le Monde* is dated the day after its publication and availability in Paris.

6. Jean-Claude Méry made the tape in May 1996 during his investigation of illegal fundraising "*pour le cas où il m'arriverait quelque chose*" [in case something happened to [him]]. He died of cancer in June 1999.

they appear in *Le Monde*'s editorials (3.1), and then as they are discussed by the Parliament, presented on public TV and thought about by the public opinion (3.2). The conclusion (3.3) places *Le Monde*'s positions within the French societal context. This descriptive part of the analysis is conceptualised in Chapter 6. Additional background information on French political life is given in Appendix 6.

3.1 The "institutional issues" in *Le Monde's* editorials

From a qualitative media-centric perspective, *Le Monde*'s positions on the institutional issues under analysis are exposed through their substantive frames (3.1.1) and the presentation of actors involved in the editorials' argumentation (3.1.2). A synthesis follows (3.1.3).

3.1.1 Substantive frames

The substantive frames (Entman 2004: 24) in which *Le Monde* exposed the institutional issues are established on the basis of the editorials' macrostructures (i.e. propositional content of the sentences most likely to remain in long-term memory). The frames are presented in Table 3.1 on the institutional issues *per se*, and in Table 3.2 on Méry's affair that is connected with institutional issues.

In the matter of institutional issues *per se* (Table 3.1), the wording and application of the 1958 Constitution and its 1962 amendment (i.e. election of the President by direct universal suffrage) resulting in a two-headed Executive are in *Le Monde*'s opinion the main cause for the problems experienced on the internal political stage, i.e. the fights between the President and his Prime Minister of opposed political orientation in a cohabitation period and the "sacrosanctity" with which the office of President is treated. To solve these problems, *Le Monde* enjoins French elites to engage in a meaningful debate that goes to the heart of the problem, as it claims to have already started with the publication of five constitutional experts' opinions in May 1997. In particular, *Le Monde* supports the idea of a five-year presidential mandate, of holding the legislative elections after the presidential elections, and of a better separation between the Executive (i.e. Ministry of Justice) and the Judiciary (in this case, the Public Prosecutor's office).

As if the difficulties arising from the Constitution and its application were not enough, the actions of French politicians were far from above reproach as demonstrated by the Méry affair (Table 3.2). In this matter of illegal fundraising concerning mostly the right but also the left, *Le Monde* strongly calls for the judicial pursuit of all of those involved, including the President, even if it were to necessitate an amendment to the Constitution. *Le Monde* harshly criticizes the French political class and makes it responsible for the citizens' lack of trust and

interest in political life. It calls for a renewal of political life and public critical scrutiny of it, as it itself is already engaged in.

The frame function, "endorsing remedy", concerning the issues of the institutions (Table 3.1) and of Méry's tape (Table 3.2), is addressed to the entire French political class, in particular to those with higher functions and, therefore, responsibilities (e.g. Chirac as President of the Republic). *Le Monde* is included in this circle, but it presents itself in contrast to the other addressees as already doing its best to fulfill its responsibilities.

Table 3.1. French institutions' substantive frame (Entman 2004: 24)

Function of Frame	***Focus of Frame***	
	Issues/Events	***Political Actors (Individuals, Groups, Nations)***
Defining problematic effects/conditions	– Cohabitation: fight between the two heads of the Executive (President and Prime Minister)	– Chirac and his party (RPR); Jospin and his party (PS)
	– "Sacrosanctity" of the office of President	– Chirac, President of *Assemblée Nationale*,
Identifying cause/agent	– Constitution of the 5th Republic: two-headed Executive; President elected for 7 years by direct universal suffrage; Prime Minister issued from results of legislative elections every 5 years	– General de Gaulle (1962 referendum)
Endorsing remedy	– Debate on institutions and democracy in France	– *Le Monde*, political class
	– Constitution: change 7-year presidential term to a 5-year term	– Chirac (organization of referendum)
	– Presidential elections to precede the legislative elections	
	– Constitutional amendment: severance of the links between the Public Prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Justice; call for referendum	– Chirac (organization of referendum)
Conveying moral judgment	– French politicians are neither appropriately debating nor trying to find solutions for institutional, social and economic problems	

Table 3.2. Méry affair's substantive frame

Function of Frame	*Focus of Frame*	
	Issues/Events	*Political Actors (Individuals, Groups, Nations)*
Defining problematic effects/conditions	– Illegal fundraising for political parties (in particular, RPR)	– Right and left political parties
	– Chirac's incrimination in the affair of the RPR's illegal fundraising in Méry's videotape	– Chirac, RPR, *Le Monde*
	– Strauss-Kahn's non-disclosure of Méry's tape	– Strauss-Kahn, Chirac, Jospin, *Le Monde, L'Express*,
Identifying cause/agent	– Political system in general	– Right, left
Endorsing remedy	– Judgment of both affairs (i.e. involving Chirac and Strauss-Kahn)	
	– Constitutional amendment: President's answerability to ordinary courts for common law infractions	– Socialist Party (proposition of the)
	– Renewal of the political system	– French political class (right and left)
	– Politicians involved in illegal affairs must leave political life	
	– Critical look at the political class	– *Le Monde*
Conveying moral judgment	– French political class is responsible for citizens' lack of trust and interest in political life	

3.1.2 Actors

Le Monde's argumentation is based on and results from the interactions between the social actors it includes in its editorials (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). In the matter of Méry's tape, a survey of the mentioned actors and their positive, negative or neutral presentation reveals that *Le Monde*'s critical gaze focuses mainly, but not exclusively on the two heads of the Executive, Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin. While both undergo *Le Monde*'s criticism, Jacques Chirac is the one most often blamed and, in this corpus, he is never presented under a favourable light. As to the other actors, be they from left or right, their input into the debate is most often exposed in a non-partisan manner when considered at the micro-level (i.e. intra-sententially), but they function as pawns in *Le Monde*'s argumentation towards its (non-neutral)

goals at the macro-level. The only actors to be presented only positively are the TV journalist, Arnaud Hamelin, who provided a copy of Méry's tape to *Le Monde*, and *Le Monde* who published the tape transcripts. The analysis from *Le Monde*'s editorials below capitalizes on their hierarchical structures as revealed by their coherence analysis.[7]

The day *Le Monde* published the tape transcripts, anticipating strong reactions, it justified its decision in its editorial, "*Les raisons d'une publication*" (22 September 2000). The editorial recognizes that Méry's accusations against President Chirac, who at the time of the events was Mayor of Paris, are partly unverifiable (TTh). However, as the affair has to do with the functioning of democracy in France, *Le Monde* considers it its duty to assume the risks inherent to the publication of the document (TMcr), "*il est de notre devoir de les* [*risques*] *assumer*". Before *Le Monde* arrives to this conclusion, each of its arguments (i.e. each Mcr) points to the newspaper's sense of responsibility: *Le Monde* has already in the past underlined the key role played by Méry in the affair ("*Le Monde le soulignait déjà* ["*Jean-Claude Méry est reconnu à peu près unanimement comme l'homme-clé des collectes de fonds sur lesquelles enquêtait le juge Halphen*"]"); *Le Monde* attests to the undeniably historical value of the document ("*le document présente à nos yeux une incontestable valeur historique*"); *Le Monde* did not choose when the document would come into its hands, i.e. it cannot be accused of coming to the rescue of Lionel Jospin when he is having difficulty ("*nous n'avons pas choisi le moment où ce document nous est parvenu*"); and finally, the content of the document is confirmed (i.e. validated) by another source as also published in *Le Monde* ("*le partage qu'il* [*Méry*] *raconte* […] *est confirmé par le socialiste Gérard Monate, dans son témoignage au* Monde").

Having thus firmly established its leading role, *Le Monde* can afford to only mention it *en passant* (i.e. not in a Mcr) when it strongly calls in "*Tous concernés*" (27 September 2000) for the legal investigation not only of the "affair within the affair", as Strauss-Kahn's possession and non-disclosure of Méry's tape was called, but also of Chirac's involvement as alleged in the tape, despite his presidential status (TTh-Mcr). To sustain the validity of its demand, *Le Monde* presents all involved primary

7. The coherence analysis is exposed in detail in Appendix 3. This logico-semantic analysis of coherence brings to the fore "macrostructures" (i.e. Mcr: sentences at the paragraph level that mark the ending point of the paragraph argumentation and are most likely to remain in long-term memory) and "text macrostructures" (i.e. TMcr: sentences at the text level that mark the ending point of the text argumentation and are most likely to remain in long-term memory). It also allows identification of "themes" (i.e. Th: sentences at the paragraph level that indicates the "aboutness" of the paragraph and marks the starting point of the paragraph argumentation), and "text themes" (i.e. TTh: sentences at the text level that indicates the "aboutness" of the text and marks the starting point of the text argumentation).

(Strauss-Kahn, Chirac) and secondary (Jospin) actors, in a negative light, but especially Chirac's circle which it accuses of trying to eradicate the affair of Méry's tape by the affair of Strauss-Kahn's possession of the tape. Chirac is accused of having declared war between the two Executive Heads, and Jospin's apparent lack of reaction is blamed as inappropriate because of his status as Prime Minister, because of all parties' participation in the benefits of illegal fundraising (TMcr), and because silence would be tantamount to complicity (TThMcr). The darker the actors are presented, the more laudable *Le Monde*'s actions appear.

However, most of the time in the construction of its argumentation, *Le Monde* presents the actors in a seemingly neutral manner. For example, in "*L'aveu*" (29 September 2000), a number of voices are orchestrated to bring readers to the conclusion that no amnesty can be envisaged for the corrupt practices that have been admitted: "*Face à une telle réalité* [*pratiques corruptrices*]*, évoquer une amnistie est tout simplement hors sujet*" (TMcr). These corrupt practices (i.e. illegal political fundraising) are presented in the terms of three prominent officials of the RPR, party of the President Chirac:

Qu'a dit Alain Juppé, ancien premier ministre de Jacques Chirac?	What did Alain Juppé, Jacques Chirac's former Prime Minister, say?
Qu'a dit Patrick Devedjian, porte-parole du RPR?	What did Patrick Devedjian, the RPR spokesman, say?
Qu'a dit Philippe Séguin, ancien président du RPR et candidat de ce parti à la mairie de Paris?	What did Philippe Séguin, RPR former president and RPR candidate for the Paris mayorship, say?

Their words introduced in the most neutral manner (what did they say?) and in quotation marks are then contrasted with Chirac's previous labeling of Méry's statements as lies and calumnies. With this presentation of voices, much more than merely accusing Chirac of lying, *Le Monde* is showing how Chirac is lying: a subjective evaluation is replaced with (the construction of) a fact.

For many (lay people), nothing could be more objective than a poll. *Le Monde* uses a SOFRES poll (see below, 3.2.5.3) to introduce French people as participants into the debate ("*L'image d'une démocratie*", 5 October 2000), and to express their disillusionment towards politicians:

le sondage de la SOFRES que publie Le Monde *atteste, au-delà de toute attente, que décidément rien ne va plus entre les citoyens et leurs élus.* (TTh) *Aussi les Français sont-ils tentés de s'en* [*système politique*] *détourner ou de porter un jugement sévère sur ceux qui l'incarnent.* (TMcr)	the SOFRES poll that *Le Monde* publishes attests beyond any expectation that really things do not work any more between citizens and their elected representatives. Therefore, French people are tempted to distance themselves from or judge severely those who represent this political system.

The political class, and first among them Chirac and Jospin, is thus given a severe warning: listen to the voice of French citizens and act to renew democracy:

C'est un défi lancé à tous pour que la démocratie retrouve en France une meilleure image. (TThMcr)

it is a challenge to all for democracy to recover a better image in France.

In "*Le prix des idées*" (13 December 2000), the treasurers of two right-wing (RPR, PR) and one left-wing (PS) parties are directly quoted to convince readers, who uncharacteristically had been addressed personally in the first two sentences of the editorial ("[…] *ou bien vous ne croyez plus* […], *ou bien vous continuez de penser* […]"), that the insulting manner with which they all have been treated by politicians warrants *Le Monde*'s conclusion: all those involved in illegal fund-raising must quit political life forever ("*ils doivent définitivement quitter la vie publique*" – TMcr). This general judgment must be understood with *Le Monde*'s description of the situation in mind:

Dans les coulisses de la scène où ils s'affrontaient en apparence, des élus de droite et de gauche, sous l'égide d'un RPR en position de force, s'entendaient cordialement pour truquer des appels d'offres d'intérêt public afin de bénéficier de dons privés des entreprises.

Behind the scenes where they were apparently fighting, elected officials from the right and from the left, under the guidance of a dominant RPR, came to a friendly agreement in their falsification of public tenders so that they could receive private donations from companies.

The gravity of the situation is reinforced with the additional information that all events took place after a long debate on the financing of political parties had concluded and resulted in the adoption of new legal regulations voted by the Parliament. Thus, "irrefutable" facts, in the form of the treasurers' direct quotes introduced in a neutral manner ("*dit*" [says], "*résume*" [summarizes], "*précise*" [specifies]), constitute the "objective" firm ground for *Le Monde*'s call for the definitive retirement from politics of right and left-wing politicians, including certainly President Chirac and perhaps Prime Minister Jospin.

When it comes to institutional matters, *Le Monde* still presents Chirac, Jospin and the majority of the political class in a negative light in its orchestration of different voices, but it also presents positively the former right-wing president, Giscard d'Estaing, and Jospin. It continues to present itself positively as well as the five constitutional experts who offered their positions on its pages, and a few other media. Most of the actors, including those just mentioned, except for Chirac, are presented in a neutral manner. Thus, while *Le Monde* certainly uses its critical mind to look at both Chirac's and Jospin's actions according to its concept of its role ("*il* [*Le Monde*] *entend aujourd'hui continuer d'exercer son esprit critique à l'égard de Jacques Chirac comme de Lionel Jospin*" – in "*Les raisons d'une publication*", 22 September 2000), Jacques Chirac appears the one who garners the most unfavourable reviews.

In "*Référendum pour la justice*" (20 January 2000), Chirac is portrayed as defeated by his own political friends in the debate on the reform of the judicial system ("*ce sont ses propres amis politique qui la* [*modification constitutionnelle*] *rendent impossible*"). In *Le Monde*'s eyes, the opposition of the majority of right-wing politicians demonstrates again how isolated Chirac is (Mcr). It is not only that these right-wing politicians do not want the Public Prosecutor's Office to be independent from the Minister of Justice; the reform of the constitution failed also because of the institutional malfunctioning due to the cohabitation (TMcr).

A solution presented for the prevention of other eventual cases of cohabitation was the shortening of the seven-year presidential mandate to a five-year term. In "*Le quinquennat, enfin!*" (12 May 2000), *Le Monde* prides itself in having reopened the debate in May 1997 with the publication of five constitutional experts' opinions on the topic (Mcr). A five-year presidential mandate is favored by former President, Giscard d'Estaing, and by Jospin. However, Chirac is not only presented as being opposed to it, but also as somebody who cannot be relied on:

Ainsi, en 1995, Jacques Chirac avait dit qu'il n'était pas contre [*le quinquennat*], *avant de décréter aussitôt que la question n'était «pas d'actualité».*	Thus, in 1995, Jacques Chirac had said that he was not against the five-year mandate, but he added right away that the question was not "on the agenda".
M. Chirac a expliqué, le 14 juillet 1999, qu'il était finalement hostile à cette réforme.	Mr. Chirac explained on 14 July 1999 that he was after all against this reform.

Chirac's turnaround is further underlined in the very first sentence of "*Le quinquennat malgré lui*" (7 June 2000):

Jacques Chirac s'est engagé dans la voie d'une réforme de la Constitution à laquelle il se disait opposé il y a moins d'un an.	Jacques Chirac is undertaking a constitutional reform that he opposed less than a year ago.

It is amplified a few sentences later in the next paragraph:

Préoccupé de minimiser son propre revirement plutôt que de le justifier en détaillant les mérites du quinquennat, le chef de l'État a tenu un langage paradoxal et désinvolte.	More concerned with downplaying his own turnaround than with explaining the advantages of a five-year mandate, the Head of State talked in a paradoxical and offhand manner.

To Chirac's condescension towards an amendment to the constitution for the adoption of a five-year presidential mandate,

Il reste que le quinquennat mérite mieux que la condescendance avec laquelle M. Chirac l'a traité lundi soir.	In any case, the question of a five-year mandate deserves more than the condescending manner with which Chirac talked about it on Monday evening.

Le Monde concludes by expressing its own earnest commitment to democracy:

Il [le débat parlementaire sur le quinquennat] doit devenir un vrai débat sur les institutions et l'approfondissement de la démocratie. (TMcr)

The parliamentary debate on the five-year mandate must become an authentic debate on the institutions and the progress of democracy.

"*Immunité présidentielle*" (25 May 2001) discusses another institutional debate, that of the presidential judicial status. In *Le Monde*'s terms, the numerous mentions of the President's name in relation to illegal affairs involving the city of Paris when Chirac was its Mayor combined with the presidential immunity before ordinary courts have resulted in an untenable situation ("*situation détestable*"), i.e. an affront to democracy ("*entorse à la démocracie*" – TTh). According to the Constitution and, as reminded by the Constitutional Court and by Chirac (quoted directly), the President can be tried by the High Court of Justice but only for cases of high treason. As the affairs in which Chirac's name was mentioned cannot qualify as high treason, *Le Monde* finds it "logical" to support a socialist proposal for a constitutional reform that would allow for ordinary courts to try a President in common law cases (Mcr). This would provide a way out of the existing dead-end (TMcr).

Table 3.3. Actors appearing in internal policy (institutional questions) editorials

Presentation	Right	Left	Other
Positive	Giscard d'Estaing	Lionel Jospin	*Le Monde*, experts constitutionnels (Guy Carcassonne, Olivier Duhamel, Yves Mény, Hugues Portelli, Georges Vedel), media
Negative	Jacques Chirac	Lionel Jospin, Jacques Delors	Majorité des parlementaires, plupart des politiques concernée, certains juges
Neutral	Giscard d'Estaing, Josselin de Rohan, Jean-Louis Debré, Michèle Alliot-Marie, Jacques Chirac	Arnaud Montebourg, Robert Hue, Jean-Marc Ayrault	Interlocuteurs de Jacques Chirac et Lionel Jospin, Jeune roi du Maroc, Noël, Mamère, président de l'Assemblée nationale, les juges, Conseil constitutionnel

Table 3.4. Actors appearing in internal policy (Méry) editorials

	Right	Left	Other
Positive			Journaliste de télévision Arnaud Hamelin (aff. Méry), *Le Monde*,
Negative	Entourage de Jacques Chirac, Jacques Chirac	Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Lionel Jospin	
Neutral	Jean-Claude Méry, Alain Juppé, Patrick Devedjian, Philippe Séguin, ancien trésorier du RPR (Louise-Yvonne Casetta), ancien trésorier du PR (Jean-Pierre Thomas), Michel Roussin	Lionel Jospin, ancien trésorier du PS (Gérard Peybernès)	*L'Express*, juge Desmure, les Français, sondage de la SOFRES, «vous» (lecteurs)

3.1.3 Synthesis

In conclusion, despite *Le Monde*'s claims of equitable critical scrutiny of the entire political class, a close examination of the voices' orchestration in editorials dealing with internal politics reveals *Le Monde*'s strong and systematic opposition to President Chirac, who is presented as the instigator of the war between the two heads of the Executive, a liar who does not listen to the French people and who is defeated by his own friends, somebody who does an about-face and cannot be trusted, somebody who tries to hide his wrongdoings by pinpointing those of others and, finally, as a person who should not be able to escape his responsibilities by putting forward his presidential immunity and should seriously consider complete retirement from politics. Jospin does not escape criticism either, but it is quite mild: in his capacity as Prime Minister, he should be more present on the political stage, take a strong position against illegal fundraising and listen to what the French people say for the benefit of democracy. The only member of the opposition to be figured favourably is Giscard d'Estaing (UDF), former President of the Republic, because of his support for a five-year presidential mandate. All other actors are generally considered as members of the right or left political side. Thus, despite the recognized role of Giscard d'Estaing, *Le Monde*'s thinking appears very much binary, President vs. Prime Minister, right vs. left, in accordance with the general tendencies of the French political system but also in a manner that very much emphasizes the problems of cohabitation, despite its calls for a better functioning of the institutions. In the editorials' ocean of criticisms, *Le Monde* poses itself as the only one who rises above murky waters and rightfully faces its responsibilities.

3.2 The "institutional issues" as discussed by the Parliament, presented on a public TV channel (A2), and thought about by public opinion

In the society-centric approach, *Le Monde*'s editorials are placed within the public sphere and *Le Monde*'s positions and interactions are compared with those of the other actors according to the Orchestra model (see 1.2.2). The public sphere is here considered from three different angles: how it appears on a public TV channel (A2), in the parliamentary debates, and through opinion polls. Just as *Le Monde*'s positions and "actions" have been partly described above by direct quotations from the editorials, the other actors are also represented by direct quotations so as to give a better account, not only of what was being said, but also of how it was being said. This choice certainly makes for a longer account of the situation, but it also gives a more accurate picture of the public sphere's atmosphere in which *Le Monde* evolved at the time. Readers not particularly interested in the details of French political life from 1999 to 2001 can skip the demonstrations and go directly to the synthesis given for the most complex issues, or even to this chapter's conclusion (3.3) that provides enough information to follow the book's general argumentation.

The "institutional issues" discussed by the Parliament (i.e. Senate and, especially, National Assembly), presented on public TV (A2) and thought about by the public opinion are presented in the following order: general cohabitation issues between a right-wing President and a left-wing Prime Minister (3.2.1); failure to amend the Constitution and thus enable a reform of the judicial system so that the Public Prosecutor's Office would enjoy more independence from the Executive (3.2.2); reduction of the presidential mandate's length from seven to five years (3.2.3); order in which the presidential and legislative elections should be hold (3.2.4); finally, Méry's tape and the President's immunity from prosecution (3.2.5). A synthesis for each of the most complex issues is presented after the presentation of the debates.

3.2.1 Cohabitation

In 1999–2001, the Fifth Republic was undergoing its third cohabitation period, its longest and by far its most difficult, and it was the subject of several poll questions. In a poll conducted in October 1999 among deputies of the National Assembly, 44% estimated that cohabitation made their work more difficult (vs. easier: 18%). It should be noted that the majority of members of the right-wing opposition rity found it more difficult (68%, vs. 24% for the left-wing majority), and that mostly members of the left-wing majority found it easier (32%, vs. 2% for the right-wing opposition). A third of the

respondents (33%; left-wing: 37%, right-wing: 28%) found it neither easier nor more difficult.[8]

In January 2000, after the President deferred the Congress' meeting that was supposed to vote on an amendment to the Constitution to reform the judicial system, 57% of the population thought that the cohabitation would become more difficult.[9] Despite this, French people did not seem opposed to cohabitation. In March 2000, 48% (vs. 45%) were somewhat against a system that would not allow for cohabitation in the future,[10] and 53% (vs. 37%) in May 2000.[11] In December 2000, following the adoption by the September 2000 referendum of a five-year presidential mandate, the situation was reversed. A small majority became in favour of a system that would not allow for cohabitation (46% vs. 40%), and the main responsibility for the worsening of the political climate was somewhat equally attributed to the Prime Minister (27%), the President (20%), and both of them (24%). When asked about their favourite scenario for the 2002 legislative and presidential elections, 45% thought that it would be better to end the system of cohabitation and that the same side should win the legislative and the presidential elections; 35% thought that it was better to keep the cohabitation system and that the side who lost the legislative should win the presidential; 20% did not answer.[12]

The bitter situation at the end of 2000, as shown above in the change of opinion on cohabitation, very clearly figured in the President's New Year wishes to the country in December 2000 and the Prime Minister's wishes to the media in

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8. IFOP poll conducted for *L'Express* on 11–21 October 1999. Sample: 100 deputies representative of all French deputies. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 30 October 1999; accessed: 10 September 2008.

9. IFOP poll conducted for *Journal Du Dimanche* on 20–21 January 2000. Sample: 943 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 25 January 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

10. IPSOS poll conducted for *France-Soir* on 10 – 11 March 2000. Sample: 920 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 12 April 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

11. IPSOS conducted for *Le Figaro Magazine*. Sample: 923 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 28 May 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

12. IPSOS poll conducted for *Le Point* on 1–2 December 2000. Sample: 971 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 6 December 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

January 2001. These speeches provide a good indication on the state of cohabitation after a long year of fighting, and how it augured for 2001, i.e. the year preceding the 2002 presidential and legislative elections. In his speech, Chirac lauded France's European policy; as President, he had been fully part of it. However, he sharply criticized the government's policy on internal matters, explicitly saying that the present government should concentrate on its work, i.e. not waste the year preparing for the upcoming elections:

C'est pourquoi mes chers compatriotes, 2001 doit être une année utile. Chaque année compte, aucune ne peut être perdue. […] (A2 – 31 December 2000)

This is why, dear fellow citizens, 2001 must be a useful year. Each year is needed, none ought to be lost.

Jospin answered point by point to these criticisms and called for the President (without naming him explicitly) to be more "responsible":

[…]Il est de la responsabilité de chacun de ne pas jouer la politique du pire ni de contrecarrer une démarche politique claire dans ses objectifs et saine dans sa méthode, qui porte ses premiers fruits et peut apporter une issue raisonnable à un problème non résolu depuis 25 ans. […] (A2 – 11 January 2001)

[…] It is everyone's responsibility neither to adopt the policy of the worst possible kind in order to attain one's own ends nor to obstruct a political process that has clear objectives and a sound method, a process that is bearing its first fruit and that can bring a reasonable solution to a 25 year-old problem.

In summary, despite sometimes very acrimonious exchanges between the two heads of the Executive and their detrimental consequences for the overall political climate, the French population in general did not clearly oppose cohabitation. However, the difficulties of cohabitation figured in all major debated issues shown below.

3.2.2 Justice reform

The Congress (i.e. reunion of the two chambers of the Parliament) was scheduled to meet on 25 January 2000 to vote on an amendment to the Constitution. This amendment related to the *Conseil supérieur de la magistrature* (High Council of the Judiciary) and was supposed to enable a reform that would provide the Public Prosecutor's Office with more independence from the Executive. The President deferred the Congress and thus the justice reform failed.

3.2.2.1 *In the National Assembly*

In the National Assembly (NA), speaking in the name of the opposition groups (UDF-Alliance, RPR, DL and Independents), Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (UDF), former President of the Republic, led the movement against the Justice reform by asking for the deferment of the Congress. Supported by the applause of deputies

of the right-wing opposition, i.e. Chirac's side, he declared a week before the Congress' scheduled vote:

[…] Et l'opposition ne peut pas donner son accord à un texte constitutionnel sans être assurée du contenu qu'il abritera. Il reste alors une solution possible, celle de rétablir l'ordre naturel des débats: l'adoption des lois sur la justice doit précéder la réforme de la Constitution. […] (NA – 18 January 2000)

[…] And the opposition may not agree to a constitutional amendment without being assured of its content. A possible solution would be to go back to the debates' natural order: the bill on the judicial system must be adopted before the reform of the Constitution. […]

At the same sitting, Elisabeth Guigou, Minister of Justice, responded by reminding that the Congress was supposed to confirm what had been massively approved by both chambers of the Parliament a year before:

il s'agira, le 24 janvier, de confirmer le vote émis, d'ailleurs de façon massive, il y a un an par cette assemblée, mais aussi par le Sénat, réunis en Congrès, lequel, je le rappelle, a voté massivement la loi constitutionnelle: 697 voix pour, 62 contre. Vous-même, monsieur le Président, avez voté pour, le 3 juin 1998. (NA – 18 January 2000)

on January 24, the issue will be to confirm the vote taken by a very large majority a year ago by this assembly and the Senate that were meeting in Congress. The Congress voted with a very large majority in favour of the constitutional bill: 697 in favour, 62 against. You yourself, Mr. President, voted in its favour on 3 June 1998.

3.2.2.2 *On A2*

In its presentation of the Congress' deferment, A2 involves Chirac and Jospin, the two heads of the Executive, Giscard d'Estaing (former President), Guigou (Minister of Justice) as well as a number of other politicians from the right and the left and representatives of the two main Judges' Unions. The voice orchestration tends to suggest that Chirac, who instigated the reform, decided to defer it because of his own party's opposition and not because of its content.

Indeed, after Chirac announced the Congress' deferment, A2 broadcast declarations he had made in 1996 and as late as 3 January 2000 in favour of the reform:

Le temps est venu de se fixer une grande ambition pour notre justice: refonder les principes sur lesquelles elle repose, moderniser ses moyens et les adapter à notre temps; je veux mener à bien cette grande réforme pendant ce septennat. (A2 – 19 January 2000; first broadcasted on 31 December 1996)

Time has come to adopt an ambitious aim for our justice system: to redefine the principles on which it is based, to modernize its terms and adapt them to our times; I want to accomplish this significant reform during my seven-year mandate.

Je souhaite que le dialogue engagé par le gouvernement avec les parlementaires qui seront appelés à se prononcer en conscience le 24 janvier, se poursuive et s'intensifie. (A2 – 19 January 2000; first broadcasted on 3 January 2000)

I hope that the dialogue between the government and the deputies who will decide in all honesty on January 24 may continue and strengthen.

and a declaration made by Jospin on the day of the announcement at the National Assembly underlining the President's cooperation with the government:

Cette décision que par votre attitude, mesdames et messieurs de l'opposition, vous avez imposée au Président de la République, a faussé une démarche qui avait été définie de concert et je crois de bonne foi de part et d'autre.
Vous dites que nous n'aurions pas répondu aux demandes du Président de la République; le texte de réforme constitutionnelle a été rédigé ensemble, la plume à la main par le Garde des sceaux, le Premier ministre que je suis et le Président de la République dans son bureau. (A2 – 19 January 2000)

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Opposition, this decision that you have imposed on the President of the Republic, altered a process that had been defined jointly and, I believe, in good faith by both sides.
You say that we did not conform to the requests of the President of the Republic; the text of the constitutional reform was written jointly by the Minister of Justice, myself as Prime Minister, and the President of the Republic in his office.

The same day reactions from representatives of the two main Judges' Unions, who did not approve of the deferment, were also broadcast:

Michelle Vaubaillon (*Union Syndicale des Magistrats*): *Nous craignons que des réformes qui auraient pour effet une reprise en main des magistrats soient votées sans que soit votée la réforme constitutionnelle qui améliorerait l'indépendance de la magistrature.* (A2 – 19 January 2000)

Michelle Vaubaillon (*Union Syndicale des Magistrats*[13]): We fear that reforms that would have the effect of regulating judges may be adopted before the adoption of the constitutional reform that would improve judicial independence.

Anne Crenier Vaudano (*Syndicat de la Magistrature*): *Ce projet risque d'être retaillé très sérieusement, pas du tout dans le sens de l'indépendance, et enfin le texte sur la responsabilité des magistrats, il est clair qu'un certain nombre de politiques aujourd'hui veulent se payer des magistrats, hein, et ce qu'ils souhaitent plus précisément, c'est pouvoir mettre en cause les magistrats de l'ancien CSM lorsque leurs décisions jusridictionnellles ne leur conviennent pas.* (A2 – 19 January 2000)

Anne Crenier Vaudano (*Syndicat de la Magistrature*[14]): There is a risk that this project may be greatly changed, not to increase independence; as for the reform of judges' responsibility, it is clear that today a number of politicians want to crack down on judges; more specifically, what they wish for is to compromise members of the former *Conseil supérieur de la magistrature* when their judicial decisions do not agree with them.

13. *Union Syndicale des Magistrats*: Judges' union with the largest membership. Its statutes indicate that it is autonomous, does not have any political affiliation, and does not belong to any federation.

14. *Syndicat de la Magistrature*: Judges' left-wing union.

The day after the deferment's announcement, Chirac tried to reconcile his earlier declarations in favour of the reform and his decision to defer by calling for more dialogue between the government and the Parliament:

Sachez que, en tout état de cause, je suis pour ma part déterminé à faire en sorte que cette réforme aboutisse; il appartient à chacun à sa place de prendre ses responsabilités; cela passe par une réflexion ouverte et approfondie avec les forces politiques et avec le corps judiciaire; il appartient au gouvernement de reprendre, en lui donnant une nouvelle dimension, le dialogue avec le parlement sur les textes en discussion et de fixer un nouveau calendrier parlementaire. (A2 – 20 January 2000)

Be aware that, whatever the circumstances, I am personally committed to the success of this reform; it is for each of us according to his/her position to take his/her responsibilities; this implies an open and deep discussion with the political forces and with the judiciary; the government must resume and renew its dialogue with the Parliament on the amendments under discussion, and it must establish a new parliamentary schedule.

Elisabeth Guigou, Minister of Justice, answered that this dialogue had been going on for two years and was continuing:

Ce dialogue, je l'ai mené, je continue depuis 2 ans, moi maintenant, il n'a jamais cessé, à la vérité; donc il se poursuivra normalement à l'Assemblée nationale et au Sénat. (A2 – 20 January 2000)

I have been pursuing this dialogue for two years; in fact it has never ceased; therefore it will continue as usual within the National Assembly and the Senate.

3.2.2.3 *In the public opinion*

Before the scheduled date for the Congress vote on the justice reform, opinion polls showed that in late December 1999 French people found that the justice system was rather dependent on political power (rather dependent: 62%; rather independent: 33%), and thought that public prosecutors should be independent from the government (independent: 53%; dependent: 38%).[15] This was confirmed by a poll published on 23 January 2000, according to which 52% found that judges were insufficiently independent from political power (vs. 30% for sufficiently dependent).[16] In early January 2000, a large majority (total: 77%; left-leaning respondents: 82%; right-leaning: 77%) considered the justice reform "a good thing" (vs. a "bad thing", total: 17%, left-leaning: 16%, right-leaning: 19%), and fervently

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15. Poll conducted for *CSA/Libération* on 21 – 22 December 1999. Sample : 1,007 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 9 January 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

16. Poll conducted for *Le Point*. Sample: 964 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 23 January 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

hoped that it would be adopted (total in favour: 80%, left-leaning: 84%, right-leaning: 80%; vs. total against: 15%, left-leaning: 13%, right-leaning 16%).[17]

The large approval with which the reform, presented as giving prosecutors more independence from the government, was met was confirmed in a poll conducted once it was known that the Congress would not meet (76% in favour, vs. 10% against).[18] French people thought that the deferment of the Congress was rather a "bad thing" (48%; vs. rather a "good thing": 33%), and, for that, they mostly blamed the right-wing opposition (33%) and then the President (22%), much less the Prime Minister (12%) and the Minister of Justice (9%). They thought it likely that the cohabitation would become worse (57%; vs. become better: 25%).[19] In August 2000, the independence of the judiciary was easily ranked first in priority (51% of answers) of reforms to be carried out.[20]

3.2.2.4 *Synthesis*

To sum up the issue of the justice reform, the amendment to the Constitution that would have allowed the justice reform was strongly supported by the population (i.e. the voters), the Judiciary as represented by two Judges' Unions representing the entire political spectrum, and the Executive by the voices of the Prime Minister and the President. It was defeated by the Legislative, in particular by the opposition in the National Assembly, i.e. the President's political "friends". This opposition was led by Giscard d'Estaing, former President of the Republic and member of the UDF, a right-wing political party in alliance with but also in opposition with Chirac's RPR.

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17. SOFRES conducted for the Ministry of Justice on 7 – 8 January 2000. Sample: 1,000 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 21 January 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

18. CSA poll conducted for *Le Parisien* on 20 – 21 January 2000. Sample: 1,003 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 24 January 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

19. IFOP poll conducted for *Journal Du Dimanche* on 20 – 21 January 2000. Sample: 943 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 25 January 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

20. SOFRES poll conducted for *Le Figaro Magazine* on 23 – 25 August 2000. Sample: 1,000 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. SOFRES – http://www.tns-sofres.com/ – published: 11 September 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

3.2.3 Five-year presidential mandate

In 1999, the French presidential mandate was of seven years, an unusual length (due to historical events) especially since presidents were reeligible (e.g. François Mitterrand held two mandates, 1981–88 and 1988–95). This situation prompted a number of attempts to have the mandate reduced to five years.

3.2.3.1 *In the public opinion*

Because the question of the presidential mandate's length had been raised a number of times under the Fifth Republic, it was the topic of opinion polls' questions even before any formal proposal was made. In March 2000, 78% of French people (left-wing respondents: 78%; right wing respondents: 76%) were in favour of a five-year mandate (vs. 18% against, left-wing: 19%, right-wing: 21%).[21] This majority was reaffirmed in May 2000 (71% rather in favour vs. 23% rather against).[22] This large majority probably explains the population's widespread lack of interest in this reform (in September 2000, 66% were not interested[23]), as well as the fact that French people, in general, were satisfied with their institutions as shown in an August 2000 poll.[24] Indeed, 70% were opposed to a presidential regime (vs. 19%), and 60% wished the President's role to remain the same (vs. 27% for more power, and 8% for less power). A poll conducted after the referendum showed that abstentionists and voters were equally disatisfied with the functioning of democracy in France (abstentionists: 61%; voters: 63%), but more abstentionists were satisfied with the cohabitation (54% vs. 42% disatisfied) than voters

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21. IPSOS poll conducted for *France-Soir* on 10 – 11 March 2000. Sample: 920 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 12 April 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

22. IPSOS poll conducted for *Le Figaro Magazine*. Sample: 923 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 28 May 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

23. IPSOS conducted for Ipsos / Vizzavi / France 2 / Le Point / Europe on 8 – 9 September 2000. Sample: 1,844 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more and registered on the electoral lists. Quota method. Voting intentions are calculated on the basis of people who declared they will certainly vote, i.e. 36% of the sample. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 15 September 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

24. SOFRES poll conducted for *Le Figaro Magazine* on 23 – 25 August 2000. Sample: 1,000 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. SOFRES – http://www.tns-sofres.com/ – published: 11 September 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

(44% vs. 50% dissatisfied); abstentionists mostly blamed Chirac (46%) for the high level of abstention.[25]

3.2.3.2 *In the National Assembly*

In May 2000 in the National Assembly, Giscard d'Estaing (UDF-Alliance) made known his proposal for a modification of the constitution as to the length of the presidential mandate in the following terms:

[…] Vous avez pris connaissance de la proposition de loi constitutionnelle déposée par un certain nombre de mes collègues et par moi-même, visant à ramener de sept à cinq ans la durée du mandat présidentiel et à limiter à deux le nombre des mandats successifs que pourrait exercer un Président de la République. […] cette question était irritante moins pour nos collègues que pour le Président de la République. […] le Président de la République avait exprimé publiquement son hostilité au quinquennat sous toute ses formes […] (NA – 16 May 2000)

You have been informed of the bill on constitutional law that a number of my colleagues and I submitted in favour of the limitation of the presidential mandate from seven to five years and in favour of a limit of two successive mandates that a President of the Republic could serve. […] This question was less annoying for our colleagues than for the President of the Republic. […] The President of the Republic publicly expressed his hostility to the five-year mandate in any form. […]

This address with a few manifest blows to the President was followed by laughs and applause from members of the UDF-Alliance group (opposition) as well as from members of the Socialist group and RCV group (majority). The Prime Minister expressed his agreement with this proposal:

[…] Sur le fond, ma position est claire. Je suis favorable au quinquennat depuis longtemps. […] Je rappelle aussi que, dès ma déclaration de politique générale – et j'y viens donc en 1997, j'avais marqué que l'harmonisation des mandats électifs sur une base de cinq ans me semblait être un élément essentiel de l'oeuvre de modernisation de la vie publique dans laquelle j'entendais engager le Gouvernement. (NA – 16 May 2000)

On the content, my position is clear. I have been in favour of a five-year mandate for a long time. […] I would also like to remind you that as early as 1997 in my declaration on general politics, I had noted that the harmonization of electoral mandates on a five-year basis appeared to me an essential element for the modernization of public life in which I intended to engage the government. […]

It appeared thus that parts of the National Assembly majority and parts of its opposition were both in favour of a five-year presidential mandate.

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25. CSA poll conducted for *Le Parisien/Aujourd'hui en France*/France 3/France Info/France Inter on 24 September 2000. Quota method. Questions asked to abstentionists: sample of 598 absentionists from a national sample representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Questions asked to voters: sample of 3,740 people who voted at the referendum. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 27 September 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

3.2.3.3 *On A2*

On 10 May 2000, the day after Valéry Giscard d'Estaing submitted a bill to the National Assembly for a five-year presidential mandate, A2 broadcast from its archives a declaration by Chirac on 14 July 1999 against such a five-year mandate:

J'estime que ce serait une erreur que l'on propose aujourd'hui, ce quinquennat, sous une forme ou sous une autre, ce serait une erreur, et donc je ne l'approuverai pas.	I consider that it would be a mistake to put forward this five-year term today; under whatever form, it would be a mistake, and I shall therefore not support it.

Chirac's 1999 re-broadcast position was followed by diverse reactions to Giscard's proposal: both the PS (Jospin's party) and the UDF (Giscard's party) reaffirmed their support for the bill, but the RPR (Chirac's party) expressed its opposition in a cautious manner:

François Hollande (PS): *nous, le quinquennat, nous y sommes favorables et nous sommes prêts à le voter dès qu'il sera possible de le faire.* (A2 – 10 May 2000)	François Hollande (PS): as for us, we are suppporting the five-year mandate and we are ready to vote in favour of it as soon as possible.
Jean-Louis Debré (RPR)*: il ne faut pas prendre cette question uniquement sous l'angle de la réduction du mandat présidentiel, il faut se poser la question de savoir quel est le régime adapté à la France.* (A2 – 10 May 2000)	Jean-LouisDebré (RPR): we should not look at this question solely from the angle of the shortening of the presidential mandate; we should also wonder which regime is best suited for France.
Philippe Douste-Blazy (UDF)*: il s'agit de rendre plus probable la coïncidence de deux majorités, la majorité présidentielle et la majorité législative, c'est-à-dire diminuer le risque de cohabitation.* (A2 – 10 May 2000)	Philippe Douste-Blazy (UDF*):* it is about making the agreement between two majorities more likely, the presidential majority and the legislative majority, i.e. diminishing the risks for cohabitation.

On 13 May 2000, A2 announced that in an IFOP poll, 75% of respondents were in favour of a five-year presidential mandate; and on 14 May 2000, it reported that Michèle Alliot-Marie, RPR's president (Chirac's party), had changed her mind and was also in favour of a five-year mandate. Three days later, A2 showed how Giscard d'Estaing made a cutting remark to Chirac on this matter at the National Assembly, and the manner in which Jospin picked up on this:

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (UDF): *le Président de la République avait exprimé publiquement son hostilité au quinquennat sous toutes ses formes, et en période de cohabitation, il était difficile au Premier ministre de présenter une proposition contraire à la position prise par le Président de la République.* (A2 – 16 May 2000)	Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (UDF): the President of the Republic publicly expressed his hostility to the five-year mandate in any form, and in a cohabitation period, it was difficult for the Prime Minister to present a proposal contrary to the position taken by the President of the Republic.

Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): *si le Président de la République entendait prendre cette initiative avec le même objectif d'un aboutissement effectif et rapide, alors, ainsi que je le lui ai indiqué, je serais naturellement prêt à lui faire la proposition nécessaire.* (A2 – 16 May 2000)

Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): if the President of the Republic wanted to seize this initiative with the same goal of achieving a result quickly and efficiently, then, as I told him, I would naturally be ready to present him with the required proposal.

No longer supported by his own party, Chirac announced that he had never been really against a shorter presidential mandate in an interview from the Élysée palace in June 2000:

Le problème est de savoir si l'on peut réduire la durée du mandat présidentiel, ce à quoi je n'ai jamais naturellement été hostile, car c'est une decision qui s'impose aujourd'hui, sans mettre en cause nos institutions, ça, c'est le vrai débat, sans changer la nature de notre constitution qui a fait ses preuves et qui est une bonne constitution. Alors, j'ai beaucoup réfléchi, j'ai écouté les uns et les autres, j'ai surtout observé la position prise par le gouvernement, et j'en ai conclu qu'on pouvait aujourd'hui raccourcir le délai du mandat présidentiel de 7 ans à 5 ans sans arrière-pensée et sans changer nos institutions; et à partir de là, je deviens naturellement favorable. (A2 – 5 June 2000)

The question is to know whether we can shorten the length of the presidential mandate, to which I have of course never been hostile because this is a decision that today appears necessary, without risking our institutions, and this is indeed the real debate, without changing the nature of our good and well-tested constitution. Consequently, I have been thinking for a long time, I have been listening to one side and the other; I have especially examined the position taken by the government, and I have concluded that now, we could shorten the presidential mandate from seven to five years without reservation and without changing our institutions; therefore, I am naturally in its favour.

While the majority of the interviewed politicians were in favour of the reform, a few were against. Among them, Charles Pasqua, RPF's president (right-wing), was particularly vocal throughout the campaign and presented himself as the leader against the reform:

Je regrette qu'il [*Chirac*] *ait fait sienne cette idée de diminution de la durée du mandat du Président de la République; ce faisant, il enlève à la fonction une partie de son autorité, de son assise; dès ce soir, j'appelle toutes celles et tous ceux qui savent que les institutions de la 5e République ont donné à ce pays la stabilité dont il avait besoin et qui d'autre part savent également que nous voyons là l'effet pervers de la cohabitation, je les appelle à me rejoindre, car j'entends bien être au premier rang de la bataille pour le non à ce référendum.* (A2 – 6 July 2000)

It is too bad that he [Chirac] adopted this idea of shortening the length of the presidential mandate; in doing so, he is weakening the foundation for this function, its authority. Tonight, I am calling for all of those who know that the Fifth Republic's institution gave this country the stability it needed, and who also know that what we see here is the damaging effect of cohabitation, I am calling for them to join me, because I certainly intend to be at the forefront of the battle of the "no" to the referendum.

Furthermore, Chirac's turnabout did not earn him the favours of the PS or UDF because of the strict limits he imposed on the debate:

Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): *cette ouverture à un débat plus large [sur les institutions que le simple quinquennat] n'a pas été faite par le Président qui n'a pas accordé au Parlement le droit de présenter des amendements et a dit même très clairement que s'il y avait le moindre amendement, eh bien il n'y aurait plus de proposition de réforme de la constitution*. (A2 – 20 September 2000)

François Bayrou (UDF President): *je crois que ça [quinquennat] change tout , mais on n'en a pas tiré les conclusions, on ne nous dit pas ce que ça change et on n'en a pas tiré les conclusions; on n'a pas pris les décisions logiques qui s'imposaient, par exemple de limiter le nombre des mandats, ou bien encore, décider, puisque le Président de la République vient de le dire à nouveau, c'est l'élection où le pays choisit ses orientations. Alors si c'est l'election où le pays choisit ses orientations, il faut qu'elle vienne en premier*. (A2 – 21 September 2000)

Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): The President did not open the debate to a larger issue [on the institutions rather than simply on the length of the presidential mandate]; he did not give the Parliament the possibility of presenting amendments, and he even said very clearly that if there were any amendments, then there would no longer be a proposal for a constitutional reform.

François Bayrou (UDF President): I believe that the five-year mandate is changing everything, but we did not draw any conclusion from it; we are not being told what it changes and we are not drawing any conclusion from it. For example, we made neither the logical decision of limiting the number of mandates, nor did we decide, as the President has just told us, that those are the elections where the country chooses its orientation. Thus, if those are the elections where the country chooses its orientation, then they must take place first.

3.2.3.4 *Synthesis*

The question of the five-year presidential mandate, which involved an eventual amendment to the Constitution, had been raised several times but had never been put to the population (by referendum) or to the Parliament (by a joint session of both its chambers in Congress) because of the opposition it met. Chirac's support was necessary for the adoption of this reform because, as President, he had the power to call for a referendum (Article 11 of the Constitution) or for the Parliament to convene in Congress (Article 89 of the Constitution). However, he was strongly against it. Although he was not alone in his opposition, after his own party turned in favour of the reform when numerous polls showed an overwhelming majority for it, he changed his mind. In the meantime, it was Giscard d'Estaing (UDF), officially on the same political side as Chirac who, from the beginning, had led the campaing for the reform, and in doing so had not shied away from sharply criticizing Chirac.

The referendum was held on 24 September 2000 and approved a five-year presidential mandate by a 73.21% majority. The question of the order in which to have the presidential and legislative elections took then prominence.

3.2.4 Order of presidential and legislative elections

If the presidential and legislative mandates were to be of the same five-year length and if the elections were to occur the same year, then naturally the question

of their order was being asked despite the President's refusal to consider both questions during the campaign for the referendum (see above 3.2.3.3). Once the reform was adopted by referendum on 24 September 2000, the question of the elections' order became central.

In December 2000, i.e. after the presidential mandate was shortened to five years, fewer French people (37%) were in favour of changing the election calendar so as to have the presidential elections before the legislative than those who preferred the *status quo*, i.e. legislative first and presidential second (47%), despite the fact that more (45%) considered the presidential elections the more important when compared to the legislative elections (41%).[26]

Divisions on the elections' order as they were presented on A2 followed neither party lines nor even the left-right political cleavage. They also differed from the previous divisions on the length of the presidential mandate. For example, one month after the referendum, A2 broadcasted the following positions:

Robert Hue (PC) : *si on a le sentiment qu'il n'y aura plus que deux camps dans le cadre des législatives, le camp du soutien au nouveau Président de la République, ou celui qu'il a battu, alors là il n'y a plus du tout de possibilité d'expression plurielle de la gauche*. (A2 – 26 November 2000)

François Bayrou (UDF): *on ne peut pas savoir 18 mois à l'avance à qui éventuellement profiterait l'inversion du calendrier; on sait une chose certaine, c'est que ça profitera à la démocratie française*. (A2 – 26 November 2000)

Charles Pasqua (RPF) : *puisqu'on a décidé de modifier les institutions et qu'on vient d'adopter le quinquennat, il faut en tirer les conséquences, il faut que l'élection du Président de la République intervienne avant l'élection des députés*. (A2 – 26 November 2000)

Patrick Devedjian (RPR) : *bien sûr je voterai contre, parce que je suis contre la manipulation du calendrier electoral pour des raisons de stricte convenance et de calcul politicien; M. Jospin a peur de perdre les élections législatives, c'est le fond de sa démarche.* (A2 – 26 November 2000)

Robert Hue (PC): If we get the impression that there will be only two sides left in the legislative campaign, the side in favor of the new President of the Republic or the side in favor of the just defeated candidate, then there won't be any more possibility for a plurality of the Left.

François Bayrou (UDF): We cannot know 18 months in advance who will profit from a reversal in the (electoral) calendar. One thing we know for sure is that it'll be beneficial to the French democracy.

Charles Pasqua (RPF): Since it has been decided to modify the institutions and since we have just adopted the five-year mandate, we must draw the consequences from it. The election of the President of the Republic must take place before the election of the deputies.

Patrick Devedjian (RPR): Of course, I will vote against it because I am against manipulating the electoral calendar for reasons of pure convenience and political calculations. Mr. Jospin is afraid of losing the legislative elections; this is what is behind his position.

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26. IPSOS poll conducted for *Le Point* on 1–2 December 2000. Sample: 971 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more and registered on the electoral lists. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – accessed: 10 September 2008.

A few days later, Giscard d'Estaing (UDF) explained, in his position of former President as he explicitly indicated, that presidential elections should take place before legislative ones because, in de Gaulle's terms, the President was the keystone of the institutions:

[*le pilier des institutions*], *c'est le Président, et d'ailleurs de Gaulle, il disait lui, c'est la clé de voûte; il vaut mieux construire le pilier avant d'habiter la maison; la deuxième raison, c'est quand on interroge les Français et qu'on leur dit, quelles sont pour vous les élections les plus importantes, alors ils disent, d'abord l'élection présidentielle, 40% disent que c'est la plus importante, ensuite les élections municipales, et après les élections législatives, 17%. Il faut donc commencer par l'élection la plus importante parce qu'elles réagiront l'une sur l'autre; il faudrait pas que ce soit l'élection la moins importante qui détermine le résultat de la plus importante.* (A2 – 30 November 2000)

The pillar of our institutions is the President. As de Gaulle said, it is the keystone. It is better to build the pillar before the house. The second reason is: when you poll French people and you ask them which elections are most important for them, then they answer, first the presidential elections, 40% call it the most important, and then the municipal elections, and then the legislative elections, 17%. We must thus start with the most important election because they will have an effect on each other. We should not let the least important election determine the results of the most important one.

This gave Noël Mamère, Green MP, the opportunity to make a sarcastic comment about Jospin's support for presidential elections first:

Ce que propose Lionel Jospin qui est devenu le premier gaulliste de France, c'est que le Président reste la clé de voûte de nos institutions; nous, nous voulons un renforcement du pouvoir du Parlement. (A2 – 19 December 2000)

What Lionel Jospin who has become the first Gaullist of France proposes is that the President remains the keystone of our institutions. As for us, we want for the powers of the Parliament to be reinforced.

François Bayrou, UDF President, in favour of presidential elections first, underlined the strange opposition of the RPR and of most of the UDF:

C'est un clivage curieux parce que c'est habituellement une idée que le gaullisme a apportée; la grande idée gaulliste, c'était que pour construire des institutions solides, il fallait que le peuple s'exprime en élisant un président, et tous les Français le savent, et donc c'est curieux de voir qu'on n'est pas exactement sur les mêmes lignes qu'on attendait. (A2 – 19 December 2000)

It is a strange division because it is an idea that was put forward by Gaullism; the main Gaullist idea was to build strong institutions; it was for people to express themselves by electing a President, and all French citizens know that; thus it is strange to see that we are not following the same path as we expected.

On 20 December 2000, the National Assembly voted in favour of presidential elections before legislative elections. A2 underlined that 25 UDF members voted with the PS.[27] In this issue again, Giscard d'Estaing (UDF), supported by his party's President, opposed Chirac and his party, the RPR.

27. 300 in favour, 245 against, 6 abstentions.

3.2.5 Méry's tape and the presidential immunity

The number of politico-financial affairs, whose significance was highlighted with the content of Méry's tape, brought to prominence the issue of politicians' penal responsibility and status, in particular that of the President.

3.2.5.1 *On A2*

The President's immunity had been an object of discussion since August 1998, but it became a stronger focus of attention with the publication of Méry's posthumous confessions by *Le Monde* on 21 September 2000. Indeed, in his tape Méry directly accused Chirac (who was Mayor of Paris at the time of the incriminating facts), and Chirac reacted the same day with strong indignation against *Le Monde*:

Je suis indigné, indigné par le procédé, indigné par le mensonge, indignée par l'outrance. Madame [?], il doit y avoir des limites à la calomnie; hier, on faisait circuler une rumeur fantaisiste sur une grave maladie qui m'aurait atteinte, sous-entendu je ne serais plus capable d'assumer mes fonctions; aujourd'hui, on rapporte une histoire abracadabrantesque, on fait parler un homme mort il y a plus d'un an, on disserte sur des faits invraisemblables qui ont eu lieu il y a plus de 14 ans, on exhume un enregistrement fait il y a plus de 4 ans et dont le journal, lui-même qui publie ces propos, les qualifie d'invérifiables et de sans valeur juridique, et tout cela comme par hasard, 3 jours avant un référendum visant à améliorer le fonctionnement de notre démocratie; alors, je vous le dis, ces allégations sont indignes et mensongères; et voilà pourquoi je demande que ces éléments soient transmis à la justice afin que la vérité balaye la calomnie. (A2 – 21 September 2000)

I am indignant at the process, indignant at the lie, indignant at the excess. Mrs. [?], there must be a limit to calumnies. Yesterday, people were spreading the false rumour that I was gravely ill and, it was implied, could no longer carry out my duties. Today, a fantastic story is being told: a man dead for more than a year is made to talk; incredible facts from more than fourteen years ago are being discussed; a tape recorded four years ago is being exhumed, a tape whose content cannot be verified and which has no legal value according to the newspaper that published its transcripts; and all of this happens, by chance, three days before the referendum for improving the functioning of our democracy. Thus, I am telling you, these allegations are shameful and untrue. This is why I am asking for these elements to be transmitted to the justice system so that the truth can sweep away the lies.

A declaration by Gérard Monatte (PS) confirmed that not only the RPR took advantage of illegal fundraising, but several parties of the right and the left including the PS:

Effectivement, Mery était venu me voir pour me dire, voilà je suis embetté, j'ai reçu des instructions, j'ai touché un gros paquet pour les lycées de la région parisienne et on me dit qu'il faut que je partage avec tout le monde, alors comment je fais? Je lui ai dit, écoute, moi je ne peux pas te prendre des liquidités parce que ce n'est pas du tout dans mes attributions, si tu veux faire cette affaire là, tu la verses directement au parti. (A2 – 21 September 2000)

Indeed, Méry came to see me to tell me, I am in trouble, I've received instructions, I've got that big load of money for the Parisian highschools and I'm told to share with everybody, thus, what do I do? I told him, listen, I can't take cash because it is not within my prerogative, if you want to do this, you can give the money directly to the party.

On the right and on the left, the "rotten" political climate was denounced:

François Bayrou (UDF) : *les accusations les uns contre les autres, ce climat d'embuscade, ce n'est pas comme cela qu'on gouverne un grand pays; il faut sortir de ce climat, voilà, empoisonné dans lequel on vit, il faut essayer de faire en sorte que bon, la démocratie française, comme les autres, elle soit plus faite d'estime et de civisme que de ce genre de coup bas; en tout cas, pour ma part, c'est ce pourquoi je me battrais*. (A2 – 21 September 2000)

François Bayrou (UDF): Accusations against each other, a climate of ambush, one cannot govern a great country in this manner. We must get rid of this, well, poisonous climate in which we live; we must try to behave so that French democracy, as others, be built more on esteem and public respect than on this type of low blows. In any case, this is what I will fight for.

Robert Hué (PC) : *je crois que si on pense que de révélation en révélation à partir d'éléments plus ou moins sérieux, eh bien on va en déversant des tombeaux de boue sur les hommes politiques en faisant l'amalgame, ils sont tous pourris, ils en croquent tous, si on pense qu'on va s'en sortir dans ce pays à ce que la représentation, à ce que les jeunes, 10% seulement des jeunes se reconnaissent dans la politique d'aujourd'hui, si on pense qu'on va s'en sortir comme ça, je crois que c'est complètement être à côté de la plaque*. (A2 – 22 September 2000).

Robert Hué (PC): I believe that if we think that, from one revelation to another based on more or less serious elements, well by throwing buckets of mud on politicians and saying they're all the same, they're all rotten, they're all greedy, if we think that this country can manage for only 10% of its young people to feel represented in politics, if we think we can manage this way, then we are absolutely not with it.

The revelation by *L'Express* that the original of Méry's tape had been in possession of Dominique Strauss-Kahn (PS) was followed by hostile reactions on the right as well as the left, with an appeal by the PS First Secretary, François Hollande, not to use this issue to partisan ends:

Michèle Alliot-Marie (RPR) : *de plus en plus, nous nous trouvons devant une affaire très grave; peut-être même d'ailleurs une affaire d'État; pourquoi Dominique Strauss-Kahn, ministre de la République, en possession de ce document puisqu'il l'avoue, ne l'a pas communiqué à la justice?* (A2 – 25 September 2000)

Michèle Alliot-Marie (RPR): More and more, we find ourselves faced with a very serious situation, maybe even a state affair. Why did Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Minister of the Republic, not transmit this document that was in his possession?

Odette Grzegrzulka (PS) : *je souhaite vraiment que le Parti socialiste fasse le ménage, que le Parti socialiste en tire les conclusions, puis Dominique Strauss-Kahn aussi lui-même, je crois qu'il n'est plus digne d'être membre de notre parti*. (A2 – 25 September 2000)

Odette Grzegrzulka (PS): I would like the Socialist Party to do some house-keeping, to draw some conclusions, and then for Dominique Strauss-Kahn to do the same. I believe he is no longer worthy of belonging to our party.

François Hollande (PS First Secretary): *nous prendrons, je vous le dis ici, les décisions les plus graves, parce que nous ne voulons pas faire de la politique de cette manière, nous ne voulons*

François Hollande (PS First Secretary): We will take, I am telling you now, the most considered decisions, because we do not want to do politics in this manner, we do not want

pas utiliser les affaires, les turpitudes des uns des autres, les financements de partis politiques à des fins d'intérêt partisan. (A2 – 25 September 2000)

to use scandals, turpitudes of the ones or the others, financing methods of political parties to partisan ends.

Among these reactions, Jospin, as Prime Minister, positioned himself outside of the controversy:

Cette histoire de cassette de M. Méry, elle ne me concerne en rien, ni en ce qui concerne le contenu ni pour ce qui touche à sa diffusion et aux conditions de sa diffusion; ce que je souhaite, moi, à cet égard, comme toujours, c'est que la justice fasse son travail et éclaire les différents aspects de cette question. (A2 – 25 September 2000)

I am not concerned in any way by this story of Mr. Méry's tape, neither in regard to its content nor to its airing and conditions of its diffusion. What I wish for in this matter, as always, is for justice to follow its course and to shed some light on the different aspects of the question.

On the right, Devedjian (RPR) and Seguin (RPR) suggested an amnesty, but it was not well received on any political side for different reasons:

Jean-Louis Debré (RPR) : *moi, je suis contre, contre le principe même de l'amnistie. De quoi s'agit-il? Il s'agit d'une cassette qui est une manipulation. Tout cela est grotesque.* (A2 – 27 September 2000)

Jean-Louis Debré (RPR): As for me, I am against, against the principle of amnesty itself. What are we dealing with? It is a tape that is a manipulation. All of this is grotesque.

Jean-Marc Ayrault (PS) : *se lancer dans une telle aventure [amnistie], non nous n'en serons pas. Je crois que Jacques Chirac est concerné, mais, évidemment l'instruction en cours cite son nom sans cesse, mais c'est son affaire, pas la nôtre.* (A2 – 27 September 2000)

Jean-Marc Ayrault (PS): If we throw ourselves into such an adventure [amnesty], we will not get out of it. I believe that Jacques Chirac is involved, it is true that the investigation keeps mentioning his name, but it is his business, not ours.

Henri Emmanuelli (PS): *bien écoutez, la repentance [prônée par Seguin], je pense que c'est une lâcheté a posteriori. Je ne suis pas pour l'amnistie.* (A2 – 28 September 2000)

Henri Emmanuelli (PS): well, listen, as for the penitence [advocated by Seguin], I believe that it is *a posteriori* cowardice. I am not in favour of amnesty.

Noël Mamère (Green): *demander l'amnistie et la repentance, c'est dire tourner la page; on ne lit pas la page, on efface tout comme si rien ne s'était passé; ça, c'est de l'amnésie, de la tartufferie*. (A2 – 28 September 2000)

Noël Mamère (Green): To ask for amnesty and repentence is to turn the page. We are not reading the page, we are erasing it as if nothing happened. This is amnesia and hypocrisy.

The question of the President's penal status was raised again, and Valéry Turcey, President of the *Union Syndicale des Magistrats*, declared that the President could be summoned, but not forced, to testify:

un juge d'instruction peut adresser une convocation au Président de la République mais certainement pas le contraindre à venir déposer; je crois que s'agissant du chef de l'État, il est normal que sa situation soit un tout petit différente que celle d'un témoin ordinaire. (A2 – 27 September 2000)

An examining judge may summon the President of the Republic, but certainly not force him to testify. I believe that in the case of the Head of State, it is normal for his situation to be slightly different from that of an ordinary witness.

As exemplified by the broadcast declaration of Noël Mamère on 10 October 2000 in the National Assembly, the lower chamber of the Parliament heard a number of speeches on the President's eventual responsibility. Both on the left and the right, voices called to leave justice to follow its course:

Jean-Marc Ayrault (PS) : *il faut respecter l'indépendance de la justice et l'hémicycle de l'Assemblée nationale n'a pas à être transformé en prétoire*. (A2 – 22 October 2000)
Alain Juppé (RPR) : *il faut laisser faire la justice, vous me dites que le chef de l'État doit s'expliquer, mais je voudrais insister sur un point, il n'y a pas d'immunité pénale du chef de l'État, contrairement à ce que l'on a dit, ce n'est pas vrai, il y a simplement et je voudrais utiliser le vocabulaire des juristes, ce qu'on appelle un privilège de jurisdiction, c'est-à-dire qu'il n'est pas responsable devant les mêmes tribunaux que vous et moi, parce qu'il est le chef de l'État, mais sa responsabilité peut parfaitement être mise en jeu devant la Haute Cour, donc je voudrais bien insister sur ce point, il n'est pas au-dessus des lois*. (A2 – 22 October 2000)

Jean-Marc Ayrault (PS): We must respect judicial independence and the benches of the National Assembly should not be transformed into a court.
Alain Juppé (RPR): We must let justice follow its course. You tell me that the Head of State must give explanations, but I would like to emphasize a point, there is no immunity for the Head of State, contrary to what has been said, it is not true. There is simply, and I would like to use jurists' words, what is called a privilege of jurisdiction. That means, he is not responsible in front of the same courts as you and I, because he is the Head of State, but his responsibility can very well be examined by the High Court. Thus, I would like to emphasize this point, he is not above the law.

This call for justice to be served was reiterated by Chirac, Jospin and a number of other politicians. However, in December 2000, A2 broadcast again an extract of an interview given by Chirac on 14 July 1999 when he had refused to answer a journalist who had asked him whether a President was responsible for his actions before becoming President:

[journaliste]: *Et pour ce qui est maintenant des responsabilités d'avant? Est-ce que, d'abord vous donneriez un conseil?*
[Chirac]: *Je trouve que votre question dérape vers une certaine insolence*. (A2 – 4 December 2000; first broadcasted on 14 July 1999)

[Journalist]: And what about responsibility for what happened before? Would you give advice?
[Chirac]: I think that your question borders on a certain insolence.

A few days later during a long TV interview (A2), Chirac posed himself as a defenceless permanent victim:

tous ceux qui m'attaquent, sachant très bien que je ne peux pas me défendre, que je ne peux pas être entendu, que je ne peux pas porter plainte en diffamation, peuvent dire tout ce qu'ils veulent, en toute sérénité et sans courir aucun risque; je suis la victime permanente dans cette affaire. (A2 – 15 December 2000)

All of these who are attacking me, knowing perfectly well that I cannot defend myself, that I cannot be heard, that I cannot lodge a complaint for slander, can say everything they want in all serenity without incurring any risk. I am the permanent victim in this affair.

and he justified his refusal to appear in Court with his status as President:

le Chef de l'État tient son pouvoir de l'ensemble des Français; il est le garant de la continuité de l'État; il ne peut pas être soumis ni au pouvoir législatif ni au pouvoir judiciaire ni d'ailleurs au pouvoir militaire. (A2 – 15 December 2000)

The Head of State holds his power by the will of the French people; he can be subjected neither to legislative power, nor to judicial power, nor even to military power.

On this point of the President's status, experts disagreed: some were of the opinion that the President could be summoned to testify, others not (A2 – 15 December 2000):

Didier Maus (Professseur de droit constitutionnel): *La constitution ne dit pas expressément que le Président de la République n'a pas le droit d'être témoin, mais je crois que c'est une conséquence logique et inéluctable du fait qu'il est le garant de l'indépendance de l'autorité judiciaire; car il est au-dessus du système judiciaire; Jacques Chirac est selon le vieil adage le premier magistrat de la République, et s'il est le premier magistrat de la République, il peut pas être interrogé par un autre magistrat de la République quelle que soit la qualité, l'indépendance ou le talent d'un juge d'instruction*. (A2 – 15 December 2000)

Didier Maus (Professsor of Constitutional Law): The Constitution does not expressly say that the President of the Republic may not testify. However, I believe that it is a logical and inescapable consequence of the fact that he is answerable for the independence of the judiciary. Indeed he is above the judiciary system; Jacques Chirac is, as the old saying goes, the First Magistrate of the Republic. If he is the First Magistrate of the Republic, then he cannot be questioned by another magistrate of the Republic whatever the quality, the independence or the talent of an investigating judge.

Valéry Turcey (Président de l'*Union Syndicale des Magistrats)*: *Juridiquement, le Président de la République peut parfaitement être entendu comme témoin; le Conseil constitutionnel a estimé qu'il ne pouvait pas faire l'objet d'un acte de poursuite, il ne peut pas être mis en examen; en revanche, une déposition comme témoin qui n'est pas un acte de poursuite est parfaitement possible*. (A2 – 15 December 2000)

Valéry Turcey (President of the *Union Syndicale des Magistrats)*: Legally, the President of the Republic may perfectly be heard as a witness. The Consitutional Council was of the opinion that he cannot be pursued, he cannot be investigated. However, asking him to testify is not to pursue him and is perfectly possible.

While Jospin reitereated that the Government did not interfere in these matters, he appeared in favour of Chirac testifying in Court:

Lorsqu'on parle des affaires, ces affaires, à partir d'un certain stade, doivent être l'affaire des juges; c'est à eux d'agir sereinement, en toute indépendance, et que si c'est ainsi que l'on procède, ce sera mieux pour notre vie démocratique, pour les assainissements nécessaires, c'est mon approche constante, le gouvernement n'interfère pas en ces matières, et donc je m'y tiens. (A2 – 15 December 2000)

When we talk about affairs, these affairs, after a certain point, must become the judges' concerns. It is their duty to act calmly and independently. If we proceed in this manner, it will be better for our democratic life, for the necessary cleaning up. This is how I constantly approach these matters; the government does not interfere in them; thus I am keeping to that.

The uncertain situation around the President's immunity resulted in political confusion that, combined with the various "affairs", produced a climate of distrust as denounced by Hervé de Charette, UDF acting President:

Cette crise de confiance, elle existe; elle va pas être dissipée comme la brume du matin en quelques instants; elle va, malheureusement d'ailleurs parce qu'elle pénalise notre fonctionnement démocratique, elle va continuer, et elle va peser sur la vie politique française, je suis persuadé, dans les mois qui viennent. (A2 – 15 December 2000)

This crisis of confidence exists. It will not dissipate in a few moments like morning mist. It will last, unfortunately, because it penalizes the functioning of our democracy, it will last and weigh on French political life, I am sure, for the next few months.

The situation did not improve when on 26 April 2001, a prosecutor, Eric Halphen, served Jacques Chirac with a subpoena, arguing that there was enough evidence to charge him:

«*il existe maintenant des indices rendant vraisemblable que Jacques Chirac ait pu participer comme auteur ou complice à la commission des infractions*.»

"There exists now sufficient evidence to make it likely that Jacques Chirac could have participated as an author or as an accomplice in the commission of these infractions."

The RPR strongly protested, while the PS with the voice of its First Secretary evoked the necessity of reforming the status of presidential immunity:

Patrick Devedjian (RPR spokesman): *j'y vois un grave acte de partialité de la part de ce juge qui a fait de l'acharnement contre le Président de la République un fonds de commerce*. (A2 – 26 April 2001)

Patrick Devedjian (RPR spokesman): I see in it a serious act of partiality from this judge who has made unrelenting attacks against the President of the Republic his trademark.

François Hollande (PS First Secretary): *le mieux c'est que nous changions à l'avenir la règle qui veut une immunité pénale, c'est-à-dire une impossibilité de juger le Président de la République pour des faits qui n'ont pourtant rien à voir avec sa responsabilité, et ça il faudra en décider après 2002, et puis pour le reste il faut que les Français soient juges*. (A2 – 26 April 2001)

François Hollande (PS First Secretary): The best hope is that in the future we change the rule of immunity, i.e. the impossibility of judging a President of the Republic for actions that do not pertain to his function. This, we should decide upon after 2002; as for the rest, French people must judge themselves.

The socialist deputy, Arnaud de Montebourg, went considerably further than the First Secretary of his party and circulated a petition in the National Assembly to have Chirac prosecuted by the High Court of Justice. The petition greatly embarrassed the Socialist Party; it received only 30 signatures and therefore did not succeed:

Vincent Peillon (PS spokesman): *nous considérons qu'il ne revient pas au Parti Socialiste ou au groupe socialiste de mettre Jacques Chirac en accusation devant la Haute Cour, pour une raison que tous les Français comprennent, cela paraîtrait en période de cohabitation comme une manoeuvre politicienne*. (A2 – 21 May 2001)

Vincent Peillon (PS spokesman): We consider that it is neither up to the Socialist Party nor to the socialist group to indict Jacques Chirac in front of the High Court for a reason that all French people understand; in a period of cohabitation, it would appear politically calculated.

In June 2001, the socialist group in the National Assembly proposed to amend the Constitution about the President's status of immunity. The right was divided: some explicitly recognized the importance of the issue; other did not but could not explicitly deny it; instead, they criticized the timing of the proposal.

François Hollande (PS First Secretary): *on a pris la précaution, nous les socialistes de renvoyer à 2002 l'application de ce texte, donc ça ne vise pas une personne, ça correspond à une évolution quant à la protection d'une fonction; mais j'ai l'impression que l'opposition aujourd'hui défend davantage une personne qu'une fonction.* (A2 – 12 June 2001)

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (UDF) : *d'abord, ce n'est pas un sujet qu'on puisse discuter en période pré-électorale, et ensuite ce n'est pas un sujet qu'on peut traiter à partir de l'initiative d'un parti politique*. (A2 – 12 June 2001)

Alain Juppé (RPR) : *je suis favorable à ce qu'on y [statut pénal du Président de la République] réfléchisse; il y a un problème, c'est vrai, et un problème pour l'ensemble de l'exécutif si je puis dire*. (A2 – 14 June 2001)

François Hollande (PS First Secretary): We, the Socialists, were cautious about sending this amendment forward in 2002; therefore, nobody is targeted; it corresponds to the way in which a function is protected. However, I have the impression that the opposition today is more defending a person than a function.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (UDF): First, this is not a topic that can be discussed in a pre-election period, and then, it is not a topic that can be discussed on the initiative of a political party.

Alain Juppé (RPR): I agree that we should discuss the penal status of the President of the Republic. There is a problem, it is true, and it is a problem concerning the entire Executive, if I may say so.

A month later in the traditional 14 July presidential speech, Chirac made some remarks on the confusion in the justice system attributing it to the government and the Minister of Justice. The Ministry of Justice and one of the Judges' Unions responded by accusing the President of considering that the Ministry could give orders to public prosecutors, but the largest Judges' Union was more circumspect in its reactions:

Jacques Chirac: *je ne dirais pas qu'il n'y a pas aujourd'hui dans la justice une certaine confusion; […] les procureurs, oui les procureurs, mais ça c'est pas la faute de la justice, c'est pas à imputer à tort à la justice, c'est la faute de l'État, du gouvernement, du ministre de la justice*. (A2 – 14 July 2001)

Marylise Lebranchu [une heure plus tard] (porte-parole du Garde des Sceaux): *je constate que le Président en dénonçant la confusion de la justice en appelle aux ancienne méthodes tendant à ce que le Garde des Sceaux donne des instructions aux magistrats; ce temps est révolu*. (A2 – 14 July 2001)

Jacques Chirac (President): I would not say that there is not today some confusion in the justice system. […] the public prosecutors, yes, the public prosecutors, but the system should not be incriminated; it is the responsibility of the State, of the government, of the Minister of Justice.

Marylise Lebranchu [one hour later] (spokeswoman for the Minister of Justice): I note that the President, when he denounced the confusion in the justice system, called for a return to old times when the Minister of Justice gave instructions to the judges. These times are past.

Evelyne Sire-Marin (*Syndicat de la magistrature*): *M.Chirac en fait nous dit, tous le petit doigt sur la couture du pantalon, je ne veux pas voir un seul képi et je veux que tous les procureurs et les procureurs généraux aient le même avis, et le ministère de la justice doit leur intimer des ordres; non, le procureur en fait, c'est quelqu'un qui représente la société et pas l'Exécutif.* (A2 – 14 July 2001)
Valery Turcey (*Union syndicale des magistrats*): *il n'y a pas eu d'attaque directe contre les juges ni contre le fonctionnement de la justice; il y a eu la constatation mais qui n'est pas inexacte d'une certaine confusion, à la fois dans le fonctionnement des institutions et dans le fonds du droit.* (A2 – 14 July 2001)

Evelyne Sire-Marin (President of the *Syndicat de la magistrature*): Mr. Chirac is actually telling us that everybody must obey as in the army, I do not want to see anybody out of line, I want all public prosecutors and all chief public prosecutors to be of the same opinion, and the Minister of Justice must give them orders. No, in fact, the public attorney represents society, not the Executive.
Valery Turcey (President of the *Union syndicale des magistrats*): There has been no direct attack either against judges or against the functioning of justice; it has been noticed, not inaccurately, that there is some confusion in the functioning of the institutions as well as to the content of the law.

3.2.5.2 *In the National Assembly*

After the revelation of Méry's tape, Mamère (Green) asked in the National Assembly for a judicial inquiry into the role of Chirac as presented by Méry:

[…] De tout ce qui précède, les Français tirent la pénible conclusion que la justice a accordé une sorte d'impunité au Président de la République, puisqu'il est déclaré au-dessus des lois pour des faits antérieurs à ses fonctions. […] Madame la garde des sceaux, nous aimerions savoir, et les Français avec nous, ce qui vous empêche d'ordonner au parquet de la République, comme vous en avez le pouvoir et le devoir, de mettre en mouvement l'action publique par citation directe contre personne dénommée afin qu'un tribunal indépendant et impartial puisse connaître de la réalité ou de la fausseté des graves accusations portées contre le chef de l'Etat par M. Méry. […](NA – 10 October 2000)

From what has happened, French people conclude with pain that the justice system gave the President some sort of immunity because he is above the law inasmuch as events prior to his functions are concerned. […] Madam Minister of Justice, we, as well as the French people, would like to know what impedes you from ordering the Republic's office of public prosecution, as it is your right and your duty, to start a procedure of civil action so that an independent court may rule on the veracity or falsity of the serious accusations made by Mr. Méry against the Head of State.

Elisabeth Guigou, Minister of Justice, contrasted this request with the independence of the Justice system, i.e. the Ministry could not instruct public prosecutors what to do:

[…] Dans ce dossier comme dans les autres, je m'en suis tenue à ma ligne de conduite

In this dossier as in the others, I kept to my constant line of behaviour: complete respect

constante: respecter totalement l'indépendance de la justice et ne pas intervenir dans une affaire individuelle, fût-ce par la voie d'un recours exercé dans l'intérêt de la loi. Je rappelle que c'est la ligne de conduite définie par le Gouvernement et, ici même, par le Premier ministre, en juin 1997, qu'il n'y a pas eu d'exception et qu'il n'y en aura pas. (NA – 10 October 2000)

of the independence of the Judiciary and no intervention in any individual affair, even in favour of an action intended in the respect of the law. I would like to remind that this is the line of behaviour that was defined by the government, and by the Prime Minister in June 1997 here in this place. There has been no exception and there will be none.

The same day, the opposition by the voice of Roselyne Bachelot-Narquin (RPR) asked for explanations as to the role of the Socialist Party in the affairs revealed by Méry:

[…] Monsieur le Premier ministre, vous ne vous êtes pas encore expliqué directement devant les Français, alors que cette cassette vous met personnellement en cause en tant que premier secrétaire du Parti et alors même que l'un de vos proches, M. Monate, a confirmé avoir reçu, pour le Parti socialiste, des sommes importantes. […](NA – 10 October 2000)

Mr. Prime Minister, you have not yet addressed the French people directly, yet this tape incrimates you personally as First Secretary of the Party, and furthermore one of your close relations, Mr. Monate, confirmed that he received significant amounts of money for the Socialist Party.

In his answer, the Prime Minister suggested to leave justice follow its course:

[…] de laisser, quand il y a lieu, la justice mener les enquêtes nécessaires ou les procédures qu'elle a à conduire ; et, pour le reste, de faire comme moi : vous garder de vouloir utiliser ce qu'on appelle les affaires dans le débat public! (NA – 10 October 2000)

to let, when relevant, justice lead the necessary investigations or follow the needed procedures; as for the rest, to do like me and refrain from using these so-called scandals in the public debate!

These exchanges underlined the very delicate position of the government in this cohabitation period, as further demonstrated below. Indeed, justice followed its course and the President was summoned by a prosecutor to appear in Court. In March 2001, Michèle Alliot-Marie (RPR) accused the Prime Minister of using the justice system for political goals:

[…] la convocation par un juge d'instruction du Président de la République, assortie d'une menace de contrainte par la force publique, est une violation caractérisée de notre Constitution. […] Monsieur le Premier ministre, vous ne pouvez vous en laver les mains. Il vous appartient d'assumer vos responsabilités de chef du Gouvernement. Si vous ne faisiez pas votre devoir constitutionnel en dissuadant ceux des vôtres qui cherchent

The summons of the President of the Republic by a public prosecutor with the threat of the use of force is a flagrant violation of our Constitution. […] Mr. Prime Minister, you may not wash your hands of the matter. You must assume your responsibilities as Head of the Government. If you do not perform your constitutional duties and dissuade those among you from using the judicial procedure to political ends,

à instrumentaliser des procédures judiciaires à des fins politiques, ce serait, chacun le comprendra, que vous approuvez ces initiatives, les tentatives de ceux qui cèdent à la manipulation politique jusqu'à vouloir provoquer la saisine de la Haute cour de justice pour pouvoir atteindre le chef de l'Etat alors même, comme vient de l'indiquer ce matin, publiquement, le procureur de la République de Créteil, qu'il n'y a pas de charges contre lui. Au coup de force juridique s'ajouterait alors un coup de force politique. (NA – 28 March 2001)

everybody will understand that you agree with these procedures, these attempts by political manipulators to go up to the seizure of the High Court of Justice in order to attack the Head of the State, while this morning the prosecutor of the Republic in Créteil said publicly that there are no charges against him. Thus, a political coup would be added to a juridical coup.

The Prime Minister replied by reading the letter he had just sent to the President. It said, among other things that "neither the government nor the Minister of Justice could comment on an act performed by a sitting judge as part of a judicial procedure":

[…] Pour ce qui concerne la violation de la Constitution que vous invoquez, il n'appartient, en vertu même de celle-ci, ni au Gouvernement ni au garde des sceaux, de porter une appréciation sur un acte de procédure judiciaire émanant d'un magistrat du siège. […] Pour ce qui concerne la révélation de faits couverts par le secret de l'instruction, j'ai demandé à la garde des sceaux, ministre de la justice, de faire diligenter sans délai une enquête par l'inspection générale des services judiciaires. […] (NA – 28 March 2001)

As for the violation of the Constitution that you are referring to, according to the Constitution neither the government nor the Minister of Justice may comment on an act performed by a sitting judge as part of a judicial procedure. […] Regarding the disclosure of facts covered by the secrecy of investigation, I asked the Minister of Justice to have the general inspectorate for judicial services start an investigation without delay.

3.2.5.3 *In the public opinion*

In the public opinion, the revelation of Méry's tape confirmed the negative image of politics that resulted from the numerous politico-financial affairs. In August 2000, i.e. just before *Le Monde* published the transcripts of Méry's tape, 71% were of the opinion that Ministers should be answerable for their acts performed in the exercise of their function to ordinary courts, just as other citizens, and 66% (left-wing respondents: 75%; right-wing: 54%) found it abnormal that the President could not be pursued judicially during his mandate, even for acts committed before his election.[28]

28. SOFRES poll conducted for *Le Figaro Magazine* on 23 – 25 August 2000. Sample: 1,000 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. SOFRES – http://www.tns-sofres.com/ – published: 11 September 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

In September 2000, after the publication of the transcripts, 61% felt indignant (indifferent: 36%) about Méry's revelations; 76% thought that Chirac should give an explanation to the French population, and 70% that he should ask to be heard in court.[29]

In October 2000, a poll conducted at the request of *Le Monde*[30] (and refered to in its editorial, "*L'image d'une démocratie*", 5 October 2000; see above 3.1.2) revealed the image French people had about politics in the context of the Méry affair. A majority (64%) thought that French politicians were rather corrupt (vs. 33% for rather honest), and 62% believed that there was not more corruption but it was more talked about. "Politics" first evoked feelings of mistrust (48%), and then, far behind, hope (25%) and disgust (24%).

In this same October 2000 poll, questions about Méry's tape *per se* tended to draw partisan answers even though in some cases left- and righ-wing respondents would not basically disagree. For 49% (left-wing: 36%; right-wing: 67%), Méry's direct implication of Chirac in the RPR illegal fundraising was a political manipulation to harm Chirac, and for 40% (left-wing: 57%; right-wing: 23%), the tape contained important information on the RPR fundraising. A large majority (73%; left-wing: 67%; right wing: 81%) believed that Strauss-Kahn had lied about having misplaced the tape, and that he had wanted to keep it to use it for political ends later. The entire affair was mostly prejudicial to the entire political class (quoted first from a list of options: 67%; quoted first or second: 77%) and to Chirac (quoted first: 15%; quoted first or second: 47%). Overwhelmingly, it was thought that Chirac should testify if summoned by a judge (80%), and should give explanations to the French population (72%). The press was mostly given approval for having revealed Méry's tape (right: 57%, left-wing: 71%, right-wing: 40%; vs. wrong: 40%, left-wing: 27%, right-wing: 57%). In corruption affairs, judges were perceived equally to act competently (47%, left-wing: 53%, right-wing: 43%) or to act with political motives (49%, left-wing: 44%, right-wing: 52%). A majority of 57% (left-wing: 66%, right-wing: 48%) vs. 40% (left-wing: 36%, right-wing: 50%) were against an amnesty for deeds such as those talked about in Méry's tape. However, there should be no early elections, and the 2002 presidential and legislative elections

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29. IFOP poll conducted for l'*Express* on 25 September 2000. Sample: 804 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 30 September 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

30. SOFRES poll conducted for *Le Monde* on 2 October 2000. Sample: 1,000 people representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Quota method. SOFRES – http://www.tns-sofres.com/ – published: 2 October 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

should take place as planned (89%). Finally, 55% of the respondents (vs. 57% in November 1999) believed democracy to work well in France, while 44% (vs. 40% in November 1999) did not, thus showing little difference between before and after Méry's tape.

3.2.5.4 *Synthesis*

In conclusion, the Méry affair by its political implications provoked havoc in political circles and great confusion among jurists, but not so much in the public opinion that was already rather disillusioned about politics. All parties were involved and had something to lose, but some more than others. All tried to save whatever they could, either by pointing at the other side or by looking for judicial protection or by trying to disengage in saying that justice should follow its course independently. In this matter, Giscard d'Estaing's position, when he stated about the President's status of immunity:

d'abord, ce n'est pas un sujet qu'on puisse discuter en période pré-électorale, et ensuite ce n'est pas un sujet qu'on peut traiter à partir de l'initiative d'un parti politique (A2 – 12 June 2001),	first, this is not a topic that one can discuss in a pre-election period, and then it is not a topic that can be dealt with on the initiative of a political party,

was not very different from the others.

3.3 Conclusion: *Le Monde*'s role in debates on French institutional issues

Le Monde's positions on French institutional issues (i.e. cohabitation, independence of the Public Prosecutor's Office from the Executive, length of the presidential mandate, order of the presidential and legislative elections, presidential immunity) have been investigated from two complementary perspectives: media-centric by bringing to the fore the editorials' substantive frames and the actors taking part in the editorials' argumentation, and society-centric by looking at the positions of different actors appearing on the public TV channel A2, taking a stand in Parliament, or participating in public polls.

The difficulties of cohabitation figured in all major internal debates and gave rise to some very acrimonious exchanges in the public sphere, particularly between President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin. While, for *Le Monde*, cohabitation was the source of all the problems, the general population rather thought that politicians, and not the phenomenon of cohabitation itself, were the problem because of the manner in which they lived this cohabitation. *Le Monde*'s proposed solution was to reduce the length of the presidential mandate and to make it coincide with the legistative mandate. In doing so, *Le Monde* sided with Giscard d'Estaing (UDF)

who was leading this campaign against his supposedly political ally, Chirac (RPR). The UDF-Alliance group was supported in this cause by the Socialist group and the RCV group in the National Assembly. After several polls very clearly showed the population's backing for a reduction of the presidential mandate, the RPR and then Chirac changed their position. The five-year presidential mandate was adopted by referendum on 24 September 2000 by a large majority.

Once the presidential mandate was reduced to five years, i.e. the length of the legislative mandate, the question arose of which election, presidential or legislative, was to take place first. There again, Giscard d'Estaing opposed Chirac in promoting the precedence of presidential elections, and *Le Monde* agreed with Giscard d'Estaing. So did the PS but not all of the UDF. Divisions on the elections' order followed neither party lines nor the left-right political cleavage (i.e. the RPR and PC were against). They also differed from the previous divisions on the length of the presidential mandate. The National Assembly decided in favour of presidential elections first and legislative second on 20 December 2000.

A justice reform had been talked about for quite a while. *Le Monde* called for a better separation of the Judiciary from the Executive, and this was to be achieved by means of an amendment to the Constitution by referendum. Both heads of the Executive, Chirac and Jospin, the general population, and the Judiciary as represented by two Judges' Unions representing the entire political spectrum were in agreement on having the Constitution amended by decision of the Congress (i.e. both chambers of the Parliament voting jointly). However, the RPR and UDF, led by Giscard d'Estaing (UDF), managed by their opposition to the government's proposal to have Chirac (RPR) defer the Congress and thus the justice reform failed.

In these three issues, Giscard d'Estaing appeared as the political leader in charge. As a member of the UDF, he was theoretically an ally of the presidential side, the parliamentary opposition. In practice, he had been for years opposed to Chirac.[31] *Le Monde*'s positions on the length of the presidential debate, the order of elections and the justice reform coincided with the PS positions and it would have been enough for *Le Monde* to say it agreed with the PS. However, probably partly in order to show its independence from the government, partly in order to emphasize disagreements within the opposition, *Le Monde* supported Giscard d'Estaing when their positions concurred. When they did not, *Le Monde* did not criticize Giscard d'Estaing but mocked Chirac for being defeated by his own political allies.

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31. The rivaly between Chirac and Giscard d'Estaing dates back to Giscard's Presidency (1974–1981). The RPR was founded in 1976 by Chirac, and the UDF as a support to Giscard in 1978.

The Méry affair compromised all political parties both on the right and on the left, and they all tried to save whatever they could, either by pointing at the other side, by looking for juridical protection or by trying to disengage by saying that justice should follow its course independently. In these conditions, it was easy for *Le Monde*, not being a political party, to blame the entire political class for the citizens' lack of trust and interest in political life, and to call for the sanction of all those involved including the President. Then, thanks to this "superior" stand, *Le Monde* was in a better position to avoid accusations of partiality toward the government when it supported a PS proposal to amend the Constitution; this amendment was supposed to allow for a President to be tried for common law infractions by ordinary courts.

It was not only in the Méry affair that *Le Monde* could give itself a "superior" role, one that would lead political life toward higher, more noble goals. In passing moral judgements on the French political class about all issues, in underlining its role in (re)-opening debates (e.g. length of the presidential mandate), and in making public the transcription of Méry's tape, *Le Monde* strived to assume the role of an orchestra conductor. While the different groups of musicians (i.e. politicians organized in political parties) actually play the music (i.e. take actions), the conductor (i.e. *Le Monde*) uses his knowledge of what is melodious or not (i.e. morality and democracy) and of what each player can achieve in his/her position in the orchestra (i.e. expert knowledge of the political stage) to have the entire orchestra perform for the enjoyment of the public (i.e. solve institutional, social and economic problems for society).

In *Le Monde*'s eyes, cohabitation was close to being the source of all evils. It is true that this third cohabitation period under the Fifth Republic had not been foreseen and thus could not have been prepared for; furthermore, it was in place for five years. The 1958 Constitution, in reaction to the Third and Fourth Republics' instability, created a doubly mixed system (i.e. part presidential/part parliamentary, and multipartite but bi-partisan because of the electoral system) with a double-headed Executive (i.e. a President elected by direct universal suffrage, and a Prime Minister coming from the legislative elections). When the President and the Prime Minister are on the same political side, i.e. either both on the left or both on the right, then their eventual differing political shades (as they would not necessarily come from the same party) could be seen as enriching the dialogue between the Captain (i.e. the President) and his First Mate (i.e. the Prime Minister) and, if their divergence of views were to become unmanageable, then the President's dismissal of the Prime Minister would appear politically appropriate. However, when the two heads of the Executive belong to opposing political sides (i.e. the right vs. the left), as was the case from 1997 to 2002, a solid minimum of understanding that cannot be taken for granted is necessary for the ship not to get

lost because of contradictory orders. While not ideal for determining the course of the ship, this particularly delicate exercise is not impossible: it had been performed twice before. Two opposing heads, provided they each have sufficient strength, can eventually find some common ground for the common good. However, it suffices for one of the two heads to waiver, and the direction loses its chance of being steady. The observation of the institutional issues as discussed by the Parliament, presented on public TV, and thought about by the public opinion seems to indicate that this is what happened between President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin. Indeed, on the issues of the justice reform, the five-year presidential mandate, and the order of the presidential and legislative elections, the presidential minority was divided by Giscard d'Estaing, member of the UDF and former President of the Republic, in both roles more a "rival" to Chirac than a political friend or a mentor. Thus, the core of the problem was not the cohabitation system, but rather the multipartite/bi-partisan system that forces coalitions.[32] The only issue (i.e. Méry's tape) in which Giscard d'Estaing did not apply his stamp was when all parties, from the right and the left even if with varying degrees, were implicated for the same reasons.

With its binary reading of the internal political stage and its rather left-wing orientation, *Le Monde* picked up on Giscard d'Estaing's interventions when he was in agreement with the left, as this underlined the "untenability" of Chirac's positions. In other words, *Le Monde* "played" with the system's characteristics to further its partisan goals, just as any other politician would. This was accomplished with the reinforcement of one aspect of the French political system to the detriment of the other, whereas the Fifth Republic rests on an unusual and potentially unstable blending of political characteristics. In this, *Le Monde* contributed to the malfunctioning of the institutions and of democracy against which it had called not only for the political class but also ultimately for the entire society to react.

All in all, *Le Monde*'s role in debates on French institutional issues from 1999 to 2001 as indicated above illustrates how the newspaper with its knowledge of the French political stage promotes its conception of French society based on its values.

32. The multipartite/bi-partisan system is also one of the Fifth Republic's strengths.

CHAPTER 4

The enlargement of the European Union and *Le Monde*

This chapter is the second part of the editorials' qualitative communicative analysis that consists first of a media-centric frame analysis and second of a description of interactions in the public sphere for the analysis of *Le Monde*'s interactions in society according to the Orchestra model. As in the preceding chapter, the media-centric approach is conducted with the definition of the editorials' substantive frame (Entman 2004) and a description of the different voices (i.e. actors) appearing in the argumentation. In the society-centric perspective, the interactions between the public sphere's actors appearing on TV news, in the Parliament (for information on the French political system, see Appendix 6) or through the collective voice of opinion polls are described in detail. The combination of the two perspectives then gives an account of *Le Monde*'s positions and actions in context. First, the question of the European Union's enlargement needs to be briefly introduced.

Conceived in 1992 with the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Union (EU) was born in 1993 when the Treaty came into force and replaced the European Community. Starting with twelve member States, the EU soon comprised fifteen member States with the addition of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, and prepared for further growth. Indeed, in 1993, the Copenhagen European Council had already adopted the principle whereby a number of States could join the Union provided they were able to adhere to its political, economic and monetary aims. In July 1997, the European Parliament was presented with a document prepared by the European Commission (Agenda 2000) that outlined the preparation procedures States needed to follow in order to obtain membership. In December of the same year, the Luxembourg European Council defined a group of twelve "candidate States",[1] and agreed to start negotiations with six of

1. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. They joined the EU in 2004 except for Bulgaria and Romania who joined in 2007.

them.[2] While negotiations were going on, institutional adjustments were being made and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), that amended and consolidated the Treaties of the European Community (Rome – 1957) and the Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht – 1992), came into force in May 1999. In December 1999, the Helsinki European Council decided to open negotiations with the six other members[3] of the group defined in December 1997, and also granted Turkey the status of "candidate State" that gave it the benefits of pre-accession but neither opened access for negotiations nor set a date for accession. In view of the impending considerable enlargement of the Union, institutional reforms were needed. Indeed, the decision-making process within the Union could not be the same with fifteen as with up to 27 members. The Union was supposed to be able to integrate about 110 million inhabitants representing a fifth of the Union's population but less than 5% of its GNP. The question of the nature of the European Union was also raised: at stake was the choice between a large Union and a strong Union; France, one of the Union's founding members, repeatedly expressed concern about the matter. It presided over the European Council from July to December 2000 during the negotiation period on the Union's needed institutional reforms. In December 2000, the Council came to an agreement in Nice, and the Nice Treaty was signed in February 2001.[4] In June 2001, the Gothenburg European Council reached an agreement on the framework for successful completion of the enlargement negotiations.

During the period under study, important issues of internal functioning (renewal of the Commission due to accusations of dishonesty and nepotism), and of EU members' commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms (Charter of Fundamental Rights) were addressed. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission on behalf of their institutions during the Nice summit. However, it was the question of enlargement and the institutional reforms it implied that focused most energy and attention from 1999 to 2001. It is, therefore, these issues that have been chosen for the qualitative study. First, they are presented as they appear in *Le Monde*'s editorials (4.1), then as they are discussed by the Parliament and presented on public TV (4.2), and finally how they are thought about by public opinion (4.3). The conclusion (4.4) places

2. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus.

3. Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia .

4. The Treaty of Nice came into force in February 2003.

Le Monde's positions within the French societal context. This descriptive part of the analysis is conceptualised in Chapter 6.

4.1 The issue of the European institutions in *Le Monde*'s editorials

The presentation of the substantial frames, within which *Le Monde*'s positions on the enlargement and the European institutions are presented (4.1.1), is followed by an analysis of the actors involved in the editorials' argumentation (4.1.2), and then by a synthesis (4.1.3).

4.1.1 Substantive frames

Le Monde's substantive frames (Entman, 2004: 24) on the European institutions (Table 4.1) are based on the editorials' macrostructures (i.e. propositional content of the sentences most likely to remain in long-term memory).

Le Monde identifies the lack of democratic legitimacy in the EU as the main cause for the citizens' lack of interest in the Union in general and especially in the crucial choice it faces: "enlarging" the Union's member base or "deepening" its powers. As the process for enlargement is already engaged, the question is really about how to build a strong Europe[5] that could act as a credible counterpart to the USA despite the difficulties caused by its enlargement. Otherwise, Europe would become what the Americans want it to be: a large common market under the influence of NATO. Therefore, while *Le Monde* calls for a large debate on the European institutions and their goals, it already makes clear that it favours a two-speed Europe: a "driving group" composed of France, Germany and those who would like to join them would go faster and "deeper" than the others in their political integration by delegating more sovereignty. France, as any other member State, should participate in the debate on Europe, and in that matter, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin should not let President Jacques Chirac take all the initiatives. The frame function, "endorsing remedy", is to be fulfilled by the fifteen Member States, and within France by Lionel Jospin and not just Jacques Chirac. In other words, the primary addressees of *Le Monde* are the fifteen Member States on the European political stage, and Jospin on the French political stage.

5. The term "Europe" is used throughout for "European Union".

Table 4.1. European institutions' substantive frame

Function of Frame	Focus of Frame	
	Issues/Events	**Political Actors (Individuals, Groups, Nations)**
Defining	– Lack of citizens' interest in the EU	– 15 Member States
problematic effects/ conditions	– "Enlarging vs. deepening"	– 15 Member States
Identifying cause/agent	– Lack of democratic legitimacy in the EU	– 15 Member States
	– Enlargement of the EU from 15 to up to 27 members	
Endorsing remedy	– Large debate on European institutions and their goals	– 15 Member States
	– A strong EU must exist to act as a counterpart to the USA	
	– Radical reform of European institutions: two-speed Europe	
	– All those who want to join France and Germany to form the basic core unit of Europe are welcome	
	– Jospin should not let Chirac alone put forward propositions for reform of Europe	– Jospin, Chirac
Conveying moral judgment	– Member States are not doing what is needed to face the challenges of the Union's enlargement and to build a strong Europe	

4.1.2 Actors

A survey of all actors presented in the editorials (see Table 4.2) reveals that Jacques Chirac, Lionel Jospin and the fourteen other member States of the EU are presented under a positive, negative and neutral light. However, Chirac is presented positively in a restricted context, i.e. when he is said to act in agreement with the government. Actors not related to one of the member States (i.e. from the USA) are presented mostly in a neutral manner but certainly not to neutral ends. The analysis from *Le Monde*'s editorials below capitalizes on their hierarchical structures as revealed by their coherence analysis.[6]

6. The coherence analysis is exposed in detail in Appendix 3. This logico-semantic analysis of coherence brings to the fore "macrostructures" (i.e. Mcr: sentences at the paragraph level that mark the ending point of the paragraph argumentation and are most likely to remain

Following editorials on the necessity of the EU's discussing its future and its institutions in an open debate ("*La contradiction européenne*", 19 January 2000; "*Danke schön, M. Fischer*", 15 May 2000), "'*Notre Europe*'" (28 June 2000) commends the speech on Europe that Jacques Chirac delivered to the Bundestag (i.e. German lower chamber of the Parliament) to revive the debate on Europe in response to the 12 May 2000 speech on Europe by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer:

Et c'est un vrai discours de relance européenne qu'il [Jacques Chirac] est allé délivrer dans le cadre qui symboliquement s'y prêtait le mieux : l'enceinte de l'ancien Reichstag à Berlin. (TTh)	It is a real speech on European renewal that Jacques Chirac delivered in symbolically the best location for effect: the site of the former Reichstag in Berlin. (TTh)
C'est [discours de Chirac], en fait, une méthode pour sortir du blocage conceptuel, des exclusions, des anathèmes. (TMcr)	In fact Chirac's speech proposes a way out of the conceptual cage, out of exclusions and anathemas. (TMcr)

While *Le Monde* only has praise for Chirac's speech, the scope of its praise for Chirac himself is subtly restricted by the mention of the government's approval:

C'est la position officielle de la France (approuvée donc par le gouvernement) que Jacques Chirac a exposée solennellement devant le Bundestag.	It is the French official position (that has therefore been approved by the government) that Jacques Chirac solemnly expressed to the Bundestag.

Chirac's speech to the Bundestag is further discussed in "*Dissonance sur l'Europe*" (1 July 2000). *Le Monde*'s general argumentation is based on criticisms of the speech from members of the government:

Le président de la République disait à Berlin que le premier ministre aurait pu tenir les mêmes propos que lui.	The President of the Republic said in Berlin that the Prime Minister could have spoken the same words as he did.
Rien n'est moins sûr, à en juger par les critiques à peine voilées émanant de plusieurs memb-res du gouvernement. (TTh)	This is not at all certain if one considers the barely hidden critical comments expressed by several members of the government. (TTh)

in long-term memory) and "text macrostructures" (i.e. TMcr: sentences at the text level that mark the ending point of the text argumentation and are most likely to remain in long-term memory). It also allows the identification of "themes" (i.e. Th: sentences at the paragraph level that indicates the "aboutness" of the paragraph and marks the starting point of the paragraph argumentation), and "text themes" (i.e. TTh: sentences at the text level that indicates the "aboutness" of the text and marks the starting point of the text argumentation).

Thus, Chirac's speech was entirely his and it had not received the government's approval. *Le Monde* still does not, and could not without contradicting itself, withdraw its support from it. In fact, it praises the President for his strategic skill:

Le débat était ouvert. La position de la France était attendue. Le Président de la République a eu l'habileté de saisir l'occasion. (TMcr)

The debate was open. France's position was still awaited. The President of the Republic was skillful enough to seize the opportunity. (TMcr).

However, what *Le Monde* does not is directly criticize Jospin for not having taken position on Europe; instead, it advises him on the strategy to adopt:

Mais en abandonnant ce terrain [Europe] à Jacques Chirac, il [Jospin] commettrait une erreur stratégique. (TMcr)

By leaving this (European) topic to Jacques Chirac, Jospin would make a strategic mistake. (TMcr)

The European Council, meeting in Nice in December 2000, took place under (the two-headed) French presidency. "*Le pouvoir dans l'Europe*" (9 December 2000) deals with the question of power and the reluctance of the fifteen member States to deal with it:

Derrière ces expressions ésotériques se cache en fait la question fondamentale [du pouvoir] que les Quinze n'osent pas aborder de fond. (TTh)

These esoteric expressions actually hide the essential question (of power) that the Fifteen do not dare tackle. (TTh)

The importance of this assertion is underlined by its repetition in the next paragraph:

Soutenue par ses partenaires, la présidence française s'est bien gardée de poser dans sa brutale simplicité la question du pouvoir dans l'Union européenne, préférant limiter ses ambitions aux institutions pour ne pas, disait-on, «charger la barque». (Mcr)

With the support of its partners, the French presidency took care not to ask the question of power in the European Union in its naked simplicity, but preferred to limit the scope of the discussions to the institutions in order not to "overload the boat", so it was said.

Addressing the French Presidency and its fourteen partners in the previous sentence, *Le Monde* had just given place to the voices of the largest and also most indefinite body of people, "*tout le monde*" [everybody]:

Mais tout le monde s'accorde à penser qu'elle [*la mécanique de l'Europe*] *ne peut pas tourner dans une Europe élargie à vingt-cinq ou trente États, alors qu'elle est déjà pratiquement paralysée avec quinze membres.*

Everybody agrees that the European apparatus cannot function in a European Union enlarged to 25 or 30 States, when it is already practically paralyzed with fifteen members.

The disproportionate opposition between "*tout le monde*" and the fifteen Member States represented by their head of State or government plays in favor of *Le Monde*'s conclusion that sharply criticizes the refusal to open a large democratic debate while deploring citizens' lack of interest in Europe:

Il est inconséquent de déplorer le désintérêt des citoyens pour l'Europe qui va de pair avec un manque de légitimité démocratique et, en même temps, de refuser un large débat sur l'organisation du pouvoir dans une institution qui, sans être un super-État, a de plus en plus d'influence sur la vie des Européens. (TMcr)

It is inconsistent to deplore the citizens' lack of interest in Europe that goes hand in hand with a lack of democratic legitimacy and, at the same time, to refuse a large debate on the organization of power in an institution that, although not a super-State, has more and more influence on the life of Europeans. (TMcr)

Having strategically advised Jospin to take a position on the future of Europe ("*Dissonance sur l'Europe*", 1 July 2000), *Le Monde* can only welcome his long-awaited speech in "*L'Europe de M. Jospin*" (29 May 2001):

Sa réponse était donc très attendue. (TTh)

His response was therefore highly anticipated. (TTh)

Right from the first sentence, Jospin is given approbation:

Lionel Jospin place avec raison, le débat sur l'avenir de l'Europe, au fond. (Th)

Rightly, Lionel Jospin focuses on content in the debate on the future of Europe.]

This approbation continues throughout the argumentation (e.g. "M. Jospin a raison de dire" [Mr. Jospin is right in saying]) and concerns the process more than the content:

M. Jospin remet la politique au poste de commande en proposant un projet de société pour l'Europe qui marque sa différence par rapport à l'autre puissance, les Etats-Unis. (TMcr)
On peut discuter ses conclusions, mais sa démarche ne peut qu'être approuvée.

Mr. Jospin puts politics back at the centre of command with his proposition for a European society that is different from that of the other power, the United States. (TMcr)
His conclusions may be debatable, but the process he followed can only be approved.

The American concept of Europe had been partly presented five months earlier in "*M. Bush et l'Europe*" (19 December 2000). This editorial exposes the American opposition to a European system of defense:

Plus précisément, M. Bolton, qui pourrait devenir l'un des adjoints de Colin Powell au département d'État, dénonce l'idée française selon laquelle cette force [*de réaction rapide*] *pourrait s'appuyer sur une planification, stratégique et opérationnelle, purement européenne.* (TTh)

More precisely, Mr. Bolton, who could become one of Colin Powell's assistants at the State Department, denounced the French idea for rapid reaction forces that could be based on uniquely European, strategic and operational planning. (TTh)

Bolton, one of the newly elected[7] President George Bush's advisers, had been introduced in the preceding sentence as delivering a virulent attack ("*attaque virulente*") against this proposal. Throughout the argumentation, American

7. On 12 December 2000, the American Supreme Court halted the court fight between Republicans and Democrats over the winner of the presidential elections by ruling against the recount of

officials, linked to the (Democrat) Clinton Administration but especially to the Republican senior Bush's Administration, are presented in a negative manner. *Le Monde* warns the incoming Republican Administration that it cannot call for a rapid withdrawal of American troops from Bosnia and Kosovo and, at the same time, not let Europe plan by itself military operations of which the USA does not or no longer wants to be part:

C'est l'un ou l'autre. (TMcr)

It is one or the other. (TMcr)

Despite Jospin's speech on Europe and his "project for a European society that is different from that of the other power, the United States" ("*L'Europe de M. Jospin*", 29 May 2001), "a depressing mood dominates" ("*Or la déprime domine*") according to *Le Monde* ("*M. Bush et Göteborg*", 19 June 2001) because of the Nice Treaty:

Les compromis boiteux du traité de Nice (mais qui propose mieux en l'état de l'Union?) sont la traduction de cette infernale contradiction entre élargissement et approfondissement de l'Europe. (TTh)

The shaky compromises of the Nice Treaty (however, in the present circumstances in the Union, who can propose anything better?) reflect the infernal contradiction between the enlargement and the strengthening of Europe. (TTh)

The "no" of the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty and the anti-globalization demonstrators' attacks against Europe at the Gothenburg meeting of the European Council concur in giving a weak image of Europe,

Le référendum irlandais va au-delà de la bouffée d'ingratitude de la part d'un pays qui, après avoir tant reçu de l'Union, refuserait son élargissement.

Il faut répéter aux anti-mondialistes qu'ils se trompent de cible.

The results of the Irish referendum represent more than an outburst of ingratitude from a country that would deny the enlargement of the Union after having received so much from it.

The anti-globalization militants must be told again that they are going after the wrong target.

and this weakness provides a fertile ground for Bush's project for Europe:

Et comme s'il [*Bush*] *en avait profité* [*de ce moment d'hésitation de l'Europe*] *pour, dans son discours de Varsovie, le combler à sa manière en donnant «sa» vision de ce que doit être l'Union: une sorte de pendant politique et économique de l'OTAN.*

As if Bush had taken advantage of Europe's temporary indecisiveness to replace it in his speech in Warsaw in his own way with "his" vision of what the Union should be: a sort of a political and economic counterpart of NATO.

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litigious ballots. On 6 January 2001, The United States Congress certified George W. Bush's Electoral College victory. George Bush was sworn in as President on 20 January 2001.

Of this, "Europeans are warned" ("*Les Européens sont prévenus*" – TMcr). A few days later, after having exposed a number of mistakes (e.g. "*maladresses*", "*bévues*", "*mauvais coup*", "*faute*") by several European officials, *Le Monde* reiterates this warning in "*L'Europe des maladroits*" (24–25 June 2001):

Quand l'Union s'affaiblit, le risque grossit de voir cette Europe-là [*Europe-marché politiquement sous l'influence de l'OTAN*] *l'emporter*. (TMcr)

When the Union gets weaker, the danger of seeing the concept of a Europe-market, under the political influence of NATO, succeed is increasing. (TMcr)

Table 4.2. Actors appearing in European policy (institutional questions) editorials

Presentation	*Right*	*Left*	*Other*
Positive	Jacques Chirac (with government)	Lionel Jospin	Chefs d'État et de gouvernement des Quinze, Joschka Fischer, nouveaux dirigeants allemands, Gerhard Schröder
Negative	Jacques Chirac	Lionel Jospin, Pierre Moscovici	Dirigeants européens, délégation allemande, Gerhard Schröder, les Quinze, John Bolton (USA), Irlandais, «non» danois, Romano Prodi, Wim Duisenberg (président de la banque centrale), anti-mondialistes
Neutral	Jacques Chirac	Hubert Védrine, Lionel Jospin, Pierre Moscovici	Jacques Delors, Allemagne, Grande-Bretagne, William Cohen, Colin Powell, Condoleeza Rice, Maison Blanche, les Quinze, Jacques Delors, Vaclav Havel, Jean-Louis Bourlanges, George Bush

4.1.3 Synthesis

Le Monde in its editorials is definitively pro-European. It advocates a strong European Union that could act as a counterpart to the U.S.A. It is therefore important for the Union not to become what Americans have in mind for it, "a sort of a political and economic counterpart of NATO" ("*M. Bush et Göteborg*", 19 June 2001). Unfortunately, the Union's weakness due to its lack of democratic legitimacy is further impaired by its enlargement from fifteen to 25 members, and its leaders' lack of courage in facing the challenges. In these conditions, *Le Monde* is ready to criticize all those who could make the EU appear weak even if in other times the newspaper might have sided with them (i.e. the anti-globalization demonstrators), and to praise

all those who are trying to revive the debate on the institutions even if they are politically regularly criticized (i.e. Chirac). In promoting a two-speed Europe, *Le Monde* directly addresses the fifteen Member States.

4.2 The issue of the European institutions on French public TV channel (A2) and in the Parliament

Le Monde's main chosen interlocutors in its editorials are the fifteen member States on the European political stage and Jospin on the French political stage. When other (mostly institutional) actors are being mentioned, it is to support what *Le Monde* has to say to its chosen interlocutors. In contrast, the public TV channel, A2, presents a more complex stage. On the French one, it underlines how the debate transcends the left/right political split and it leaves a larger space to engaged citizens, in particular union members and anti-globalization militants. On the European stage, it also provides space for anti-globalization militants. The questions to the Government in the Parliament also reveal finer distinctions than those made by *Le Monde*.

As in the preceding chapter (see above 3.2), the description of the public sphere in which *Le Monde* evolved in regard to European institution matters is mainly conducted through direct quotations so as to give a more accurate account of the public sphere's atmosphere. Readers not particularly interested in the details of French debates on the enlargement of the European Union can skip the demonstrations and go directly to the synthesis given in 4.2.8.

The following issues are presented in chronological order as they appeared and were discussed on the public TV channel, A2, and in the Parliament (Senate and especially, National Assembly): the enlargment process and the institutional reforms made necessary by it (4.2.1), the role of France and Germany in the construction of Europe (4.2.2), Chirac's speech to the Bundestag (4.2.3), Chirac's speech to the European Parliament (4.2.4), the French presidency of the EU and the Nice Summit (4.2.5), Jospin's speech (4.2.6), and finally, the Irish "No" to the Nice treaty and the Gothenburg Summit (4.2.7). A synthesis of these issues is then presented (4.2.8).

4.2.1 Enlargment process and institutional reforms

In December 1999, following the Helsinki European Council (10–11 December 1999) that gave Turkey the official status of candidate State and decided to open of negotiation with six candidates,[8] the first of many questions in the National Assembly (NA) on Turkey in particular, on the enlargement process in general, and on the necessary institutional reforms were asked, e.g.:

8. Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia.

Renaud Donnedieu de Vabres (UDF): *[…] l'accord donné à la candidature de la Turquie à l'Union européenne pose la question de la nature de l'Europe que nous voulons construire. […] Acceptez-vous, avant que la position de l'exécutif français n'engage notre pays, d'organiser un débat parlementaire suivi d'un vote sur la question de l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Europe ?* (NA – 14 December 1999)

Renaud Donnedieu de Vabres (UDF): The acceptance of Turkey's candidature for the European Union raises the question of the type of Europe we want to build. […] Do you agree, before the French Executive's position commits our country, to organize a parliamentary debate followed by a vote on the question of Turkey's membership in Europe?

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *[…] La Turquie doit avancer dans cette direction [démocratie, respect de l'Etat de droit et respect des minorités]. Alors seulement la négociation pourra s'ouvrir, dans le but d'aboutir, un jour, à une adhésion, qui, naturellement, sera appelée à être ratifiée. […]* (NA – 14 December 1999)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: Turkey must go in this direction (i.e. democracy, respect for the state of law and respect for minorities). Only then can negotiations for membership begin; this membership would, of course, have to be ratified.

Nicole Feidt (PS): *[…] Monsieur le ministre, pensez-vous que les décisions prises à Helsinki permettront à l'Union européenne d'atteindre les objectifs que sont l'Europe de la défense et l'élargissement ? Dans quelle mesure la prochaine présidence française de l'Union contribuera-t-elle à asseoir les décisions d'Helsinki ?* (NA – 14 December 1999)

Nicole Feidt (PS): Mr. Minister, do you think that the Helsinki decision will allow the European Union to reach its goals in regard to defence and enlargement? To what extent will the upcoming French presidency of the Union contribute to confirming the Helsinki decisions?

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *S'il était clair que l'on ne pouvait pas refuser tout élargissement, il était aussi évident que plusieurs façons de procéder étaient envisageables. Cette controverse, qui a longtemps opposé les Européens, s'est conclue par une synthèse nouvelle à Helsinki qui doit beaucoup aux idées françaises et au travail franco-allemand. Nous avons ainsi décidé d'ouvrir les négociations avec tous les candidats, sans fixer de date arbitraire a priori pour l'entrée des pays. Les négociations doivent être sérieuses. […] Nous avons fixé une date objective à laquelle l'Europe sera prête à accueillir de nouveaux pays, c'est-à-dire 2003. C'est dire que nous devons tout faire pour que la réforme institutionnelle préalable, qui constitue un gain récent puisqu'il y a encore deux ans, nos partenaires ne l'admettaient pas, soit réalisée dans les meilleurs délais […].* (NA – 14 December 1999)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: It was clear that we could not refuse any enlargement, but it was also obvious that we could proceed in different ways. This controversy that has long divided Europeans found a solution in Helsinki with a new synthesis that results largely from French ideas and Franco-German work. We have thus decided to open negotiations with all candidates without establishing *a priori* arbitrary dates for their entry. Negotiations must be serious. […] We established an objective date for Europe to be ready to integrate new members, i.e. 2003. This means that we must do all that is necessary for the preliminary institutional reform to be accomplished with the least delay. Working towards this institutional reform is in itself a recent victory since our partners had not agreed to it even two years ago.

In the Senate, Xavier de Villepin (UDF), chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Armed Forces, after touching on the status of Turkey, raised the fundamental issue faced by the European Union, "deepening" vs. "widening". In his answer, the Minister of Foreign Affairs talked of "variable geometry" (i.e. flexibility):

Enfin, monsieur le ministre, la conception qui apparaît aujourd'hui d'un élargissement concernant d'ores et déjà treize pays est-elle, à terme, compatible avec l'approfondissement de la construction communautaire et la réalisation du dessein européen que nous appelons de nos voeux? (Senate; 16 December 1999)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *Pour conclure, j'évoquerai les conséquences de l'élargissement. C'est naturellement par plus de souplesse, c'est-à-dire par la géométrie variable, pour appeler les choses par leur nom, que nous poursuivrons, de manière volontariste, l'approfondissement, même après l'élargissement.* (Senate; 16 December 1999)

Finally, Mr. Minister, is today's understanding of an enlargement that already appears to include thirteen countries compatible with the deepening of the Community developement and the fulfillment of the European mission that we are wishing for?

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: To conclude, I will mention the consequences of the enlargement. It is naturally with more flexibility, i.e. through variable geometry to call things by their proper names, that even after enlargement we will pursue deepening in a voluntary manner.

The day before the opening of negotiations with the "Helsinki countries",[9] candidates for accession to the European Union, A2 presented three diverging opinions on the question of the Union's enlargement and the necessary reform of its institutions:

Nicole Fontaine (President of the European Parliament – European People's Party) *: je pense vraiment qu'on n'y a pas suffisamment réfléchi. C'est le problème des frontières de l'Europe. Jusqu'où va l'Europe? Et si nous disons oui aujourd'hui à la Turquie, à qui dirons-nous non demain?* (A2 – 14 February 2000)

Philippe Morillon (UDF – member of the European Parliament): *il pourrait y avoir une Europe à deux vitesses, avec des accords de coopération particulière,*

Nicole Fontaine (President of the European Parliament – European People's Party) *:* I think that we have not thought sufficiently about it. It is the problem of Europe's borders. Up to where does Europe extend? If we say yes to Turkey today, to whom shall we say no tomorrow?

Philippe Morillon (UDF – member of the European Parliament): There could be a two-speed Europe with specific cooperation agreements,

9. At the Helsinki Summit (December 1999), the European Council had decided that negotiations for a second group of candidates (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia) would start on 15 February 2000. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/index_archive_en.htm - accessed 2 September 2008.

des accords de coopération renforcée qui permettent à ceux qui sont, qui se voudraient les moteurs, de continuer de jouer ce rôle moteur. (A2 – 14 February 2000)

enhanced cooperation agreements that would allow those who are, who would like to be key actors, to be able to play a key role.

Norbert Schwaiger (Spokesman for the Council of Ministers of the European Union): *on pourrait relativement facilement faire une majorité ou le contraire, une minorité de blocage, avec un nombre de petits pays ou de pays moyens*. (A2 – 14 February 2000)

Norbert Schwaiger (Spokesman for the Council of Ministers of the European Union): We could easily have a majority or the contrary, a blocking minority, with a number of small or middle-sized countries.

In sum, it appears that Turkey occupied an unusual place in the discussions on EU enlargement. In Helsinki (December 1999), Turkey had only been granted the status of candidate State, and there was no question yet of even opening negotiations with it. In fact, it was recognised that Turkey did not fulfill the political requirements set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 as admission conditions. However, Turkey was the topic of a number of questions in the Parliament. While a misunderstanding on Turkey's status due to the complexity of the process might partly explain this phenomenon, it is more likely that Turkey's status as a candidate State functioned as a trigger and revealed, in fact, a lack of deliberation on the general issue of the European Union's purpose right from the beginning, i.e. in 1993. The Copenhagen European Council had set political, economic and monetary conditions for admission, but the discussions were not brought to the level of the European citizens and their representatives. Thus, questions of institutional reforms could not be debated either, as the paucity of statements on this issue shows.

4.2.2 Role of France and Germany in the construction of Europe

The driving role of France and Germany in the construction of Europe was the topic of recurring questions. Contrary to its predecessors (i.e. de Gaulle-Adenauer, Giscard d'Estaing-Schmidt, Mitterrand-Kohl), the Franco-German "couple", Chirac-Schröder, was not enjoying a particularly harmonious relationship. Indeed, because of its considerably greater population, Germany was asking for a higher weighting of its vote in the European Council, but France insisted on keeping the parity between the two States. In November 1999, following a PS question, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reassured the Assembly that France and Germany were still continuing to work together for the good of all in Europe:

Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *[…] le travail actuellement mené par les ministres compétents afin d'élaborer, pour la nouvelle phase qui commence, une vision à long terme, commune et convergente de la France et de l'Allemagne sur l'élargissement afin de le maîtriser au mieux des intérêts des pays candidats et de l'Europe,*

Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: The work in this beginning phase to develop a convergent and long-term vision that is common to France and Germany is presently being accomplished by the relevant Ministers for the enlargement process to be mastered in the best interest of the candidate countries and of Europe.

sur la réforme de l'Union elle-même afin de la préparer à ce nouveau bond en avant, sur le développement enfin de nouveaux domaines d'action – Europe sociale, Europe des citoyens, etc. –, tout cela ne peut que nous rendre optimistes: le moteur franco-allemand continuera bien à fonctionner pour l'avenir de toute l'Europe. (NA – 9 November 1999)

This work is being accomplished for the Union's reform to prepare it for this new advancement, and for the development of new domains of actions – social Europe, citizens' Europe, etc. We can only be very optimistic about all of this: the Franco-German motor will continue to function for the future of all of Europe.

The topic came back in May 2000 and the Minister for Foreign Affairs urged everyone to consider first things first:

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *[…] Notre rôle, à ce stade, n'est pas de mettre sur la table des propositions de nature à diviser les Européens mais de parvenir à un consensus le plus ambitieux possible pour l'avenir de l'Europe, en commençant par la première étape et non par la dernière. […]* (NA – 16 May 2000)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: […] Our role at this stage is not to put propositions on the table and divide Europeans, but to reach the most ambitious consensus on the future of Europe and thus start with the first step and not the last .

In November 2000, the Prime Minister gave the same type of answer to a UDF question after emphasizing how the entire Executive was working in concert on the issue:

Answer by Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister: *[…] Je ne crois pas qu'il faille être trop préoccupés par les difficultés prétendues de la relation franco-allemande. C'est un classique de l'histoire européenne et des sommets européens. En réalité, les relations sont bonnes, et nous travaillons.* (NA – 29 November 2000)

Answer by Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister: […] I do not believe that we ought to be overly concerned with the alleged difficulties of the Franco-German relationship. It is a classical question in European history and European summits. In reality, the relationship is good and we are working.

The Minister for European Affairs was more direct in his own answer to a RCV question:

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: *[…] Du point de vue philosophique, il paraît donc légitime de conserver une égalité perpétuelle – la formule est du chancelier Adenauer – entre la France et l'Allemagne. Il n'est pas non plus illégitime que le chancelier Schröder s'exprime comme il l'a fait. Je note par ailleurs que, pour sa part, il fait totalement confiance à la présidence française.* (NA – 29 November 2000)

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: From the philosophical point of view, it appears thus legitimate to keep perpetual parity – this is Chancellor Adenauer's formula – between France and Germany. It was also not wrong for Chancellor Schröder to speak the way he did. I note that he expressed complete confidence in the French presidency.

While it is true that the construction of Europe started on the basis of a Franco-German cooperation with the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and

that it continued thereafter, the numerous references to the Franco-German couple in the French political sphere appear as if there had been no (or little) reflection on the change of context. The post-World War II European society and the respective places of France and (at that time, West-) Germany in it were not the same as at the turn of the millennium. With its will to build a leading role for the EU on the world stage, France seemed to accept (or at least be resigned to) the loss of its own leading world role, but it was still clinging to some of its advantages that now looked more like privileges than rights.[10]

4.2.3 Chirac's speech to the Bundestag

In May 2000, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, speaking for himself, gave a speech on Europe in which he favoured the idea of a European Federation. Chirac answered him in his address to the Bundestag a few days before taking the presidency of the European Council. In this speech, he called for a European constitution but at the same time he very carefully underlined that it did not mean he was considering the idea of a European super-State:

Nous pourrions également réfléchir, dans le cadre de ce processus, aux frontières géographiques ultimes de l'Union, préciser la nature de la Charte des droits fondamentaux, préparer les ajustements institutionnels nécessaires; les gouvernements puis les peuples seraient appelés à se prononcer sur un texte que nous pourrons alors consacrer comme la première constitution européenne.

C'est déformer la vérité de dire qu'il y a d'un côté ceux qui défendent la souveraineté nationale et de l'autre ceux qui la bradent; ni vous ni moi, n'envisageons la création d'un super-État européen qui se substituerait à nos États nations. (A2 – 27 June 2000)

In the framework of this process, we could also think about the furthest geographical borders of the Union, define precisely the nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and prepare the necessary institutional adjustments. Governments and then citizens would be called to come to a decision on a document that we could then designate as the first European Constitution.

To say that on one side are the guardians of national sovereignty and on the other those who sell it off is distorting reality. Neither you nor I have in mind the creation of a European super-State that would replace our nation States.

In the same speech, Chirac talked about the accession into the constitution of a group of pioneer States who would integrate further than others into the construction of Europe. The TV news anchor noted that the future of Chirac's propositions would depend on European reactions, in particular those of Great

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10. "*Mais un diplomate français renvoie la balle dans le camp français: 'Le moteur franco-allemand a beaucoup tourné à l'avantage de la France. Il faut trouver de nouvelles lignes de compromis.*'" *Le Monde*, 8 April 2002, in "*L'Europe a besoin d'une charnière franco-allemande mais l'élargissement et l'influence britannique obligent à des révisions*".

Britain which might feel estranged from the pioneers' group, but that Germany had already received Chirac's speech favourably. The reactions on the French political stage were diverse: in opposition to the Greens, the RPR, the President's party, and the Mouvement des Citoyens opposed the use of the term "constitution". The UDF and PS were cautiously positive.

François Bayrou (UDF): *au-delà d'une constitution de l'Union, il faut que le rôle des citoyens soit reconnu; nous proposons qu'un Président de l'Union, un Président de l'Europe soit élu au suffrage universel.* (A2 – 27 June 2000)	François Bayrou (UDF): Beyond a constitution for the Union, the citizens' role must be recognized. We are proposing that a President of the Union, a European President, be elected by universal suffrage.
Noël Mamère (Greens): *en tant que Vert, on ne peut que se féliciter de ce ralliement à la construction européenne, à la souveraineté européenne, même s'il est tardif.* (A2 – 27 June 2000)	Noël Mamère (Greens): As members of the Green Party, we can only rejoice over this coming over to the side of European construction, to the side of European sovereignty, even at this late stage.
Michèle Alliot-Marie (RPR): *en ce qui concerne le terme constitution, pour ma part, je suis un peu réticente, mais parce que c'est peut-être l'occasion de confondre entre…, nous avons une constitution nationale, là il s'agit d'un texte européen.* (A2 – 27 June 2000)	Michèle Alliot-Marie (RPR): With regards to the term constitution, I am somewhat reluctant, because it might lead to confusion with…, we have a national constitution and here, it is about a European document.
François Hollande (PS): *je ne crois pas qu'il y ait là d'idée véritablement nouvelle, mais il y a la poursuite d'un effort engagé depuis longtemps pour essayer de simplifier, de clarifier les institutions européennes, notamment leurs niveaux de compétence.* (A2 – 27 June 2000)	François Hollande (PS): I do not believe that it is really a new idea; we can see here an attempt that was started a long time ago to simplify, to clarify the European institutions, in particular their levels of competence.
Georges Sarre (Mouvement des Citoyens): *il ne peut y avoir constitution que quand il y a peuple, mais il n'y a pas de peuple européen, il n'y a donc pas de nation européenne, donc parler de constitution est une affaire surréaliste.* (A2 – 27 June 2000)	Georges Sarre (Mouvement des Citoyens): There can be a constitution only when there is a people, However, there is no European people, thus no European nation; therefore it is surrealistic to speak about a constitution.
Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): *il faut s'atteler à une réflexion plus large sur l'avenir de l'Europe. Nous connaissons les analyses et les propositions qui ont été exposées ces derniers temps; elles sont intéressantes, toujours utiles, même si elles ne sont pas toutes compatibles entre elles et devront subir l'épreuve de la réalité.* (A2 – 29 June 2000)	Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): We must get down to a larger reflection on the future of Europe. We know the analyses and the propositions that have been made lately. They are interesting, always useful, even if they are not always compatible with each other and still need to undergo the test of reality.

In the National Assembly, Chirac's speech to the Bundestag gave rise to questions about the government's intentions. In answering a UDF-Alliance question, the

Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized the importance of the upcoming French presidency of the Union and the intergovernmental conference that was going to take place (in Nice):

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs:[11] *[…] Il faut que nous participions à cet important débat sur l'avenir de l'Europe au moment où s'entame le grand élargissement. Comme vous l'avez dit, à juste titre, ce débat a été encore enrichi hier avec le discours du Président de la République, mais le point commun de toutes les propositions qui sont faites, point sur lequel nous attendent tous nos partenaires, à commencer par les Allemands, c'est que nous devons réussir la conférence intergouvernementale pendant la présidence française. C'est notre responsabilité première.* (NA – 28 June 2000)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: We must participate in this important debate on the future of Europe now when enlargement is starting. As you rightly said, this debate was enriched yesterday by the President of the Republic's speech. The common denominator among all the proposals that have been made, on which all our partners, starting with our German partners, are watching us, is that the intergovernmental conference, under the French presidency, be successful. This is our first responsibility.

In summary, the concept of a European Federation present in Joschka Fischer's speech is an old idea that was first proposed by the French statesman, Aristide Briand, in 1929. However, this idea was never well received because of the loss of national sovereignty it normally implies. In his answer to Joschka Fischer, Chirac made sure not to talk about a federation, as he knew that members of his Gaullist party, the RPR, would be against it. Thus, he merely used the term "constitution", thereby trying to entertain a certain "artistic fuzziness". However, the term "constitution" still evokes the idea of a State, and this proved to be too much for a number of RPR members, including the party's president, Michèle Alliot-Marie, while not being strong enough for others (on the right and the left) who wanted to go further in the construction of Europe. The difficulty of trying to find and keep the delicate balance between the "fearful" and the "fearless" was also experienced on the left as Jacques Delors' (PS) proposal of a "*fédération d'États nations*" [Federation of Nation States] in July 2000 demonstrates.[12] Thus, it appears clearly that the right-left split on the issue of the European institutions is not at play.

4.2.4 Chirac's speech to the European Parliament

A few days later (4 July 2000), Chirac addressed the European Parliament as President of the European Council. The TV commentator noted that his speech

11. The question was addressed to the Prime Minister, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs answered.

12. "Ma vision d'une fédération des États Nations", *Le Monde des Débats*, July 2000.

was well received by the Greens and Socialists, but not by the right (4 July 2000). Although Chirac did not mention the word "constitution" that had caused difficulties in some quarters of the right, not only did he not manage to win their support but he also was the object of criticisms from those (on the right or not) in support of a European constitution:

Charles Pasqua (RPF): *la vérité Mme la Présidente, M. le Président en exercice de l'Union Européenne, c'est que cette Europe est et restera condamnée à la fuite en avant.* (A2 – 4 July 2000)	Charles Pasqua (RPF): The truth Madam President, Mr. Acting President of the European Union, is that Europe is and will remain condemned to a fruitless pursuit.
François Bayrou (UDF): *Ce que j'aurais aimé entendre dans le discours du Président de la République aujourd'hui, c'est le plan de l'architecte; mais le mot de constitution qui figurait la semaine dernière ne figurait pas aujourd'hui*. (A2 – 4 July 2000)	François Bayrou (UDF): What I would have like to have heard in the President of the Republic's speech today is the architect's plan. However, the word, "constitution", that was spoken last week was not uttered today.
Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Greens): *quand on vient de l'appel de Cochin.*[13] *c'est pas mal; c'est ce que j'appelle la promiscuité politique; maintenant, je dis, Jacques Chirac, le caméléon politique.* (A2 – 4 July 2000)	Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Greens): After the Cochin's call, it's not bad. This is what I call political promiscuity. Now, I say, Jacques Chirac, the political chameleon.

This question of a European constitution had been the cause of disagreements among French Greens in the European Parliament. In June 2000, A2 had presented differences among them on the position to adopt towards the European Union. In particular, it reported how Daniel Cohn-Bendit was criticized for his appeal with François Bayrou, the UDF president, in favour of a European constitution:

Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Green – member of the European Parliament): *ce qui est intéressant, c'est quand des forces politiques qui n'ont pas l'habitude de prendre des initiatives en commun, se mettent en commun au service d'une idée politique et la constitution européenne.* (A2 – 18 June 2000)	Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Green – member of the European Parliament): The interesting part is when political forces that usually do not take joint initiatives start working together to push forward a political idea and the European Constitution.

13. The "*Appel de Cochin*" is a speech given by Chirac on 6 December 1978 as part of the RPR's pre-campaign against the first direct elections of the European Parliament members (10 June 1979). It took a very strong position against the principle of direct elections. Talking about the UDF (that had just been founded as a support to Giscard d'Estaing), Chirac said: «*Comme toujours quand il s'agit de l'abaissement de la France, le parti de l'étranger est à l'oeuvre avec sa voix paisible et rassurante. Français, ne l'écoutez pas. C'est l'engourdissement qui précède la paix de la mort*.» http://www.gaullisme.fr/lappel%20de%20cochin.htm; accessed: 2 September 2008.

Didier Rod (Green – member of the European Parliament): *il est un peu gros et un peu dur d'organiser des meetings en France avec les gens qui justement ont organisé sur le plan du marché et de la politique libérale cette Europe que nous dénonçons.* (A2 – 18 June 2000)

Didier Rod (Green – member of the European Parliament): It is a bit steep and a bit harsh to plan meetings in France with those who have organized this Europe that we criticize for its market economy and its liberal policy.

As stated previously (see above 4.2.3), the divisions in the French debate on the European institutions did not coincide with the right-left political split.[14] In fact, it provided an opportunity to transgress it, and those who dared to do so were criticized for it.

4.2.5 French presidency of the EU and Nice Summit

From July 2000 to December 2000, France presided over the European Council. This period was crucial for the future of Europe because of the negotiations on the institutional reforms necessary for the enlargement. This presidency had to be prepared by both heads of the Executive:

Alain Juppé (RPR): *le Premier ministre nous a assuré cet après-midi que c'était le cas [la France parle d'une seule voix] et que les priorités de la Présidence française avaient été préparées en plein accord avec le Président de la République.*

Alain Juppé (RPR): The Prime Minister assured us this afternoon that France is speaking with one voice and that the priorities of the French presidency were prepared in full agreement with the President of the Republic.

Je ne sais pas si on peut aller jusque-là [pas de différence entre la droite et la gauche sur ce problème de l'Europe à part les extrêmes à droite comme à gauche]; disons qu'il n'y a pas de divergences fondamentales sur la façon d'aborder ces 6 mois de présidence française qui sont une étape importante, mais enfin qui ne régleront pas tous les problèmes. (A2 – 9 May 2000)

I don't know if we can say that there is no difference between the right and the left on the issue of Europe (except for the ultra-right and ultra-left). Let's say that there is no fundamental divergence on the manner in which we should consider these six months of French presidency that constite an important step, but which will not solve all of the problems.

Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): *la présidence française est préparée dans une unité totale de vue.* (A2 – 3 July 2000)

Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): The French presidency is prepared with a complete unaminity of views.

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14. Explicitly and strongly opposed to the idea of a European federation because of, among other things, the loss of national sovereignty it would entail are, on the left, the Communist party (led by Hue), the *Mouvement des Citoyens* (led by Chevènement), and on the other side of the political spectrum, the *Rassemblement pour la France* (led by Pasqua), as well as the *Front National* (led by Le Pen). The Greens (left) and the UDF (right) were in favour of a European Federation.

Cohabitation was not the only source of difficulty in preparing for the presidency. Divergences within the majority were apparent and questioned by the opposition:

René André (RPR): *Monsieur le Premier ministre, en politique étrangère, on attend de la France – et donc du Gouvernement – qu'elle s'exprime d'une seule voix, claire et responsable. Or, au lieu de cela, c'est une véritable cacophonie que nous entendons, non seulement au sein de la majorité, mais, hélas, ce qui est plus grave, au sein de votre gouvernement. […]* (NA – 14 June 2000)

René André (RPR): Mr. Prime Minister, France, and therefore the government, is expected to speak with one, clear and responsible voice in foreign policy. However, instead of this, we are hearing a real cacophony not only within the majority, but also, and this is worse, within your government.

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *[…] Aucun interlocuteur de la France dans le monde n'a le moindre doute: tous connaissent la France, sa démocratie, la vitalité de son débat politique. Ils peuvent comprendre les nuances et les richesses de la majorité plurielle et du Gouvernement. […]* (NA – 14 June 2000)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: No partner of France in the world has any doubt: all know France, its democracy, the vitality of its political debate. They can all understand the nuances and the richness of the plural majority and of the government.

During the period of the French presidency, a number of questions were asked in the National Assembly on the progress of the negotiations. Most of them related to the voting procedure within the intergovernmental European Council, probably the most crucial element in the institutional reforms made necessary by the impending enlargement. Questions about the relationship with NATO and the protection of the French cultural identity were also raised.

Pierre Lequiller (speaking for RPR, UDF and DL): *Il nous faut donc encore résoudre les deux problèmes fondamentaux sur lesquels le traité d'Amsterdam avait échoué, hier, et sur lesquels la CIG [Conférence intergouvernementale] paraît aujourd'hui bloquée: la repondération des voix et la composition de la Commission. A deux mois du sommet de Nice, l'Assemblée nationale devrait savoir quelles options précises vous avez retenues et quelles propositions concrètes s'y rattachent.* (NA – 18 October 2000]

Pierre Lequiller (speaking for RPR, UDF and DL): We still need to solve the two fundamental problems on which the Treaty of Amsterdam failed yesterday and on which the intergovernmental conference seems deadlocked today: the weighting of votes and the composition of the Commissison. Two months before the Nice summit, the National Assembly should know exactly which options you have and which concrete proposals pertain to them.

Answer by Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister: *[…] À propos de la Conférence intergouvernementale [CIG], qui est l'un des dossiers essentiels que doit traiter notre pays sous sa présidence, la réponse vous sera bien sûr donnée à Nice, car, pour le moment, nous sommes encore dans une dynamique de négociation.*

Answer by Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister: The answer on the intergovernmental conference that is one of the main issues that our country must deal with as president, will, of course, be given to you in Nice, because right now we are still in the process of negotiation.

[…] A Nice, notre mission est certes de prendre en compte nos propres intérêts nationaux, mais aussi, en tant que président, de faire à l'ensemble des Etats membres des propositions qui permettent d'arriver à un accord. Nous serons confrontés à une question. Ne pas aboutir à un accord sur la CIG serait un échec, mais trouver un accord a minima *qui ne permettrait pas de réformer sérieusement les institutions de l'Union avant qu'elle ne s'élargisse ne serait pas un succès.* (NA – 18 October 2000)

[…] In Nice, our mission is certainly to take into account our own national interests, but also, as president, to make proposals to all of the member States so that we can reach an agreement. We will be faced with a problem. No agreement on the intergovernmental conference would be a failure, but an *a minima* agreement that would not allow for a serious institutional reform of the Union would not be a success.

Chantal Robin-Rodrigo (RCV): *Sentez-vous chez nos partenaires européens la volonté de créer les conditions de l'indépendance de l'Europe en matière de défense ?* (NA – 25 October 2000)

Chantal Robin-Rodrigo (RCV): Do you sense among our European partners the will to create the conditions that are necessary for European independence in matters of defence?

Answer by Alain Richard, Minister of Defence: *Sur le plan politique, je constate – j'ai pu le dire au Parlement européen, hier – une approche très convergente de nos quinze nations, bien qu'elles aient eu, dans le passé, des positions, on le sait, très différentes. Ainsi la position des uns et des autres par rapport à l'Alliance atlantique n'est plus facteur de contradiction entre les Européens aujourd'hui pour la réalisation de ces objectifs concrets. Nous avons même vu, lors d'une récente réunion de l'Alliance atlantique, nos partenaires américains, par la voix du secrétaire à la défense, William Cohen, exprimer clairement leur assentiment pour une organisation européenne en matière de défense. Là aussi, nous avons su convaincre.* (NA – 25 October 2000)

Answer by Alain Richard, Minister of Defence: On the political level, I see – as I said in the European Parliament yesterday – a very convergent approach from our fifteen nations despite the very different positions they have had in the past. Thus, the position of one or the other towards the Atlantic Alliance is no longer today an element of contradiction among Europeans for the realization of these concrete objectives. At a recent meeting of the Atlantic Alliance, we even heard our American partners, through the voice of the Defence Secretary, William Cohen, clearly express their agreement for a European defence organization. In this matter also, we were successful.

Alain Barrau (PS): *Comment abordez-vous les deux points qui sont aujourd'hui les plus difficiles, à savoir, d'une part, la composition, le fonctionnement et le nombre des membres de la Commission, et surtout, d'autre part, la pondération des voix au sein du Conseil – question centrale qui conduit à poser celle des relations entre les différents pays qui composent l'Union ?* (NA – 8 November 2000)

Alain Barrau (PS): How do you see the two issues that appear today as the most difficult, that is on the one hand the composition, the functioning and the number of members of the Commission and, especially on the other hand, the weighting of votes within the Commission, i.e. a central issue that raises that of the relationships between the different members of the Union.

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: *Le sommet de Biarritz, je le crois sincèrement, a mis la conférence intergouvernementale sur de bons rails.*

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: I sincerely believe that the Biarritz summit put the intergovernmental conference on the right track.

C'était un bon et utile sommet. Il demeure qu'on a pu avoir l'impression d'une opposition entre ceux qu'on appelle les «grands» Etats et ceux qu'on appelle les «petits». C'est dans ce contexte que le Président de la République et le Premier ministre m'ont demandé de faire un certain nombre de visites […] Tout cela fait que, à Nice, nous pourrons, je le crois, parvenir à un bon traité, même si, globalement, la négociation sera difficile. (NA – 8 November 2000)

It was a good and useful summit. We might have left the impression of an opposition between the so-called "big" States and the so-called "small" States. It is in this context that the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister asked me to make a few visits […]. Because of this, I believe that, in Nice, we will be able to agree on a good treaty even if generally negotiations will be difficult.

Pierre Goldberg (PC): *A la veille du sommet de Nice consacré à la réforme des institutions, que la France va présider, pouvez-vous nous dire, monsieur le ministre, ce que le Gouvernement entend faire pour s'opposer à la déréglementation libérale de secteurs essentiels qui font l'exception française.* (NA – 29 November 2000)

Pierre Goldberg (PC): On the eve of the Nice summit, devoted to the institutional reform under the French presidency, could you tell us, Mr. Minister, how the government intends to oppose the liberal deregulation in essential areas that constitute the French exception?

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: *[…] Je veux vous assurer que le gouvernement français, dans cette affaire, se fera jusqu'au bout – jusqu'à Nice – le défenseur de notre identité culturelle. Nous considérons, en effet, qu'il serait dangereux d'accepter la majorité qualifiée pour certaines matières, comme l'audiovisuel ou la culture. Nous devons pouvoir conserver des moyens de défendre, dans les négociations commerciales multilatérales, une identité culturelle française, mais aussi européenne.* (NA – 29 November 2000)

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: I would like to assure you that in this matter the French government will defend until the end – until Nice – our cultural identity. Indeed, we consider that the adoption of a qualified majority in some areas, like the audiovisual or cultural sectors, would be dangerous. In multilateral international trade negotiations, we must keep some means to defend a French but also a European cultural identity.

The Nice Summit in December 2000 was covered extensively by A2. In its introduction to a long interview with the President of the European Commission, A2 mentioned that the Summit had a very high probability of failure ("*très forte probabilité d'échec*"); the President expressed his concern by saying that he was neither pessimistic nor optimistic and that the EU was counting on France:

Romano Prodi (President of the European Commission – in French): *non, je ne suis pas pessimiste et pas optimiste, mais je suis déterminé à travailler pour les résultats de Nice; et je vais à Nice, préoccupé, mais plein d'espoir sur la sagesse de la France parce que je pense que la France est la France; elle a la responsabilité de conduire l'Europe à l'élargissement.*
La présidence française a été efficace, elle a fait tout du point de vue technique pour préparer la réunion,

Romano Prodi (President of the European Commission – in French): No, I am not pessimistic and not optimistic, but I am determined to work to get results in Nice. I am going to Nice with concerns, but also full of hope on French wisdom because I think that France is France. It has the responsability to lead Europe towards its enlargement.
The French presidency has been efficient. It has done all it could technically to prepare this meeting.

mais là est le moment de compromis, c'est le moment de l'accord final et je répète que, je pense que la France, elle a encore la force et la capacité de conduire les négociations avec les pays européens dans les points que vous avez si bien illustrés avant.

Écoutez, c'est impossible d'avoir un accord à 25 avec la règle de l'unanimité; l'Europe, ça a été fondé avec la règle de l'unanimité quand c'était l'Europe à 6, 6 amis ensemble; maintenant, c'est vraiment difficile avec 15, il sera impossible avec 25; mais je pense que les jours de Nice seront les jours dans lesquels nous serons capables de prendre des décisions parce que c'est impossible *de refuser l'élargissement de l'Europe; tous les pays européens, ils attendent l'unité de l'Europe, c'est quelque chose que c'est nécessaire pour la paix, pour la prospérité, pour avoir un rôle dans le monde entier dans la nouvelle globalisation, il faut être ensemble, il faut être tous ensemble.*

Mais ça [l'inquiétude des petits pays lorsqu'ils voient que les grands veulent au fond s'arranger entre eux] c'est la raison pour laquelle j'ai proposé de voter avec la double majorité, c'est-à-dire, l'Europe, c'est l'Europe des nations et c'est l'Europe des peuples; alors, pour approuver les délibérations, il faut avoir la majorité des peuples et la majorité des nations; à mon avis, c'est sage, […], c'est clair, tout le monde il comprend voter avec la majorité des nations et des peuples. (A2 – 5 December 2000)

However, now is the time for compromise, it is time for the final agreement and, I repeat, I think that France still has the strength and the capacity to lead the negotiations with the European countries on the points that you have illustrated so well before.

Listen, it is impossible for 25 members to reach a unanimous agreement. Europe was founded on unanimity when there were six of us, six friends; right now, it is really difficult when there are fifteen of us, this will be impossible with 25. However, I think that the time in Nice will be the time when we can make decisions because it is <u>impossible</u> to reject the enlargement of Europe. All European countries are waiting for the unity of Europe; it is necessary for peace, for prosperity, for playing a role in the new globalizing world. We must be together, we must all be together.

The small countries' apprehension when they see that the big ones basically want to deal between themselves is the reason why I proposed the double-majority rule; in other words, Europe is the Europe of nations and the Europe of people. Thus, the majority of nations and the majority of people are needed to approve deliberations. I think that it is wise, […] it is clear; everybody understands what it means to vote with the majority of nations and of people.

In its coverage, A2 included numerous movements of opposition to the European Union. It mentioned that it was "*l'occasion pour des dizaines de milliers de personnes de rappeler leur opposition aux dérives ultra-libérales et à la mondialisation, notamment en matière sociale*" [the opportunity for tens of thousand of people to remind (all) of their opposition to ultra-liberal excesses and globalization, in particular in social matters]:

Marc Blondel (FO): *l'entité syndicale européenne existe; la deuxième logique, c'est qu'on va débattre au sommet de problèmes sociaux, y a aucune raison qu'on dise pas, on en veut plus, on veut sur le plan social plus que ce que nous avons*. (A2 – 6 December 2000)

Marc Blondel (FO[15]):There is a European trade union entity; the second logical point is: social issues are going to be debated at the top level; there is no reason not to say, we want more, we want socially more than what we have.

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15. *Forces ouvrières* – trade union.

Bernard Thibault (CGT): *Y a besoin de définir un droit social applicable en Europe qui complète les acquis sociaux et les législations sociales de chacun des pays*. (A2 – 6 December 2000)

Bernard Thibault (CGT[16]): There is a need to define a social legal policy that is applicable in Europe and that completes the social "acquis" and the social laws in each country.

A2 drew attention to the fact that anti-globalization militants were arrested in Bordeaux, and that 2,000 Spanish union members as well as about 2,000 Italians had been stopped at the border:

Beppe Caccia (spokesman for *Rifondazione Comunista*): *L'Union européenne discute de l'adoption de la Charte des droits, nous voyons ici qu'un droit essentiel, un droit fondamental, le droit à la liberté de circulation dans l'Europe pour les citoyens européens, c'est nié*. (A2 – 6 December 2000)

Beppe Caccia (spokesman for *Rifondazione Comunista*):The European Union is debating the adoption of the Charter of Rights; we are witnessing here the negation of an essential right, a fundamental right, the right of the freedom of movement in Europe for European citizens.

Alain Krivine (Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire): *J'ai appelé le préfet, il doit me rappeler, il rappelle pas; les autorités italiennes nous disent, mais nous, on fait qu'appliquer les ordres, nous, on est prêt à laisser passer dès qu'on a une autorisation des Français; donc on se fout de nous, vraiment c'est l'image de l'Europe proprement scandaleuse qu'on est en train de nous donner*. (A2 – 6 December 2000)

Alain Krivine (Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire): I called the "*préfet*" [i.e. high civil servant at the head of a territorial administrative structure], he is supposed to call back, he has not called. The Italian authorities are telling us, we are only following orders, we are ready to let you go as soon as we get the authorization from the French authorities. So, they're laughing at us; that's really a scandalous image of Europe that they're giving us.

To its coverage of the protest against globalization and the high level of liberalization adopted by the EU members, A2 added replies that efforts were made to correct globalization:

Bernard Cassen (President of Attac): *Nous voulons une autre Europe et nous pensons qu'une autre Europe est possible, une Europe sociale, écologique, solidaire, ce qui est exactement le contraire de celle qui est en train de se construire; nous combattons pour une autre Europe*. (A2 – 6 December 2000)

Bernard Cassen (President of Attac[17]) We want a different Europe and we think that a different Europe is possible, i.e. a Europe where social matters, ecology and solidarity count. This is exactly the contrary of what is being built. We are fighting for a different Europe.

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16. *Confédération Générale du Travail* – trade union.

17. ATTAC: *Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financières pour l'Aide aux Citoyennes et citoyens* (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens). Founded in 1998.

Michel Rocard (member of the European Parliament): *Tout n'est pas vrai, c'est une chose fausse que l'Europe soit seulement une moulinette au libéralisme; le fait de faire notre monnaie unique est la première création d'un vrai contrepoids à une hyperdomination américaine.* (A2 – 6 December 2000)

Michel Rocard (member of the European Parliament): Not everything is true. It is wrong to say that Europe is only an instrument for liberalism. The fact that we have a common currency is our first real action to counterbalance the American superdominance.[18]

Nicole Notat (General Secretary of the CFDT): *Pour lutter contre la mondialisation, je crains qu'elle [la mondialisation] soit là et que si on ne cherche pas au contraire à l'infléchir, à l'influencer, elle passe, et que nous serons demain très déçus de ses résultats*. (A2 – 6 December 2000)

Nicole Notat (General Secretary of the CFDT[19]): To fight against globalization. I am afraid that globalization is already here, and if we do not try to correct it, to influence it, it will go forward, and we shall be very sorry for the results.

While acknowledging the eventuality of violent actions, A2 also mentioned that "*5000 manifestants sont venus exprimer pacifiquement leurs diverses visions de l'Europe*" (A2 – 7 December 2000) [5,000 demonstrators came to express their various visions of Europe peacefully]:

Paule Maze (leadser of Attac 06): *Si l'on reste, on va être contre ce que l'on défend; alors, moi je suis une mère de famille, je suis grand-mère et je veux pas qu'il y ait de la casse, alors je vous conseille de vous replier, de rentrer chez vous, j'en suis désolée*. (A2 – 7 December 2000)

Paule Maze (leader of Attac 06): If we stay, we'll work against what we're defending. I am a mother and a grand-mother; I don't want bloodshed. Thus I am advising you to retreat, to go back home; I am sorry.

The Summit's chances for success were not deemed particularly high either by foreign journalists or by the President:

Nutz Krusche (German journalist – in French): *La rivalité grandissante entre M.Chirac et M.Jospin a pris trop d'énergie; ils n'avaient pas assez de temps de s'occuper d'Europe* [sic]. (A2 – 7 December 2000)

Nutz Krusche (German journalist – in French): The growing rivalry between Mr. Chirac and Mr. Jospin took too much energy. They did not have enough time to deal with Europe.

Jacques Chirac: *On touche à des intérêts très sensibles soit pour les opinions publiques soit pour les pouvoirs, et donc chacun devra faire un effort un important effort pour accepter un compromis*. (A2 – 8 December 2000)

Jacques Chirac: We are treading on very sensitive issues for public opinions and for governments. Thus, everybody will have to make a serious effort to accept a compromise.

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18. The prefix "hyper-" in French means "bigger than super-" and is not pejorative.

19. *Confédération Française Du Travail* – trade union.

but some were less pessimistic:

Hubert Védrine (French Minister of Foreign Affairs): *Ça reste difficile, ça reste laborieux comme on l'a dit depuis le début, mais là, ça avance, y a pas de blocage, encore beaucoup de difficultés mais pas de blocage; on a l'impression d'être sur un chemin de halage, vous voyez, avec nous dans le rôle des chevaux*. (A2 – 10 December 2000)

Hubert Védrine (French Minister of Foreign Affairs): It remains difficult; it remains laborious as we have been saying since the beginning. However, we are now making progress; we are not stuck; there are many difficulties but we are not stuck. It is as if we were on a towpath and we were the horses.

Raymond Barre (UDF affiliated): *À Nice, nous sommes dans une situation difficile; c'est peut-être l'un des sommets les plus difficiles auxquels on doit faire face; beaucoup ont dit c'est la France qui règlera tous les problèmes; c'était une erreur, parce que la France, même la France et l'Allemagne, ne vont pas l'emporter au départ sur les réticences, sur les résistances d'un certain nombre de pays; et prenons les choses telles qu'elles sont, ne soyons pas outre-mesure pessimistes; l'essentiel, c'est d'avancer*. (A2 – 10 December 2000)

Raymond Barre (UDF affiliated): In Nice, we are in a difficult situation. It may be one of the most difficult summits we have been facing. Many have said that France will solve all the problems. This was an error, because France, and even France and Germany together, will not succeed from the beginning in dispelling the reservations, the opposition of a number of countries. However, let us take things as they are, let us not be overly pessimistic. The important thing is to make progress.

A2 concluded that the Summit ended with "*le sentiment pour les 'petits' pays (Belgique, Portugal, la Suède, l'Autriche, la Finlande et la Grèce) d'avoir été oubliés*" [the feeling from the "small" countries (Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Austria, Finland and Greece) of having been forgotten] (11 December 2000). On the French side, positive reactions came from the parties of the President and of the Prime Minister, but they were not shared by all (e.g. the PC).

Alain Madelin (PC): *Hélas, par manque de vision, par manque d'ambition, par manque de souffle parce qu'on n'a pas posé les bonnes questions, ce sommet se termine sur un compromis riquiqui*. (A2 – 11 December 2000)

Alain Madelin (PC): Unfortunately, a lack of vision, a lack of ambition, a lack of stamina have led to the wrong questions being raised. This summit is ending with a minuscule compromise.

Jacques Chirac (President): *J'entends parfois certains dire, ah on n'a pas suffisamment d'ambition, il n'y a qu'à faire ceci, il n'y a qu'à faire cela; mais faire l'Europe, c'est naturellement obtenir d'un certain nombre de chefs d'Etat et de gouvernements en liaison avec la Commission des progrès, mais c'est aussi faire ratifier ces progrès par les populations*. (A2 – 11 December 2000)

Jacques Chirac (President): Sometimes I hear some people say that we are not ambitious enough, we should simply do this, we should simply do that. However, the contruction of Europe necessarily implies getting a number of Heads of State and governments to act in concert with the Commission, and it also implies having these advances ratified by the populations.

Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): *Si vous mesurez ce qu'aurait été un échec, à ce moment vous pouvez aussi apprécier l'importance de ce qui vient d'être décidé même si on peut les uns et les autres se fixer naturellement des objectifs plus ambitieux*. (A2 – 11 December 2000)

Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): If you compare with what a failure would have been, then you can appreciate the importance of what has been decided, even if naturally the ones or the others may have more ambitious objectives.

Michèle Alliot-Marie (RPR): *Je dirais que le sommet de Nice est un succès pour la présidence française, n'en déplaise à ceux qui prédisaient un échec; et je crois que tous les acteurs doivent en être remerciés, le Président de la République en premier lieu, mais aussi le Premier ministre et les ministres qui ont été directement concernés.* (A2 – 11 December 2000)

Michèle Alliot-Marie (RPR): I would say that the Nice summit is a success for the French presidency, whatever those who predicted a failure think. I think that all participants should be thanked, the President of the Republic in the first place, but also the Prime Minister and the Ministers who have been directly involved.

Vincent Peillon (PS spokesman): *Je crois qu'on est projeté vers l'avenir; il y avait un risque de blocage; vous savez le gouvernment avait dit, le chef de l'État aussi, plutôt pas d'accord du tout qu'un mauvais accord; il y a un accord aujourd'hui, et c'est parce que cet accord est bon, même s'il ne résoud pas toutes les questions, il permet d'avancer*. (A2 – 11 December 2000)

Vincent Peillon (PS spokesman): I believe that we are going forward. There was a risk of being stuck. You know, the government and also the Head of State said no agreement is better than a bad agreement. Today, we have an agreement, because it is a good agreement. Even if it does not resolve all the questions, it allows going forward.

After the Nice negotiations of the European Council ended, Chirac presented the agreement to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Reactions were globally negative.

Jacques Chirac (President): *Ce traité, je crois, est le meilleur accord possible compte tenu des contraintes qui existaient*. (A2 – 12 December 2000)

Jacques Chirac (President): This treaty is, I believe, the best possible agreement in view of the constraints we were under.

Charles Pasqua (RPF): *Mais bon, vous féliciter M. le Président, pour la belle capacité de résistance physique dont vous avez fait preuve lors de ce marathon à Nice, mais mes félicitations s'arrêteront là; le résultat final est abracadabrantesque, et personne ne comprend rien aux règles de fonctionnement de cette usine à gaz*. (A2 – 12 December 2000)

Charles Pasqua (RPF): Well, I could congratulate you, Mr. President, for your physical stamina during this Nice marathon, but that's it. The final results are hocus-pocus. Nobody understands anything in the organization of this gasworks.

Hans Gert Poettering (PPE President – Christian-democrats): *Nous voulons une procédure avec la garantie d'une participation du Parlement européen ainsi qu'un agenda*. (A2 – 12 December 2000)

Hans Gert Poettering (PPE President – Christian-democrats): We want a procedure that guarantees the participation of the European Parliament and an agenda.

Enrique Baron Crespo (PSE President – Spanish socialist party – translation): *Plus de conférence entre gouvernements à huis clos comme à Nice*. (A2 – 12 December 2000)

Enrique Baron Crespo (PSE President – Spanish socialist party): no more *in camera* inter-governmental conferences as in Nice.

François Bayrou (UDF): *La présidence française porte une part de responsabilité parce qu'elle n'a pas proposé de vision, et quand on n'a pas de vision, quand on n'a pas de projets, quand on n'a pas de*

François Bayrou (UDF): The French presidency is partly responsible because it did not offer a vision, and when we do not have a vision, when we do not have projects, when

plan, on en reste aux discussions d'intérêt qui sont tellement absurdes par rapport à ce que nous avons à construire. (A2 – 12 December 2000)

we do not have a plan, we remain at the level of self-interested discussions that are absurd in relation to what we have to establish.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Greens): *Je crois que le Président de la République se trompe quand il dit qu'on va pouvoir élargir, et même que les pays de l'Est, ces pays se trompent aussi, ils ne connaissent pas encore l'usine européenne, c'est un système ingérable qui a pris naissance à Nice et qui va créer des problèmes.* (A2 – 12 December 2000)

Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Greens): I believe that the President of the Republic is wrong when he says that enlargement is possible, and the Eastern countries are wrong too; they do not know the European "factory"; it is an unmanageable system that was born in Nice and that will cause problems.

In the National Assembly, the "after-Nice" was expectedly not unanimous. Some chose to highlight the positive, others the negative. The communist group pointed to the insufficient attention given to a social Europe.

Answer to a PS deputy by Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister: *Monsieur le député, pour ceux pour qui l'Europe est d'abord l'objet d'un idéalisme abstrait faisant litière des réalités nationales et parfois même des différentes conceptions de l'Europe, ce sommet de Nice peut apparaître comme décevant et, à certains égards, il l'est. Pour ceux qui pèsent de façon plus réaliste […] le poids des réalités nationales, la force des contradictions entre les Etats, […] et la difficulté à réunir dans une seule négociation les éléments dispersés d'un faisceau de contradictions, le sommet de Nice a été un rendez-vous réussi. Il aurait pu être manqué. […] La question est posée de savoir si des négociations aussi complexes doivent faire l'objet, pendant des mois, de discussions qui n'avancent pas dans le cadre d'une conférence intergouvernementale, ou si ce n'est pas dans des cadres plus politiques, après consultation de l'ensemble des diverses forces de nos sociétés européennes, qu'il faut nouer ces débats. […] Cet accord est équilibré et il porte sur la substance, puisque la Commission, comme nous le souhaitions, sera plafonnée, même si ce plafonnement, c'est vrai, est différé […]. Le Conseil aura une capacité plus grande à décider, puisque 90% des décisions seront prises à la majorité qualifiée, même s'il est honnête de préciser que, sur des sujets essentiels, l'unanimité reste la règle. […] Le Parlement européen verra son rôle conforté […].* (NA – 12 December 2000)

Answer to a PS deputy by Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister: Mr. Deputy, to those who look at Europe in an abstract and idealistic manner, who ignore national realities and sometimes even the different concepts of Europe, this Nice summit may appear disappointing and, in some of its aspects, it is. To those who in a more realistic manner take into consideration […] the weight of national realities, the weight of contradictions between States, […] and the difficulty of putting together in one negotiation package the scattered elements of a set of contradictions, the Nice summit was a success. It could have been a failure. […] The question is raised whether such complex negotiations and the discussions they give rise to for months must take place within the framework of an intergovernmental conference, or whether such debates should take place in more political settings after consultation with all the diverse social forces of our European societies. […] This agreement is balanced and it is tangible as the Commission, following our wishes, will have a maximum number of members, even though it is true that the application of this measure has been deferred […] The Council will have a greater ability to make decisions because 90% of the decisions will be taken by a qualified majority, but to be honest, I should make it clear that on fundamental issues, unanimity remains the rule. […] The role of the European Parliament is reinforced […].

Félix Leyzour (PC): *[…] Par rapport au contenu des politiques européennes, il faut surtout retenir du sommet de Nice l'importante présence pacifique, le 6 décembre, de forces politiques, syndicales, associatives, de citoyens porteurs d'une ambition pour une Europe sociale, une Europe démocratique. […] L'idée d'une Europe sociale a avancé, mais la charte des droits fondamentaux est encore trop timide. Elle a été signée, mais on en est resté au stade des déclarations. […] L'après-Nice a déjà commencé. Comment, sur ces terrains qui sont ceux de la vie quotidienne des Français, de la citoyenneté, de la démocratie, du renforcement des solidarités européennes, le Gouvernement entend-il contribuer à faire avancer des solutions permettant d'avoir une croissance porteuse d'activité et d'emplois, des solutions au plan social et au plan culturel?* (NA – 12 December 2000)

Félix Leyzour (PC): In regard to the content of European policies, from the Nice summit we must remember the important peaceful presence on December 6 of political, trade-unionist and community forces, of citizens with the ambition for a social Europe, for a democratic Europe. […] The idea of a social Europe has made progress, but the Charter of Fundamental Rights is still too timid. It has been signed, but we are still at the stage of declarations. […] The after-Nice has started. On these issues that pertain to the daily life of French people, to citizenship, to democracy, to the strengthening of European solidarity, how does the government intend to contribute to job-creating solutions, to social and cultural solutions?

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *[…] L'agenda social est également un résultat important de la présidence française. Cet ensemble d'orientations guidera les progrès sociaux des Etats membres de l'Union européenne et, ensuite, ceux des Etats candidats. Il faudra veiller à ce que ces derniers voient bien que cette dimension doit être prise en compte. Ces orientations sociales concernent l'amélioration de la qualité et le nombre des emplois, le développement d'un nouvel équilibre entre la souplesse et la sécurité des emplois, la lutte contre l'exclusion, la modernisation de la protection sociale, la promotion de l'égalité homme-femme, le renforcement du volet social du processus d'élargissement.* (NA – 12 December 2000)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: The social agenda is also an important result of the French presidency. This policy will guide the social progress of the member States of the European Union and then, of the candidate States. It will be necessary to see that the latter take this dimension into account. These social directions pertain to the improvement of the quality and number of employment, the development of a new balance between job flexibility and security, the fight against exclusion, the modernization of social protection, the promotion of gender equality, the reinforcement of the social aspect in the enlargement process.

M. Jean-Claude Lefort (PC): *[…] Ainsi l'Europe restera lourdement impérative s'agissant des conséquences de l'adoption de la monnaie unique ou bien encore de la Banque centrale et de sa sacro-sainte indépendance. Par contre, elle [l'Europe] se garde bien de fixer des objectifs significatifs également contraignants pour une harmonisation sociale par le haut. Les manifestants, qui étaient trois fois plus nombreux dans les rues de Nice que dans celles d'Amsterdam, seront certainement, et légitimement, déçus.*

M. Jean-Claude Lefort (PC): Europe will thus remain very imperious as a consequence of the single currency's adoption or in regard to its Central Bank and its sacrosanct independence. However, Europe is wary of establishing significant objectives that compel a top-down social harmonization. The demonstrators, who were three times more numerous on the streets of Nice than they were in Amsterdam, will certainly, and legitimately, be disappointed.

[…] C'est pourquoi Nice reste marqué par la domination de l'économique et du financier sur le politique. […] (NA – 20 December 2000)

[…] This is why Nice still stands out for the domination of economics and finances over politics. (Applause on several benches of the Communist group)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *[…] Je ne crois pas que l'on puisse dire que le résultat de Nice soit un tissu de contradictions. C'est un compromis démocratique entre gouvernements démocratiques, qui sont allés ensemble, à quinze, le plus loin qu'il était possible d'aller dans les circonstances réelles d'aujourd'hui. […] L'accord de Nice est un accord très important. Il est ambitieux, il est réaliste et il permettra à la fois de mieux fonctionner au sein des Quinze, par rapport à nos ambitions, et de faire face aux perspectives d'élargissement au fur et à mesure que les pays candidats seront réellement en mesure de reprendre nos acquis. […]* (NA – 20 December 2000)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: I do not believe that we can say the results in Nice were a bundle of contradictions. They are a democratic compromise between democratic governements that tried to go together, the fifteen of them, as far as possible in the circumstances of today's reality. […] The Nice agreement is a very important agreement. It is ambitious, it is realistic and it will allow for the Fifteen to work better together and to face the prospect of enlargement as candidate countries are really able to integrate our "acquis".

The necessity of dealing with the effects of globalization that was at the heart of the claim for a social Europe was brought up again in March 2001.

M. Jean-Jacques Filleul (PS): *[…] L'Europe que nous voulons ne saurait se limiter à un espace marchand. Nous voulons une Europe qui crée de la civilisation et tienne compte de la diversité nationale. […]* (NA – 28 March 2001)

M. Jean-Jacques Filleul (PS): The Europe that we want cannot be limited to a trading space. We want a Europe that generates civilization and takes into account national diversity.

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: *[…] L'Union européenne souhaite la poursuite de sa modernisation face à la mondialisation, mais une modernisation encadrée par des régulations, aussi bien sur le plan économique que sur le plan social.* (NA – 28 March 2001)

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: The European Union wishes for the continuation of its modernization in the face of globalization, but a modernization that takes place in a frame of economic as well as social regulations.

To summarize, because the Amsterdam European Council had failed in adapting the European institutions to an increasing membership (June 1997), the Nice European Council (December 2000), under the double-headed French presidency, had no choice but to find a compromise on the European institutional reforms before the impending enlargement. To the relief of many, an agreement was reached, but it was a rather limited agreement. Because the summit "succeeded", on the French political stage the right-wing RPR and the left-wing PS, usually on the worst terms with each other, rejoiced together as a form of support respectively for the President and for the Prime Minister who had prepared and were responsible

for the summit jointly. Those on the right or the left who were not tied by party allegiance to Chirac and Jospin criticized the Nice summit for the complexity of the agreement and for not having gone far enough. The lack of consideration given to the anti-globalization demonstrators and their concerns was particularly underlined.

4.2.6 Jospin's speech

Chirac had presented his vision of Europe to the Bundestag in late June 2000 just a few days before taking the presidency of the European Council. Because this presidency was supposed to be prepared and assumed together by the two-headed French Executive, Jospin could not present his own views on the topic right away. Thus, while in his comments on Chirac's Bundestag speech he had said that a larger reflection on the future on Europe was necessary (A2 – 29 June 2000 – see above), he gave his own thoughts on the subject only in May 2001, i.e. five months after the end of the French presidency of the European Council. Reactions from the French political stage as presented by A2 were not particularly positive except from the Greens (no reactions from the PS were presented).

Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): *Mesdames, Messieurs, parce que je ne suis pas un Européen tiède, je ne veux pas d'une Europe fade.*	Lionel Jospin (Prime Minister): Ladies and Gentlemen, as I am not a timid European, I do not want a dull Europe.
Pour équilibrer l'édifice de l'Union, la coordination des politiques économiques doit être considerablement accrue.	So that we can balance the construction of the Union, we must considerably increase the coordination of our economic policies.
Je ne sépare pas la France de l'Europe; comme tant d'autres Européens convaincus, je désire l'Europe, mais je reste attaché à ma nation. (A2 – 28 May 2001)	I do not separate France and Europe; as many other committed Europeans, I aspire after Europe but I remain attached to my nation.
Michèle Alliot-Marie (RPR's President): *Ce discours finalement ne faisait pratiquement pas de part à la place de l'Europe dans le monde alors qu'il s'agit d'un sujet fondamental pour notre avenir.* (A2 – 28 May 2001)	Michèle Alliot-Marie (RPR's President): This speech finally did not really contain anything on the role of Europe in the world while it is a fundamental issue for our future.
Alain Madelin (President of Démocratie Libérale): *Je pense que Lionel Jospin a exprimé une vision très frileuse de l'Europe qui est celle d'un vieux socialisme qui n'a plus cours nulle part, sauf en France. Il veut bien de l'Europe, mais il ne veut pas d'une Europe qui baisse les impôts, la concurrence fiscale.* (A2 – 28 May 2001)	Alain Madelin (President of Démocratie Libérale): I think that Lionel Jospin's very fearful vision of Europe comes from an old type of socialism that is no longer prevalent anywhere but in France. He is fine with Europe, but he does not want a Europe that lowers taxes, fiscal competition.
Jean-Pierre Chevènement (RCV): *La proposition de Lionel Jospin vise à faire de l'Europe un substitut de la nation en confiant à*	Jean-Pierre Chevènement (RCV): Lionel Jospin's proposition wants to substitute Europe for the nation by trusting Europe

l'Europe non plus seulement des actions communes, mais des politiques communes dans le domaine de la politique étrangère, de la défense, en matière policière, dans la représentation au sein des grandes institutions internationales. (A2 – 28 May 2001)

not only with common actions but also with common policies in the domains of foreign policy, of defence, of police, of representation in big international institutions.

Noël Mamère (Greens): *On le disait très réticent sur la construction européenne et il a montré une certaine résolution; il y a des choses que nous pouvons soutenir, les Verts, comme par exemple l'idée de la constitution européenne, l'idée de la souveraineté européenne*. (A2 – 28 May 2001)

Noël Mamère (Greens): It was said that he was very reluctant towards the construction of Europe but he has shown some determination. There are some points that we, the Greens, can side with as, for example, the idea of a European constitution, the idea of European sovereignty.

On the European political stage, the A2 news anchor mentioned that Jospin's speech was not well received by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair (A2 – 28 May 2001). However, the German reactions were encouraging:

Joschka Fischer (Greens – German Minister of Foreign Afffairs): *Le concept d'une fédération d'États-nations me paraît intéressant; Lionel Jospin a fait des propositions qui permettent de continuer à travailler de manière constructive; la chose la plus importante est que le débat se poursuive et qu'on ne commence pas à dire qu'il y a des contradictions entre les uns et les autres et que chacun s'arc-boute sur sa position; on verra plus tard, mais pour l'instant on est en plein débat et aujourd'hui, Lionel Jospin a bien fait avancer le débat*. (A2 – 28 May 2001)

Joschka Fischer (Greens – German Minister of Foreign Afffairs): The concept of a federation of Nation-States seems interesting to me. Lionel Jospin made proposals that allow us to keep on working together in a constructive manner. The most important point is for the debate to continue without the ones or the others starting to talk about contradictions between themselves and without remaining entrenched in one's positions. We will see later, but for the moment we are in the middle of our debate and today, Lionel Jospin made it move forward.

Jorg-Otto Spiller (SPD member of Bundestag – in French): *les progrès a* [sic] *besoin de ballons d'essai*. (A2 – 28 May 2001)

Jorg-Otto Spiller (SPD member of Bundestag – in French): For progress to happen, we need trial balloons.

In the National Assembly, the reaction to Jospin's speech was highly marked by the context of cohabitation.

Henri Plagnol (UDF): *[…] Dans son discours sur l'Europe, Monsieur le Ministre, Lionel Jospin s'est présenté comme l'avocat d'un gouvernement politique de la zone euro. […] Or tous les actes majeurs décidés par votre gouvernement dans le domaine économique et social sont en contradiction avec les orientations de tous nos partenaires, y compris ceux dont le gouvernement est socialiste. […]*

Henri Plagnol (UDF): In his speech on Europe, Mr. Minister, Lionel Jospin showed himself as the defender of a political government of the Euro zone. […] However, all major actions taken by your government in social and economic matters are in contradiction with our partners' orientations, including those whose government is socialist. […]

Ma question est simple: qui dit la vérité ? Est-ce le Premier ministre quand il s'adresse à l'opinion publique internationale et se présente comme un européen convaincu, ou l'homme de la majorité plurielle soumis au chantage grandissant de ses alliés communistes […]? (NA – 30 May 2001)

My question is simple: who is telling the truth? Is it the Prime Minister when he is addressing international public opinion and appearing as a convinced European, or is it the man of the plural majority who is more and more under the blackmail of his Communist allies?

Answer by Laurent Fabius, Minister of Economics, Finances and Industry: *[…] Malheureusement pour vous, les exemples que vous prenez desservent votre thèse. […] Bref, Monsieur le Député, je vous rassure ou je vous inquiète: la position prise par M. le Premier ministre est parfaitement confirmée par la politique que nous menons. Nous avons une approche européenne, nous continuerons à la défendre. […]* (NA – 30 May 2001)

Answer by Laurent Fabius, Minister of Economics, Finances and Industry: Unfortunately for you, the examples you give disprove your point. […] In brief, Mr. Deputy, let me reassure you or trouble you: the position taken by the Prime Minister is in complete conformity with our policy. We are following a European approach; we shall continue to defend it.

In his May 2001 speech on Europe, Jospin took up the idea of a "*fédération d'États Nations*" [Federation of Nation States], first expressed by Jacques Delors (PS) in July 2000.[20] The concept of "federation", whatever other notions it was associated with, could only raise the friendly interest of Joschka Fischer who had pleaded for a "European federation" in May 2000. However, Jospin's speech came almost a year after Chirac's address to the Bundestag.

4.2.7 Irish "No" to the Nice Treaty and the Gothenburg Summit

The European Council's agreement on institutional reforms that was reached in Nice was written up under the "Nice Treaty", signed on 26 February 2001. To come into force, the treaty needed to be ratified by each member of the Union according to its own procedures. In a June 2001 referendum, the Irish population rejected the Nice Treaty.[21] This caused some to doubt the validity of the treaty as reflected by a RCV question in the National Assembly to which the Deputy Minister for Cooperation and Francophony replied:

Answer by Charles Josselin, Deputy Minister for Cooperation and Francophony: […] *Et hier*

Answer by Charles Josselin, Deputy Minister for Cooperation and Francophony: Yesterday,

20. "Ma vision d'une fédération des États Nations", *Le Monde des Débats*, July 2000.

21. Later, in a 2002 referendum, Ireland accepted the Nice Treaty. The treaty came into force on 1 February 2003.

le ministre des affaires étrangères, réuni avec ses collègues au Conseil "Affaires générales" à Luxembourg, ont réaffirmé leur engagement profond et ferme en faveur de la construction européenne et de la ratification du traité de Nice que personne ne considère comme caduc. […] Rien n'empêche donc l'Assemblée nationale, Mesdames, Messieurs les Députés, de se prononcer tout à l'heure par un vote solennel sur la ratification. (NA – 12 June 2001)

the Minister of Foreign Affairs in a meeting with his colleagues of the "General Business" Council in Luxemburg reaffirmed their deep and firm engagement towards the construction of Europe and the ratification of the Nice Treaty that nobody considers as null and void. […] Thus, nothing prevents the National Assembly, Ladies and Gentlemen Deputies, to proceed in the next while with an official vote on its ratification.

The Gothenburg Summit (combined EU and EU-US summits) that ended the Swedish presidency of the European Council (January-June 2001) was marked by demonstrations of anti-globalization militants protesting against President Bush and against the EU. A2 broadcast interviews of militants:

Fabrice Pilleul (Confédération Nationale du Travail): *On est ici pour dire aux gouvernements qu'on n'est pas d'accord avec leurs politiques, et c'est nous qui sommes, en fait c'est nous qui sommes la vraie puissance, c'est ceux qui travaillent qui créent les richesses, et donc c'est à eux d'avoir leur mot à dire et de décider ce que deviennent ces richesses, quoi.* (A2 – 14 June 2001)

Fabrice Pilleul (Confédération Nationale du Travail): We are here to tell governments that we do not agree with their policies. It is we in fact who constitute the real power; it is those who work, who create wealth; therefore it is for them to say what they think and decide what becomes of this wealth.

Lotta Holmberg (association «*réseau contre le racisme*»): *Je pense que c'est important d'apprendre, de discuter, de lire, mais qu'il faut aussi agir et montrer qu'on est là.* (A2 – 14 June 2001)

Lotta Holmberg (association «*network against racism*»): I think that it is important to learn, to debate, to read; however, we must also act and show that we are here.

In the National Assembly, the Irish "No" to the Nice Treaty and the Gothenburg's demonstrations were invoked by the PS, the UDF and the RCV to underline the lack of popular support for the European Union, the lack of citizen participation in the construction of Europe?.

Alain Barrau (PS): *[…] Et nous avons constaté que ceux qui trouvaient le traité de Nice positif ne se sont pas mobilisés. S'ouvre devant nous une période de trois ans, jusqu'en 2004, pour essayer de compenser ce déficit démocratique, ce déficit de participation de l'ensemble de nos peuples, en particulier du nôtre, par rapport aux questions européennes […] comment le Gouvernement compte-t-il faire pour que tous nos concitoyens soient partie prenante à ce débat essentiel […] et pas seulement à tel ou tel moment précis ? Il faut que l'enjeu européen, qui, nous le*

Alain Barrau (PS): We noticed that those who were in support of the Nice Treaty did not rally. We have a three-year period until 2004 to compensate for this democratic deficit, this lack of participation from all our populations, in particular ours in European matters. […] What does the government intend to do so that all of our fellow citizens be part of this fundamental debate […] and not only take part in it from time to time?

savons tous, est essentiel, soit aujourd'hui au coeur du débat politique, non seulement au cours des échéances électorales de l'année prochaine, mais aussi dans la vie quotidienne de notre pays. […] (NA – 20 June 2001)

The European issue, that is fundamental as we all know it, must now be at the centre of the political debate not only during next year's electoral campaigns but also in our country's daily life.

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: *[…] Il n'en subsiste pas moins que des interrogations subsistent sur le sens de cette construction européenne, sur sa légitimité. Cela s'est traduit par un déficit de participation et par le résultat du référendum irlandais, ce qui témoigne du besoin d'engager une réflexion plus large, plus approfondie, plus fondamentale oserai-je dire, sur la construction européenne. […] Comme vous le savez, nous avons déjà pris en France des initiatives pour organiser ce grand débat […]. L'objectif d'un tel débat doit être […] de façon plus générale, de répondre en pratique à la question suivante: quelle Europe voulons-nous ? Quelle politique concrète voulons-nous conduire ?* (NA – 20 June 2001)

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: Nevertheless, it remains that questions on the meaning of this construction of Europe, on its legitimacy linger. This shows through a lack of participation and the results of the Irish referendum, and it shows the need to engage in a larger, deeper, dare I say more significant, reflection on the construction of Europe. […] As you know, we have already taken initiatives in France to organize this big debate […]. The general objective of such a debate must be to answer practically the following questions: which Europe do we want? Which concrete policy do we want to follow?

Francis Hillmeyer (UDF): *[…] On dirait que l'Union s'enferme dans le difficile problème de l'élargissement. […] Ne pensez-vous pas, Monsieur le Ministre, qu'il faut, après tous les débats manqués, désigner de nouveaux objectifs, proposer des initiatives pour sortir de l'impasse et rassurer le citoyen qui a besoin d'une Union européenne à la fois plus proche de lui, plus compréhensible, moins technocratique et plus fraternelle ?* (NA – 20 June 2001)

Francis Hillmeyer (UDF): It seems that the Union is becoming a prisoner of the difficult enlargement problem. […] Don't you think, Mr. Minister, that after all the failed debates, it is necessary to define new objectives, to propose initiatives for coming out of this deadlock and to reassure citizens who need a European Union that would be closer, more understanding, less technocratic and more friendly?

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: *[…] Toutes ces questions que nous nous posons tous sur la légitimité, la lisibilité, la transparence et sur la gouvernance de l'Union européenne doivent être clairement exposées. Il faut que le débat qui s'ouvre dans les régions permette de commencer à y répondre, afin de donner la vision française de l'Europe simple, lisible et démocratique que nous souhaitons. Et cette Europe-là, elle doit aussi être – en cela je partage votre but, même si nous n'envisageons pas les mêmes moyens pour l'atteindre – proche du citoyen.* (NA – 20 June 2001)

Answer by Pierre Moscovici, Deputy Minister for European Affairs: All of these questions that we have on the legitimacy, the intelligibility, the transparency and the governing of the European Union must be clearly spelled out. The debate that is starting in all regions must contribute to their answers in order to present a French vision of the simple, intelligible and democratic Europe that we wish for. And this Europe must be close to its citizens; in this, I agree with your goal even though we do not look at the same means to achieve it

Marie-Hélène Aubert (RCV): *[…] Le rejet du traité de Nice au début du mois par les Irlandais et, à Göteborg la semaine dernière, le spectacle de responsables européens discutant de la construction européenne dans un camp retranché, alors que la "société civile", une fois de plus, exprimait bruyamment sa contestation et ses inquiétudes légitimes, voilà qui offre de l'Europe une image surréaliste et inquiétante. Sans parler de l'action calamiteuse de la police suédoise qui, débordée, n'a su ni contenir les casseurs ni respecter les manifestants, tirant même à balles réelles. […] C'est que le discours de l'Europe sur elle-même est devenu indéchiffrable par l'opinion: […] C'est de démocratie, de solidarité et d'écologie que veulent discuter nos concitoyens réunis dans un mouvement dénommé à tort "antimondialisation". […] Sinon, l'Europe ne sera qu'une zone de libre-échange banalisée, se contentant de ratifier les accords ultralibéraux sortis du chapeau de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce. […] qu'entend faire le Gouvernement pour ranimer le débat européen, plombé par le médiocre traité de Nice, et enfin oser le dialogue avec la société civile ?* (NA – 20 June 2001)

Marie-Hélène Aubert (RCV): The rejection of the Nice Treaty at the beginning of the month by the Irish and, last week in Gothenburg, the sight of European leaders debating the construction of Europe in a fortified camp, while "civil society", once more, was noisily showing its protest and its legitimate worries, what a surreal and worrisome image of Europe. And I am not talking about the disastrous actions of the overwhelmed Swedish police that were able neither to withhold the rioters nor to respect the demonstratrors, and who even shot with real bullets. The discourse of Europe on itself has become inintelligible for public opinion: […] in a movement, wrongly called "anti-globalization", our fellow citizens want to talk about democracy, solidarity, ecology. […] Otherwise, Europe will only be an ordinary free-trade zone and satisfy itself with the ultraliberal agreements coming from the World Trade Organization. […] What does the government intend to do to revive the European debate that was sunk by the mediocre Nice Treaty, and to dare finally start a dialogue with civil society?

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *Nous sommes dans le cadre d'un dialogue politique normal, mais je crois qu'une partie de ces manifestants se trompent de cible. […] À Göteborg, les manifestants s'exprimaient contre la mondialisation au moment même où le Conseil européen consacrait une après-midi entière au développement durable. Je pense que les manifestants opposés à la mondialisation devraient affiner leur diagnostic, rechercher des lieux plus propices à leur démarche et ne pas manifester systématiquement là où l'on tente d'organiser, de réguler, de civiliser ou d'humaniser la mondialisation.* (NA – 20 June 2001)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: We are in the framework of a normal political dialogue, but I believe that a number of these demonstrators are aiming at the wrong target. […] In Gothenburg, demonstrators were speaking against globalization at the same moment when the European Council spent an entire afternoon talking about sustainable development. I believe that anti-globalization demonstrators should refine their diagnostic, look for places more appropriate for their endeavours, and not demonstrate systematically where people try to organize, regulate, civilize or humanize globalization.

To summarize, the Gothenburg European Council, even more than the Nice European Council six months earlier, was facing a civilian society that did not feel included in what was going on: it rejected a treaty that had been so painfully arrived at, and demonstrated *en force* on the streets. Whatever the validity of the demonstrators' positions, the member States did not understand that above all,

the demonstrators were not satisfied with the place left to them and wanted to be recognized as social actors in their own terms in the construction of Europe.

4.2.8 Synthesis

The enlargement of the European Union from fifteen to 25 members brought up a number of issues. One concerned the candidacy of Turkey. The questions asked in the Parliament revealed how misunderstood the process of admission was, and also exposed the insufficiency of deliberation on the general issue of the European Union's purpose right from the beginning, i.e. in 1993. This lack of clarity on the Union's purpose could only hamper any discussion on institutional reform.

France and Germany had been at the forefront of the construction of Europe since the 1950s. The quality of their cooperation, as a "couple", was often questioned. Officially, the relationship was said to be working. In practice, France had difficulties giving up its advantages over Germany, advantages that now looked more like privileges than rights. Both France and Germany made speeches for the construction of Europe. In May 2000, Joshka Fischer, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, talked about a European Federation, an idea favourably received by the UDF and the Greens. In his answer to Fischer in June 2000, Chirac had to be very careful not to evoke the idea of a European State, as the term of "European Federation" would, because of his own party's opposition to any idea of European super-State. However, in using the term "constitution", Chirac was not able to keep the delicate balance between the "fearful" and the "fearless" of a loss of national sovereignty. Both the "fearful" (including the RPR, Chirac's party) and the "fearless", whose division did not coincide with the right-left political split, criticized his speech. Jospin gave his own speech only much later, in May 2001, after the French presidency of the European Council had ended. The idea of a Federation of Nation States he mentioned was well received by Fischer, but not in France except by the Greens.

The institutional reform of the European Union, made necessary by the Union's enlargement, was to be adopted at the Nice European Council (December 2000) under the double-headed (President and Prime Minister) French presidency. Despite widespread pessimism, the Council managed to come to an agreement, though a limited one. The RPR and the PS, usually at odds with each other, could only rejoice in support of their respective leader, but all those not tied by party allegiance to Chirac or Jospin criticized the agreement for its complexity and limitations. The concerns of anti-globalization demonstrators were not recognized.

At the following European Council in Gothenburg in June 2001, the situation of anti-globalization demonstrators got worse as observed in the Parliament and on TV news. Having come to Gothenburg in large numbers to be recognized as

social actors in a Europe under construction, the demonstrators were completely ignored by the Member States and were shot at by the police. This, combined with the Irish population's rejection of the Nice Treaty, underlined how the construction of Europe was being done without the European population.

4.3 The issue of the European institutions in the French public opinion

In June 2000 before France took its turn at the EU presidency, a poll[22] conducted on the positions of the French population towards Europe revealed that 70% of the respondents wish for the acceleration of the political and economic unification of the EU (vs. 25% for a slow down), 61% are in favour of the possibility of some member States going faster in this construction of Europe than others (vs. 37%), and 67% agree that decisions should be taken on the basis of the absolute majority and no longer unanimity (vs. 30%). In general, 59% (vs. 41%) look at the construction of Europe positively. While 62% are in favour of the enlargement (vs. 36%), this enlargement is not for everybody. Indeed, a majority is againt the inclusion of Turkey (52%), Ukraine (53%) and Russia (61%). They trust Chirac (yes: 64%; no: 34%) just as much as Jospin (yes: 62%; no: 36%) for the construction of Europe, and believe that social protection is better dealt with by the French government (76%) than by European institutions (21%). Finally, they rank the purposes of the EU as follows: (1) peace keeping in Europe (55%); (2) defence of human rights (42%); (3) counterpart to American power (36%); and (4) social and economic model (35%).

During the French presidency of the EU, a poll conducted for the Ministry of European Affairs in November 2000[23] showed how opinions had changed from June. Indeed, 51% of the respondents (vs. 70% in June) wished for the acceleration of the construction of Europe (vs. 9% for a slow down and 36% for the same pace). Furthermore, 53% thought it necessary to adapt the rhythm of construction to all members even if it meant a slow down (vs. 37% in June). However, while fewer were in favour of the enlargement (56% in November vs. 62% in June), the difference was not very big.

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22. CSA poll conducted for *Libération* on 15–17 June 2000. Sample: 1,000 people representative of the French population of the age of 18 years or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 28 June 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

23. IPSOS poll conducted for the Ministy of European Affairs on 17–18 November 2000. Sample: 1,013 people representative of the French population of the age of 18 years or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ – published: 6 December 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008.

The French presidency of the EU was not considered a success: 30% evaluated it rather positively, 34% rather negatively, and 36% had no opinion.[24] In July 2001 (i.e. after the Gothenburg European Council), in a poll conducted for *Le Monde,*[25] 54% of respondents answered that the European Union did not protect France against the negative effects of globalization (vs. 40%), and 63% support anti-globalization movements. Globalization is feared for its risks of increasing North-South inequalities (39%), of domination by the stock exchange and financial markets (37%), or by the United States (24%), more than for its eventual consequences on the job market (21%) or cultural identities (21%).

The progressive loss of interest in the European Union and even, growth of distrust as revealed by the opinion polls from June 2000 to July 2001, combined with a high support for anti-globalization movements appear to confirm the population's feelings of exclusion from the construction of Europe.

4.4 Conclusion: *Le Monde*'s role in the French debates on the European Union's enlargement

As a condition for the impending enlargement of the European Union, its institutions had to be reformed by an international treaty among its Member States. The negotiations were thus at the State level, and it was up to the Member States to take into account their citizens' concerns or not. In France, public polls revealed how excluded the population felt from the entire process. Among politicians, the debate was not particularly animated. Few spoke about the Union's *raison d'être*, its goals. Chirac and Jospin did each make a speech on Europe. However, reactions to them focused on whether their respective proposals entailed a loss of national sovereignty or not, and political parties took position along this line and not the right (opposition) – left (majority) political division.

In this particular context on the European political stage, *Le Monde* could not presume to be the orchestra conductor, but it could aspire to be the orchestra's concertmaster. As concertmaster and thus head of the orchestra after

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24. Poll conducted for *UN GROUPE DE JOURNAUX DE PROVINCE* [a group of provincial newspapers] on 21–22 février 2001. Sample: 1,000 people representative of the French population of the age of 18 years or more. Quota method. SOFRES – http://www.tnssofres.com/- published: 7 February 2001; accessed: 10 September 2000.

25. SOFRES poll conducted for *Le Monde* on 12–13 juillet 2001 Sample: 1,000 people representative of the French population of the age of 18 years or more. Quota method. SOFRES – http://www.tns-sofres.com/ - published: 18 July 2001; accessed: 10 September 2000.

the conductor, *Le Monde* could aim to replace the conductor whose leadership it found deficient and promote a strong Europe that could act as a counterpart to the USA. As concertmaster, *Le Monde* could also incite the other musicians to rebel against the conductor and denounce the lack of democratic legitimacy in the European Union. It could also tell which of the two soloists (Chirac and Jospin) was to have preeminence (in putting forward proposals for the reform of the Union). *Le Monde*'s style in its role of concertmaster was to criticize all those who were against its own interpretation of the music (i.e. a strong Europe) and praise all those who agreed with it, whatever the instrument they played (i.e. the political party to which they belonged).

The observation of the public sphere through TV news, parliamentary discussions and opinion polls confirms the lack of democratic legitimacy of the EU as denounced by *Le Monde*. Members of the National Assembly and the TV news opened a space of expression for the civilian society in particular when they mentioned the anti-globalization militants at the European Councils of Nice and Copenhagen; *Le Monde* on the contrary did not. While *Le Monde* deplored the lack of citizens' interest in Europe, it shut the door on those who were trying to express their concerns and it did so in two complementary ways. The first was by denying the legitimacy of their demands: "*Il faut répéter aux antimondialistes qu'ils se trompent de cible*" [We must again tell the anti-globalization activists that they are aiming at the wrong target] (in "M. Bush et Göteborg", 19 June 2001), i.e. words to be later repeated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (NA – 20 June 2001; see above 4.2.7); the second was by denying them the status of worthwhile actors in mentioning them only in one sentence that furthermore does not occupy a prominent place in the text structure.[26]

A second contradiction in *Le Monde*'s argumentation concerns its call for a large debate on the European Union. Indeed, the contextual analysis very clearly shows the lack of reflection on the issue. However, *Le Monde* in its editorials, instead of enriching the debate by discussing diverse aspects of the question, rather gives its own "solution", a solution very similar to the one that was later given in "The socialists' international project" adopted by the National Council of the French Socialist Party in October 2001.[27] *Le Monde*'s failure to engage in what it calls for (i.e. the opening of a large debate on Europe) is further demonstrated by the fact that its addressees are only the fifteen member States on the European stage and Jospin on the French stage.

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26. i.e. it is neither a theme nor a macrostructure (see Appendix 3).

27. It can also be found in "To build together the future of the European Union" that was made public in January 2002 by the PS and the SPD (French and German socialist parties).

In the issue of the European institutions, *Le Monde* could not play the binary partisan game as it did for the French institutional issues because, as has been shown above, the right-left political split did not apply. The UDF was certainly more forward-looking in its positions on the purpose of the EU than the RPR, but it appeared that Chirac, despite the "*Appel de Cochin*" in 1978 (see above 4.2.4), was also more "pro-European" than the RPR. Was it because of his own personal convictions or as a result of adjustments due to the cohabitation with a socialist Prime Minister? The analysis above does not reveal it. If *Le Monde* had used the UDF positions against Chirac (i.e. by emphasizing the divisions between the two main right-wing parties), it would also have gone against Jospin. *Le Monde* appears to favour Jospin over Chirac in its reactions to their respective speeches on Europe, but it cannot be very critical of Chirac because Chirac did seize the timely opportunity to give his speech, and because criticizing Chirac would also have amounted to criticizing Jospin when both were jointly preparing the French presidency of the European Council. Jospin's speech on Europe came late, but *Le Monde*'s reaction was to focus positively on it with a "better late than never" type of answer. As also shown by *Le Monde*'s reactions to the Nice summit, by its support of Jospin, *Le Monde* tied itself to Chirac because of their joint presidency of the European Union.

In conclusion, from a European standpoint, *Le Monde* takes a pro-European position but manoeuvres from a French perspective marked by a right-left cohabitation. In terms of process, *Le Monde* could be said to function like a member of a "select club" that discusses *inter pares* the necessity of including others "from below" but does not actually talk with or even listen to them. In other words, *Le Monde* contributes to the French construction of Europe from the top, i.e. what it denounces in its editorials. More generally, *Le Monde*'s role in the French debates on the European Union's enlargement as demonstrated above illustrates how the newspaper, with its knowledge of the European and especially French political stages, promotes its concept of the European Union based on the tenet that if France can no longer have a leading role by itself on the world stage to offset the superpowers, i.e. in this case the USA, then the European Union ought to.

CHAPTER 5

The Second Chechen war and *Le Monde*

This chapter is the third and final part of the editorials' qualitative communicative analysis that consists first of a media-centric frame analysis and second of a description of interactions in the public sphere for the analysis of *Le Monde*'s interactions in society according to the Orchestra model. As in Chapters 3 and 4, the media-centric approach is conducted with the definition of the editorials' substantive frame (Entman 2004) and a description of the different voices (i.e. actors) appearing in the argumentation. In the society-centric perspective, the interactions between the public sphere's actors appearing on TV news, in the Parliament (for information on the French political system, see Appendix 6) or through the collective voice of opinion polls are described in detail. The combination of the two perspectives then gives an account of *Le Monde*'s positions and actions in context. First, the situation in and with Russia is briefly introduced.

The 1990s in Russia were a very turbulent decade. The introduction of Western economic reforms after the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 25 December 1991 greatly impoverished the general population. In the Duma (lower chamber of the Parliament), a conservative (communist) majority hostile to these economic reforms entered into a fierce confrontation with President Yeltsin. This confrontation ended with government forces storming the parliament building in October 1993. Having defeated his political opponents and consolidated his power, Yeltsin could turn his attention to Chechnya, which had proclaimed its independence on 2 November 1991 during the political turmoil that followed a failed *coup d'état*. The war that started was unpopular in the Russian media and population, and constituted one of the factors that brought Yeltsin's popularity down. Although the communist party obtained a majority in the Duma in December 1995, Yeltsin won the presidential election of 1996 against the communist candidate, Evgenij Zjuganov. The first Chechen war (1994–96)[1] ended with the humiliating defeat of the Russian army. In May 1997, Maskhadov, who in January had been elected President of Chechnya with the support of both Chechens and Russians in Chechnya, signed an agreement with Yeltsin on the Russian withdrawal from Chechnya, and obtained a *quasi*

1. For an excellent analysis of the first Chechen war, see Lieven (1999).

de facto independence from the Russian Federation. It was also decided that the question of Chechnya's constitutional status was not to be discussed before 2001. Unfortunately, Maskhadov did not succeed in containing acts of violence nor other criminal activities in Chechnya and Dagestan. In August 1998, as Russia was going through an acute economic crisis, the Duma demanded Yeltsin's voluntary resignation. Instead, Yeltsin dismissed his Prime Minister Kirienko and five-month-old government and he appointed Černomyrdin as an interim Prime Minister. While the economic crisis deepened, Černomyrdin's appointment was rejected twice by the Duma. In September 1998, Primakov's appointment as Prime Minister was approved. His government was not yet formed when the deputy Prime Minister in charge of financial affairs resigned. Primakov remained in office until May 1999. After the failure of an impeachment vote against Yeltsin, the Duma confirmed the appointment of Stepašin as Prime Minister. In this very unstable political context, on 6 August 1999, the IMF published a report confirming that the Russian Central Bank had invested part of its IMF loans in Jersey for speculative purposes. On August 7, several hundred fighters under the command of Shamil Basaev, a Chechen separatist leader, invaded a few villages in Dagestan on the border of Chechnya. On the 9th, Stepašin was dismissed. Vladimir Putin, appointed on the 10th, was confirmed as Prime Minister by the Duma on 16 August 1999. The month of August was particularly gruesome with four explosions in civilian apartment buildings in Dagestan and Russia that killed about 300 people and injured many more. These explosions were attributed to Chechens. It is in this context that the second Chechen war started. The war culminated with the battle and fall of Grozny, the Chechen capital, on 6 February 2000.

As underlined by a number of political actors and media on the international political stage, the second Chechen war coincided with the accession of Vladimir Putin, an hitherto unknown politician, to power: Prime Minister of the Russian Federation in August 1999, Acting President in January 2000, elected President in March 2000. During this war, Russia was accused of numerous violations of human rights. Human rights are enshrined in French national memory through the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and thus they are tightly linked to French national identity. This is why the Second Chechen war has been chosen for the qualitative analysis. *Le Monde*'s presentation of the issue is set out first (5.1). Then, unlike the two previous qualitative analyses that deal with internal and European issues (respectively, Chapters 4 and 5), the positions of the French Executive are presented separately (5.2) because of the Executive's primary role in external policy matters. This is followed by the picture given of the war on A2, the public TV channel (5.3), by the questions on the war in Parliament (5.4), and by the reactions of public opinion (5.5). The conclusion (5.6) underlines *Le Monde*'s "dissimilarity in its similarity" to French people and government. This descriptive part of the analysis is conceptualised in Chapter 6.

As in the two preceding chapter (see above 3.2, 4.2), the description of the public sphere (as presented through A2, in Parliament, and by opinion polls) in which *Le Monde* evolved in regard to the second Chechen war is mainly conducted through direct quotations so as to give a more accurate account of the public sphere's atmosphere. Readers not particularly interested in the details of French debates on the second Chechen war can go directly to the synthesis given for each part or even to the chapter's conclusion (5.6) where they will find enough information to follow the book's general argumentation.

5.1 The Second Chechen war in Le Monde's editorials

As with the two previous qualitative analyses (see above 3.1 and 4.1), the substantive frames with which *Le Monde* presented the war are first examined (5.1.1), then the actors appearing in the editorials' argumentation (5.1.2). A synthesis follows (5.1.3).

5.1.1 Substantive frames

The substantives frames (Table 5.1), based on the editorials' macrostructures (i.e. propositional content of the sentences most likely to remain in long-term memory), reveal that *Le Monde* blames human rights violations in Chechnya on Russian national-militarism; it also accuses the Western powers of complicity because of their lack of appropriate reactions to the first and second Chechen wars. *Le Monde* strongly calls for the West to assume its responsibility, enforce the respect of human rights, and support Russian democrats. Both Russia and the West figure as actors in each of the frames' functions, except for one, "endorsing remedy". This last function embodies the purpose of the editorial, and in that sense it is the most important one; the other functions only serve to give it a firm ground. The only actors for the function "endorsing remedy" being the West, *Le Monde*'s editorials clearly are mainly concerned with the West (and its deficiencies).

Table 5.1. War in Chechnya's substantive frame

Function of Frame	***Focus of Frame***	
	Issues/Events	***Political Actors (Individuals, Groups, Nations)***
Defining problematic effects/ conditions	– War in Chechnya: use of extreme violence	– Russia
	– Lack of appropriate reactions from Western powers (first Chechen war, second Chechen war)	– West

(*Continued*)

Table 5.1. War in Chechnya's substantive frame (Continued)

Function of Frame	*Focus of Frame*	
	Issues/Events	*Political Actors (Individuals, Groups, Nations)*
Identifying cause/agent	– National-militarism	– Russia
	– Complicity	– West
Endorsing remedy	– Enforce the respect of human rights	– West
	– Support Russian democrats	
Conveying moral judgment	– negative	– Russia
	– does not assume its responsibility	– West

5.1.2 Actors

Russian and Western actors in the editorials on the second Chechen war (Table 5.2) are in the great majority presented negatively. In the very rare cases where a few of them are presented positively, it is to underline how the others, the majority, do not behave in an appropriate manner. In contrast to the editorials on the Méry affair and on French or European institutions, actors are rarely presented neutrally. The analysis from *Le Monde*'s editorials below capitalizes on their hierarchical structures as revealed by their coherence analysis.[2]

The first editorial on Chechnya, "*Silence sur la Tchétchénie*" (27 September 1999), was published a few days after bombing of Grozny and its surroundings began (23 September 1999). In it, Alan Maskhadov, President of the Chechen Republic (part of the Russian Federation), is the only actor presented as having acted for peace:

2. The coherence analysis is exposed in detail in Appendix 3. This logico-semantic analysis of coherence brings to the fore "macrostructures" (i.e. Mcr: sentences at the paragraph level that mark the ending point of the paragraph argumentation and are most likely to remain in long-term memory) and "text macrostructures" (i.e. TMcr: sentences at the text level that mark the ending point of the text argumentation and are most likely to remain in long-term memory). It also allows the identification of "themes" (i.e. Th: sentences at the paragraph level that indicates the "aboutness" of the paragraph and marks the starting point of the paragraph argumentation), and "text themes" (i.e. TTh: sentences at the text level that indicates the "aboutness" of the text and marks the starting point of the text argumentation).

Cet arbitre élu des différents clans tchétchènes réclame désespérément depuis deux ans une rencontre avec Boris Eltsine, prolongeant celles qui ont entériné la paix entre les deux «présidents», sur la base du «droit international» […].

This elected arbiter between the different Chechen factions has been begging for two years for a meeting with Boris Yeltsin as a follow-up of the meetings, that concluded with a peace agreement between the two "presidents", on the basis of international law […].

According to the editorial, without any support, Maskhadov could not oppose the excesses of Chamil Bassaiev, the Chechen warlord who was financed by Boris Berezowski. Essentially, the inadequacy of Western reactions after the first Chechen war and the IMF financing that led to the systematic destruction of the country let "Islamist" extremists loose (TTh). Therefore, the OSCE refusal to protest Russia's non-participation in the negotiations planned in the Russian-Chechen peace agreement is likely to end with much more than the death of Chechen civilians (TMcr).

Two days after *Le Monde*'s first editorial on Chechnya, on 29 September, the French, German and Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs expressed their deep concern about the situation. A month later (30 October 1999), *Le Monde* published an editorial entitled: "*Grozny: silence, on tue*" [Grozny: silence, killings in process]. Its purpose is to denounce Russia's action and the international community's lack of reaction:

Si les Russes, lors de la guerre du Kosovo, craignaient les conséquences du nouveau "droit d'ingérence", ils avaient tort de s'inquiéter. (TMcr)

If, after the Kosovo war, Russians were afraid of what might follow from the new "right of intervention", they worried needlessly. (TMcr)

In this editorial of 24 sentences, thirteen denounce the lack of appropriate reactions from the international community as a whole and some of its members in particular (i.e. Council of Europe, NATO-Russia Council, Western leaders), and eight present Russia in very negative terms.

In December 1999, just before the Russian parliamentary elections, *Le Monde* continues to castigate the West, in particular the G8 members, for insufficient reactions ("*Démission en Tchétchénie*", 18 December 1999). The only Western leader not to completely undergo *Le Monde*'s criticism is Hubert Védrine, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is "disappointed":

s'est dit «déçu» par les réponses de son collègue russe

declared that he was "disappointed" by the answers of his Russian colleague.

Although the use of quotation marks suggests that "disappointed" is not enough, Védrine still fares better than a "Western Minister of Foreign Affairs" (no supplementary information given) who is directly quoted in those terms:

«*Croyez-vous que ce que l'on fera modifiera la politique russe en Tchétchénie?*»

"Do you believe that we can do anything to modify Russian politics in Chechnya?"

or than the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking in the name of the EU:

«*Il faut lui* [*Poutine*] *laisser le bénéfice du doute*.»	"One must grant Putin the benefit of doubt."

Le Monde recognizes that Europeans had wanted to cancel the G8 meeting and to talk about sanctions, but Americans were against this:

Mais les Américains ne veulent pas en entendre parler, pour ne pas compromettre leurs relations avec Moscou et risquer, disent-ils, d'y encourager les forces nationalistes…	But the Americans do not want to hear about it in order not to endanger their relations with Moscow and not to risk, as they say, encouraging nationalist forces…

Beside the helpless and credulous Europeans, Americans are presented as selfish and naïve. *Le Monde* concludes that if the West does not do anything to help out the few Russian democrats, then it will only get its due in return:

Nous aurons la Russie que nous aurons méritée. (TMcr)	We will get the Russia that we deserve.

After the fall of Grozny (6 February 2000), Westerners are again castigated for their lack of a firm stand against Putin. In "*Poutine et les Occidentaux*" (19 February 2000), *Le Monde* starts with a direct quotation from Jacques Chirac:

«*Il ne faut pas humilier les Russes.*»	"One must not humiliate the Russians."

to which *Le Monde* replies directly, addressing not only Chirac, but also Blair, Clinton and Schröder that the West is being humiliated by Russia:

« *Jusqu'à quand allez-vous vous laisser humilier par les Russes?* » *Car c'est bien un sentiment de profonde humiliation que l'on éprouve devant la complaisance manifestée par les États-Unis et l'Union européenne face à ce qui se passe en Tchétchénie.* (TTh)	"How long will you let yourselves be humiliated by the Russians?" Indeed, it is with a feeling of deep humiliation that we witness the indulgence of the United States and the European Union towards the events in Chechnya. (TTh)

In a context, described by *Le Monde*, of Russians massacring civilians, destroying complete villages and putting part of Chechnya's population into camps where torture is systematically practised, Western governments only express their "preoccupation", and worse, President Clinton manifests his admiration:

«*C'est un homme* [*Poutine*] *avec qui on peut s'entendre (…) un homme direct fort et efficace (…) déterminé, intelligent*», *disait lundi, admiratif, le président Clinton*.	"He (Putin) is a man with whom one can find an understanding (…) a man who is direct, strong and efficient (…) determined, intelligent", said President Clinton admiringly on Monday.

Europeans do not fare any better with their inflated praises:

De retour de Moscou, les Européens, qui se sont précipités pour aller saluer le nouveau maître du Kremlin, ont rivalisé de louanges.	Back from Moscow where they had hurried to greet the new Kremlin master, Europeans tried to outdo each other in praising him.

For *Le Monde*, Westerners do not even show a minimum (of decency):

Au minimum, il y aurait de quoi prendre quelques distances avec un régime que les Occidentaux, bien loin de « l'humilier », embrassent avec un incompréhensible enthousiasme. (TMcr)

The minimum would be to take a position some distance from a regime that Westerners, far from "humiliating" it, are welcoming with inexplicable enthusiasm. (TMcr)

Almost a year after the fall of Grozny, Europe is still framed negatively. Indeed, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe restored Russia's voting rights ("*Jour de honte*", 27 January 2001). The Assembly's decision is all the more shameful because it went against the advice of the most serious Human Rights organizations:

contre l'avis des organisations humanitaires les plus sérieuses et les plus compétentes sur la Tchétchénie: Memorial (une ONG russe), la Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme, Human Rights Watch, le Comité Tchétchénie.

against the advice of the most serious and competent humanitarian organizations on Chechnya: Memorial (a Russian NGO), the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, Human Rights Watch, the Chechnya Committee.

and it ignored "*les récents reportages de journaux européens et américains*" (TMcr) [recent coverage by European and American newspapers].

Table 5.2. Actors appearing in foreign policy (war in Chechnya) editorials

Presentation	***West***	***Russia***	***Other***
Positive	Dirigeants occidentaux, quelques parlementaires du Conseil de l'Europe, Hubert Védrine	Serguei Kovalev,	Alan Maskhadov, reportages de certains journaux européens et américains
Negative	Dirigeants occidentaux, OSCE, communauté internationale, conseil permanent conjoint OTAN-Russie, OTAN, Jacques Chirac, quelques bonnes âmes à Paris, Bill Clinton, Conseil de l'Europe, Joschka Fischer, président de l'UE (Finlandais), Américains, la France, UE, les Quinze, admirateurs professionnels et béats des régimes russes, Lamberto Dini, Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe	Russie de Boris Eltsine, Berezovski, Vladimir Poutine, Kremlin, généraux revanchards, éventails de partis, Boris Eltsine,	Chamil Bassaiev
Neutral	Notre envoyé spécial		CNN, Anthony Loyd du Times, ex-hauts responsables américains

5.1.3 Synthesis

In summary, the analysis of *Le Monde*'s positions on the second Chechen war from a media-centric perspective overwhelmingly points to one and only one position: Westerners are shamelessly guilty of not reacting appropriately to the numerous human rights violations perpetrated by Russia. In this, *Le Monde* takes the role of world moral leader, and nobody escapes its sharp criticism.

5.2 The Second Chechen war as dealt with by the French Executive[3]

The Second Chechen war, being a matter of foreign policy, is handled by the French Executive at three levels: the European Council (5.2.1), the President (5.2.2), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (5.2.3). A synthesis of these positions follows (5.2.4).

5.2.1 Positions of the European Council

From August 1999 to July 2001, the European Council met seven times. The Council regularly called for a political settlement of the war in Chechnya while at the same time recognizing Russia's right to maintain its territorial integrity and to fight against terrorism. The Council's most severe declaration was made in Helsinki in December 1999[4] when it "condemn[ed] the intense bombardments of Chechen cities […]", stating that "this behaviour is in contradiction with the basic principles of humanitarian law, the commitments of Russia as made within the OSCE and its obligations as a member of the Council of Europe". In Stockholm in March 2001, the Council adopted a much more conciliatory tone, and it emphasized the cooperation between Russia and the European Union while still mentioning its concerns about Chechnya.[5]

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3. This section is taken and slightly adapted from Le (2006: 107–111).

4. Helsinki European Council; Presidency Conclusions, Annex II; 10 and 11 December 1999; URL: http://europa.eu/european-council/index_en.htm; accessed 7 October 2008.

5. "The presence of President Putin in Stockholm was a demonstration of the importance of the Union's strategic partnership with Russia. […] The European Council underlines that a genuine partnership must be based on common values. It reiterates its strong concerns over the situation in Chechnya and stresses the need for a political solution of the conflict as a matter of urgency." Stockholm European Council; Presidency Conclusions; 23 and 24 March 2001; URL: http://europa.eu/european-council/index_en.htm; accessed 7 October 2008.

Finally, in Gothenburg in June 2001,[6] the Council pointed out that "the situation in Chechnya continues to give rise to serious concern".[7]

The European Union unequivocally condemned the war in Chechnya, but it was perceived as if the Union considered the violation of human rights to be merely another, albeit grave, problem, though not the fundamental one in Russia. The Union's reactions to the war met with much criticism in France.

5.2.2 Positions of the President

When the OSCE summit met in Istanbul in November 1999, France threatened not to sign the Charter for European Security because of the obvious violations of some of its principles in Chechnya. As Russia finally agreed to the involvement of the OSCE in the search for a political settlement, the Charter was adopted. Answering a journalist at the press conference after the summit,[8] President Chirac recognized that Yeltsin might be under the pressure of Russian public opinion and the army in his handling of the situation in Chechnya, but Yeltsin, as President of the Russian Federation, had to take responsibility for the management of the situation. Furthermore, Russian authorities had to understand that only a political settlement was possible in Chechnya. However, at the summit, no economic or financial sanctions were even considered, because they would only aggravate the severe economic difficulties that the Russian people were experiencing.

In May 2001, asked by Mexican journalists why France in particular and the European Union in general had such a cautious approach in regard to the war

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6. "Important steps have been taken towards forging a partnership with Russia based on shared values, intensified dialogue and progress in areas of strong EU interest. […] The situation in Chechnya continues to give rise to serious concern. A political solution to the conflict is urgently needed. Reported violations of human rights must continue to be thoroughly investigated in order to bring perpetrators to trial. As agreed at the EU-Russia Summit and confirmed on 15 June, the OSCE Assistance Group is returning to Chechnya. Russia has confirmed its readiness to cooperate with the European Union in delivering humanitarian assistance programmes." Gothenburg European Council; Presidency Conclusions; 15 and 16 June 2001; URL: http://europa.eu/european-council/index_en.htm; accessed 7 October 2008.

7. The Presidency of the European Union had already made public the Union's concern about the situation of the media in Russia. *Situation des medias dans la Fédération de Russie; déclaration de la présidence au nom de l'Union Européenne*; Bruxelles, 20 avril 2001. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

8. *Conférence de presse de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, à l'issue du sommet de l'OSCE; Istanbul, Turquie, 19 novembre 1999*. URL: www. elysee.fr.

in Chechnya,[9] Chirac answered that the Union's position was not too cautious, but rather realistic. It had to take into account the different sensibilities of its Member States.

5.2.3 Positions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Védrine's first public statement on the second Chechen War dates back to 29 September 1999 when a joint statement with the German and Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs[10] expressed the grave concern of France, Germany and Italy about the deterioration of the situation in Chechnya, about its drastic consequences for the civilian population and the risks of destabilization in the region. Since then, in his multiple interventions, Védrine constantly repeated his firm opposition to the use of force as the only means of settling the situation, while he also reiterated Russia's right to maintain its territorial integrity and to fight against terrorism.[11]

Often asked by media and members of both houses of the French parliament why France and the West were not reacting more strongly to the events in Chechnya, Védrine answered that France had always been at the forefront of protests from its first statement in September 1999 to the OSCE summit in Istanbul (November 1999) and the European Council in Helsinki (December 1999), and that France had been trying to convince its reluctant partners (the USA and Germany among others) to take a firmer position.[12] Védrine said that France was alone in so clearly opposing the situation in Chechnya.[13] Furthermore, he conveyed France's positions directly

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9. *Interview accordée par M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, aux quotidiens mexicains "El Sol de Mexico" et "La Prensa"; Palais de l'Élysée, 30 mai 2001*. URL: www. elysee.fr.

10. *Tchétchénie; déclaration des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères de France, d'Allemagne et d'Italie; Paris, 29 septembre 1999*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

11. E.g. *Point de presse conjoint du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, et du Ministre russe des Affaires Étrangères, M. Igor Ivanov; Propos du Ministre français; Paris, 28 octobre 1999*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

12. *Réponse du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à une question d'actualité à l'Assemblée Nationale; Paris, 15 décembre 1999. Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec LCI; extraits; Paris, 3 janvier 2000.*
See also, *Réponse du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à une question d'actualité à l'Assemblée Nationale; Paris; 9 novembre 1999; 8 décembre 1999; 22 février 2000. Audition du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, devant la Commission des affaires étrangères de l'Assemblée Nationale; Paris; 1*er *février 2000. Réponse du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à une question d'actualité au Sénat; Paris; 9 décembre 1999*. URL: www. doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

13. *Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec RTL; Paris, 16 décembre 1999*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

to the acting Russian President, Vladimir Putin, to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, and to the Russian population.[14] Commenting on his meeting with Putin (Védrine was the first French leader to meet with the acting Russian President), he added that their clear and frank mutual discussions about Chechnya had been useful (although Putin had commented rather harshly that France was the most severe in its statements on Chechnya[15]). Védrine considered that European long-term cooperation with Russia to help it become a great modern and democratic country was a terrible contradiction with the manner in which Russia handled Chechnya, and he deplored that Russian public opinion – from Zjuganov, leader of the Communist party, to Solženitcyn – did not see this contradiction and qualified the French attitude as an anti-Russian campaign.[16]

In his many interviews with print, audio and audiovisual media, Védrine was often asked the same questions about France's position on Chechnya. To the weekly *Marianne,*[17] he explained that the role of foreign policy was to defend French freedom, decisional autonomy and interests, and to promote French values. Public opinion and the majority of media, on the other hand, expected France to impose its system on the rest of the world. While non-Westerners more and more frequently accepted Western values as universal, they also resented the way in which these values were globally imposed on them along with Western political and economic interests. Védrine added that Western societies believe they are the world masters; thus Western societies are fundamentally paternalistic. This arrogance is visible in the resurgence of the "colonization duty" prevalent in the Third Republic[18] or in the modern concept of the duty to intervene (*devoir d'ingérence*). Asked whether he was talking about public opinion or the media, Védrine answered that media do not necessarily reflect public opinion exactly;

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14. *Visite à Moscou; conférence de presse conjointe du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec son homologue russe, M. Igor Ivanov; propos du ministre; Moscou, 4 février 2000. Visite à Moscou; entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec les radios françaises; Moscou, 4 février 2000. Visite à Moscou; entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec la chaîne de télévision russe NTV; Moscou, 4 février 2000*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr

15. *Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec RTL; Paris, 14 février 2000*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

16. *Tchétchénie; entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec le quotidien* Le Figaro*; Paris, 2 mars 2000*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

17. *Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec l'hebdomadaire* Marianne; *Paris, 20 novembre 2000*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr

18. French Third Republic (1871–1940): this period saw the establishment of most of the French colonial empire.

they anticipate it. Editorialists, in particular, assert what needs to be done or not, and castigate what appears shocking to them. In doing so, they fulfill a missionary, proselytic, evangelist function, a function of "norm definers". Today, a dramatic event becomes a major event only if it is shown visually. Public opinion then tells politicians: "do something to stop the suffering of … TV watchers!" As an example, Védrine talked about Somalia: the images were intolerable, and so "something" was done (and failed). However, a more murderous civil war in Sudan had been going on for longer but was not broadcast for technical reasons, and thus it had not been the subject of calls for intervention. In another interview,[19] Védrine had said that the mobilization of public opinion was useful but very often not sufficient to influence France's partners to adopt a firmer position towards Russia. Indeed, the USA had a different analysis of the situation. For them, Russian cooperation in matters of disarmament and Russian agreement about the revision of the ABM treaty were the first priority. (Economic) reforms and the fight against Islamic terrorism were second on the list. Chechnya came very far behind. Cohesion between partners is necessary for acting; this is what had made the Western intervention in Kosovo possible. As for France's European partners, some were afraid that a strong Western reaction would start the development of dangerous phenomena in Russia.[20] On a Russian TV channel,[21] Védrine declared that the strength of France's position on Chechnya was partly due to its public opinion that was very mobilized around this question.

France's strong reactions to Chechnya were said to be the cause of Putin's late first official visit to France, although he had been invited much earlier. The visit took place right after Putin's participation in the EU-Russia summit in Paris at the end of October 2000. The Chechen war was still going on, albeit less intensively than a few months before, and France had not changed its position on Chechnya. Answering a journalist,[22] Védrine said that Russia was not necessarily leaning on France to counterbalance the USA, but that Russia and France certainly shared the same strong opposition to the American desire to revise the 1972 ABM treaty,

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19. *Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec «Le grand jury RTL-Le Monde-LCI»; seconde partie; Paris, 27 février 2000*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

20. *Réponse du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à une question d'actualité à l'Assemblée Nationale; Paris, 15 décembre 1999*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

21. *Visite en Russie; entretien accordé par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, à la chaîne ORT; Moscou, 29 septembre 2000*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

22. *Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec l'Association des journalistes France-Russie; extraits; Paris, 26 octobre 2000*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

which France and Russia considered the cornerstone of nuclear balance in the world.[23] In another interview about Putin's visit,[24] Védrine specified that the direction of France's policy towards Russia consisted of helping it become a great, modern, democratic and peaceful country. Chechnya was not forgotten, but it was not the only issue in the relations between the two countries. In reaction to a remark by André Glucksmann against Putin's visit, he added[25] that France could not let others manage its own interests, which is what would happen if France were the only State not to have any relations with Russia. It was more intelligent to meet Putin and tell him what one thought.

5.2.4 Synthesis

In summary, the French Executive reacted to the second Chechen war as one element in its own right on the complex international political chessboard, albeit an important one for its connection to human rights, while its partners seemed to consider it only as a complicating factor. In being at the forefront of the international protest against the war, the French Executive garnered the strong discontent of Russia. The French public tended to look at the situation in Chechnya separately from the international context, and Hubert Védrine, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, tried to explain France's position in Parliament and in interviews with the media. While doing so, he also denounced those who were inclined to use human rights as a promotion tool for Western political and economic interests.

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23. According to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, neither the USA nor Russia could develop a missile defence that the other could not overwhelm. The Clinton Administration tried to negotiate a revision of the ABM Treaty with Russia but did not succeed. On December 13th 2001, President George W. Bush announced that he had given formal notice to Russia that the United States of America was withdrawing from the treaty. Indeed, he believed that the ABM treaty hindered "the government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks". Remarks by the President on National Missile Defense. The White House; Office of the Press Secretary; 13 December 2001; URL: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/.

24. *Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec France Inter; Paris, 30 octobre 2000*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

25. *Entretien du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Hubert Védrine, avec Canal Plus; Paris, 31 octobre 2000*. URL: www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.

5.3 The Second Chechen war as presented on a French public TV channel (A2)

In contrast to *Le Monde*'s focus on the West in its editorials on the second Chechen war, A2 (Antenne 2) mainly concentrates on Russia (including its leaders) and depicts it in a very negative manner. When Western actors intervene, it is occasionnally in a positive manner (5.3.1), but most of the time it is to blame Russia (5.3.2). Contrarily to *Le Monde*'s position, the West itself is practically not criticized. When Russian or Chechen actors are heard, it is also to blame Russia either indirectly (5.3.3) or directly (5.3.4). This section ends with a synthesis of A2's news on the war (5.3.5).

5.3.1 Positive Western reactions

A month after Putin became Acting President of the Russian Federation, Hubert Védrine met him on an official visit to the Kremlin. While indicating that he and Putin did not agree on everything, Védrine also appreciated Putin's communication style:

Il est direct, il analyse vite les choses, on sait de quoi on parle, on peut parler utilement, on est d'accord, on se comprend, on n'est pas d'accord, on s'explique. (A2 – 4 February 2000)

He is direct; he analyzes the situation rapidly; we know what we are talking about; there is an agreement, we understand each other; there is a disagreement, we explain what we mean.

Later, at the G8 meeting in Japan, i.e. Putin's first international meeting, most Western participants (but not France) were said by the news anchor to have had a positive impression of him (no interview or official statement were broadcast):

Au dîner de travail, hier soir, pour sa première apparition, Vladimir Poutine a fait forte impression [...] La plupart des participants au sommet ont fait l'éloge du nouveau maître du Kremlin [...] Vladimir Poutine, qui s'est entretenu en privé avec chacun des leaders du G8, à l'exception notable de Jacques Chirac. (A2 – 22 July 2000)

At the working dinner yesterday evening, Vladimir Putin made a strong impression for his first appearance. […] Most participants at the summit praised the new Kremlin leader, […] Vladimir Putin, who spoke with each of the G8 leaders with the notable exception of Jacques Chirac.

Chirac had used the tight schedule of international summits as an official excuse for not meeting with Putin privately:

l'expérience que j'ai des sommets m'a démontré qu'il était très difficile de prévoir des entretiens bilatéraux sérieux à l'occasion d'un sommet, très difficile, pour des raisons matérielles, c'est la raison pour laquelle, je lui [à Poutine] avais fait dire qu'il me semblait que ce n'était pas l'endroit le plus, le mieux adapté [pour le rencontrer]. (A2 – 21 July 2000)

My summit experience has taught me that, for practical reasons, it is very difficult to have serious bilateral discussions during a summit. This is why Putin was informed that it did not appear to me the most appropriate place for us to meet.

In fact, a Russian tall ship, the Sedov, had just been seized in a French port following a French court decision in a law suit by a Swiss company. The incident ended when the ship was released on July 25, two days after the end of the G8 meeting.

5.3.2 Negative Western reactions

The French Executive was shown to protest against the war in Chechnya at different occasions in national and international gatherings:

Hubert Védrine (French Minister of Foreign Affairs) : *Même si l'intégrité territoriale russe n'est contestée par aucun pays occidental, par aucun pays au monde d'ailleurs, nous pensons que la Russie se fourvoie dans cette aventure au Caucase du nord et que d'une façon ou d'une autre, elle doit reconnaître qu'il y a un problème tchétchène, de même qu'il y a un problème du Caucase du nord, qui dépasse de loin la question du terrorisme qui existe aussi et que ce problème tchétchène doit être abordé sur une base politique*. (A2 – 9 November 1999 – in the National Assembly)	Hubert Védrine (French Minister of Foreign Affairs) : Even if no Western country, even if no country in the world contests Russian territorial integrity, we think that Russia is losing its way in the North Caucasus adventure and that, in one way or another, it must recognize the existence of a Chechen problem and also the existence of a North Caucasus problem that goes much beyond terrorism, and that the Chechen problem must be looked at from a political basis.
Jacques Chirac: *Les conséquences humainement dramatiques des bombardements enTchétchénie et les très nombreuses victimes qu'ils provoquent au sein de la population civile, sont inacceptables au regard de nos principes. L'offensive en cours est une erreur tragique pour l'ensemble de la région*. (A2 – 18 November 1999 – at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul)	Jacques Chirac: The dramatic human consequences of the bombing in Chechnya and their very numerous victims among the civilian population are inacceptable in regard to our principles. The ongoing offensive is a tragic error for the entire region.
Jacques Chirac: *Nous avons réagi, là encore, contre le comportement inacceptable des armées russes qui s'attaquent dans des conditions inadmissibles aux populations civiles, notamment à Grozny et il est certain que cette pression aura des effets. Le problème est de savoir quelle sera l'ampleur de ces effets*. (A2 – 11 December 1999 – at the European Summit in Helsinki)	Jacques Chirac: Yet again, we reacted against the inacceptable behavior of the Russian army that is attacking the civilian population in inadmissible conditions especially in Grozny; it is certain that our pressure will be followed by effects; the question is to know which ones.

The A2 news anchor also announced that while in a visit in Japan, Jospin had denounced "*une violence inacceptable des Russes en Tchétchénie aujourd'hui*" (A2 – 16 December 1999) [an unacceptable level of violence perpetrated by Russians in Chechnya today], and that Chirac had called Putin to protest against the war in Chechnya and to ask for the liberation of the French journalist, Brice Fleutiaux, who had been taken hostage by Chechen forces (A2 – 18 January 2000).

During Putin's first official visit to France, Chirac did not completely agree with him on the position to adopt towards Chechnya:

Jacques Chirac: *Respect de l'intégrité territoriale de la Fédération de Russie, condamnation du terrorisme, respect des engagements souscrits notamment dans le cadre de l'OSCE et du Conseil de l'Europe, priorité de l'action humanitaire, nécessité et urgence d'une solution politique seule à même de permettre un règlement durable de cette difficile crise.* (A2 – 30 October 2000)

Jacques Chirac: Respect of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, condemnation of terrorism, respect for the commitments taken in the framework of the OSCE and of the Council of Europe, priority for humanitarian action, urgent need for a political solution as the only means for a long-lasting settlement of this difficult crisis.

Vladimir Putin: *Oui, nous devons élargir le dialogue avec toutes les composantes tchétchènes, mais nous nous opposons catégoriquement à ce que l'on nous pousse à avoir des contacts avec des gens qui ont du sang sur les mains; je dirais même plus, envisager un tel dialogue avec ces gens-là ne passerait pas pour un signe de tolérance de notre part, mais au contraire comme une marque de faiblesse.* (A2 – 30 October 2000)

Vladimir Putin: Yes, we must open the dialogue with all Chechen constituents, but we strongly oppose those who want us to be in contact with people with blood on their hands. I would even say, to have a dialogue with these people would not be a sign of tolerance on our side, but on the contrary of weakness.

At this same occasion, a number of personalities were shown to protest against Putin and the war, some quite theatrically:

Noël Mamère (Green): *C'est une situation de crime contre l'humanité, de massacre contre des civils, bref une guerre sale, une guerre coloniale, une guerre qui n'est pas acceptable de la part d'un pays qui prétend rejoindre le concert des grandes nations démocratiques.* (A2 – 30 October 2000)

Noël Mamère (Green): It is a case of crime against humanity, of massacres of civilians, in other words it is a dirty war, a colonialist war, a war that is inacceptable from a country wanting to join the assembly of the big democratic nations.

André Glucksman (writer, philosopher): *Voilà le monsieur que nous recevons aujourd'hui, c'est un monsieur qui a rasé une capitale, la première depuis le crime contre Varsovie en 1944.* (A2 – 30 October 2000)

André Glucksman (writer, philosopher): This is the gentleman whom we are receiving today, the gentleman who has razed a capital city for the first time since the crime against Warsaw in 1944.

Maïerbek Vatchagaiev [tearing up his Russian passport in front of the cameras] (former representative of the Chechen President): *Je suis maintenant un apatride et les autorités françaises devront en tenir compte.* (A2 – 30 October 2000)

Maïerbek Vatchagaiev [tearing up his Russian passport in front of the cameras] (former representative of the Chechen President): I am from now on stateless and French authorities will need to take this into account.

Replying to a journalist's comment that Putin had accused France of being the most virulent in its criticisms of the war in Chechnya, Védrine endorsed France's

leading role in this issue but very diplomatically mentioned the long-standing friendship between France and Russia:

Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *il se peut que les Russes n'aient pas compris au nom d'une amitié franco-russe historique que la France soit en pointe en effet dans cette critique [sur la guerre en Tchétchénie] pour dire qu'il fallait une solution politique et pas une solution purement militaire, bon, mais nous assumons ça*. (A2 – 4 February 2000)

Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: In the name of the long-standing Franco-Russian friendship, Russians may not have understood that we are indeed at the forefront of criticisms against the Chechen war and that we insist on a political, and not military, solution. Well, we take it upon ourselves.

Later in the same month, the A2 news anchor mentioned that Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Greens) had called Putin an assassin (17 February 2000), that 200 French artists and intellectuals called for ending the silence on Russian massacres and compared Putin's actions to Stalin's (21 February 2000), and that following the appeal of the "*Comité Tchétchénie*", 2,000 to 5,000 people had demonstrated in Paris against Russian abuses in Chechnya (23 February 2000).

France was not alone in protesting. A2 mentioned: the European Parliament's vote for freezing some European aid to Russia (18 November 1999); the threat of economic sanctions by the international community (9 December 1999); political condemnations by the fifteen members of the European Council meeting in Helsinki (10 December 1999); Bill Clinton's concerns (2 January 2000); Madeleine Albright's appeal for the end of the war (1 February 2000); accusations by the Americans of human rights violations (18 February 2000); the shock felt by members of the Parliament of the Council of Europe when they witnessed the indiscriminate and systematic use of force in Grozny (13 March 2000); the European Union's "deep preoccupation" with the civilians' situation in Chechnya (20 March 2000); Mary Robinson's (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) request for an international enquiry into the situation (4 April 2000); the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe's request to start a suspension procedure against Russia (6 April 2000); Bill Clinton's criticism to Putin against the Russian armed intervention in Chechnya (4 June 2000). In particular, A2 gave a voice to some leaders by broadcasting their statements:

Bill Clinton: *Les habitants de Tchétchénie sont dans une position terrible, assaillis par les groupes terroristes d'un côté et par les troupes russes de l'autre. La Russie va payer le prix fort; elle s'enfonce de plus en plus dans un bourbier qui va accentuer les extrémismes et affaiblir sa propre position dans le monde*. (A2 – 18 November 1999)

Bill Clinton: The Chechen inhabitants are in a terrible position between the terrorist groups on one side and the Russian troops on the other. Russia will pay a hefty price; it is going deeper into a mess that will strengthen extremists and weaken its own position in the world.

Malcom Hawkes (Human Rights Watch): *Tous les témoignages parlent de coups, de torture, parfois de viols, voire d'assassinats*. (A2 – 18 February 2000)

Malcom Hawkes (Human Rights Watch): All testimonies report beatings, torture, sometimes rapes and even murders.

Malcolm Hawkes (Human Rights Watch): *Le moment choisi pour diffuser ces images [cassette video diffusée par Jastrembisky, porte parole du Kremlin, portant sur les violations des droits de l'homme par les Tchétchènes sur les Russes, et disant explicitiment que la cassette a été préparée pour le Conseil de l'Europe] est très politique, précisément au moment où le Conseil de l'Europe est réuni pour débattre et nous attendons jeudi Mary Robinson après sa visite dans la région. C'est un calcul très cynique qui cherche à répondre à la campagne critique contre les Russes.* (A2 – 4 April 2000)

Malcom Hawkes (Human Rights Watch): The time that was chosen (by Jastrembinsky, Kremlin's spokesman) to show the videotape (prepared for the Council of Europe and pertaining to human rights violations by Chechens on the Russian population) is very political; it happens when the Council of Europe is assembling, and on Thursday we are expecting Mary Robinson after her visit to this region. It is a very cynical choice made to counteract the campaign of criticisms against Russians.

To counterbalance these criticisms, a few Russian reactions were shown. However, rather than justifying the Russian side, they could have been interpreted as threatening:

Dimitri Rogozin (leader of the Russian delegation at the Council of Europe, to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that had requested for the suspension of Russia): *La ressource du compromis est déjà terminée*. (A2 – 6 April 2000 – in French)

Dimitri Rogozin (leader of the Russian delegation at the Council of Europe, to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that had requested the suspension of Russia): The possibility for compromise is closed.

Vladimir Putin: *Les Européens ont adopté une mauvaise attitude; ils ne devraient pas réagir comme ça, nous nous battons en Tchétchénie contre le terrorrisme, pas contre l'Islam, il pourrait en coûter aux Européens de ne pas comprendre*. (A2 – 17 April 2000)

Vladimir Putin: The Europeans chose to adopt the wrong attitude. They should not react this way. We are fighting in Chechnya against terrorism, not against Islam. The Europeans might have to pay a price for not understanding.

5.3.3 Russian reactions indirectly negative towards Russia/Putin

No Russian statement in its broadcast by A2 gave a complete and unmistakably positive image of Russia or Putin. The only Russian declaration that at first sight could somewhat be counted as positive towards Russia, because it would "justify" its actions, was that of the Commander of the Western front in Chechnya:

General Vladimir Chamanov (Commander of the Western front): *ici, le chef de guerre Khattab et ses complices allaient monter un camp d'entraînement pour des extrémistes venus de toutes les régions de notre pays et de l'étranger proche*. (A2 – 10 December 1999)

General Vladimir Chamanov (Commander of the Western front): Here, the warlord Khattab and his accomplices were going to build a training camp for extremists from all of our country's regions and from bordering countries.

It was broadcasted two months after a Wahabit leader's statement on his goals to instate Islam in the world:

General Magomedov (Wahabit leader) [recorded in September 1999]: *L'Islam, on va l'instaurer en Russie, et aussi en Amérique, en Angleterre, partout.* (A2 – 4 October 1999)

General Magomedov (Wahabit leader) [recorded in September 1999]: Islam, we are going to establish it in Russia, and also in America, in England, everywhere.

However, to appreciate the eventual impact of General Chamanov's declaration, one must take into account the fact that most TV news watchers would not know who the warlord Khattab was, that this happened before the world became particularly preoccupied with Muslim extremists (i.e. before 11 September 2001), and especially that it was shown at the same time as images of Chechen civilian refugees and of Grozny destroyed by Russian bombs. Furthermore, the numerous reports on Chechnya that had been regularly broadcast for weeks had reactivated and were reinforcing the negative side of Russia's image in French collective memory.[26] Thus, it is unlikely that General Chamanov's declaration could have been interpreted in favour of Russia.

Another Russian declaration could technically count as an instance of showing the position from both sides:

Colonel Alexandre Veklitch (Russian army's spokesman in the Caucasus): *Aucune opération aérienne n'était en cours à ce moment-là sur Grozny; les forces générales n'ont rien à voir avec cela.* (A2 – 26 October 1999)

Colonel Alexandre Veklitch (Russian army's spokesman in the Caucasus): At that time, there was no air operation over Grozny. The general forces have nothing to do with that.

However, it was broadcast just after the news anchor announced that Grozny had been hit by Russian missiles and that this had resulted in 137 dead and 260 wounded according to Chechen authorities. Thus, the veracity of Colonel Veklitch's statement was not likely to be accepted.

Still another Russian declaration, by acting President Putin, while *a priori* showing concern for the life of civilians, was immediately qualified by a journalist as "a not very credible explanation":

Vladimir Putin: *En ce moment avec le brouillard, il est impossible d'utiliser les bombes ou l'artillerie sans mettre en danger les civils. Cette démarche de nos militaires est dictée par le souci de préserver la vie de ces civils* [journalist's comment: «*une explication peu crédible*»]. (A2 – 8 January 2000)

Vladimir Putin: Right now because of the fog, it is impossible to employ bombs or artillery without endangering civilian lives. Our military moves are dictated by the desire to preserve civilian lives.

26. According to a poll conducted in October 1999, the word "Russia" evoked "something negative" for 72% of the respondents. CSA poll conducted for *Courrier International* on 22–23 October 1999. Sample: 1,002 people representative of the French population of the age of 18 years or more. Quota method. IPSOS – La banque des sondages – http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/ - published: 28 June 2000; accessed: 10 September 2008

5.3.4 Russian and Chechen reactions directly negative towards Russia/Putin

In early October 1999, a declaration by the Chechen warlord, Chamil Bassaev crudely dismissed any type of agreement with Russians:

Chamil Bassaev (Chechen warlord): *Avec les Russes, n'importe quel accord ne vaut même pas le prix du papier sur lequel on a signé*. (A2 – 2 October 1999)	Chamil Bassaev (Chechen warlord): Any agreement with the Russians is not even worth the price of the piece of paper it is written on.

His virulence against Russians, that could be interpreted in disfavour of Chechens, is equalled by that of Russian general, Lobouniets, against Chechens.

General Mikhail Lobouniets to his soldiers: *une fois pour toute, il faut donner une leçon à ces bandits*. (A2 – 2 October 1999)	General Mikhail Lobouniets to his soldiers: Once and for all, we must give a lesson to these bandits.

Furthermore, as both declarations were introduced by the announcement that following several days of intensive bombing, Russia had started a land offensive and penetrated within Chechnya for the first time three years after its defeat (in the first Chechen war), not only does Bassaev's virulence seem obliterated, it also appears that Russians are in fact trying to get revenge.

All other Russian or Chechen declarations were intrinsically (very) critical of Russia. For example:

Gadji Makhatchev (Deputy Prime Minister of Daghestan – pro-Russian): *Si on avait rétabli l'ordre dès le départ, il n'y aurait pas eu autant de victimes, ni autant de maisons détruites. C'est aussi notre faute*. (A2 – 4 October 1999)	Gadji Makhatchev (Deputy Prime Minister of Daghestan – pro-Russian): If we had first put some order back, there would not have been so many victims, so many destroyed houses. It is also our fault.
Inhabitant of a Daghestani village (near the Chechen border): *On n'est pas tous des wahabittes, on est des gens honnêtes. Pourquoi est-ce que personne ne nous aide? On n'a plus rien, il fait froid, l'hiver approche, on n'a plus de maison*. (A2 – 4 October 1999)	Inhabitant of a Daghestani village (near the Chechen border): We are not wahabits, we are honest people. Why does not anybody help us? We have nothing left; it is cold; winter is coming; we don't have a house any longer.
Russian officer: *Tout ce qui se passe ici, je vous le jure, et je le vous dis sans gêne et sans réfléchir, tout ça c'est pour cacher les affaires du Kremlin et de Boris Eltsine.* (A2 – 4 October 1999)	Russian officer: Everything that is happening here, I swear and I'm telling you with no embarrassement and no afterthought, everything is to hide the Kremlin's affairs and Boris Yeltsin's affairs.
Older women (in Chechnya): *Ce ne sont pas des wahabites qu'ils tuent, mais des civils!* (A2 – 26 October 1999)	Older women (in Chechnya): They are not killing wahabits, they are killing civilians.
Ce qu'ils veulent, c'est nous tuer tous! (A2 – 26 October 1999)	What they want is to kill us all.

Evgueni Kroutikov (military expert for the newspaper "Izvestia"): *Ils [les forces russes] ont déjà utilisé dans les zones de montagne, les zones peu peuplées, là où il y avait nécessité technique de couper toute fuite, les armes binaires [commentaire du journaliste: «qui tuent et brûlent tout ce qui vit y compris sous terre»], ils les ont utilisées à Argoun; c'est très probable qu'ils les utilisent aussi à Grozny*. (A2 – 7 December 1999)

Gleb Pavlovski (Russian politolog): *La seule idée de cette campagne, c'est de faire les élections [législatives] de telle sorte, que le fauteuil de Eltsine en juin prochain ne soit pas occupé par un dictateur* [journalist's comment: *Poutine*]. (A2 – 18 December 1999)

Serguei Kovalev (former dissident and human rights militant): *L'ultimatum à la population de Grozny lancé par nos généraux, de tels actes, vous savez, même Staline ne se le permettait pas*. (A2 – 18 December 1999)

Russian deserter: *Ils ont sonné l'alerte à 1 heure ou 2 heures du matin, ceux qui avaient un an de service, pardon 6 mois de service ou plus, ils étaient bons pour partir au front. On leur a demandé de signer un papier, une sorte de contrat, on leur a promis 1000 dollars par mois. Le matin, ils étaient tous partis*. (A2 – 16 October 1999)

Maria Fedoulova (Coordinator for the Association of Soldiers' Mothers): *Si notre président lui-même est le premier à ne pas respecter les lois qu'il signe, que pouvez-vous exiger des citoyens ordinaires?* (A2 – 16 October 1999)

Grandmother: *Il a été envoyé là–bas, il a été transféré au Daguestan, personne ne lui a demandé son avis, on ne sait même plus où il est, ça fait 4 mois sans nouvelles*. (A2 – 16 October 1999)

Chechen woman: *Ce qu'on veut, c'est pouvoir sortir d'ici; ouvrez les routes qu'on puisse aller à Grozny chercher les nôtres et après on pourra parler du reste; comprenez, on n'a rien fait, on n'est pas des criminels, on est de simples civils, ça se voit, regardez-nous, on est des travailleurs!* (A2 – 21 October 1999)

Evgueni Kroutikov (military expert for the newspaper "Izvestia"): Russian forces have already used binary arms (journalist's comment: 'that kill and burn everything alive including underground') in the mountain zones, the little-populated zones where there was a strategic need to stop any flight; they used them in Argun; it is very probable they are using them in Grozny too.

Gleb Pavlovski (Russian politolog): The only idea behind this campaign is to prepare the legislative elections so that Yeltsin's position be not occupied next June by a dictator (journalist's comment: Putin).

Serguei Kovalev (former dissident and human rights militant): The ultimatun sent to the Grozny population by our generals: you know, even Stalin would not have done this.

Russian deserter: They rang the alarm at 1 a.m. or 2 a.m.; those who have served one year, sorry six months or more, were being sent to the front. They were asked to sign a paper, sort of a contract; they were promised $1,000 a month. In the morning, they were all gone.

Maria Fedoulova (Coordinator for the Association of Soldiers' Mothers): If our President himself is the first in not respecting the laws he signs, what can you expect from ordinary citizens?

Grandmother: He was sent there; he was transfered to Dagestan; nobody asked for his opinion; we do not even know where he is; we have been without any news for four months.

Chechen woman: What we want is to get out of here. Open the roads so that we can go to Grozny and fetch our own, and then we can talk about other things. Understand, we're not criminals, we're simple civilians. Look at us, it's obvious, we're workers!

Driver whose bus was hit by artillery shell: *Que cette guerre soit maudite! Que peut-on penser de cette guerre où les Russes tuent les civils?* (A2 – 21 October 1999)

Chechen refugees: *Ils nous disent de rentrer et de remmener nos enfants à la maison; ils disent qu'en Tchétchénie il y a tout ce qu'il faut, que c'est bien là-bas, mais il y a des bombardements jour et nuit*. (A2 – 28 October 2000)

Tout est fait pour nous tuer, quand ce n'est pas par balle ou par bombe, alors on nous tue lentement à coup de crises cardiaques, déchirements du cœur, de toutes les façons imaginables. (A2 – 28 October 2000)

Ils tapent dans les reins, il y a 5 ou 6 hommes qui t'écrasent par terre; ils t'accrochent des trucs au talon, ils mettent de l'électricité, et quand tu reprends connaissance, tu sens une odeur de brûlé à l'intérieur de toi; il vaut mieux mourir que de tomber entre leurs mains; il vaut mieux mourir tout de suite. (A2 – 28 October 2000)

Je l'ai cherché parmi les cadavres, je ne l'ai pas trouvé, j'ai vu plus de 800 cadavres, je les ai trouvés tous méconnaissables, défigurés; il y avait des corps avec des oreilles coupées, il y en avait même sans tête. (A2 – 28 October 2000)

Andreï Piontkovsky (Director of the Strategic Studies Centre – Moscow): *La période des succès et des victoires, quand vous pouvez vendre à la télévision la preuve de l'intelligence de la politique de Poutine pour faire monter sa popularité, est terminée*. (A2 – 18 January 2000)

Alexandre Tcherkassov (Human rights militant – Memorial Foundation): *Leur méthode essentielle, c'est d'obtenir des aveux, par la brutalité et la torture*. (A2 – 17 February 2000)

Beshi Yandarbiyeeva (Chechen refugee): *Quand les Russes sont entrés dans Grozny, ils ont ouvert toutes les caves et massacrés ceux qui s'y cachaient et en fait voulaient seulement se protéger; mes sœurs, elles ont été brûlées vives, devant ma mère*. (A2 – 18 February 2000)

Guennadi Ziouganov (Russian Communist Party): *C'est Eltsine et sa bande qui ont declenché cette guerre; ils n'ont rien fait pour trouver une solution pacifique. [Si vous aviez été au pouvoir, auriez-vous fait cette guerre?] Jamais, c'est une folie.* (A2 – 23 February 2000)

Driver whose bus was hit by artillery shell: Damn this war! What is there to think about this war in which Russians kill civilians?

Chechen refugees: They tell us to go back home with our children. They say in Chechnya there's everything that's needed, it's good there. But there's bombing day and night.

Everything is done to kill us; when it is not with bullets or bombs, they are slowly killing us with heart attacks, heart break, all possible ways.

They beat you on the small of the back; five or six men push you down to the ground. They hang things onto your heels and put electricity on. When you regain consciousness, you smell burnt inside yourself. It's better to die than to fall within their hands; it's better to die right away.

I looked for him among the corpses, I could not find him. I've seen more than 800 corpses; they were all unrecognizable, disfigured. Some had their ears cut off, some even their heads.

Andreï Piontkovsky (Director of the Strategic Studies Centre – Moscow): The time for successes and victories, when you could sell proof of Putin's intelligent policy to TV channels to increase his popularity, is finished.

Alexandre Tcherkassov (Human rights militant – Memorial Foundation): Their main method is to get confessions through brutality and torture.

Beshi Yandarbiyeeva (Chechen refugee): When Russians entered Grozny, they opened all cellars and massacred all those who were hiding there just to protect themselves. My sisters, they were burned alive before my mother's eyes.

Guennadi Ziouganov (Russian Communist Party): It's Yeltsin and his gang who started this war. They've done nothing to find a peaceful solution. [If you had been in power, would you have started this war?] Never, it's insane.

Andreï Babitski (Russian journalist): *Il y a une police d'état russe qui gouverne de fait en Tchétchénie par la terreur*. (A2 – 1 March 2000)
Iouri Skoutarov (Prosecutor): *La famille a fait son boulot, la famille a placé son héritier; c'est pourquoi, Poutine est lié à cette famille par des milliers de fils*. (A2 – 23 March 2000)

Andreï Babitski (Russian journalist): The Russian state police is *de facto* governing Chechnya through terror.
Iouri Skoutarov (Prosecutor): The family (i.e. Yetsin and its close allies) did its job. The family put its heir in place. This is why Putin is linked to this family by thousands of threads.

On 14 March 2000, the A2 news anchor stated that about 1,600 Russian soldiers had died since 1 October 1999, and that the families of the 84 paratroopers who had just been killed were expressing their resentment against Putin. On 29 April 2000, it was announced that 50 more Russian soldiers had been killed in the preceding week, and that acting President Putin had decided to intensify the Russian intervention in Chechnya despite the Chechen President's calls for dialogue. A few days later, the Chechen President declared:

Alan Maskhadov (Chechen President): *On tire de tous les buissons, nous sommes les maîtres ici, sur les barrages russes au carrefour où se trouve le malheureux soldat russe sale, couvert de boue, affamé, tremblant, il attend qu'on vienne le chercher ou qu'on lui tire dessus;*
personne ne peut dire qu'on contrôle 10% ou 50% du territoire, nous contrôlons tout le territoire, nous sommes les maîtres dans notre pays; nos petits groupes de combattants pendant encore 6 mois ou 1 an vont fatiguer l'ennemi qui devra nous poursuivre; quand cette grosse machine militaire russe aura des pertes immenses, tous nos petits groupes se réuniront et porteront un coup qui fera basculer la situation. (A2 - 4 May 2000)

Alan Maskhadov (Chechen President): We are firing from all bushes; we are the bosses here, on the Russian roadblocks at the crossroad where the miserable Russian soldier, dirty, covered in mud, hungry, and shaking, is waiting to be fetched or to be fired at.
Nobody can say we are controlling 10% or 50% of the territory, we are controlling the entire territory; we are the bosses in our country. For six months or one year to come, our small fighting groups will harass the enemy who will need to go after us. When this big Russian war machine has endured tremendous losses, all of our small groups will get together and strike the blow that will completely reverse the situation.

While outside of any context, this declaration appears rather belligerent to say the least, and thus would bring discredit to the Chechen side, within a specific context it could be read as: "see how insensitive Putin is towards his own soldiers, how he puts their lives into danger; see what Putin drives us to do to defend ourselves", and thereby puts the blame of the situation on Putin.

5.3.5 Synthesis

The TV channel A2 provided a large coverage to the second Chechen war and was careful to involve numerous Western, Russian and Chechen voices in it. The inclusion of the different sides fulfills a "quantitative" requirement of "objectivity" but in no way guarantees a "qualitative" objectivity (Le 2003). In this case, the only French positive reaction concerned Putin's communication skills and came from

Hubert Védrine, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, who on numerous other occasions did not shy away from openly criticizing Russia. All other voices, from the West from Russia or from Chechnya, were either directly or indirectly (through the context in which they were broadcasted) presenting Russia under a very negative light.

5.4 The Second Chechen war as discussed in the Parliament

In Parliament (Senate and National Assembly), most of the questions to the government about the Second Chechen war were asked in December 1999 when the battle for Grozny was in preparation and in February 2000 after Grozny fell to the Russian army. All questions relate to what can be done, and in particular what the French government can do to stop the war in Chechnya. Some declarations go further and demand action. While all shades of the political spectrum react strongly against the war and ask for more than diplomatic protests, some are more forceful than others like Renaud Muselier's (RPR) declaration on 23 February 2000 that was followed by applause from the three right-wing groups (RPR, UDF-Alliance, Démocratie libérale et Indépendants). However, on 27 October 1999, right- and left-wing groups (PS, RPR, UDF-Alliance, Démocratie libérale et Indépendants, PC) had applauded the Minister of Foreign Affairs when he affirmed that French foreign policy was different and went beyond statements and diverse hypocritical measures. On 9 November 1999, Jean-Louis Bianco's (PS) request for France to speak clearly and loudly was also applauded by the right and the left. Otherwise, the right tended to support the right and the left to support the left, although basically all agreed with each other. The notable event that happened on the internal political stage between October-November 1999 and February 2000 and might explain the change of attitude within the National Assembly is the failure of the justice reform in January 2000 (see above 3.2.2). Answers given to the deputies or senators by the Minister of Foreign Affairs invariably underlined France's leading role in the international protest against the war. Hubert Védrine recognized France's difficulties in convincing its partners (15 December 1999), but he insisted that France was nonetheless reacting very firmly against the war (22 February 2000).

Marie-Hélène Aubert (RCV): *[…] Entre embargo et sanctions, bien hypocrites, et cynisme commercial, il doit y avoir une autre voie […]* (NA – 27 October 1999)	Marie-Hélène Aubert (RCV): Between embargo and sanctions that are rather hypocritical, and commercial cyniscism, there must be another way. […]

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: […] *Il s'agit de savoir comment faire, et pas uniquement de prendre des positions ou de faire des déclarations. […] Vous avez rappelé l'hypocrisie des sanctions et des embargos, et vous avez raison. Vous avez demandé s'il existait une autre voie. Cette autre voie que celle des diverses pratiques que vous condamnez existe bel et bien : c'est la politique étrangère de la France.* (Applause on the benches of: PS, RPR, UDF-Alliance, DL&I, PC) (NA – 27 October 1999)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: The point is to know how to do it and not only to take positions and make declarations. […] You reminded us of the hypocrisy of sanctions and embargo measures, and you are right. You asked whether there was another path. This path that differs from the several practices you are condemning does exist: it is the foreign policy of France. (Applause on the benches of: PS, RPR, UDF-Alliance, DL&I, PC)

M. Jean-Louis Bianco (PS): *[…] Pour venir à bout des terroristes, les militaires russes sont-ils obligés de bombarder un marché ou une maternité ? Est-ce en refusant de négocier avec le président tchétchène modéré, M. Maskhadov, que l'on prépare les conditions d'une solution politique ? Aujourd'hui la presse fait état de près de 200 000 réfugiés. Du point de vue de la morale, mes chers collègues, ce qui se passe aujourd'hui en Tchéchénie est-il si fondamentalement différent de ce qui se passait au Kosovo avant l'intervention de l'OTAN ? Est-ce l'absence d'images télévisées qui explique la mollesse et la lenteur de réaction des démocraties ? […] En d'autres termes, la France condamne-t-elle l'intervention militaire russe, comme l'a fait le Parlement européen ? […]*

Monsieur le Ministre, même si, nous en sommes tous d'accord, il ne faut pas déstabiliser la Russie, nous attendons, au-delà d'une action diplomatique efficace, que s'exprime clairement la voix de la France. (Applause on many benches of the PS, PS, RCV, as well as on some benches of the RPR, UDF-Alliance and DL&I) (NA – 9 November 1999)

M. Jean-Louis Bianco (PS): To overcome terrorists, does the Russian military have to bomb a market or a maternity hospital? Is it possible to prepare the conditions for a political solution while refusing to negotiate with the moderate Chechen President, Mr. Maskhadov? Today, media reports estimate about 200,000 refugees. From the moral point of view, my dear colleagues, is what is happening today in Chechnya radically different from what was happening in Kosovo before the NATO intervention? Does the lack of televised images explain the gentleness and the slowness in the democracies' answers? […]
In other words, does France condemn the Russian military intervention as the European Parliament did? […]

Mr. Minister, even if we all agree we should not destabilize Russia, we are expecting France, in addition to an efficient diplomatic action, to make its voice clear. (Applause on many benches of the PS, PS, RCV, as well as on some benches of the RPR, UDF-Alliance and DL&I)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *Monsieur le député, nous avons déclaré très clairement, il y a plusieurs semaines, avec mes homologues allemand et italien, suivis depuis par l'ensemble des ministres de l'Union européenne, que, […] la nécessité de lutter contre le terrorisme dans une région où il sévit depuis plusieurs années – […] – ne justifiait pas l'escalade à laquelle se*

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mr. Deputy, we very clearly declared, several weeks ago, with my German and Italian colleagues, and we have since been followed by all of the Ministers of the European Union, that the necessary fight against terrorism in a region where it has rampant for several years […]

livrent les autorités russes et l'armée russe en Tchétchénie, ni la façon dont est traité le problème d'ensemble du Caucase du Nord. […] Le problème tchétchène doit être abordé sur une base politique. Je l'ai dit sans aucune ambiguïté à M. Ivanov, le ministre russe des affaires étrangères, lors de sa venue à Paris ; nous le redirons clairement au sommet de l'OSCE à Istanbul, où la Russie se trouvera clairement au centre des pressions de tous les pays désireux qu'une solution d'une autre nature soit trouvée en Tchétchénie. (Applause on the benches of PS and some benches of RCV) (NA – 9 November 1999)

justifies neither the military escalation of the Russian authorities and the Russian army in Chechnya, nor the manner in which the entire problem of the North Caucasus is dealt with. […] The Chechen problem must be considered on a political basis. I have said this without any ambiguity to Mr. Ivanov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs during his visit to Paris. We shall repeat it clearly at the OSCE summit in Istanbul, where Russia will clearly find itself under pressure from all countries in favour of another type of solution for Chechnya. (Applause on the benches of PS and some benches of RCV)

Huguette Jacquaint (PC): *[…] La guerre menée en Tchétchénie n'a soulevé, jusqu'au sommet d'Istanbul, que quelques condamnations verbales de la part des gouvernements occidentaux. Dans l'immédiat, le plus urgent pour la France et la Communauté européenne est de prendre leurs responsabilités, compte tenu de l'impuissance et de l'inefficacité qui ont caractérisé les timides initiatives prises jusqu'à ce jour. […] Quelles sont les intentions du Gouvernement pour concrétiser sa volonté affichée d'agir pour faire cesser les bombardements et arrêter cette guerre?* (Applause on the benches of PC, on some benches of PS and RCV. Exclamations on the benches of PRP, UDF-Alliance, DL&I) (NA – 15 December 1999)

Huguette Jacquaint (PC): Until the Istanbul summit, Western governments reacted only with some verbal condemnations to the war in Chechnya. In the immediate future, because of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the timid measures taken until now, France and the European Union must most importantly accept their responsibilities. […] How does the government intend to transform its stated wish for an end to bombings and to this war into concrete measures? (Applause on the benches of PC, on some benches of PS and RCV. Exclamations on the benches of PRP, UDF-Alliance, DL&I)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *[…] Nous avons dû, je dois le reconnaître ici, convaincre certains de nos partenaires européens et de nos partenaires occidentaux – pour quelques-uns de ces derniers, nous avons eu du mal – qu'il fallait être ferme et clair.*

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: We had to, I admit, convince some of our European and Western partners – with some of the latter, it was not easy – that we needed to be firm and clear.

Nombre d'entre eux nous ont mis en garde à chacune de nos initiatives, que ce soit avant Istanbul ou avant Helsinki, contre le risque de déclencher en Russie des phénomènes dangereux, d'enclencher des engrenages qui pourraient entraîner ce pays dans une direction dramatique pour tout le monde, pour eux comme pour nous, ce que nous voulons éviter depuis dix ans. Nous avons entendu ces

A number of them warned us at each of our initiatives, be it before Istanbul or Helsinki, against the risk of starting dangerous phenomena in Russia, of starting a chain of events that would lead this country towards a direction disastrous for them and for us, i.e. what we have wanted to avoid for ten years. We have heard these messages because we are responsible. However, this does not prevent

messages car nous sommes responsables. Mais cela ne nous empêche pas d'être clairs dans la condamnation. Et, au-delà des horreurs de la Tchéchénie, nous lançons aux Russes un message : vous vous trompez ; à un moment ou à un autre, vous devrez revenir à la solution politique. […]Certes, c'est totalement insuffisant, mais s'ils commencent à s'engager dans cette voie, c'est parce que, depuis deux mois et demi, nous avons su parler clairement et que nous continuerons à le faire jusqu'à ce qu'une solution politique soit trouvée. (Applause on several benches of PS and PC) (NA – 15 December 1999)

us from being clear in our condemnations. Beyond the horrific events in Chechnya, we are telling Russians: you are wrong; at some point or another, you will have to come back to a political solution. […] I agree, what is being done is absolutely insufficient, but if they are starting to take this path, it is because for the last two and a half months we have been talking clearly, and we shall continue to do so until a political solution is found. (Applause on several benches of PS and PC)

Joseph Tyrode (PS): *[…] La communauté européenne s'est mobilisée à juste titre contre l'extrême droite autrichienne. […] Mais si nous devons être attentifs à toutes les poussées extrémistes, notre vigilance doit s'exercer au-delà des frontières européennes, contre toutes les violations des droits de l'homme. Notre pays a su agir à l'occasion de faits tout aussi dramatiques au Timor-Oriental et au Kosovo. Ne doit-il pas, avec ses partenaires européens, condamner plus fermement les agissements russes et proposer la suspension des aides économiques que perçoit la Russie ? […]* (NA – 22 February 2000)

Joseph Tyrode (PS): The European community rightly rallied against the Austrian ultra-right. […] However, if we are to pay attention to all extremist upsurges, our surveillance must go beyond European borders against all human right violations. Our country knew how to act in face of the dramatic events in East Timor and in Kosovo. Should it not with its European partners condemn the Russian operations in a firmer way and ask for the suspension of economic aid to Russia?

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: *Monsieur le député, vous vous étonnez de l'insuffisance des réactions internationales. Je dois dire que je partage votre étonnement (Applaudissements sur les bancs du groupe socialiste – «Ah !» sur quelques bancs du groupe du Rassemblement pour la République.) […] vous avez pu noter, vous l'avez dit vous-même, que la voix de la France s'était élevée dans un relatif isolement. […] Cela n'a pas empêché la France de dire ce qu'elle a dit. Cela ne l'a pas empêché d'être en pointe. Nous pensons avoir le devoir à la fois de mener une vraie politique franco-russe, euro-russe, de long terme – c'est notre intérêt – et d'exiger des Russes l'arrêt de ces comportements en Tchétchénie.*
Nous sommes, je crois, le seul pays qui arrive à faire les deux de cette façon. (Applause on the benches of PS) (NA – 22 February 2000)

Answer by Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mr. Deputy, you are surprised by the insufficiency of international reactions. I must say that I share your surprise (Applause on the benches of the PS – "Ah!" on some benches of the RPR). […] You may have noticed, you said it yourself, that France was relatively isolated when it let its voice be heard. […] This did not prevent France from doing what it did. It did not prevent it from leading. We think it our duty to pursue a real long-term Franco-Russian, Euro-Russian policy, and to demand that the Russians stop their activities in Chechnya.

We are, I believe, the only country which succeeds in pursuing these two goals. (Applause on the benches of PS)

Renaud Muselier (RPR): *[…] Il importe donc que le gouvernement français, avec ses partenaires de l'Union européenne, indique clairement, fermement et immédiatement au gouvernement russe qu'il doit absolument accepter en Tchétchénie la présence d'observateurs internationaux du Conseil de l'Europe et de l'OSCE, mais aussi de la presse internationale, pour que l'on puisse prendre la mesure de ce qui se passe réellement là-bas. Nous demandons au Premier ministre de dire cela aux Russes. Nous lui demandons d'être extrêmement ferme à leur égard et de prendre des engagements devant nous pour que la pression diplomatique sur la Russie soit constante, car nous ne pouvons tolérer ce qui se passe en Tchétchénie aujourd'hui.* (Applause on many benches of RPR, UDF-Alliance, DL&I) (NA – 23 February 2000)	Renaud Muselier (RPR): It is therefore important for the French government with its partners from the European Union to declare clearly, firmly and immediately to the Russian government that it absolutely must allow the presence of international observers from the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and also of the world press, so that we can be informed of what is really happening there. We are requesting that the Prime Minister tell the Russians this. We are asking him to be extremely firm in this regard and to commit us to putting constant diplomatic pressure on Russia, because we cannot tolerate what is happening in Chechnya today. (Applause on many benches of RPR, UDF-Alliance, DL&I)
Answer by Daniel Vaillant, Minister of Communication with the Parliament: *[…] Le ministre des affaires étrangères est en contact sur ce point avec nos partenaires de l'Union européenne afin d'apprécier les meilleures mesures à prendre pour répondre à la situation.* (Exclamations on the benches of RPR, UDF-Alliance) (NA – 22 February 2000)	Answer by Daniel Vaillant, Minister of Communication with the Parliament: On this point in concert with our European partners, the Minister of Foreign Affairs evaluates the best measures to take when faced by this situation. (Exclamations on the benches of RPR, UDF-Alliance)

5.5 The Second Chechen war as considered by the public opinion[27]

While members of both houses of the French Parliament and the media reacted to the war in Chechnya by repeatedly asking the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine, what France was doing to change the situation, more public and general actions were also taken. In February 2000, on the initiative of André Glucksmann, Romain Goupil[28] and the academic Emmanuel Wallon, 200 French intellectuals

27. This section is taken and slightly adapted from Le (2006: 111–112).

28. André Glucksmann is a philosopher, a former Maoist, who published in 1975 *La Cuisinière et le Mangeur d'hommes*, a book that symbolically consecrated the rupture of part of the intellectual ultra-left with Marxism-Leninism. Glucksmann was involved with Bernard Kouchner in the operation "A ship for Vietnam". Romain Goupil is a film-maker, former member of the Trotskyite *Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire*.

signed a petition, "Crime left unpunished in Chechnya". It called for a demonstration in Paris against the international silence on "massive war crimes and barbarian acts that will have to be called crimes against humanity".[29] This was the first Western mass demonstration in support of Chechens, as noted by a journalist from the Russian elite daily, *Izvestija*.[30] Several former Soviet dissidents[31] had also signed this petition, quite similar in tone and content to *Le Monde*'s editorials. Despite this appeal for action, a group of intellectuals and politicians meeting in the National Assembly in March were still deploring the public's indifference to the war.[32] Two other petitions followed in the same month just before the Russian presidential elections. One was signed by a group of 130 researchers and academics, specialists on all former Soviet Republics. Its content was the same as that of the February petition, although the tone was less incisive.[33] The other, entitled "Horror haunts Europe"[34] and written again on the initiative of Glucksmann and Goupil, bore the signature of more than 200 personalities from sixteen European States. Its tone was the most virulent, and Russian intellectuals and journalists responded to it.[35]

As for the "general public opinion", a poll conducted a few days after the Russian army command issued an ultimatum to Grozny's population[36] in December 1999[37] revealed that 54% of the respondents felt concerned by the actions of the Russian army in Chechnya, but 45% did not. 36% thought that media did not cover Chechnya sufficiently, 43% that Chechnya was adequately covered, and 14% that it was over covered. 78% wished that Western powers would apply more pressure so that Russia would stop its military intervention. On the subject of measures that France

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29. Petition title: "*Crime sans châtiment en Tchétchénie*"; *Le Monde*; 22 February 2000.

30. *Izvestja*; Maxim Sokolov; 24 February 2000.

31. Among them figured Elena Bonner, Vladimir Boukovski, Viktor Fainberg, Alec Guinzbourg, Arina Guinsbourg, Natalia Gorbachevskaïa, Paul Goma, Sergueï Kovalev, and Leonid Pliouchtch. *Le Monde*; 24 February 2000.

32. *Le Monde*; 15 March 2000.

33. *Le Monde*; 22 March 2000.

34. *Le Monde*; 23 March 2000.

35. See Le, 2006: 138–140

36. According to this ultimatum issued on 6 December 1999, if Grozny's population did not leave Grozny by the 11 December, they would be considered as terrorists and be killed. This ultimatum and the events preceding it were widely covered in the media.

37. *La banque des sondages – Guerre en Tchétchénie: qu'en pensent les Français*?. Poll conducted on 10–11 December 1999 by the BVA Institute on a sample (N = 941) representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Method of quota. URL: www.ipsos.fr/Canalipsos/poll/; published: 17 December 1999; accessed: October 2004.

and the European Union could take, a majority was in favour of: emergency help for Chechen refugees (92% v. 5%), suspension of credits to Russia (54% v. 38%), embargo on some types of products (53% v. 40%), and seizure of certain Russian properties (49% vs. 38%); but a majority was against the suspension of diplomatic relations (67% v. 27%). According to another December 1999 poll,[38] 41% considered that the media had covered Chechnya rather well, 42% rather badly, and 17% did not answer. At the end of December,[39] 49% (vs. 35%) thought that the political situation in Russia was a threat to international security, and 75% took Yeltsin's resignation from his position of President as good news for the future of Russia. The battle for Grozny started towards the end of November 1999 and ended on 6 February 2000 when the city fell to the Russian army. On 17–18 February 2000, asked to rank the major international events that had affected them most the previous months, poll respondents[40] answered: fighting in Kosovo (quoted first: 30%; total of quotations: 55%); the war in Chechnya (quoted first: 25%; total of quotations: 49%); participation of Jörg Haider's party in the Austrian government (quoted first: 22%; total of quotations: 30%); massacres in Algeria (quoted first: 12%; total of quotations: 30%); request for judging General Pinochet (quoted first: 6%; total of quotations: 15%). The events that the European Union ought to handle in priority were: fighting in Kosovo (34%), war in Chechnya (31%), participation of Jörg Haider's party in the Austrian government (25%), and request for judging General Pinochet (5%).

In summary, a quite limited part of the French population, led by a few intellectuals, was very active and hostile against Russia and the war in Chechnya, but the "general public opinion" did not place this issue as the top of its main international concerns: the war in Kosovo ranked first even after the TV images of the battle for Grozny. The French army was involved in Kosovo under NATO forces, but not in Chechnya.

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38. *La banque des sondages – Baromètre des médias.* Poll conducted on 27–30 December 1999 by SOFRES on a sample (N = 1,000) representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Method of quota (gender, age, profession of the main income earner) and stratification (region, area status). URL: www.ipsos.fr/Canalipsos/poll/; published: 28 January 2000; accessed: October 2004.

39. *La banque des sondages – Les Français et la menace russe.* Poll conducted on 31 December 1999 by IFOP on a sample (N = 802) representative of the French population of 18 years of age or more. Method of quota. URL: www.ipsos.fr/Canalipsos/poll/; published: 8 January 2000; accessed: October 2004.

40. *La banque des sondages – Les évènements marquants de ces derniers mois*. Poll conducted on 17–18 February 2000 by IFOP on a sample (N = 1,002) representative of the French population of 15 years of age or more. Method of quota. URL: www.ipsos.fr/Canalipsos/poll/; published: 22 February 2000; accessed: October 2004.

5.6 Conclusion: *Le Monde's* role in the French debates on the Second Chechen war

Le Monde took a position on Russia and especially on the second Chechen war in an unusually large number of its editorials,[41] but on the basis of a perception of the situation that was different from the one produced by A2 TV news and certainly from the French Executive. According to *Le Monde*, Western powers, including France, were shamelessly guilty by their lack of reactions of letting Russia commit massive human rights violations in Chechnya. Similarly, some members of the Parliament and a limited section of the population led by a few but very outspoken intellectuals demanded an account of the government's line of action on the issue. In contrast, the French Executive put to the fore its leading role in the world protest against the war and underlined its importance by mentioning a number of times that Russia had singled out and was "punishing" France for this role. A2 covered all sides and broadcasted voices from the West, Chechnya and Russia that were very critical of Russia. As for the few non critical voices, they were presented in a context that led to a negative perception of Russia.

On an issue, considered internal by Russia but with international ramifications by most of the world, *Le Monde*'s editorials took a distinctively different orientation in focusing their attention not on the accused primary perpetrators (i.e. Russia) but on the rest of the world (i.e. principally the West). In this role, with its emphasis on the universality of human rights *Le Monde* was neither simply one of the actors in the "league against Russia" nor even its leader, it was the world moral leader superseding the world "material powers".

In a country that prides itself for its leading role in the domain of human rights,[42] the war in Chechnya was unanimously decried by everybody in France

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41. 25 editorials on Russia from August 1999 to July 2000, thirteen of them about Chechnya; eight editorials on Russia from August 2000 to July 2001, two of them about Chechnya.

42. « Human rights hold special historical significance for France. The French tradition of commitment to human rights stems from the philosophy of the Age of Enlightenment in the 18th century and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 26 August 1789. France was one of the first nations to draft a declaration proclaiming human rights. When the General Assembly of the United Nations met at the Chaillot Palace in Paris in 1948, it adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One of the main drafters of the Declaration was René Cassin, a great French legal expert and Nobel Peace Prize winner, who served as the President of United Nations Human Rights Commission and the European Court of Human Rights. France has since participated in the drafting of most of the international doctrines and instruments dealing with human rights. In the spirit of Vienna in 1993, France considers that the promotion and protection of all human rights are a matter of legitimate concern for

at all levels but with varying intensity. In this context, *Le Monde*'s editorials are striking by their "dissimilarity in their agreement". *Le Monde* is certainly part of the leaders in the outcry: the firmness and even violence of its tone is only surpassed by the petition, "Horror haunts Europe", written on the initiative of two intellectuals. The negativity of its views on Russia equals that of the most critical. However, *Le Monde* is alone in focusing its strong criticism on the West and not Russia. The West (including France), in *Le Monde*'s eyes, is to be blamed for what is happening by letting it happen. In this sense, although *Le Monde* is critical of the French Executive, it also comes to its rescue when France tries to convince its allies of being more vigorous towards Russia. Thus, in a domain (i.e. human rights) that functions as a pillar for the French national identity and thus in principle rallies everybody around it, *Le Monde* manages to be "different in being similar", to be more "French" than French people and government. *Le Monde*'s role in the French and international protest against the second Chechen war is an illustration of how the newspaper tries to embody its understanding of human rights, i.e. the values it embraces because of their key role in the construction of French national identity and because of their universality.

the international community and it attaches the same importance to civil and political rights as to economic, social and cultural rights". Source: France Diplomatie; France and the world; France's human rights policy; http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/; accessed: 7 October 2008

CHAPTER 6

Le Monde, editorials and politics

In order to investigate political roles played by media, quantitative media-centric and qualitative media- and society-centric analyses within a discursive communication identity framework have been performed on 150 editorials published in *Le Monde* from August 1999 to July 2001. Their overall results provide a definition of editorials as a genre in *Le Monde* (6.1), and allow for the discussion of *Le Monde*'s discursive socio-cultural identities (6.2) and for the assessment of its editorials as political discourse (6.3). This in turn raises the question of editorials' power in democracy (6.4). The general conclusion (6.5) sets out the advantages and limits of the discursive communication identity framework.

6.1 Editorials as a genre in *Le Monde*

Inasmuch as "a genre reflects, constructs, and reinforces the values, epistemology and power relationships of the group from which it developed and for which it functions, though the force fullness of that reinforcement might vary in different kinds of groups and in different kinds of genre sets" (Devitt, 2004: 64), genre analysis was chosen to investigate media socio-cultural identities (see above 1.2.3). It was also observed that the investigation of text genre must pay close attention to the text content and the socio-political context(s) in which it is produced and meant to be received. From this it results that the definition of a genre for editorials published in one newspaper during a certain period cannot be automatically extended to another period and even less to another newspaper. Although this greatly limits the validity of any genre study, genre studies still provide very meaningful information of what can be achieved with a certain text type in general. In other words, while the definition of editorials as a genre in *Le Monde* from 1999 to 2001 that is presented below is valid only for this newspaper at that time, it still informs us of what editorials in general can be and it provides a starting point for investigating the genre of editorials in other newspapers.

In this study, genre analysis was conducted in accordance with Askehave and Swales' (2001) five-step text-driven procedure (see above 1.2.3). The first step consisted in an analysis of structure, style, content, and provisional purpose; it

was performed with a quantitative linguistic analysis. The second step provided a provisional definition of genre based on the results of the first step (see above 2.5.2). Editorials in *Le Monde* are:

> short argumentative texts that are developed by a media presenting itself as a national, European, and international social actor. At the macro-level, editorials are generally composed of constatives (i.e. speech acts stating how something is), most often containing a negative evaluation in reference to socio-cultural codes of values, and are followed by a directive. Editorials are addressed to recognized institutional actors on the national, European, and international levels both openly (by their directives) and covertly (through the effects of the media's persuasive skills on the general audience). The more salient (in terms of extent of coverage) the issue dealt with in the editorial, the more negative the evaluation appears; and the further away from France the issue, the less openly directive (in terms of speech acts) but more negative (i.e. covertly "directive") *Le Monde* tends to be.

The third step consisted in a qualitative analysis of interactions on issues chosen from internal, European, and external politics. The analysis about French institutional issues (Chapter 3) revealed how *Le Monde* "played" with the system's characteristics (i.e. multipartism vs. bi-partisanship) to further its own partisan goals and thereby, in the context of the right-left cohabitation, contribute to the destabilization of the delicate balance on which the Fifth Republic's institutions rest. Therefore, while *Le Monde* repeatedly called on the entire society for a better functioning of democracy, it participated in its malfunctioning by being very much like its other members. The analysis of European institutional issues (Chapter 4) showed how *Le Monde* adopted a pro-European position from a French perspective marked by the right-left cohabitation at the Executive level. Furthermore, in barring civil society from the debates in its editorials' argumentation, *Le Monde* contributed to the top-down construction of Europe in France and in the European Union although it was denouncing the Union's lack of democratic legitimacy. Finally, the analysis about the second Chechen war (Chapter 5) exposed how *Le Monde* managed to be "different" in a domain (i.e. human rights) that rallies everybody as a pillar of the French national identity by being more "French" than anybody else in France.

At this stage of Askehave and Swales' (2001) text-driven procedure for genre analysis, the provisional genre should be "repurposed" (step 4) and "reviewed" (step 5). The three contextual analyses underlined a same aspect: in exercising its critical mind and expressing its opinions on diverse issues, *Le Monde* displayed its undeniable individuality, but it did so seemingly paradoxically in a manner that appears quite similar to what it apparently was strongly opposing. This "contradiction" in fact reflects the tension between the individual and the collective identities within one's in-group, i.e. how to belong but be different at the same time. In conclusion,

to complement (but not complete) the above provisional genre definition of *Le Monde*'s editorials, one ought to add to it:

> *Le Monde*'s editorials manifest the newspaper's individual identity as a committed member of French society. In this regard, they embody and transmit the newspaper's personal interpretation of French cultural values ("*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*"), of their general significance, and of their practical applications in specific cases. In addressing institutional actors on the international, European, and French political stages, *Le Monde*'s editorials purport to show the world's, European, and French powerful the newspaper's own interpretation of what "French" means in practice.

The function of *Le Monde*'s editorials "to show the world's, European and French powerful its own interpretation of what 'French' means in practice" would explain the arrogance it is accused of in the world, in Europe and in France. Indeed, in playing such a role, *Le Monde* not only asserts its authority in regard to the definition of French cultural values ("*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*"), but also to a number of human rights inasmuch as the French national motto relates to them.

The genre of editorials in *Le Monde* is complemented below by the investigation of *Le Monde*'s use of its discursive identities in its editorials (6.2) and of its legitimacy as a political actor (6.3).

6.2 Editorials and *Le Monde's* dynamic use of its "concentric network of socio-cultural identities"

With its combined media- and society-centric approach and its resulting focus on interactions within editorials and between *Le Monde* and other actors, this study of *Le Monde* through its editorials has brought an additional dimension to the knowledge of its socio-cultural identities, different from what could have been revealed through studies of framing, agenda setting, and priming, or even internal organization (including financial structure). It has been shown how in promoting its ideas for France, Europe and the world in its editorials, *Le Monde* represents its own positions, and participates as a social actor on the French, European, and international political stages. The strategies it deploys to attain its goals (6.2.1) illustrate the interplay between collective and individual identities (6.2.2) and between identities and power (6.2.3).

6.2.1 Use of identities

Within the French political sphere, *Le Monde* uses its knowledge of the institutions and of interactions between different actors to promote its own ideas of what "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*" means under the general goal of "common good" for the entire

country, just as any other politician would do. In other words, *Le Monde* uses its "Le-Monde-ness" (i.e. its individual identity at the national level) to work on France and participate in the continuous construction of a "French-Republic-ness" (i.e. its collective identity at the national level) (see row 1b of Table 6.1). Also within the French political sphere but sometimes in a larger sphere as well, *Le Monde* responds to critics by defending and affirming its professional authority (see row 1a of Table 6.1). In its construction of an active polyphonic participation within its argumentation and its careful positioning in this polyphony with the use of person markers, it demonstrates its competence as a responsible newspaper that compares favorably with the world's most prestigious (Le 2004; see also above 2.4).

On the European stage, a former study based on 98 editorials on Europe published from April 1999 to August 2001 (Le 2002) showed how *Le Monde* used well-implanted national values ("*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*") to promote new ideas (i.e. increased level of political integration) and to participate in the construction of a European identity in France. Indeed, in *Le Monde*'s vision, France needed a strong Europe to maintain an important element of its national identity (i.e. values associated with the motto "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*") that are also used as a banner to validate a political role on the international scene (on the role of these values in the establishment of an international status for *Le Monde*, see: Le 2006b: 176–179). This Europeanization of French national identity could be successful in the eyes of French society only if the European Union asserted itself in opposition to the USA and that, in turn, necessitated a higher level of European political integration. The present study adds how *Le Monde* manoeuvres among political parties and actors on the national level to promote its conception of mutual dependence between France and Europe. In these interactions, *Le Monde* uses its "Le-Monde-ness" (i.e. its individual identity at the national level) and its "French-Republic-ness" (i.e. its collective identity at the national level) to build a "European-ness" for France (i.e. France's collective identity at the European level) (see row 2 of Table 6.1); and it uses its "Le-Monde-ness" (i.e. its individual identity at the national level) and its "French-Republic-ness" (i.e. its individual identity at the European level) to build a "European-ness" for the European Union (i.e. France's collective identity at the European level) (see row 3 of Table 6.1).

In the international arena, another former study on all (33) editorials published on Russia from August 1999 to July 2001 and Russian reactions to them revealed the transnational role played by *Le Monde* (Le 2006b). *Le Monde* was considered in and by itself as an actor worthwhile enough to be taken into account and be publicly answered to. This present study specifies how in promoting human rights, a "universal" but also pillar value in French national identity, *Le Monde* manages to be "more than merely French" (i.e. universal) by being "more French" than the French people and government (i.e. more respectful of a French value). In other words, *Le Monde*

as an individual media with its own "Le-Monde-ness" (i.e. lowest individual identity) uses its "universal-ness" (i.e. its highest collective identity) to remind France (i.e. its lowest collective identity) of its values (see row 4 of Table 6.1), and simultaneously uses its "French-Republic-ness" (i.e. second lowest individual identity at the world level) to remind the world of universal values (see row 5 of Table 6.1).

Table 6.1. *Le Monde*'s uses of its individual (I) and collective (C) socio-cultural identities

	Use of	**towards**	**in order to**
1	Le-Monde-ness (I)	a. French and foreign critics of *Le Monde*	a. Assert *Le Monde*'s professional expertise (I')
		b. French public opinion and elites	b. Promote a specific solution to a French problem and thus participate in the continuous construction of French-Republic-ness (C')
2	Le-Monde-ness (I) & French-Republic-ness (C)	– French public opinion and elites	– Build "European-ness" (C') for France (see Figure 6.1)
3	Le-Monde-ness (Ia) & French-Republic-ness (IA)	– European elites	– Build "European-ness" (C') for the European Union (see Figure 6.2)
4	Le-Monde-ness (I) & Universal-ness (C)	– France	– Remind of French national values and thus participate in the continuous construction of French-Republic-ness (C') for France (see Figure 6.3)
5	Le-Monde-ness (Ia) & French-Republic-ness (IA)	– World	– Remind of universal values and thus participate in the continuous construction of Universal-ness (C') for France (see Figure 6.2)

6.2.2 Interweaving of identities

In combining identities, *Le Monde* imparts force to its positions, i.e. it is not only *Le Monde*, *stricto sensu* (I or Ia on Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3), that is speaking, but also *Le Monde* with another larger identity (IA or C on Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3). As Table 6.1 shows, these combined forces may come from below and "zero" level to reach together a higher end for this "zero" level (row 2 of Table 6.1; Figure 6.1), or from below to reach a higher level (rows 3 and 5 of Table 6.1; Figure 6.2), or from below and above to encircle a middle level (row 4 of Table 6.1; Figure 6.3). It is worth noticing that construction by pressure from below and above (Figure 6.3) applies (a) neither to European-ness, (b) nor to French-Republic-ness when 'above' would

mean European-ness. The former case (a) could be explained by one of the European Union's main *raisons d'être*, i.e. to represent an independent entity on the international stage; thus, except for (universal) human rights and principles of public international law, it cannot *a priori* be subordinated to anything (but it can voluntary bind itself legally). As for the latter case (b), it suggests that European-ness is not seen as being able to provide additional strength, i.e. it is not sufficiently established in the minds of addressees for them to consider that it would go without saying that what it represents is important. Indeed, it is the 'invisibility' of pressure that makes it efficient. (A diachronic approach involving the study of a later period could show the evolution of European-ness, how much it would have become accepted, by looking at its eventual use as 'invisible' pressure tool.)



Figure 6.1 Combination of identities-1

Figure 6.2 Combination of identities-2

Figure 6.3 Combination of identities-3

Note: *Le Monde* combines its Le-Monde-ness (I or Ia) with another (individual) IA or (collective) C identity to participate in the construction of a collective C' identity.

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 represent a bottom-up strategy, i.e. a combination of "forces" that targets a higher level, while Figure 6.3 corresponds to an "encirclement" of the target from the bottom and from the top. Only one type of strategy is not represented: one that would be exclusively top-down; it would be theoretically possible if *Le Monde*'s editorials covered issues internal to the newspaper, but this is not the case. Thus, Figures 6.1 to 6.3 represent all cases of identity combinations.

Some supplementary explanations are necessary about Figures 6.1 and 6.2. They differ as to which stage *Le Monde* decides to function on as an actor. In Figure 6.1, *Le Monde* is an actor within France with the intention of having France act in a certain manner on the European or international stage, i.e. *Le Monde*'s action is indirect. In Figure 6.2, *Le Monde* is an actor on the European or international stage; i.e. its action is direct. To do so, *Le Monde* puts at par its Le-Monde-ness (Ia) and its French-Republic-ness (IA), and *Le Monde* could be interpreted as either complementing or shortcutting the role of France on the European or international stage.

Le Monde's choice of the indirect (Figure 6.1) or direct (Figure 6.2) route appears to be dependent on structural and political factors. In the case of the construction of European-ness, both are used: the indirect one because intergovernmental issues are at stake and *Le Monde* cannot negotiate with other European governments; and the direct one because *Le Monde* is one of the elements of European society.

It is only at the national level that *Le Monde* appears with its Le-Monde-ness only (row 1 of Table 6.1), but it is also at this level that it acts within its "natural" circle, i.e. the environment where its legitimacy of action is first and foremost established although without necessarily being sufficient (see below, 6.3.3, for the manner in which this "natural" legitimacy is reinforced). If *Le Monde* were to use the pressure of an identity above French-Republic-ness to participate in the continuous construction of French-Republic-ness, it would appear as external interference within internal affairs and *Le Monde* could be accused of being the "foreign hand". However, inasmuch as human rights are universal, *Le Monde* can use its universal-ness to promote their respect by France (row 4 of Table 6.1). European-ness, as seen above, is not considered strong enough to be used by *Le Monde* as a means of pressure on French-Republic-ness (although European law may supersede French law). When it defends its professional expertise, *Le Monde* resorts also uniquely to its Le-Monde-ness; indeed, invoking its French-Republic-ness, its European-ness, or its universal-ness would amount to calling "big brother" to its rescue and could be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

Le Monde acts from the perspective of an in-group member; thus, except when it defends its own professional expertise, it always targets the construction of a collective identity. In the combination of identities it assumes, *Le Monde* never uses the collective aspect of the identity in whose construction it aims to participate. For example, if its goal is the continuous construction of French collective identity, it does not assume collective French-Republic-ness because it would mean putting itself at par with the French State within the French national public sphere; but it can (and does) assume collective French-Republic-ness for the construction of collective European-ness (row 2 of Table 6.1).

Le Monde's interweaving of its identities allows for its participation in national, European, and international networks of information and interactions, and gives it the means to take part in the continuous construction of the identities it claims for itself, including its Le-Monde-ness. Indeed, individual and collective identities are in a dialectical relationship (see above 1.2.1). One could speak here of a "Le-Monde schizophrenia", i.e. an opposition but also a combination between its Le-Monde-ness, French-Republic-ness, European-ness, and "universal-ness", just as Ezra Suleiman (2008) speaks of "French schizophrenia" to characterize French socio-political inner contradictions. These tensions that *Le Monde* must manage

correspond to its three successive circles of belonging (i.e. France, Europe, and the world), in each of which *Le Monde* is torn between a collective and an individual identity in a "concentric network of identities" (see Table 6.2). The answer to the difficult question of balance that must be found appears in the form of a peculiar blend of selfness, Frenchness and universalism. The respective weights of these components vary expertly depending on the matter under discussion in a manner that certainly furthers *Le Monde*'s positions but can also make *Le Monde* appear offensive. For anybody and anywhere, issues of identity always involve such tensions, but *Le Monde* differs from comparable media in other countries because of the multiple natures of its national values, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*".

6.2.3 Identities and "Liberté, égalité, fraternité"

"*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*", the French motto, keeps coming back as a leitmotiv apropos of *Le Monde*'s actions and interactions, be it formally (in *Le style du Monde*, 2002) or practically on the national, European, and international political spheres (as evidenced by the editorials' analysis).

In practice, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*" is very much used to the benefit of France. The "French-Republic-ness" of *Le Monde* is translated from 1999 to 2001 (before the September 11 events) into positions that result in promoting France in Europe and in the world. Indeed, *Le Monde* is against the world's political unipolarity and it wants the world to be transformed with a more active, independent and powerful European Union thanks in great part to the leading role of France and its values. Furthermore, *Le Monde* sets itself up as the defender of human rights and wants the West, more precisely Europe and therefore France to follow its lead, but the violence of its criticism of Russia, based undeniably on "universal" values but also on issues of self-insecurity (Le 2006b: 163), impedes the return of Russia as a power figure on the international stage, and thus in fact supports a bipolar world, USA/European Union, in whose European Union France plays a crucial role.

In theory, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*" can be somewhat claimed for Europe and the world also, and not just France. Indeed, while "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*" originates from the French Revolution, the birthplace of the French Republic, these values have also been recognized under one form or the other at the European Union's level in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000, 2007), and at the world level in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Thus, when *Le Monde* speaks in the name of the very French "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*", it can also simultaneously do so in the name of European and universal values. When other (non-French) media take position in the name of universal values, they do not necessarily *ipso facto* also refer to their own national motto, and thus do not present their own peculiar blend of "nationalism" as

"universal". The name of *Le Monde* (i.e. "the world") may not be unique in the world of media, but *Le Monde*'s name (i.e. "'the world' in French") appears to reflect the extent of its identities (i.e. the world seen through French lenses) rather well.

Table 6.2. *Le Monde*'s "concentric network of socio-cultural identities"

Entities (smallest to largest)	Identities	Core Values
Le Monde	Le-Monde-ness	"*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*"
France	French-Republic-ness	"*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*"
European Union	European-ness	Charter of Fundamental Rights
World	Universal-ness	Universal Declaration of Human Rights

In conclusion, the concentric network of *Le Monde*'s socio-cultural identities combined with *Le Monde*'s uses of its identities empowers *Le Monde* in the transmission of its own interpretation of the French motto, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*", at all levels. This interweaving of identities, much more than the types of speech act being used (see above 6.1), strengthen the editorials' persuasive character. Indeed, the effortlessness of identity combination turns into an invisible pressure upon the audience. The more types of identity the audience shares with *Le Monde*, the more likely this pressure would affect it to a point where it might tend not even to look beyond what is so smoothly presented. The fact that at the international level *Le Monde*'s editorials are mostly only covertly directive for diplomatic reasons affects the strength of their persuasive character at the surface level only; the seemingly diminished strength of the speech act is reinforced by the power of identity interweaving. Furthermore, *Le Monde*'s strategies are all the more powerful considering the political nature of its editorials.

6.3 *Le Monde*'s editorials as political discourse

Much more than "just" selecting, presenting and, eventually, commenting on news for the public, i.e. the primary and traditional function of media, *Le Monde* through its editorials behaves like any other politician but with specific advantages. Indeed, first, *Le Monde* is assured of a defined platform where it can address its national and international audience everyday. Undeniably, media's "power" to decide what to report on is constrained by the status of politicians, i.e. if a specific media does not report what a politician wants to be known, what has the potentiality of being considered "news" by other media, it may lose part of its audience. However, this interdependency between media and politicians affects the news transmission

aspect of media much less than the choice of editorials' topic. Second, *Le Monde* can play on the fact that it does not have any official partisan affiliation, and it presents itself with the aura of "independence". Third, *Le Monde* reaches and thus has the means to influence its audience in two complementary manners, indirectly through its selection and presentation of news, and directly through its editorials. Fourth, *Le Monde* is not at the mercy of the electorate (as it cannot stand for election), although it is at the mercy of its clients' (who may discontinue its purchase). However, *Le Monde* can compensate the orientation of its editorials' positions (that may result in a loss of readership) by the quality of its news coverage. This is what is meant when *Le Monde* is said to be "compulsory reading" whatever one's political ideas. Fifth and finally, the main element that distinguishes *Le Monde* from "ordinary politicians" is that *Le Monde* will never have access to power through elections. This, viewed from another perspective, can in fact turn to advantage. Indeed, as shown by the issue of the second Chechen war, *Le Monde* does not have to consider the broad practical implications of its positions with the same weight as do those in power.

Considering the inherent power of editorials and the fact that media cannot be forbidden to publish editorials where there is freedom of speech, the type of discourse presented by editorials needs to be examined more systematically in connection with politics.

In *Le discours politique*, Charaudeau (2005) defines the domain of social practice (i.e. its nature, 6.3.1) in which political discourse takes place (i.e. its locus, 6.3.2), the conditions for its development (i.e. its legitimacy, 6.3.3) and the strategies it manifests whatever the ideas and positions put forward (6.3.4). The nature of *Le Monde*'s editorials as political discourse leads to the question of *Le Monde* as a political actor (6.3.5).

6.3.1 Its nature

Charaudeau distinguishes among three types of political discourse. Political discourse as a system of thought attempts to establish a community around political principles functioning as terms of reference for the definition of ideas and positions. Political discourse as a communicative act purports to influence people and get them to agree or disagree. Finally, political discourse as a comment is a discourse about politics with no political involvement as, for example, in a discussion between friends. It is also supposed to be the case when journalists comment on news.

The analysis of *Le Monde*'s editorials clearly shows that they are more than just comments, i.e. they decidedly take a position as demonstrated by the type of complex speech act they generally represent (i.e. statements of how something is, most often with a negative evaluation in reference to socio-cultural codes of values, followed by a directive of what to do). In doing so, they are communicative acts. *Le Monde*'s editorials also represent political discourse as a system of thought.

Indeed, it was shown how they embody and try to rally their audience around a specific interpretation of the French motto, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*".

6.3.2 Its locus

According to Charaudeau, political discourse takes place in a system of interactions among three spaces. The political space holds the power to act and to make people think; the citizen space is where opinions are formed outside of governance; and the media space is what links the political and citizen spaces by informing the latter of what is happening in the former.

It would seem that *Le Monde*'s editorials are "three-legged" with a foot in each space. Indeed, they certainly contain an informative part (represented by the "constatives", i.e. statements of what is, in the complex speech act), but they also represent an opinion outside of governance (represented by the "directives", i.e. what to do, in the complex speech act). Finally, the powerful style with which these two characteristics are combined strongly incites people to think. What *Le Monde*'s editorials cannot do, however, is "act", i.e. decide.

6.3.3 Its legitimacy

To be recognized, political discourse must come from a legitimate source. Legitimacy is given on the basis of status, and/or of knowledge, both theoretical and practical. It can be acquired by filiation (e.g. social, biological), by training (i.e. graduation from recognized educational institutions or significant experience), or by mandate (e.g. electoral). "Political legitimacy […] always proceeds from the manner in which society looks at it with the values on which this specific political legitimacy rests" (Charaudeau 2005: 59).[1]

French politicians benefit from these three types of legitimacy. By filiation: they belong to a recognized political party. By training: a number of them have graduated from a few select institutions (i.e. the so-called "*grandes écoles*" and the *Institut d'études politiques* in Paris) and all those who have reached the national stage have done so thanks to a certain experience in the field. By mandate: they cannot access any position of responsibility without having first been elected. In comparison, the legitimacy of *Le Monde*'s editorialists may appear weak.

Le Monde does not belong to any political party and it cannot stand at any political election. Thus, *Le Monde*'s editorialists would need to find their primary legitimacy in their training, more specifically in their professional expertise. A number of *Le Monde*'s journalists acquired it partly from their studies at the

1. "*La légitimité politique, […], est toujours le résultat d'un regard social qui reflète les valeurs au nom desquelles celle-ci se fonde.*"

Institut d'études politiques in Paris, and all of them also through their experience. This professional expertise is defined in the "reading contract" that *Le Monde* makes with its readers and whose purpose is to guarantee the newspaper's independence, as well as its dynamic, responsible and loyal search for the truth ("*Une discipline collective*" in *Le style du Monde*, 2002: 3; see Appendix 7). The reading contract is "enforceable" by *Le Monde*'s mediator who is appointed by the newspaper's director ("*directeur de la publication*"). The mediator's columns are not subject to any reading before publication, and the editorial staff and newspaper's directors may not reply to them ("*Une exigence particulière*" by Jean-Marie Colombani in *Le style du Monde*, 2002: 3; see Appendix 7).

By making the reading contract public and explicitly opposable by all and by appointing a mediator to "enforce" it, *Le Monde* not only apparently reinforces its legitimacy by professional expertise but it also tries to remedy to its lack of legitimacy by electoral mandate. Indeed, if *Le Monde* cannot test the level of trust it inspires by standing for (re-)election, it can still put itself publicly on the stand to demonstrate its accountability.

Furthermore, *Le Monde*'s legitimacy by professional expertise can in turn become a legitimacy by filiation. Indeed, working for a "respected and serious" institution lends its journalists a certain aura, and this aura can outlast affairs and scandals affecting the institution, provided they are neither continuous nor irretrievably damaging. This type of legitimacy by filiation is partly carried out by references to *Le Monde*'s well-respected founder, Hubert Beuve-Méry (see above 2.4).

Another type of legitimacy by filiation is provided by the newspaper's strongly professed attachment to the French Republic's motto, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*". With it, *Le Monde* manifests its belonging to the "French Republic's family", and as a member of it, its right and duty to see to its well-being. However, one could say that this type of legitimacy by filiation is that of any French citizen.

In conclusion, it appears that *Le Monde*'s editorialists are not deprived of legitimacy, but theirs does not amount to that of politicians and *Le Monde* does not ignore it. First, as a newspaper, *Le Monde* is also a business that must please its readers sufficiently for them to continue to buy it so that it can survive financially. Thus, if *Le Monde* does not display the professional expertise it claims to be its trademark, it could lose its audience. It follows that the express specification of the reading contract's opposability and the appointment of a mediator, while laudable *per se* and certainly very well thought out in terms of journalistic ethics, could in fact mask in part an operation of "public relations". Second, the editorialists' extensive use of the indefinite pronoun "*on*" for any type of action going beyond the role of news provider (see above 2.4) suggests a certain level of cautiousness or even uneasiness. *Le Monde*'s legitimacy is rather strong for its function of news provider. However, with its editorials, it goes quite beyond this role, and some (Péan & Cohen 2003;

Poulet 2003) have contested its legitimacy to do so. This controversial point would need to be considered in a larger framework on the role of media in democracy (see below 6.4).

6.3.4 Its strategies

Charaudeau delineated a number of strategies used in political discourse. A number of them are easily identifiable in *Le Monde*'s editorials as well.

The first group of strategies concerns the presentation of oneself. Charaudeau (2005: 61) notes that speakers play on the singular-collective identity, the "I – we", and that they often use the indefinite "*on*" to represent the leader. The linguistic analysis of personal markers (see above 2.4) has revealed the predominant use of "*on*" in editorials when *Le Monde* plays a role of social actor, and "*on*"'s rhetorical effect on both sides of the interactions (addressers and addressees) resulting from its dual "I – we" composition.

Charaudeau adds that in politics, the *raison d'être* of one's self image is to be directed to the public because this image must function as a support for identity via "desired common values" (2005: 67). The most straightforward manner for *Le Monde* to present itself is to use "*Le Monde*" or "*nous*" (to represent *Le Monde* only). These two markers have been shown in the majority to represent *Le Monde* as a news provider (see above 2.4), the traditional function of a newspaper. The analysis of the use of "*Le Monde*" also reveals that *Le Monde* is most likely to come to the fore under its own name in cases of self-defence (see above 2.4), i.e. when the newspaper takes strong or controversial positions. Thus, the editorials on Russia, because of the newspaper's strongly expressed stand against the war in Chechnya among other things, provide a particularly good ground for the systematic study of *Le Monde*'s self image. The linguistic analysis of these editorials showed that *Le Monde* establishes its authority on its professional expertise, its social representativeness, its attitude as an independent and committed intellectual, and the use of a quite incisive style (Le 2006b: 71–78). In summary, the principles on which *Le Monde*'s constructs its self-image all refer to well-accepted values among the French elites.

Alongside strategies to present oneself, different strategies are used to "dramatize" the discourse, i.e. to present it in an interesting, appealing manner: tripartite presentation of the situation (i.e. emphasis on problems, their sources and solutions), disqualification of the opponents, and subjective discourse mixing emotions and reason.

The tripartite presentation of the situation corresponds to three of the four functions of Entman's substantive frames (i.e. defining problematic effects/conditions, identifying cause/agent, endorsing remedy). The qualitative analysis of selected editorials on internal, European, and external issues showed how

complete *Le Monde*'s editorials are in this respect: each function is fulfilled by a number of actors (see above 3.1.1, 4.1.1, 5.1.1). The importance of reason in the editorials is attested by the predominant evaluation of situations (APPRECIATION) and individuals (JUDGMENT) as per socio-cultural codes of values; emotions, though not prominent, are not absent as they necessarily result from the mostly negative evaluations of the issues in discussion (see above 2.1). Furthermore, the subjective character of the editorials appears in the fourth function of substantive frames, i.e. the conveyance of a moral judgment. Finally, the qualitative analysis of the actors taking part in the editorials' inner debate plainly exposed who the "opponent" was: President Chirac on the internal stage (see above 3.1.2), mostly President Chirac again but in a more nuanced manner on European issues (see above 4.1.2), and Russia, but most particularly the West on the war in Chechnya (see above 5.1.2).

Finally, the last group of strategies concerns values: their choice and their presentation. *Le Monde* openly declares its values: "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*", the motto of the French Republic (Le Monde 2002: 6). In defending them, it expresses its collective identity; but more than that, in putting these "unopposable" values as a background to its own views (reflecting its individual identity), it very adroitly puts forward its positions that are far from garnering unanimous approval on the internal, European, and international stages (e.g. see above 2.5.3). The comparison of interactions within *Le Monde*'s editorials and interaction within the French, European and international spheres (see above 3.3, 4.4, 5.6) underlines *Le Monde*'s strategic manoeuvring on the political stage to pursue its own goals. Marc Augé's statement that "*Qu'il soit langage du consensus ou langage de terreur, le langage politique est un langage de l'identité*" [whether it is a language of consensus or a language of terror, language of politics is language of identity] (quoted in Charaudeau 2005: 72–73) is amply demonstrated in *Le Monde*'s editorials.

In conclusion, the review of the characteristics presented by *Le Monde*'s editorials according to Charaudeau's description of political discourse undeniably demonstrates that *Le Monde*'s editorials are political discourse. This may not appear particularly astonishing, but it still raises a few interesting points, especially in regard to legitimacy. *Le Monde*'s legitimacy as a news provider is not in question; it is in fact quite well founded. It is its legitimacy as a political actor (considered separately from its impact as a news provider) that may be somewhat perplexing. Indeed, except for the power to act, *Le Monde*'s editorials exhibit all major characteristics of "classical" political discourse as can be produced by any political party. Editorialists also benefit from a regular public platform that many politicians would envy. *Le Monde*'s editorialists, however, do not enjoy any type of "elective legitimacy". Does this still give them the "right" to address the world as they do?

6.3.5 *Le Monde* as a political actor

Does the nature of *Le Monde*'s editorials as political discourse imply that *Le Monde* is a political actor? According to Patterson (1997), news media are not effective political actors. Rather than a question of legitimacy, their limitations in that matter pertain more to their capacity. Indeed, while political parties have the incentive of giving order and voice to society's values, the goal of media is to produce good stories; these stories focus on means and not ends. The choice of stories is more dependent on time and news cycle than on the importance of their matter. Issue coverage is also determined by the participation or not of prominent personalities, and commercial pressures. All of this results in events going unreported despite their broader significance. News' roots are shallow because of the severe constraints under which journalists operate, while political issues are deeply entrenched in society.

Patterson's arguments may present a darker image of media and a rosier one of politics than is really the case. Distinctions must be made among different types of news media, even though one cannot deny that journalists work under very restrictive conditions and that this undeniably has repercussions. In his argumentation, Patterson looks at news media primarily as news providers; he does not seem to take their (unsigned) editorials into account. The analysis of *Le Monde*'s editorials has demonstrated how their primary function is to give a directive to recognized institutional actors on the basis of the newspaper's interpretation of the French national values, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*". It has also been shown how *Le Monde*'s argumentation relies on French collective memories (Le 2006a). Finally, it can be added that the knowledge of *Le Monde*'s editorialists, gained through years of practice in observing and reporting on political life, is not inferior to that of a number of politicians. Furthermore, a number of *Le Monde*' journalists graduated from the same prestigious educational institutions as some politicians. Thus, according to Patterson's criteria, *Le Monde*'s editorials are evidence of *Le Monde*'s status as political actor. It is not a political actor in the same sense as political parties, but all political actors do not need to be of the exactly same type.

In conclusion, editorials appear as one of the main tools (if not the main tool) of *Le Monde* as a political actor. This raises the question of how this fits in with the concept of democracy.

6.4 Editorials and democracy

Media are essential for the functioning of democracy. They provide information without which no choice exists. To fulfill this function, they need to select what

they will present, and choose how to present it. This allows them to bring the public's attention to important issues that could otherwise be deliberately left ignored by politicians; in that, they play the important role of "watchdog". However, in being watchdogs, media can also use their power in ways that are detrimental to the good functioning of democracy: their "framing", "agenda setting", and "priming" of news (see above 1.1) can unduly influence the public in one way or the other. Their efficiency as watchdogs depends partly on a combination of their independence (from political and financial sources of power) and plurality (Hamilton 2003; James 2004).

To their primary role of news providers, some media add that of news commentators. The two roles are more or less present and more or less separated depending on the type of media system (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 73–75):

> The Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model is characterized by an elite-oriented press with relatively small circulation and a corresponding centrality of electronic media. […] Political parallelism tends to be high; the press is marked by a strong focus on political life, external pluralism, and a tradition of commentary-oriented or advocacy journalism persists more strongly than in other part of Europe. Instrumentalization of the media by the government, by political parties and by industrialists with political ties is common. […]
>
> The North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model is characterized by early development of press freedom and the newspaper industry, and very high newspaper circulation. It is also characterized by a history of strong party newspapers, and other media connected to organized social groups. […] Media are seen to a significant extent as social institutions for which the state has responsibility, and press freedom coexists with relatively strong state support for and regulation of media. […]
>
> The North Atlantic or Liberal Model, similar to the Democratic Corporatist Model, is characterized by early development of press freedom and the mass-circulation press, though newspaper circulation today is lower than in the Democratic Corporatist societies. Commercial newspapers dominate, political parallelism is low, and internal pluralism predominates […]. Information-oriented journalism predominates, with a bit stronger commentary tradition in Britain. […]

These three models are contingent on the socio-cultural environment in which they developed over time and none of them can be said to be superior to the others. In fact, there seems to be a reciprocal tendency to find that the others' model would be better. *Le Monde* follows the Polarized Pluralist Model and ought therefore to be evaluated within its confines. About the French model, Hallin and Mancini note:

> a strong emphasis on commentary remained, as did an emphasis on style, creating a French model of journalism distinct from the Anglo-American. Information-oriented journalism, […], has made even greater inroads into French journalism,

> in the last couple of decades of the twentieth century, as investigative journalism, for example, has become common. But French journalism still includes a relatively strong emphasis on commentary that reflects its political roots. (2004: 99)

Whether they belong to one model or the other, specific media may choose to have editorials or not, and these editorials may be signed and represent an individual's opinion, or not and thus bear an institutional character. When a specific media opts to publish unsigned editorials, as *Le Monde* does, it *ipso facto* decides to go beyond the role of news provider. The publication of unsigned editorials could be interpreted as a "logical" extension of being a news provider. Indeed, publishing "facts" (or "hard news") without a context deprives these facts of what gives them their meaning(s); in other words, the lack of context by allowing any type of interpretation opens the door wide to misinformation. Just as facts need to be selected in the telling of a story, their contextual information does as well. The choice of the contextual information to be published limits the number of interpretations of the facts and leads to their more or less open comments. The purpose of editorials is not to give raw facts, but to state a position on the basis of facts presented in their selected context. Thus, editorials continue openly and explicitly what may be done at various degrees in news articles.

In this regard, *Le Monde* is very clear about the concept of journalism it aspires to embody. It affirms in "*Le Monde* et ses principes" (*Le style du Monde*, 2002: 6–7; see Appendix 7) that it is an independent daily newspaper that resists all political, economic and other pressures that may be exerted on it, and that it provides a balanced and honest coverage of news. While providing news as impartially as possible is one of its functions, it is not a neutral newspaper and it states its positions in (signed and daily non-signed) editorials as well as in its journalists' analyses and commentaries. It provides a place for discussion in which different ideas confront each other so that solutions can be found. In this context, one may wonder whether in the way *Le Monde* expresses its opinions in its editorials (as revealed by this study), it simply exercises any citizen's or association's right to express one's opinions, or it goes beyond that.

The political role played by *Le Monde* (or other media) is different and "less" than that of political parties because its ultimate purpose cannot be to access power through elections, and in this sense it is akin to organized civil society groups (e.g. labour unions, lobby groups) that try to influence politicians. However, *Le Monde*'s role is "larger" than that of these organized groups because of the newspaper's very encompassing area of interest compared to the different groups' foci on certain types of issues. Furthermore, *Le Monde* is greatly advantaged compared both to political parties and other groups by its professional access to various information networks, its regular public platform, its expert use of rhetoric, and its dual mode

of reaching the public, i.e. by its selection and presentation of news and by its editorials. The legitimacy of *Le Monde* acting as an editorialist/national, European and international political actor needs to be assessed in terms of the conformity between its professed values and its practice, internally: who is really behind the editorials, in which measure do the editorials' content reflect the newspaper's values; and externally: how is *Le Monde*'s attitude perceived by society in connection to the society's values?

In regard to the authors of *Le Monde*'s editorials, *Le style du Monde* (2002: 10) states:

> *L'éditorial quotidien est rédigé par un journaliste de la rédaction. Il n'est pas signé. Il est relu par la direction de la rédaction et le directeur et peut être modifié pour des raisons de forme et de fond.*
> [The daily editorial is written by one of the newspaper's journalists. It is not signed. It is reread by the editorial board and its head, and it may be modified in its form and content.]

During the period under consideration (1999–2001), the three individuals mainly responsible for the line of the editorials were: the Chairman of the newspaper's Executive Board (Jean-Marie Colombani) who chairs the daily meeting in which the editorial's topic is chosen; the Head of the editorial staff (Edwy Plenel) who is in charge of editorial reflections (editorials, analyses and debates); and the chief editor for the editorials' section (Alain Frachon). An ethnographic and organizational study would be necessary to shed some light on the editorials' genesis. As this study followed a text-driven approach, the question of the editorials' sources can unfortunately not be examined here. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that issues of financial structure, newspaper's ownership and structural organization appear particularly relevant in this matter. Even when internal shareholders constitute the majority as in *Le Monde*'s case (52.61% on 1 September 2001), organizational and personal power networks within the newspaper still need to be investigated.

In regard to the conformity of *Le Monde*'s content with its professed values, this study has shown in detail how *Le Monde*'s editorials manifest the newspaper's allegiance to the French Republic's motto, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*", when it takes a position and issues directives on particular issues. Is *Le Monde* really independent from all political, economic and other pressures it might be subject to? The qualitative analyses of this study have shown *Le Monde*'s stand against President Chirac (RPR) and in favour of Prime Minister Jospin (PS) in their cohabitation during the period under study. *Le Monde* is widely recognized as a left-centre newspaper, but as it has emphasized when under attack, it did not shy away from criticizing

President Mitterrand (PS) when he was in power. *Le Monde* does not entertain any official link with any political party; its positions might be influenced by personality issues or by ideological inclinations of the individuals in position of power within the newspaper. The extent to which these individuals, whatever their personal inclinations, exercise a critical mind or not, could only be investigated with an ethnographic study. One might disagree with *Le Monde*'s interpretation of the French Republic's motto but, just the same, one cannot agree with each and every politician and political parties whose diversity epitomizes how the same abstract national values can be understood and applied differently in practice. *Le Monde* does lack the elective legitimacy that politicians enjoy, but *Le Monde* does not aim to and cannot access any position in the Executive or Legislative branches of power.

The discursive analysis of *Le Monde*'s editorials underlines their power and the basis for their "theoretical" legitimacy. However, editorials are only one aspect of newspapers' power (that they may furthermore choose not to exercise), and their "actual" legitimacy is linked with that of the entire newspaper. As noted above (6.3), "Political legitimacy […] always proceeds from the manner in which society looks at it with the values on which this specific political legitimacy rests" (Charaudeau 2005: 59). In *Le Monde*'s case, these values are "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*" (on the significance of these values for *Le Monde*'s legitimacy on the international stage, see: Le 2006b: 176–179). In the French socio-political context during the time under study, *Le Monde* was the only influential national newspaper and it was seen as able to promote and demote ministers and politicians. The veracity of this allegation is not the point here; what matters is the perception of *Le Monde* by French society, and the perceived socio-political weight of *Le Monde* went against the value of equality. This resulted in a very strong malaise within and without that came to public attention with the publication of *La face cachée du* Monde – *Du contre-pouvoir aux abus de pouvoir* [The hidden face of *Le Monde* – From counter power to abuses of power] by Péan and Cohen (2003). Although a rather good example of "bad" journalism itself, this book had the merit of saying aloud what was being said behind closed doors for a while. In *Le pouvoir du* Monde – *Quand un journal veut changer la France* [The power of *Le Monde* – When a newspaper wants to change France], Poulet (2003) credibly substantiates a number of Péan and Cohen's accusations. In his conclusion, he states:

> *La puissance du* Monde *de Jean-Marie Colombani est modeste face à ces colosses* [Randolph Hearst, Rupert Murdoch, Silvio Berlusconi]. *Mais à l'échelle de la France, elle n'est pas négligeable et sa démarche n'est pas si différente. Car, sans contrôle démocratique, les médias basculent naturellement dans l'abus de pouvoir. Et quand Jospin dit qu'on ne gouverne pas contre* Le Monde*, quand Jean-Marie Messier a la conviction d'avoir été «tué» par ce journal, quand François Mitterrand ou Jacques*

> *Chirac se sentent victimes d'une chasse à l'homme, il est clair que* Le Monde *est devenu un des acteurs majeurs de la scène publique française.* (2003: 251)
> [*Le Monde*'s power is modest compared to that of Randolph Hearst, Rupert Murdoch, and Silvio Berlusconi. However, within the context of France, it is not negligible and its process is not that different. Indeed, without any democratic control, media naturally fall into an abuse of power. Thus, when Jospin says that it is not possible to govern against *Le Monde*, when Jean-Marie Messier is convinced he was "killed" by this newspaper, when François Mitterrand or Jacques Chirac feel they have been victims of a manhunt, it is clear that *Le Monde* has become one of the major actors on the French public stage.]

The analysis of *Le Monde*'s editorials concurs with the conclusion that *Le Monde* is a political actor, but it does not demonstrate that by and in itself, *Le Monde* is abusing its power, i.e. exerts more power than it has the legitimacy for. The situation in which *Le Monde* appears as exceeding its legitimate power results in great part from its dominant position among French media. In other words, the power exercised by *Le Monde* through its news provider's role and its editorials is not counterbalanced by any comparable media, situation for which *Le Monde* cannot be held accountable. However, the often denounced arrogance of *Le Monde*'s editorial board, also clearly noticeable in their editorials' style and positions, has certainly contributed to the perception of *Le Monde* as domineering and in making it appear as the only one responsible for the situation.

Having thus described the function of *Le Monde*'s editorials on the (mostly) French political stage, one may wonder as to their place in the functioning of democracy, and of which type of democracy. After having compared four models of democracy, Strömbäck (2005) defines their distinguishing and core normative demands upon news journalism. Journalism must (2005: 341)

- in procedural democracy: respect the democratic procedures; act as a watchdog or as a burglar alarm exposing wrong-doings;
- in competitive democracy: act as a watchdog or a burglar alarm; focus on the record of office-holders and the platform of the political candidates and parties; focus on the political actors;
- in participatory democracy: let the citizen set the agenda; mobilize the citizens' interest, engagement and participation in public life; focus on problem solving as well as problems; frame politics as a process open for everyone with citizens as active subjects; link active citizens together;
- in deliberative democracy: act for inclusive discussions; mobilize citizens' interest, engagement and participation in public discussions; link discussants to each other; foster public discussions characterized by rationality, impartiality, intellectual honesty and equality.

Le Monde's editorials clearly go beyond the role of media in procedural and competitive democracies. Furthermore, they do not fit within the participatory democracy frame as their content attests neither to an open access to citizens as active subjects, nor to citizens setting the agenda. Finally, they do not appear to suit the criteria for deliberative democracy either, in particular that of equality.

In "deliberative democracy", as theorized by Jürgen Habermas (1996) and John Rawls (1993), "political decisions should be reached through a process of deliberation among free and equal citizens" (Mouffe 2000: 1). However, considering the structural advantages enjoyed by media in general (and not just *Le Monde*) with the publication of editorials, it is hard to see how, in practice, there can be equality among political actors (neither of means nor of opportunities to participate). In response to the shortcomings of the concept of deliberative democracy, Chantal Mouffe (2000) proposes the notion of "agonistic pluralism" in which the emphasis is no longer on rationality or forms or argumentation (as in deliberative democracy) but on types of practices: "the constitution of democratic individuals can only be made possible by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, the forms of life that foster identification with democratic values" (Mouffe 2000: 11). "A well functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions" (Mouffe 2000: 16). Media asserting their democratic positions with a strong voice (as *Le Monde*) definitively play an important role in this type of democracy, provided other political actors (media or not) can be heard just as well. Thus, the "extra" power media hold with editorials does not undermine democracy *per se*; it only underlines the crucial democratic necessity for media pluralism.

6.5 Conclusion: The discursive communication identity framework and socio-political identities

Throughout this study, *Le Monde*'s editorials have been investigated quantitatively and qualitatively from media-centric and society-centric perspectives. When put together, their ensuing results provide the following general description for the period 1999–2001:

> Editorials represent one of the main tools of *Le Monde* as a political actor on the national, European, and international stages.
> Formally, they appear as short argumentative texts that are at the macro-level generally composed of constatives (i.e. speech acts stating how something is), most often containing a negative evaluation in reference to socio-cultural codes of values, followed by a directive. Editorials are addressed to recognized institutional actors on the national, European, and international levels both openly (by their directives) and covertly (through the effects of the media

> persuasive skills on the general audience). The more salient (in terms of extend of coverage) the issue dealt with in the editorial, the more negative the evaluation appears; and the further away from France the issue, the less openly directive (in terms of speech acts) but more negative (i.e. covertly "directive") the editorial tends to be.
>
> *Le Monde*'s editorials manifest the newspaper's individual identity as a committed member of French society. In this regard, editorials embody and transmit the newspaper's personal interpretation of French cultural values ("*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*"), of their general significance, and of their practical applications in specific cases. In addressing institutional actors on the international, European and French political stages, *Le Monde*'s editorials purport to show the world's, European, and French powerful the newspaper's own interpretation of what "French" means in practice. The editorials' persuasive strength partly stems from an "invisible" pressure upon the addressees that is produced by a complex but smooth and powerful interweaving of individual and collective identities at different levels of the argumentation.
>
> The power of *Le Monde*'s editorials underlines the crucial democratic necessity for media pluralism.

This description of *Le Monde*'s editorials reveals advantages and shortcomings of the approaches followed in this study. The text-driven procedure for genre analysis was very efficient in circumscribing the form, structure and content of editorials, and in connection with the communication approach, their function. The identity approach unmasked how identities are displayed and played with by editorialists to reach their goals. However, an ethnographic approach and a structural media approach would have allowed delving more deeply into the issue of editorials' legitimacy. Furthermore, if a political science approach had been added to this combination, then the study of editorials in democracy could have been completed.

Despite its shortcomings, unavoidable because no single model can be all-encompassing, the discursive communication identity framework defined in this study has revealed the places from which *Le Monde* through its editorials looks at the social world and interprets it meaningfully, and the directions in which *Le Monde* wants this social world to go. The identities thus revealed are only those of *Le Monde* considered as a political actor because the study focused on editorials. For the identities of *Le Monde* as a professional news provider, the study would have needed to include news articles (their content, length and place in the physical layout), as well as all other components (e.g. advertising, classifieds). For the identities of *Le Monde* as a news business, the study of its financial and legal organizations and the ethnographic study of its inner social interactions would have been required. These three types of identity are interwoven: the socio-cultural identity of the political actor gives insight into the professional identity of the news provider that is influenced by the organizational identity of the news business. In turn, the

characteristics of this news business have an impact on the positions that can be taken by the political actor. Thus, it is from the interactions between *Le Monde*'s identities as a political actor, as a professional news provider, and as a news business that *Le Monde*'s "global identities" can be defined.

With the general intent of investigating political roles played by media, this study has looked at media socio-cultural identities as they are expressed in editorials, and it has done so with *Le Monde*'s editorials from 1999 to 2001. Socio-cultural identities are very much context dependent; the conclusions that have been reached with a specific newspaper working in a specific media system at a specific time are not *prima facie* generalizable. However, they tell us what can be found. The study of *Le Monde*'s roles in the debates on French institutional issues and on the European's Union enlargement as well as in the protest against the second Chechen war has shown how they are illustrations of *Le Monde*'s concept of what French society should be, of its ambition for the role of France in and through the European Union, and of its understanding of human rights, a key concept in the construction of French national identity, in sum, of *Le Monde*'s individual embodiment of its collective French identity. In this sense, this specific case study oversteps its temporal frame. In its limited settings, this study on editorials suggests that media roles in politics might be quite more significant than has been generally thought. Editorials, as instruments that extend and complement media power as news providers and commentators, allow them to function as political actors at different levels of governance thanks to a strategic interweaving of identities. As for the legitimacy with which editorials' power is used in democracy, it can only be investigated case by case, i.e. media by media taking into account the type of media system to which each of them belongs.

APPENDIX 1

Editorials

The number (#) of the editorial corresponds to its chronological rank of publication from 1 August 1999 to 31 July 2001.

* editorial that is part of the restricted groups analysed qualitatively

Russia (33 editorials)

#	Date	Title
005	1999-08-06	*Le FMI et la Russie*
010	1999-08-11	*Le naufrage de Boris Eltsine*
018	1999-08-19	*"Cauchemar" à Moscou*
026	1999-08-27	*Questions au FMI*
056	1999-09-26	**Silence pour la Tchétchénie*
066	1999-10-07	**Ingérence en Tchétchénie?*
089	1999-10-30	**Grozny: silence, on tue*
095	1999-11-05	**Massacre en Tchétchénie*
117	1999-11-26	**Tchétchénie: fermer les yeux*
129	1999-12-08	**Inquiétante Russie*
132	1999-12-11	**Russie: que faire?*
135	1999-12-14	*Le chaos russe*
140	1999-12-19	**Démission en Tchétchénie*
142	1999-12-21	*L'ère Poutine*
154	2000-01-02	*Les deux faces de M. Poutine*
175	2000-01-23v	**Parler franc à M. Poutine*
192	2000-02-09	**De Vienne à Grozny*
202	2000-02-19	**Poutine et les Occidentaux*
239	2000-03-26	**Le sacre sanglant de M. Poutine*
242	2000-03-29	*Poutine, pourquoi faire?*
287	2000-05-13	*Le premier geste de M. Poutine*
311	2000-06-06	*Une nouvelle ère stratégique*
319	2000-06-14	*Leçon d'une libération*
341	2000-07-06	**En Tchétchénie, le pire*
349	2000-07-14	*L'inquiétant M. Poutine*

385	2000-08-19	*D'un naufrage à l'autre*
390	2000-08-24	*Le "Koursk" et le Kremlin*
457	2000-10-29	*Parler à M. Poutine*
527	2001-01-07	*Bonapartisme russe*
547	2001-01-27	**Jour de honte*
603	2001-03-24	*L'odyssée de Mir*
627	2001-04-17	*La presse russe sous contrôle*
711	2001-07-12	**La guerre de M. Poutine*

Europe (26 editorials)

#	Date	Title
032	1999-09-02	*Démocratie européenne*
075	1999-10-16	*L'Europe après l'euro*
133	1999-12-12	*L'Europe-puissance*
136	1999-12-15	*Le mauvais exemple français*
171	2000-01-19	**La contradiction européenne*
185	2000-02-02	*L'Europe politique existe*
288	2000-05-14	**Danke schön, M. Fischer*
316	2000-06-11	**L'Europe relancée*
333	2000-06-28	**"Notre Europe"*
336	2000-07-01	**Dissonance sur l'Europe*
411	2000-09-14	*Les leçons des sanctions*
427	2000-09-30	*Leçon danoise*
439	2000-10-12	*L'Europe et la Serbie*
461	2000-11-02	*L'Europe de la mer*
483	2000-11-24	*Un succès de l'Europe*
498	2000-12-09	**Le pouvoir dans l'Europe*
501	2000-12-12	**Un petit sommet*
508	2000-12-19	**M. Bush et l'Europe*
521	2001-01-01	**L'Europe du bricolage*
552	2001-02-01	**Contradiction européenne*
647	2001-05-08	**Répondre à Schröder*
668	2001-05-29	**L'Europe de M. Jospin*
673	2001-06-03	*L'Europe au Proche-Orient*
680	2001-06-10	**Euroconfusion*
688	2001-06-19	**M. Bush et Göteborg*
693	2001-06-24	**L'Europe des maladroits*

France – Internal Politics (38 editorials)

#	Date	Title
096	1999-11-06	**Le vrai visage de la cohabitation*
172	2000-01-20	*Référendum pour la justice*
177	2000-01-25	**Âpre cohabitation*
196	2000-02-13	*L'effet Haider*
238	2000-03-25	*Sauver la réforme*
286	2000-05-12	**Le quinquennat, enfin!*
308	2000-06-03	**Un président sacralisé*
312	2000-06-07	**Le quinquennat magré lui*
314	2000-06-09	*La démocratie bafouée*
325	2000-06-20	**Institutions bouleversées*
374	2000-08-08	*Abus de secret*
395	2000-08-29	**Absentéismes*
396	2000-08-30	*Les raisons d'un départ*
402	2000-09-05	*La ligne d'une fracture*
405	2000-09-08	*La voix des Verts*
424	2000-09-27	**Tous concernés*
426	2000-09-29	**L'aveu*
432	2000-10-05	**L'image de la démocratie*
449	2000-10-21	**Calendriers présidentiels*
475	2000-11-16	*Le "techno" et le "démago"*
492	2000-12-03	**L'argent de la corruption*
496	2000-12-07	**M. Chirac et les juges*
502	2000-12-13	**Le prix des idées*
505	2000-12-16	**Les vérités de M. Chirac*
520	2000-12-31	*Lionel Jospin censuré*
522	2001-01-02	*La République et la confiance*
529	2001-01-09	*Renouveler la politique*
593	2001-03-14	*Séguin, le fiasco*
604	2001-03-25	*L'alternance à Paris*
606	2001-03-27	*Pour le vote des étrangers*
629	2001-04-19	*Lionel Jospin a déçu*
644	2001-05-05	*M. Chirac et l'écologie*
664	2001-05-25	**Immunité présidentielle*
676	2001-06-06	*Un mystérieux silence*
689	2001-06-20	*Cassandre avait raison*
691	2001-06-22	*La course à l'écologie*

716	2001-07-17	**Cohabitation de combat*
719	2001-07-20	*Un secret anachronique*

Random (53 editorials)

#	Date	Title
007	1999-08-08	*Pour une politique corse*
028	1999-08-29	*La paix des banques*
052	1999-09-22	*Les atouts de M. Barak*
053	1999-09-23	*Nord-Sud: la fracture*
061	1999-10-01	*Priorité à l'intégration*
069	1999-10-10	*L'ingérence contre l'impunité*
072	1999-10-13	*Les jeunes et le tabac*
081	1999-10-22	*La justice bafouée*
083	1999-10-24	*Elf: l'aveu de "M. Afrique"*
099	1999-11-09	*Jean-Paul II fait un rêve*
122	1999-12-01	*L'ETA n'est pas l'IRA*
128	1999-12-07	*Le PACS franco-allemand*
159	2000-01-07	*Brutalité policière*
178	2000-01-26	*Italie, le pardon sélectif*
179	2000-01-27	*Les femmes, enfin*
189	2000-02-06	*Dans les prisons de France*
227	2000-03-14	*Le couronnement de M. Aznar*
231	2000-03-18	*La méthode et l'équipe*
237	2000-03-24	*Un homme de paix*
245	2000-04-01	*La famille et le social*
248	2000-04-04	*L'Europe des banquiers*
249	2000-04-05	*Un verdict exemplaire*
274	2000-04-30	*L'euro et les fantasmes*
281	2000-05-07	*Conduites irresponsables*
284	2000-05-10	*La mort d'un juste*
294	2000-05-20	*Tchernobyl tue encore*
301	2000-05-27	*Des hôpitaux ingérables*
305	2000-05-31	*France Télécom, l'européen*
348	2000-07-13	*Fabius le libéral*
354	2000-07-19	*Une justice commerciale juste*
356	2000-07-21	*Le précédent Cellatex*
364	2000-07-29	*Les lois de l'hospitalité*
403	2000-09-06	*La surprise libanaise*

416	2000-09-19	*Le prix de l'automobile*
419	2000-09-22	**Les raisons d'une publication*
484	2000-11-25	*L'Europe du cinéma*
494	2000-12-05	*La Côte d'Ivoire déchirée*
499	2000-12-10	*Etats-Unis et démocratie*
541	2001-01-21	*Une chance pour les Philippines*
559	2001-02-08	*Les harkis et la mémoire*
569	2001-02-18	*Bush et l'impasse irakienne*
610	2001-03-31	*M. Bush en pollueur*
616	2001-04-06	*Moderniser la SNCF*
628	2001-04-18	*Dans les prison turques*
641	2001-05-02	*M. Berlusconi disqualifié*
659	2001-05-20	*Contre la torture*
682	2001-06-12	*La parité familiale*
692	2001-06-23	*Intervenir en Macédoine*
700	2001-07-01	*Vérités franco-marocaines*
704	2001-07-05	*Concurrence universelle*
706	2001-07-07	*Loi de la jungle en Guyane*
707	2001-07-08	*L'inquiétant M. Sharon*
712	2001-07-13	*Enrayer les délocalisations*

APPENDIX 2

Structure analysis

Complex speech acts

The purpose of an utterance is recognized by the type of speech act it represents (Bach & Harnish 1979). As the expression of a position, editorials considered as speech acts would *a priori* be expected to take a general form of "constative" (i.e. stating how something is) or "acknowledgment" (i.e. expressing feelings concerning a certain event or state of affairs). However, "directives" (i.e. trying to get the listener to do or not do something) should not be excluded, in which case the editorial would go beyond its officially stated function and participate proactively in the socio-political debates.

The analysis of the editorials' structure (Le 2009) comprises the following steps: its textual inner boundaries are defined with a coherence analysis (A2.1); then the complex speech act represented by the editorial can be identified (A2.2), as well as its addressee(s) when the complex speech act is a directive (A2.3).

A2.1 Coherence analysis

In the framework presented here, the analysis of the editorial's structure aims to reveal the type of speech act represented by the entire editorial. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) present argumentation as a *complex* speech act that is composed of *elementary* speech acts at the sentence level. The determination of the complex speech act category to which a specific editorial belongs presupposes the determination of the editorial's hierarchical structure and, therefore, necessitates the identification of textual boundaries. Paltridge (1994) critically examined the criteria employed for the identification of textual boundaries in genre studies and concluded that "the search for structural divisions in texts should be seen as a search for *cognitive* boundaries in terms of *convention*, *appropriacy*, and *content*" (1994: 295). In this framework, this is provided by a model of coherence analysis (Le, 2006) that rests on cognitive psychology (Kintsch 1998), van Dijk's concept of macrostructures (1980), Daneš' Functional Sentence Perspective (1974; 1989), and Hobbs' relations of coherence (1985). A general explanation of the model follows (for details, see Appendix 3).

The application of the coherence model uncovers the logico-semantic coherence relations (coordination, subordination or superordination) that link sentences and determine units of analysis ("macrostructural bases", more or less equivalent to paragraphs), intermediate between single sentences and the entire text. Then formal rules allow us to define in the text the sentence in each macrostructural basis that is thematic (i.e. that indicates what it is talked about) and the sentence that is macrostructural (i.e. that gives the gist of what is said). Although defined in accordance with different formal rules, these macrostructural sentences correspond to van Dijk's concept of macrostructures and their semantic content is the most likely to remain in long-term memory (1980: 254). The analysis is recursive and, once relations between sentences within a same paragraph have been established and the macrostructures defined, relations of coherence between macrostructures are determined. Higher-level units of analysis are thus defined, as well as their themes ("text themes") and macrostructures ("text macrostructures") thanks to the application of the same rules that were applied at the first-level analysis. The coherence analysis is verified at these two levels of analysis. First, all themes (Th) and macrostructures (Mcr), when put one after the other in the order in which they appear in the text, must form a coherent summary of the text; second, all text themes (TTh) and text macrostructures (TMcr), when put one after the other in the order in which they appear in the text, must form a coherent abstract of the text. In other words, the application of this model reveals the successive stages of argumentation: each sentence serves to build an argumentation; sentences combine in macrostructural bases (more or less equivalent to paragraphs) which are each represented by their macrostructural sentence(s); these macrostructures, i.e. higher-level elements in the argumentation, combine with each other to make the complete text argumentative point, represented by the text macrostructures. A single editorial can contain one or several text macrostructures. Thus, at each level, macrostructural sentences (and to a lesser degree, thematic sentences) represent the cornerstones of the text hierarchical structure.

The text hierarchical structure as uncovered through the coherence analysis translates as follows into a hierarchy of speech acts. Elementary speech acts (represented by each sentence in the text) combine to form first-level complex speech acts (represented by the macrostructural sentences) that combine and form second-level complex speech acts (represented by the text macrostructural sentences). These second-level complex speech acts may also combine to result in the final-level complex speech act represented by the text in its entirety.

A2.2 Types of speech acts

This study adopts Bach and Harnish's classification of speech acts (1979). Macrostructures have been classified under the four general types: constatives (1), directives (2),

commissives (3), and acknowledgments (4). A sentence may include two different types of speech act (5).

> *Constatives* express the speaker's belief and his intention or desire that the hearer have or form a like belief. *Directives* express the speaker's attitude toward some prospective action by the hearer and his intention that his utterance, or the attitude it expresses, be taken as a reason for the hearer's action. *Commissives* express the speaker's intention and belief that his utterance obligates him to do something (perhaps under certain conditions). And *acknowledgments* express feelings regarding the hearer or, in cases where the utterance is clearly perfunctory or formal, the speaker's intention that his utterance satisfy a social expectation to express certain feelings and his belief that it does. (1979: 41)

1. Constative (CON)

> 052-2-6[1] : *Ehoud Barak est un dirigeant singulier : froid, cérébral, travailleur acharné, mais aussi chaleureux, ouvert et imaginatif.* [Ehud Barak is a peculiar leader: cold, intellectual, hard-working, but also welcoming, open and creative.]

2. Directive (DIR)

> 007-6-21 : *Il doit, en tout cas, reprendre rapidement l'initiative, sur le terrain politique.* [In any case it must, quickly regain the initiative on the political stage.]

The directive may be implied. In the following sentence, *Le Monde* is relying on experts' words to say "do something before it happens".

> 294-4-30 : «*Une catastrophe nous attend.*» [«A catastrophe is awaiting us.»]

3. Commissive (COM)

> 641-4-23 : Le Monde *approuve la mise en garde de* The Economist. [*Le Monde* agrees with *The Economist*'s warning.]

4. Acknowledgment (ACK)

> 128-5-20 : *Et c'est tant mieux.* [And this is for the best.]

5. Combination of speech acts : In agreeing with *The Economist*'s warning, *Le Monde* commits itself and, in so doing, it "warns", i.e. it emits a directive.

> 641-4-23 : Le Monde *approuve la mise en garde de* The Economist. [*Le Monde* agrees with *The Economist*'s warning.]

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1. The first number refers to the editorial (as ranked among all editorials published from August 1999 to July 2001), the second to the paragraph, and the third to the sentence (numbered according to its position in the entire editorial).

The following complex sentence is composed of a constative (main clause) and a directive (subordinate clause).

> 354-4-24 : *La transparence de ces pratiques, qui ont souvent contribué à l'enrichissement de quelques-uns au détriment de la collectivité, sera l'un des enjeux de la loi proposée par Mme Guigou, dont le but principal doit rester l'édification d'une justice plus accessible*. [The transparency of these practices that often contributed to the enrichment of a few to the detriment of the whole will be one of the objectives of the bill presented by Mrs. Guigou, whose main goal must remain that of making the system of justice more accessible.]

A2.3 Addressees of directives

When the type of complex speech act for each editorial is defined, it still remains to be seen to whom that speech act is addressed. In the case of constatives, commissives or acknowledgments, it can be assumed that the addressee is the newspaper's general readership. However, the same assumption cannot be made with directives. In issuing directives, especially when these are to be found in macrostructures (Mcr and TMcr), *Le Monde* takes a very active part in public debates. Defining the addressees of these directives allows us to circumscribe not all but at least the main actors of the public debate as constructed by *Le Monde*, i.e. those whom *Le Monde* considers to be in a position of power.

The context (6), co-text (7) or directive itself (8) indicates who *Le Monde*'s addressees are. These addressees can be classified in four major categories: French (State, Republic, President, government, Prime Minister, Minister, Parliament, its members, politicians, specific members of French society, society), European (European Union, institutions, specific European States, Parliament, part or all of European society), world (West, i.e. Western liberal democracies, Russia, (other) specific States; heads of State), and general (i.e. when no indication is given). The identification of the directives' addressees, while not necessarily completely defining the limits of the public sphere in which the editorials operate, at least gives a very good indication of what they are.

6. In "Italie, le pardon sélectif" (26 January 2000), *Le Monde* comments an Italian decision of justice for its general audience, French society, and tells it how to interpret it (178-2-13).

> 178-2-13 : *C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut situer la décision de justice annoncée, lundi 24 janvier, à l'encontre d'Adriano Sofri et de deux de ses camarades, anciens membres du mouvement d'extrême gauche Lotta Continua*. [It is in this context that one must place the judicial decision, handed down on Monday January 24, in the case of Adriano Soffri and two of his companions, former members of the far-left movement, Lotta Continua.] [DIR – to F soc]

7. Pointing out to a divergence that appeared between North and South States at the 54th General Assembly of the United Nations ("Nord-Sud: la fracture" – 23 September 1999), *Le Monde* tells States who oppose the right of intervention on humanitarian grounds (co-text: 53-5-21) that no good argument can support their position (53-5-24).

   053-5-20 : *Universellement défendue, la cause des partisans du droit d'ingérence serait plus forte encore.* [If it were universally promoted, the advocates for the right of intervention would have an even stronger case.]
   053-5-21 : *Pour autant, les «souverainistes» de la planète font un mauvais procès d'intention à l'ONU.* [As for the world's «sovereignists», they are making unfounded accusations against the UN.]
   053-5-22 : *L'affirmation toujours plus exigeante, d'un droit d'ingérence humanitaire est dans l'intérêt de toutes les populations civiles*; [The increasingly strong demand for a humanitarian right of intervention is in the interest of all civilian populations.]
   053-5-23 : *elle est un pas de plus pour tenter d'imposer un règlement pacifique des différends.* [It is a further step that would help make the peaceful settlement of disputes obligatory.]
   053-5-24 : *Il n'y a pas de bons arguments pour s'y opposer.* [There is no good argument against it.] [DIR – to States]

8. After having criticized the situation in French prisons, *Le Monde* enjoins French intellectuals, politicians and well-known jurists to fight for the defence of human rights in prisons (189-4-26).

   189-4-26 : *Il est urgent qu'ils [intellectuels, politiques, grands juristes] reprennent ce flambeau.* [It is urgent that they [intellectuals, politicians, famous jurists] take over this mission.] [DIR – to F others]

APPENDIX 3

Coherence model

(Reprinted with minor additions from Le, 2006: 197–209)

In their writing, authors build coherence at micro- and macrolevels (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; van Dijk, 1997), i.e. they link the new and the old within sentences and paragraphs to give their text a global meaning. In their comprehension process, readers "make sense" of the text, i.e. they reconstruct a type of coherence for it that depends on their knowledge. The construction of coherence is a psychological process in which inferences are drawn to link sentences on the basis of linguistic knowledge, domain knowledge and world knowledge. This results in the understanding of the text as an entity to which the readers can assign a global intention (Charolles, 1983; Givòn, 1995; Hobbs, 1979; Sanders et al. 1992). The coherence reconstructed by readers might not be exactly the same as that of the authors, but there is a limited number of readings for each text; in other words, the number of coherence reconstructions that can be done for each text is limited. Thus, the analysis leading to the reconstruction of a text coherence must be verifiable.

In this work, coherence is reconstructed with a formal model of analysis (Le, 1996) that integrates work done on processes of text production and interpretation by van Dijk (1980), Kintsch (1988; Kintsch, 1998), Hobbs (1985, 1990), and Daneš (1974). In this integrated model, coherence links between syntactic sentences[1] are established on the basis of the type of logico-semantic relation existing between pairs of elements in the sentences. There are three basic relations: coordination (elaboration and parallelism), subordination, and superordination. These relations are Hobbs' relations of expansion that have been completed (A3.1). Once these relations have been recognized between the text sentences, it is possible to determine the themes and macrostructures on which the argumentation is based (A3.2). The combination of both these steps reveals the hierarchical structure of

1. Foltz, Kintsch and Landauer (1998: 302) also use the sentence as a unit in their Latent Semantic Analysis. While not rejecting the clause as a unit, they justify their choice by pointing out that the shortness of some clauses makes it sometimes difficult to find enough relevant semantic information in them, and that coherence breaks tend to occur more frequently between sentences than within sentences.

the text (A3.3). A table summarizing the coherence coding is given (A3.4), and is followed by the complete analysis of an editorial (A3.5).

A3.1 Relations of coherence

In the process of establishing the type of relation between two sentences S1 and S2, each of them is considered to contain three parts. Thus, S1 contains the elements x1, p1 and a1: x1 is taken as the commentary, the link, made on the pair of elements, p1 and a1. Similarly, in S2, x2 is taken as the commentary made on the pair of elements, p2 and a2.

For example, let us take the first two sentences of the third paragraph (sentences 8 and 9 from the beginning of the text) in the *New York Times*' editorial about the Swedish diplomat, Raoul Wallenberg, "The Truth about a Hero's Death" (29 November 2000) (for the complete analysis, see below A3.5):

> 3–8 : In recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out what really happened [to Wallenberg].
> 3–9 : In Budapest during World War II Wallenberg took great personal risks, issuing Swedish passports to at least 20,000 Jews who were being threatened by the Nazis with death marches and deportation to concentration camps.

In sentence 3.8, the element p1, "Wallenberg", is implied by the expression "what happened" [implied: during and after World War II] that represents a1. Knowledge of co-text and context allow for the implication of element p1 and a specification of element a1. In this sentence, "in recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out" (x1) is what links p1 and a1. In 3.9, "Wallenberg" stands for p2, and "during World War II" for a2.

> 3–8 p1= [Wallenberg] (a1 = what happened [during and after World War II])
> 3–9 p2= Wallenberg (a2 = during World War II)

Each relation of coherence, be it coordination, subordination or superordination, depends on the combination of the relations of inclusion that exist between p1 and p2, and between a1 and a2. In total, 21 such combinations that cover all possible cases can be defined. For example, when the elements p1 of S1 and p2 of S2 represent the same *signifié* (p1 = p2), definitions for the different types of relations between S1 and S2 are as follows. If the elements a1 and a2 represent the same *signifié* (a1 = a2), then the sentences S1 and S2 are said to be coordinated by elaboration. If the *signifié* of a1 and the *signifié* of a2 both belong to the same set ($a1 \subset \Sigma$ and $a2 \subset \Sigma$), then the sentences S1 and S2 are said to be coordinated by parallelism. If the *signifié* of a1 is included in the *signifié* of a2 ($a1 \subset a2$), then S1 is said to be subordinated to S2. If the *signifié* of a2 is included in the *signifié* of a1 ($a2 \subset a1$), then S1 is said to be superordinated to S2.

In the example given above, we find that on the one hand, p1 and p2 represent the same *signifié*, and on the other hand, the *signifié* of a2 is included in the *signifié* of a1; thus, 3–9 is subordinated to 3–8:

3–8 p1 = [Wallenberg] (a1 = what happened [during and after World War II])
3–9 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = during World War II)
And p1 = p2 and a2⊂a1
→ Relation: subordination

The three following tables (A3–1 to A3–3) give the definitions for all coherence relations (coordination, subordination, and superordination). The relations marked with an asterisk (*) are Hobbs' relations of expansion (1985, 1990).

Explanation of mathematical symbols
∃ : "there exists"
⊂ : "is included in"
Example: ∃ Σ / a ⊂ Σ and b ⊂ Σ
"There exists a set Σ such that 'a' is included in Σ and 'b' is included in Σ"
R : relation
Example: ∃ R / p R a
"There exists a relation R such that 'p' and 'a' are linked by R"
"non-p(a)" is equivalent to "non p (a)" or "p (non a)"

Table A3.1. Relations of coordination

Units of analysis	Relations	Relations
(1)	* *Elaboration*	* *Opposition*
S1	p(a)	p(a)
S2	p(a)	non-p(a)
(2)	* *Parallelism*	* *Contrast*
S1	p(a)	p(a)
S2	p(b)	non-p(b)
	and ∃ Σ / a ⊂ Σ and	and ∃ Σ / a ⊂ Σ and
	b ⊂ Σ	b ⊂ Σ
(3)	*Parallelism*	*Contrast*
S1	p(a)	p(a)
S2	p(B)	non-p(B)
	and p(A) implied	and p(A) implied
	and a ⊂ A	and a ⊂ A
	and ∃ Σ / A ⊂ Σ and	and ∃ Σ / A ⊂ Σ and
	B ⊂ Σ	B ⊂ Σ

(Continued)

Table A3.1. Relations of coordination (Continued)

Units of analysis	Relations	Relations
(4)	*Parallelism*	*Contrast*
S1	p(A)	p(A)
S2	p(b)	non-p(b)
	and p(B) implied	and p(B) implied
	and b ⊂ B	and b ⊂ B
	and ∃ Σ / A ⊂ Σ and	and ∃ Σ / A ⊂ Σ and
	B ⊂ Σ	B ⊂ Σ
(5)	*Parallelism*	W/O
S1	p(a)	
S2	p'(b)	
	and ∃ R / p R a and	
	p' R b	
	and ∃ Σ' / p ⊂ Σ' and	
	p' ⊂ Σ'	
	and ∃ Σ / a ⊂ Σ and	
	b ⊂ Σ	

Table A3.2. Relations of subordination

Units of analysis	Relations	Relations
(6)	* *Subordination*	*Contrast*
S1	p(A)	p(A)
S2	p(a)	non-p(a)
	and a ⊂ A	and a ⊂ A
(7)	*Subordination*	*Contrast*
S1	P(A)	P(A)
S2	p(a)	non-p(a)
	and a ⊂ A and p ⊂ P	and a ⊂ A and p ⊂ P
(8)	*Subordination*	*Contrast*
S1	p(A)	p(A)
S2	p'(a)	non-p'(a)
and a ⊂ A	and a ⊂ A	
	and ∃ Σ / p ⊂ Σ and	and ∃ Σ / p ⊂ Σ and
	p' ⊂ Σ	p' ⊂ Σ

Table A3.3. Relations of superordination

Units of analysis	Relations	Relations
(9)	* *Superordination*	*Contrast*
S1	p(a)	p(a)
S2	p(A)	non-p(A)
	and a ⊂ A	and a ⊂ A
(10)	*Superordination*	*Contrast*
S1	p(a)	p(a)
S2	P(A)	non-P(A)
	and a ⊂ A and p ⊂ P	and a ⊂ A and p ⊂ P
(11)	*Superordination*	*Contrast*
S1	p(a)	p(a)
S2	p'(A)	non-p'(A)
	and a ⊂ A	and a ⊂ A
	and ∃ Σ / p ⊂ Σ and p' ⊂ Σ	and ∃ Σ / p ⊂ Σ and p' ⊂ Σ

Thus, when we read a text and thereby construct its coherence, we are lead to compare the meaning of lexical items, and to determine how the ranges of these meanings relate to each other. Once the entire text has been analyzed in this manner, a graph representing the configuration of coherence relations between sentences within each paragraph is drawn.

A3.2 Definitions

On the basis of the configuration of coherence relations within a text, we can define units of analysis that are intermediary between the syntactic sentence and the entire text (A3.2.1) and, for each of them, determine their theme (A3.2.2) and macrostructure (A3.2.3).

A3.2.1 Macrostructural basis and text division

A macrostructural basis is a unit of analysis composed of syntactic sentences in the same standard textual paragraph.[2] It starts with the first sentence at the highest level of generality or abstraction and finishes with the last sentence at the same

2. A standard textual paragraph is the typographic paragraph.

level (including the sentences that are eventually subordinate to it), unless there is a relation of parallelism or contrast between them. In that case, it is considered that this rupture in the discursive structure constitutes a starting point for a new macrostructural basis. There will, however, be no rupture in the discursive structure if a relation of elaboration or opposition coordinates the second parallel or contrasted sentence (or a later one) with a former sentence at the same level; in other words, if the relation of parallelism or contrast is dominated by a relation of elaboration or opposition.

A text division is a unit of analysis composed of the macrostructural sentences of all macrostructural bases contained in a text section.[3] The limits of a text division are defined the same way as those of the macrostructural basis.

The coherence graph for the third paragraph of the *New York Times'* editorial, "The Truth about a Hero's Death" (29 November 2000) will provide an example (for the complete analysis, see below A3.5). It is as follows:



In this paragraph, sentences 8, 11 and 12 are coordinated by elaboration (symbol: →). Sentence 9 is subordinated to sentence 8 (symbol: ↓) and, coordinated by parallelism to sentence 10 (symbol: ⇑). Sentence 11 is superordinated to sentence 10 (symbol: ↑), and coordinated by elaboration to sentence 12. Paragraph 3 constitutes a macrostructural basis as no relation of parallelism interrupts the chain of sentences at the highest level (3.8, 3.11, 3.12).

A3.2.2 Theme

Principle: The theme indicates the "aboutness". It is the first unit at the highest hierarchical level in the coherence graph.

In the macrostructural basis contained in paragraph 3 of the *New York Times'* editorial, "The Truth about a Hero's Death" (29 November 2000), the theme (underlined) is sentence 3.8.

First exception: In the course of an argumentation, an author might make use of a general principle to link two specific elements. In the discursive structure, this general element will appear as superordinate to the two specific elements that are linked by elaboration (or opposition). In this case, the superordinate sentence is not considered in

3. A text section is a set of standard textual paragraphs grouped under the same title. There can be different levels of text sections depending on the length and the complexity of the text.

determining the thematic sentence. However, if a sentence is superordinate to the preceding and following sentences and if these preceding and following sentences are not linked by elaboration or opposition, then the basic principle applies, and the superordinate sentence must be accounted for in the determination of the thematic sentence.

Second exception: An author might also choose to conclude the argument that he has been developing in a macrostructural basis at a more general level in order to situate the specific macrotheme discussed within a broader framework. Thus, although this last sentence will be superordinate to all other sentences, it cannot be considered to be the thematic sentence. Inversely, an author might choose to begin his argument in a macrostructural basis with a specific example of the more general theme that he wants to discuss. In this case, the thematic sentence will be superordinate to the first sentence that states the example.

Third exception: Just as the author may conclude his argument at a more general level, he/she may decide to introduce it by a remark that is more general than the specific macrotheme treated in the macrostructural basis. This general introductory remark would then precede, and be superordinate to, the thematic sentence. In this case, a set of sentences linked by coordination, subordination and superordination is subordinate to the first sentence of the macrostructural basis, and a sentence n (that would be expected to be, but is not necessarily, the last) is coordinated by elaboration or opposition (directly or indirectly) to the second sentence.

A3.2.3 Macrostructure

Principle: The macrostructure is the sentence that contains the gist of the information given in the next-level unit it is part of. It is the last unit at the highest hierarchical level in the coherence graph of the next-level unit.

In the macrostructural basis contained in paragraph 3 of the *New York Times*' editorial, "The Truth about a Hero's Death" (29 November 2000), the macrostructure (in bold characters) is sentence 3.12.

Exception: In parallel to the first exception to the principle of determination of the theme, when an element is superordinated to its previous and next elements, and when these previous and next elements are coordinated by elaboration (or opposition), the superordinate element is not considered in the search for the macrostructural sentence.

A3.3 Hierarchical structure of a text

Table A3–4 summarizes the successive steps of the coherence analysis. A text is considered as an entity composed of a hierarchy of units (in a descending

order: text divisions, macrostructural bases, syntactical sentences, words). At each level, these units are linked with each other by specific relations. Although syntactical relations linking words within a sentence certainly participate in the text coherence, they are not taken into account in this analysis as we are more concerned with a higher level type of coherence. The analysis starts at the sentence level. First, the relations of coordination, subordination and superordination linking sentences within a same paragraph are defined. Once this is done, the limits of macrostructural bases are determined as well as their themes and macrostructures. These themes and macrostructures, taken together, must represent a faithful summary of the entire text. Then, if the text contains different sections delimited by their own title, the analysis continues between the macrostructural sentences of all macrostructural bases that are contained in each text section. This allows for the determination of text divisions, division themes and division macrostructures. These division themes and macrostructures must represent a faithful summary of the entire text. The analysis ends with the division macrostructures at the highest level (the number of these levels depends on the hierarchy of titles within the text), and results in the determination of the text theme(s) and text macrostructure(s) that must compose a faithful abstract of the entire text.

By bringing to the fore the hierarchical structure of the text with the determination of the themes (i.e. aboutness – starting point of the argumentation) and macrostructures (i.e. gist of the unit – ending point of the argumentation, most likely to remain in long-term memory) at successive levels, this logico-semantic analysis of coherence provides systematic (as opposed to intuitive) tools to describe the progression of a textual argumentation.

Since editorials are composed of a few paragraphs grouped under the same title, their analysis is composed of only two steps: between sentences within paragraphs, and between macrostructures of the macrostructural bases.

Table A3.4. Text hierarchical structure

	Units and relations	**Determination of:**	**Automatic generation of :**
Units	Words		
Linked by	*Syntactical relations*		
Units	Sentences	(Theme) / (Rheme)	
Linked by	*Coordination, Subordination, Superordination*		

(*Continued*)

Table A3.4. (Continued)

Units	Macrostructural bases	Theme Macrostructure	Summary 1
Linked by	*Coordination, Subordination, Superordination*		
Units	Text divisions	Div. Theme Div. Macrostructure	Summary 2
Linked by	*Coordination, Subordination, Superordination*		
Unit	Entire text	Text Theme Text Macrostructure	Abstract

A3.4 Coding

Once the coherence analysis has been completed, the sentences are coded to indicate the text hierarchical structure (Table A3–5). Depending on the text length and complexity (number of title levels), the number of levels of analysis varies. In editorials, paragraphs are grouped under one title. Thus, the analysis takes place first at the paragraph level between sentences, and then at the macrostructural basis level between macrostructures. In this case, there are no text divisions.

Table A3.5. Coding of the text hierarchical structure

Codes	Descriptions
First level of analysis: between sentences within a same paragraph	
Th	Sentence that is the theme of the macrostructural basis (unit of analysis comprised within a paragraph).
Mcr	Sentence that is the macrostructure of the macrostructural basis (unit of analysis comprised within a paragraph).

(Continued)

Table A3.5. Coding of the text hierarchical structure (Continued)

Codes	Descriptions
ThMcr	Sentence that is the theme and macrostructure of the macrostructural basis (unit of analysis comprised within a paragraph).
Next level(s) of analysis: between macrostructures (Mcr)	
DTh	Macrostructure that is also the thematic sentence of the text division.
DMcr	Macrostructure that is also the macrostructural sentence of the text division.
DThMcr	Macrostructure that is also the thematic and macrostructural sentence of the text division.
Last level of analysis: between division macrostructures (DMcr)	
TTh	Macrostructure that is also the thematic sentence of the entire text.
TMcr	Macrostructure that is also the macrostructural sentence of the entire text.
TThMcr	Macrostructure that is also the thematic and macrostructural sentence of the entire text

A3.5 Example

The above examples were taken from the analysis of the following editorial, "The Truth About a Hero's Death", that was published in *The New York Times* on 29 November 2000. Its complete text, analysis at the all-sentence level followed by the automatically generated text summary, and analysis at the macrostructural level followed by the automatically generated text abstract follow.

1–1 : Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from the Nazis, vanished mysteriously in January 1945 on his way to the Soviet Army's headquarters outside Budapest.
1–2 : Now, after decades of official Soviet denials and lies about Wallenberg's death, a Russian official investigating the case has acknowledged that the heroic Swede was probably shot in 1947 while being held by the K.G.B.
1–3 : Aleksander Yakovlev, chairman of the Kremlin commission investigating the case, reported this week that " We do not doubt that he was shot in the Lubyanka prison."
1–4 : This important pronouncement should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin's repression.

2–5 : Since Stalin's death in 1953, Russians have been trying to reckon with the horrors of his era.
2–6 : In Raoul Wallenberg's case, Moscow spent a decade denying that he had ever made it to the Soviet territory.
2–7 : Then it concocted a story that defied belief, saying that Wallenberg, at age 34, had died of a heart attack in Lubyanka, the dreaded K.G.B. prison in downtown Moscow.
3–8 : In recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out what really happened.
3–9 : In Budapest during World War II Wallenberg took great personal risks, issuing Swedish passports to at least 20,000 Jews who were being threatened by the Nazis with death marches and deportation to concentration camps.
3–10 : Once captured by the Soviets, Wallenberg was accused of being a spy for the United States and of being a Nazi agent.
3–11 : The details of his case have been secret for too long.
3–12 : It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg's last years.

Analysis at the all-sentence level

In the coherence graphs, the themes are underlined and the macrostructures are indicated in **bold** characters.

Paragraph 1

1.1 p1 = Wallenberg (a1 = vanished)
1.2 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = the case [of Wallenberg's disappearance])
And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2
→ Relation 1: coordination (elaboration)
1.2 p1 = the case (a1 = shot)
1.3 p2 = the case (a2 = shot)
And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2
→ Relation 1: coordination (elaboration)
1.3 p1 = the case [Wallenberg's] (a1 = reported)
1.4 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = this pronouncement)
And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2
→ Relation 1: coordination (elaboration)
§1 1.1 → 1.2 → 1.3 → **1.4**

Paragraph 2

2.5 p1 = Russians (a1 = horrors of his era)
2.6 p2 = Moscow (a2 = Wallenberg's case)
And p1 = p2 and a2⊂a1
→ Relation 6: subordination

2.6 p1 = Wallenberg (a1 = Moscow)
2.7 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = it [= Moscow])
And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2
→ Relation 1: coordination (elaboration)



Paragraph 3

3.8 p1 = [Wallenberg] (a1 = what happened [during and after World War II])
3.9 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = during World War II)
And p1 = p2 and a2⊂a1
→ Relation 6: subordination

3.9 p1 = Wallenberg (a1 = during World War II)
3.10 p2 = Wallenberg (a2 = captured by the Soviets)
And p1 = p2 and a1⊂Σ and a2⊂Σ, Σ = "details of the case"
→ Relation 3: coordination (parallelism)

3.10 p1 = Wallenberg (a1 = captured by the Soviets, accused)
3.11 p2 = his [= Wallenberg's] (a2 = the details of the case)
And p1 = p2 and a1⊂a2 [the capture and accusation are some of the details of the case]
→ Relation 9: superordination

3.8 p1 = Wallenberg] (a1 = what happened [to Wallenberg])
3.11 p2 = his [= Wallenberg's] (a2 = case)
And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2
→ Relation 1: coordination (elaboration)

3.11 p1 = case (a1 = his [= Wallenberg's])
3.12 p2 = record (a2 = Wallenberg)
And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2
→ Relation 1: coordination (elaboration)



Summary generated from the analysis at the all-sentence level

1–1 : Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from the Nazis, vanished mysteriously in January 1945 on his way to the Soviet Army's headquarters outside Budapest.

1–4 : This important pronouncement [that Wallenberg was shot in the Lubyanka prison] should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin's repression.
2–5 : Since Stalin's death in 1953, Russian have been trying to reckon with the horrors of his era.
3–8 : In recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out what really happened.
3–12 : It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg's last years.

Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from the Nazis, vanished mysteriously in January 1945 on his way to the Soviet Army's headquarters outside Budapest. ~~This~~ [The] important pronouncement [that Wallenberg was shot in the Lubyanka prison] should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin's repression.

Since Stalin's death in 1953, Russians have been trying to reckon with the horrors of his era.

In recent months the Russians, in conjunction with Sweden, have been trying in earnest to find out what really happened. It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg's last years.

Analysis at the macrostructural level

1.4 p1 = Stalin (a1 = Wallenberg [his case])
2.5 p2 = Stalin (a2 = horrors of his era)
And p1 = p2 and a1⊂a2
→ Relation 9: superordination

2.5 p1 = Russians (a1 = horrors of his era)
3.12 p2 = Putin (a2 = Wallenberg [his case])
And p1 = p2 and a2⊂a1
→ Relation 6: subordination

1.4 p1 = Putin (a1 = Wallenberg)
3.12 p2 = Putin (a2 = Wallenberg)
And p1 = p2 and a1 = a2
→ Relation 1: coordination (elaboration)



Abstract generated from the analysis at the macrostructural level

1–4 : This important pronouncement [that Wallenberg was shot in the Lubyanka prison] should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin's repression.

3–12 : It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg's last years.

~~This~~ [The] important pronouncement [that Wallenberg was shot in the Lubyanka prison] should prompt President Vladimir Putin to issue a decree at long last acknowledging that Wallenberg was a victim of Stalin's repression. It is time for Mr. Putin to set the record straight about Raoul Wallenberg's last years.

APPENDIX 4

Style analysis

While the analysis of editorials' structure tells us what editorials do (i.e. through their speech acts), the analysis of their style with tools in interpersonal discourse semantics tells us how. By acting through their editorials, editorialists represent their newspaper and distinguish themselves from others in assuming different professional roles (Le 2007). These roles are investigated with the analysis of personal markers representing the newspaper (A4.1). In their writing, editorialists take position in the name of the newspaper with the goal of convincing their audience. In presenting their argumentation, editorialists rely and act according to explicit or implicit criteria and, in doing so, they may resort to emotions and/or reason. This is analyzed with the ATTITUDE component of the APPRAISAL system (A4.2).

A4.1 Personal markers representing *Le Monde*

With its evaluative lexis and directives, *Le Monde* manifests its presence in its editorials and acts beyond its role as a news provider. With its metadiscursive markers (i.e. *"Le Monde"*, *"nous"*, *"notre"*, *"nos"*, *"on"*, questions and imperative), *Le Monde* also manifests its presence but in more varied roles. Among these markers, one is indefinite (i.e. "on") and can include *Le Monde* or not. Thus, it is first necessary to determine when *"on"* does not include *Le Monde*. Then, the various roles of *Le Monde* can be differentiated: news provider (LMnews), full social actor in its own name (LMactor), or "representative" of society (LMrep).

A4.1.1 "*On*" excluding *Le Monde*

When *"on"* is defined by the opposition *Le Monde* takes to it, or by a location where *Le Monde* cannot be, it excludes *Le Monde*. For example, in (1) 007-5-17, *"on"* represents the government (at least partly – see 007-5-16) to which *Le Monde* tells not to present (Corsican) nationalists as devils. In (2) 178-1-1, *"on"* is a member of the Italian political world.

(1) 007-5-16 : *La première responsabilité du gouvernement est de faire le maximum pour ramener la paix civile et favoriser un nouveau départ de l'île.* (The government's first responsibility is to do the maximum for the return of the rule of law and to facilitate the island's new beginning.)

007-5-17 : *Ce n'est pas en diabolisant les nationalistes qu'on résorbera l'abcès. (One cannot relieve the tension by demonizing nationalists)*

(2) 178-1-1 : *D'un bout à l'autre du spectre politique italien, on sait pardonner, oublier*. (From one side of the Italian political spectrum to the other, one knows how to forgive, how to forget.)

In all other cases of *"on"*'s use, it includes *Le Monde* and other, non-identified, speakers.

A4.1.2 *Le Monde* as a news provider (LMnews)

In gathering and publishing news, Le Monde is a witness and a place where exchanges take place (3, 4).

(3) 052-1-2 : *Le chef du gouvernement israélien, qui s'exprime longuement aujourd'hui dans nos colonnes, est précédé d'une réputation flatteuse*. [The Head of the Israeli government, who is expressing his opinions extensively in our columns today, is preceded by a flattering reputation.] [LMnews]

(4) 189-2-9 : *Trois semaines après l'accablant témoignage publié par le docteur Véronique Vasseur, médecin-chef à la maison d'arrêt de la Santé, à Paris,* Le Monde *a poursuivi l'enquête*. [Three weeks after the overwhelming evidence published by Dr. Véronique Vasseur, chief physician at the Santé prison in Paris, *Le Monde* took the investigation further.] [LMnews]

A4.1.3 *Le Monde* as a social actor in its own name (LMactor)

Le Monde does more than gather and publish news; as a thinking entity, it takes part in public debates. *Le Monde* appears as a social actor in six different cases (a, b, c, d, e, f).

a. *"Le Monde"* is a thinking entity that does more than just gathering and publishing news (5, 6).

(5) 419-6-20 : Le Monde *n'a pas épargné François Mitterrand naguère.* [*Le Monde* did not spare François Mitterrand in the past.] [LMactor]

(6) 641-4-23 : Le Monde *approuve la mise en garde de The Economist.* [*Le Monde* agrees with *The Economist*'s warning.] [LMactor]

b. *"nous"*, *"notre"*, *"nos"*: when it represents *"Le Monde"* or *"Le Monde* and others" (the "others" being left non-identified), and *Le Monde* is doing more than just gathering and publishing information (7).

(7) 419-6-23 *S'agissant d'une affaire qui met en jeu le fonctionnement même de la démocratie en France, il est de notre devoir de les assumer*. [Since this affair directly concerns the functioning of democracy itself in France, it is our duty to take responsibility for it.] [LMactor]

c. «*on*» : it could be replaced by «*nous*», and "*nous*" means "*Le Monde*" or "*Le Monde* and others", and more is done than just gathering and publishing information (8, 9).

(8) 348-3-9 : *On ne peut que se féliciter de ce progrès*. [One/We can only rejoice in this progress.] [LMactor]

(9) 189-4-19 : *On sait que la population carcérale est par définition une collectivité à risques*. [One knows/we know/that the prison population as a whole is by definition risky.] [LMactor]

d. «*on*» : it could be replaced by an imperative in the 2nd person plural (10).

In 171-2-10, *Le Monde* speaks to European leaders (as indicated in 171-3-11) and tells them not to keep on saying that the EU enlargement will lead to its reinforcement.

(10) 171-2-10 : *Mais on ne peut pas continuer à dire que l'élargissement, par la grâce d'on ne sait quelle miraculeuse dynamique, ira de pair avec l'approfondissement de l'Europe*. [However, one cannot continue to say that the enlargement will go hand in hand with reinforcement of the EU thanks to some miraculous force.] [LMactor]
171-3-11 : *Ce discours-là, que tiennent volontiers les dirigeants européens, est une contre-vérité*. [This type of discourse that European leaders like holding is a counter-truth.]

e. Use of the imperative: by its use of the imperative, *Le Monde* takes part directly and actively in the debate (11).

(11) 356-1-4 *N'en doutons pas, le modèle risque de faire école*. [Let's not doubt it/ There is no doubt that this pattern will be followed.] [LMactor]

f. Questions: the following reasoning is based on the premise that a question and its answer are given by different parties; when a question and its answer are given by the same agent (i.e. here, the editorialist), this same agent is considered to play the role of different parties, and it is those parties that are here of importance. Four different cases need to be distinguished (f1, f2, f3, f4).

f1. When the question is not followed by an explicit answer, it is assumed that the question is asked by *Le Monde* unless the co-text indicates that it comes from another party. For example, in (12), 569-4-22 and 569-4-24 suggest the

lack of answers to the questions in 569-4-21 and 569-4-23, and thus *Le Monde* is considered the author of the questions.

(12) 569-4-21 : *Cette gesticulation est-elle destinée à pousser Saddam Hussein à la faute afin d'engager une action militaire d'envergure destinée à renverser le régime, le fils «finissant» le travail du père?* [Is this gesticulation supposed to make Saddam Hussein at fault so that a large military campaign can be started to topple the regime, and thus the son would "finish" the father's work?] [LMactor]
569-4-22 : *Celui ci n'avait pas voulu, il y a dix ans, pousser ses armées jusqu'à Bagdad et transformer une victoire militaire en succès politique.* [The latter did not try, ten years ago, to send his troops further on to Baghdad and thereby transform his military victory into a political success.]
569-4-23 : *Ou au contraire, George W. Bush junior [sic] sera-t-il celui qui inversera la diplomatie américaine?* [Or, on the contrary, will George Bush Jr be the one to reverse American diplomacy?] [LMactor]
569-4-24 : *Son équipe est partagée entre les activistes du Pentagone et les diplomates opposés aux interventions militaires.* [His team is composed partly of Pentagon activists and partly of diplomats who are opposed to military intervention.]

f2. When questions implicitly contain their answer (13), they fulfill a rhetorical function in reinforcing a statement expressed by *Le Monde* (Riegel, Pellat & Rioux, 1994: 400–401).

(13) 099-1-3 : *Hormis la voix du dalaï-lama, quelle autre réclame, avec autant de constance, la liberté religieuse pour les croyants de Chine et du monde entier ?* [Except for the Dalai Lama, whose voice can be heard so fervently demanding religious freedom for believers in China and the entire world ?] [LMactor]

f3. The question is not asked by *Le Monde* when *Le Monde* explicitly answers it, as in (14) 72-6-23/24 .

(14) 072-1-1 : *Faut-il interdire la vente des cigarettes et autres produits du tabac aux mineurs de moins de seize ans ?* [Is it necessary to forbid the sale of tobacco and tobacco-related products to minors under the age of 16 ?] [question asked by a party other than *Le Monde*]
072-6-23 : *Le débat est ouvert.* [The debate is open.] [answer given by *Le Monde*]
072-6-24 : *Avant de le trancher, il sera utile d'évaluer les effets qu'ont produits de telles mesures dans les nombreux pays où elles commencent à entrer en vigueur.* [Before closing it, it will be necessary to evaluate the results of such measures in the numerous countries where they are now being implemented.] [answer given by *Le Monde*]

f4. The question is asked by *Le Monde* when the answer is given by another party. For example, in (15) 610-1-4, "*on*" represents the Americans in the answer to the question in 610-1-3, and in 610-1-5, "*on*" represents George Bush in the in the answer to the question in 610-1-5.

(15) 610-1-3 : *L'accord américano-russe sur la limitation des systèmes antimissiles (ABM) ne plaît plus?* [The Russo-American agreement on the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles is no longer acceptable?] [LMactor]
610-1-4 : *On l'abandonnera, que cela plaise ou non à Moscou*. [Let us give it up, whatever Moscow thinks about it.]
610-1-5 : *L'accord sur la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique pourrait nuire à l'industrie américaine?* [The agreement on global warming could be detrimental to the American industrial sector?] [LMactor]
610-1-6 : *On le jette au panier, a confirmé, jeudi 29 mars, le président George Bush à la face du chancelier allemand, Gerhard Schröder, venu à Washington plaider en faveur dudit accord*. [Let us throw it out, said President George Bush to German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, on Thursday March 29 while Schröder was in Washington to defend this agreement.]

A4.1.4 *Le Monde* as a representative of society (LMrep)

By its use of *"nous"*, *"notre"* or *"nos"*, *Le Monde* means French Society (16) or a larger group, such as Western society for example (17).

(16) 700-3-15 : *Or cette vérité nous vient aujourd'hui du Maroc même, où règne depuis deux ans le fils aîné de Hassan II, Mohamed VI*. [However, this truth comes to us today from Morocco itself, where Mohamed VI, Hassan II's oldest son, has been reigning for two years.] [LMrep]

(17) 416-3-17 : *Dans nos sociétés, la possession et l'usage d'une voiture ne sont plus un signe extérieur de richesse, un élément de «distinction», voire l'attribut d'une éternelle jeunesse.* [In our societies, owning and using a car no longer represent exterior signs of wealth; neither are they elements of "distinction" nor even of eternal youth.] [LMrep]

A4.2 ATTITUDE analysis (APPRAISAL system)

Although essential, the determination of speech acts does not suffice to characterize a text type. Editorialists take positions in *Le Monde's* name, and the relationship of *Le Monde* with its socio-political environment needs to be investigated further. The application of the APPRAISAL system (Martin 1999; Martin & Rose 2003; Martin & White 2005), in particular its component on ATTITUDES, reveals how laudatory/critical an editorial is, and in what measure it resorts to reason and emotions to appeal to its audience. In this system, evaluative lexis is considered in regard to three aspects: AFFECT for resources construing (positive or negative) emotional responses (18); JUDGMENT for resources evaluating (positively or negatively) behaviors according to a personal or moral code (19); and APPRECIATION for resources evaluating (positively or negatively) products of behaviors according to a code of "aesthetics" (in consideration of their impact, quality, balance,

complexity) or social significance (20). Thus, while JUDGMENT (of people) and APPRECIATION (of things) do give rise to emotions, they differ from AFFECT by their reliance on codes, i.e. sets of values that are socially and culturally defined. Furthermore, AFFECT and JUDGMENT both pertain to people, but JUDGMENT looks at people from an external point of view, i.e. it evaluates people's character/behaviour according to an external set of values, while AFFECT considers people from an internal point of view, i.e. how these people feel. A sentence can carry multiple APPRAISAL values (21). Positive or negative APPRAISAL values may be expressed implicitly, thus in the analysis, careful consideration of the cotext is particularly important. Sometimes, no APPRAISAL value could be given; in these cases, the macrostructure was coded neutral in terms of ATTITUDE (ATTneu).

(18) AFFECT

159-3-8 : *Ce qui choque et indigne dans le traitement infligé à Jamel Debbouze, c'est ce qu'il révèle, en creux, des pratiques policières là où elles s'exercent plus discrètement, dans des quartiers où les témoins gardent le silence parce qu'ils ne trouvent personne pour les entendre ou parce que leur intérêt leur commande de se taire, où les victimes restent anonymes parce qu'elles ne disposent pas de la notoriété qui permet d'attirer l'attention des médias.* [What is shocking and offensive in the treatment inflicted on Jamel Debbouze is…] – AFFneg

128-1-4 : *On ne peut que s'en réjouir.* [One can only rejoice about this.] – AFFpos

(19) JUDGMENT

099-4-15 : *Au nom de la religion, de l'Indonésie au Pakistan par exemple, des fanatiques exploitent toutes les frustrations.* [In the name of religion, from Indonesia to Pakistan for example, fanatics take advantage of all frustrations.] – JUDneg
052-4-17 : *Mais le premier ministre a aussi su trouver les mots qui touchent et qui apaisent.* [But the Premier also knew how to find touching and conciliating words.] – JUDpos

(20) APPRECIATION

081-1-1 : *L'affaire Papon est en passe de s'achever comme elle a commencé : par un éclatant déni de justice.* [The Papon case is ending in the way it started: with an obvious denial of justice.] – APPneg
069-5-22 : *C'est une raison supplémentaire pour en saluer le progrès.* [It is another reason for rejoicing over its progress.] – APPpos

(21) Multiple coding
128-4-17 : *La brutalité des Britanniques n'aura finalement pas été inutile, contribuant à renforcer le lien franco-allemand.* [In the end, the brutality of the British was not useless as it helped to strengthen the Franco-German relationship.] – JUDneg/APPpos

Directives, by nature, imply that something/somebody is not good enough. However, they can mean that something not too bad can be made better and, in this case, the relevant APPRAISAL value is positive (22), or they can indicate that something bad must be made good, in which case the relevant APPRAISAL value is negative (23).

(22) 179-5-18 : *Il faut souhaiter qu'il ne s'arrête pas là.* [One must hope that it will not stop there.] – Directive/APPpos

(23) 053-5-24 : *Il n'y a pas de bons arguments pour s'y opposer.* [There is no good argument against it.] – Directive/APPneg

As editorials are argumentative pieces in which editorialists reason their positions, it could be expected that the categories of JUDGMENT and AFFECT would be largely predominant. However, it is not excluded that editorialists appeal to emotions not stemming from the adherence to a social/cultural code. The three types of resources call on the readers' solidarity with the writer to follow and ultimately accept the argumentation's validity in their reliance on basic human responses (emotions) and socially constructed ways of reasoning (codes); by the same token, AFFECT, JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION reveal how writers construct their identity in the debate. In the particular application of the framework adopted in this study, all macrostructures (at any level) are coded in terms of ATTITUDE in the APPRAISAL system.

APPENDIX 5

Methodology tables

These methodology tables complete Table 1.1, "A discursive communication identity framework".

Table A5.1. Genre analysis – step 1: media-centric approach

	Analysis	*Corpus*	*Methodology*
Structure	coherence analysis	complete	quantitative
	complex speech act	complete	quantitative
	addressees of directives	complete	quantitative
Style	Personal markers	complete	quantitative
	- *Le Monde*'s representation		
	- *Le Monde* as orchestra conductor		
	ATTITUDE component of the APPRAISAL system	complete	quantitative
Content	ATTITUDE component of the APPRAISAL system	complete	quantitative
	Macrostructures	restricted	qualitative
'Purpose'	*Le Monde*'s definition of editorials	NA	NA

Table A5.2. Media-centric to society-centric approach: Orchestra model

Object of inquiry	*Questions*	*Linguistic Analysis*	*Corpus*	*Methodology*
Conductor (i.e. *Le Monde*)	Self-representation	Personal markers	complete	quantitative
Music (i.e. editorials)	To whom	Addressees of directives	complete	quantitative
	What for	Complex speech act	complete	quantitative
	General position	ATTITUDE (APPRAISAL system)	complete	quantitative
	Specific positions	Macrostructures	restricted	qualitative
Musicians (i.e. actors appearing in the editorials)	Who they are	Personal markers	restricted	qualitative
	Importance of their roles	hierarchical structure (i.e. coherence)	restricted	qualitative

Table A5.3. Society-centric to media-centric approach: Cascading Activation model

Object of inquiry	*Questions*	*Corpus*	*Methodology*
Media	Specific positions	restricted	qualitative
	Relations vis-à-vis other actors	restricted	qualitative
Executive	Specific positions	restricted	qualitative
	Relations vis-à-vis other actors	restricted	qualitative
Other elites	Who they are	restricted	qualitative
	Specific positions	restricted	qualitative
	Relations vis-à-vis other actors	restricted	qualitative
Public	Specific positions	restricted	quantitative (polls)

Table A5.4. Linguistic approach to identity

Type of identity	*Linguistic Analysis*	*Corpus*	*Methodology*
Individual	Personal markers	complete	quantitative
	Complex speech acts	complete	quantitative
	Macrostructures	restricted	qualitative
Collective	Macrostructures	restricted	qualitative

APPENDIX 6

French political landscape and institutions (1999–2001)*

The French political landscape and institutions are presented below as they stood in 1999–2001, the period under study. This appendix purports only to give the minimum background information that is necessary to understand events described in the analyses.

The Constitution of 4 October 1958 established the Fifth French Republic.

A6.1 President of the Republic

After the constitutional revision approved by the 1962 referendum and until 2000, the President of the Republic was elected for a seven-year renewable term by direct universal suffrage. The referendum of 24 September 2000 established a five-year renewable term. Jacques Chirac (RPR) hold two presidential mandates: in 1997–2002 and in 2002–2007.

The polling method used in presidential elections is the "*scrutin uninominal majoritaire à deux tours*" [two-round single name first-past-the-post poll]. A candidate is elected in the first round if s/he obtains an absolute majority of the votes cast. If no candidate obtains the absolute majority in the first round, a second round takes place two weeks later between the two highest-scoring candidates in the first round. The candidate who obtains the majority of votes cast is elected (Article 7 of the Constitution).

The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister and, on the latter's recommendation, appoints the other members of the Government (Article 8 of the Constitution). S/He presides over the Council of Ministers, promulgates Acts of Parliament and is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. S/He may dissolve the National Assembly and, in an emergency, exercises special powers (Article 16).

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*Based in great part on *"France Diplomatie"*. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/ – accessed 8 October 2008.

In 1997, Jacques Chirac (RPR) dissolved the National Assembly. The National Assembly that had a right-wing majority returned with a left-wing majority. Jacques Chirac thus appointed Lionel Jospin (PS) as Prime Minister.

A6.2 Prime minister and government

Under the direction of the Prime Minister, the government defines and carries out national policy. It is answerable to Parliament (Article 20). The Prime Minister steers the Government and ensures the implementation of legislation (Article 21).

Lionel Jospin (PS) served as Prime Minister from 1997 to 2002.

A6.3 Parliament

The Parliament contains a higher chamber, i.e. the Senate, and a lower chamber, i.e. the National Assembly. They supervise the Government and pass legislation. In the event of disagreement on a bill of law, the National Assembly makes the final decision.

Until 2003, the Senate was elected by indirect universal suffrage for a nine-year term (reduced to six years in 2003). The Senate is renewable by one-third every three years.

The National Assembly's members (deputies) are elected by direct universal suffrage for a five-year term. The polling method is the "*scrutin majoritaire à deux tours*" [two-round, first-past-the-post poll]. A candidate is elected in the first round if s/he obtains an absolute majority of the votes cast and a number of votes equal to one quarter of the registered voters. If no candidate obtains the absolute majority in the first round, a second round takes place two weeks later. To stand in the second round, a candidate must have obtained a number of votes equal to at least 12.5% of the registered voters. In this second round, the highest-scoring candidate is elected (i.e. "first past the post"); in the case of a tie, the oldest candidate is elected.

In 1997–2002, the National Assembly had 549 deputies who were organized in the following groups:[1]

Majority (left-wing)

- *Socialiste* (PS) : 239 members, 9 affiliated
- *Communiste* (PC) : 33 members, 2 affiliated
- *Radical, Citoyen et Vert* (RCV) : 31 members, 0 affiliated

1. Source : *Assemblée Nationale*. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/tribun/comm6.asp. Accessed 1 September 2008.

Opposition (right-wing)

- *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) : 122 members, 6 affiliated
- *Union pour la démocratie française* (UDF) – *Alliance* : 58 members, 4 affiliated
- *Démocratie libérale et Indépendants* (DL& I): 38 members, 2 affiliated

Deputies not belonging to any group: 5 deputies

From September 1998 to September 2001, the Senate had 319 senators who were organized in the following groups:[2]

- *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) : 85 members, 5 affiliated, 8 attached
- *Socialiste* (PS) : 73 members, 3 affiliated
- *Union Centriste* (UC) : 48 members, 3 attached
- *Républicains et Indépendants* (RI) : 42 members, 1 affiliated, 2 attached
- *Rassemblement Démocratique et Social Européen* (RDSE) : 22 members, 1 affiliated
- *Communiste, Républicain et Citoyen* (CRC) : 17 members, 1 affiliated

Senators not belonging to any group (NI): 8 senators

A6.4 Main political parties

The distinction between a political right and a political left (Gauchet, 1996) is said to stem from the French Revolution when deputies of the Third Estate were invited to sit on the right side of the Assembly if they were in favor of a specific proposal, and on the left side if they were against. However, the division came to acquire a political meaning in 1819–20 during the Restoration, and situate the position of opposite ultramonarchists and intransigent liberals and of all of those in between these two extremes. Under the Third Republic around 1900, the right represented those against Dreyfus,[3] and the left those who defended him. Right and left did not oppose bourgeoisie and proletariat; they represented "the central rift between love of established tradition and hope invested in what is new" (Gauchet, 1996: 287). Another characterization is provided by Louis Dumont; he "proposes

2. Source : *Sénat*. http://www.senat.fr/evenement/senatoriales_2001/avrenouv.html. Accessed 26 November 2008.

3. Dreyfus was a Jewish officer in the French army who had been wrongly condemned to a life sentence in 1894 on a treason accusation. He was rehabilitated in 1906 after a campaign led by the writer Emile Zola and other intellectuals.

looking at the left as the party of the individualist ideology that grew out of the French Revolution. The right, on the other hand, is supposed to be the party of the holistic imperative, which necessarily survives. Thus the ideological domination of the left is presumably balanced by the real powers that the right continues to wield within society" (Gauchet, 1996: 293–294).

Left

- PS (*Parti socialiste*); First secretary: François Hollande
- PCF (*Parti communiste français*); General secretary: Robert Hué
- Green Party (*Les Verts*); National secretary : Jean-Luc Bennahmias
- PRG (*Parti radical de gauche*); founded in 1998; President: Jean-Michel Baylet
- MDC (*Mouvement des citoyens*; President : Jean-Pierre Chevènement

Right

- RPR (*Rassemblement pour la République*); neo-gaullist; founded in 1976 by Jacques Chirac while Giscard d'Estaing was President of the Republic; President: Michèle Alliot-Marie (1999–2002).
- UDF (*Union pour la démocratie française*); founded in 1978 in support to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing; President: François Bayrou
- DL (*Démocratie libérale, Républicains indépendants et Républicains*); founded in 1998; President : Alain Madelin
- RPF (*Rassemblement pour la France*); founded in 1999; President: Charles Pasqua
- PR (*Parti Radical*); President : François Loos
- FN (*Front national*); ultra-right; President: Jean-Marie Le Pen

A6.5 Judicial system

Judicial courts have jurisdiction in disputes between persons. The highest judicial court is the *Cour de Cassation* [Supreme Court of Appeal], which rules on appeals against court-of-appeal judgments.

Administrative courts have jurisdiction in all cases involving disputes between citizens and public authorities. The *Conseil d'État* is the supreme administrative court and court of final appeal on the legality of administrative acts. The Government also consults the *Conseil d'État* for its opinion on bills and certain draft decrees.

The *Haute cour de justice* [High Court of Justice], composed of 24 elected members from the National Assembly and the Senate, is competent to judge the President of the Republic in cases of high treason (Article 68 of the Constitution[4]).

4. This article was amended later in 2007.

The *Conseil supérieur de la magistrature* [High Council of the Judiciary] is established by Article 65 of the Constitution.[5]

> Art. 65 – (Constitutional Law No. 93–952 dated July 27, 1993 amending the Constitution). The President of the Republic shall preside over the *Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature*. The Minister of Justice shall be the Vice President as of right and may be deputized to replace the President of the Republic.
>
> The *Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature* is organized in two "formations", one having jurisdiction over sitting judges and the other over public prosecutors.
>
> The formation sitting to deal with sitting judges comprises the President of the Republic, the Minister of Justice, five sitting judges and one public prosecutor, a *Conseiller* appointed by the Council of State and three prominent figures who are not members of Parliament or judges, respectively appointed by the President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate.
>
> The formation sitting to deal with public prosecutors comprises the President of the Republic, the Minister of Justice, five public prosecutors and one sitting judge, a *Conseiller* appointed by the Council of State and the three prominent figures mentioned in the above paragraph.
>
> In the formation sitting to deal with sitting judges, the *Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature* nominates sitting judges to be members of the *Cour de Cassation*, First Presidents of the Courts of Appeals and Presidents of the *Tribunaux de Grande Instance*. The other sitting judges are appointed subject to its approval via a decision which is binding on the Minister of Justice. The *Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature* acts as a disciplinary body for sitting judges. In this capacity, it is presided over by the first President of the *Cour de Cassation*.
>
> In the formation sitting to deal with public prosecutors, the *Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature* gives its opinion on the appointment of public prosecutors, with the exception of those members of the judiciary appointed by the Council of Ministers. It also gives its opinion on disciplinary measures to be taken against public prosecutors. In this capacity, it is presided over by the Public Prosecutor of the *Cour de Cassation*.

5. Source : *Conseil supérieur de la magistrature*. http://www.conseil-superieur-magistrature.fr/en/node/161. Accessed: 8 October 2008.

APPENDIX 7

Le style du Monde (2002) – Excerpts

Le style du Monde (2002) is a brochure conceived as a professional guide for the newspaper's journalists and as *Le Monde*'s presentation and "reading contract" for its audience. It contains two parts, each with a pagination starting at 1.

Part containing: "*déontologie, portrait d'un quotidien*, Le Monde *en images, la formule* "

«Une exigence particulière» – Jean-Marie Colombani, directeur du *Monde* (p.3)

> […]
> L'un des buts du *Livre de style du «Monde»* est justement de proposer une codification écrite de nos règles internes – règles morales, professionnelles, rédactionnelles –, et de les rendre publiques. Cet exercice de transparence, indispensable, vise à renforcer le contrat qui lie notre quotidien et ses lecteurs. Il s'inscrit dans le prolongement de l'institution d'un médiateur : en 1994, *Le Monde* a en effet installé pour la première fois dans la presse française cette figure d'arbitre, ayant en charge de veiller au respect par la rédaction de ses principes rédactionnels et de favoriser le dialogue avec les lecteurs. Personnalité indépendante, placée hors de la rédaction, le médiateur écrit dans les colonnes du quotidien sans aucune relecture préalable. Ses interventions ne peuvent faire l'objet d'aucune réplique de la rédaction ou de la direction du quotidien. Il rappelle donc, chronique après chronique, que les journalistes ont des comptes à rendre auprès de celles et ceux qui les lisent.
> […]

«*Le Monde* et ses principes» (pp.6–7)

A7.1 *Le Monde* et ses valeurs

> *Le Monde* est un quotidien indépendant qui n'obéit qu'à ses propres critères pour définir son traitement de l'information. La hiérarchie et le contenu de ses articles sont déterminés par la vision de l'actualité que proposent ses journalistes, en dehors de toute contrainte extérieure. Aux pressions politiques, économiques et autres dont il peut être l'objet, *Le Monde*, conformément à son histoire et à sa vocation, oppose une ferme résistance. Aucun texte ne saurait lui être imposé, aucune orientation ne saurait lui être dictée.

Le Monde est un quotidien pluraliste. […]
Le Monde défend les valeurs de liberté, d'égalité et de fraternité qu'affiche la devise de la République française. Il met au premier plan de ses engagements le combat pour la justice et la solidarité, le refus du racisme et de l'exclusion. Il choisit le parti de l'ouverture et de la coopération internationales contre celui du nationalisme et du repli.
Le Monde est, comme l'indique son titre, un quotidien international. […]

A7.2 *Le Monde* et l'information

La fonction première du *Monde* est d'informer. […]
[…]
L'information du *Monde* doit être honnête et équilibrée. Cela signifie en premier lieu qu'elle doit être scrupuleusement dissociée du commentaire: priorité doit être donnée à l'établissement des faits, aussi impartialement que possible, sur l'expression que suscitent ceux-ci. Cela signifie aussi qu'elle doit être rigoureusement vérifiée et soigneusement recoupée. […]

A7.3 *Le Monde* et le commentaire

Journal d'information, *Le Monde* est aussi un journal d'opinion. Loin d'être neutre, il a des engagements qui le conduisent à prendre position, dans les éditoriaux de son directeur ou dans l'éditorial non signé publié chaque jour mais aussi dans les analyses et les commentaires de ses journalistes, sur l'actualité quotidienne. Il a l'ambition d'être un lieu de discussion où s'affrontent des idées, où s'esquissent des hypothèses, où se cherchent des solutions dans une époque devenue plus obscure et moins lisible.
[…]

A7.4 *Le Monde* et ses lecteurs

[…]
Nommé par le directeur de la publication, un médiateur est chargé de favoriser le dialogue entre les lecteurs et la rédaction. Sa fonction est de faire connaître aux rédacteurs le jugement des lecteurs et d'expliquer aux lecteurs les choix des rédacteurs. Elle est aussi de rendre possible un débat public sur le travail de la rédaction. Le médiateur veille à l'application, par la rédaction, des règles journalistiques énoncées dans le livre de style. Ces règles définissent le contrat de lecture avec les lecteurs.

«Éditorial» (p.10)

> L'éditorial quotidien est rédigé par un journaliste de la rédaction. Il n'est pas signé. Il est relu par la direction de la rédaction et le directeur et peut être modifié pour des raisons de forme et de fond. Les éditoriaux du directeur de la publication sont initialés.

«Éditorial – 90 lignes journal» (p.59)

> L'éditorial exprime la position du *Monde* ou sa réaction à propos d'un évènement marquant. À sa manière concise, il n'hésite pas à porter «*la plume dans la plaie*». Cet article fait préalablement l'objet d'une discussion entre son auteur et la direction de la rédaction.
> Remarque : L'éditorial, non signé, peut être modifié par la direction du journal sans l'aval de son auteur.

Part containing: "l'abécédaire, les patronymes, les fiches pays, les sigles"

«Une discipline collective» – Edwy Plenel, directeur des rédactions du *Monde* (p.3)

> Quotidien international d'information générale, *Le Monde* a pour vocation la recherche dynamique, responsable et loyale de la vérité des faits dans tous les domaines de la vie publique. Il se refuse à mettre cette mission au service d'un quelconque intérêt particulier, qu'il soit celui de personnes privées ou d'autorités publiques. Il s'efforce d'être un journal indépendant de tous les pouvoirs, qu'ils soient économiques, politiques ou idéologiques. L'objet des pages qui suivent est de présenter le contrat de lecture par lequel *Le Monde* se propose d'être à la hauteur de cette ambition.
> […]
> Rendus public, ces règles et ces usages nous sont donc désormais opposables en cas d'oublis ou de manquements de notre part. Ce n'est que justice, tant leur respect est au cœur de la relation de confiance qu'un journal peut nouer avec ses lecteurs. Ce contrat oblige et requiert chacun de celles et ceux qui font *Le Monde*.

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